

The Yugoslav Wars' Implications on Romanian Security

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ABSTRACT

This paper perceives Romania as an integral part of the Balkan sub-regional security complex and attempts to evaluate the implications of its participation in Balkan affairs on its security. More precisely, the article discusses the effects that the Yugoslav (Croat-Serbian, Bosnian and Kosovar) wars had on Romanian security and presents Bucharest's endeavor to manage its insecurity. The research demonstrates that Romania envisaged the management of its insecurity by upholding its application for membership in Western security structures (NATO, WEU) rather than by institutionalizing Balkan cooperation. Considering that NATO and Yugoslavia were adversaries throughout the 1990s, the paper discusses Bucharest's dilemma of how best to show solidarity with the Atlantic Alliance without impairing its bilateral relations with Belgrade.

1. Introduction

During the twentieth century, several scholars have remarked on the peculiar geopolitical position of Romania, suggesting that the country has constantly played the role of "bridge" between the Balkans and Central Europe.¹ Romania's definition as the "junction" of these European sub-regions has historically dictated the non-contradictory terms of its participation in the developments of both sub-systems and provided that, on all accounts, Romania can be called simultaneously a Balkan and a Central European country.² The conceptualization of Romania as a member of two different regional sub-systems (a borderline state) means however that the country's security is interdependent upon developments in both sub-regions. Considering that Romania's perceptions of threat emanate from beyond both its southern and northern frontiers, it could

be suggested that any analysis of Bucharest's security agenda ought to deal concurrently with the country's Balkan and Central European dimensions.

Nevertheless, this article deals with the repercussions of Balkan instability on Romanian security rather than with Bucharest's aggregated security agenda. In other words, while the article extensively elaborates the effects of the Yugoslav crises on Romanian insecurity, it also makes brief reference to Romania's problems with its northern neighbors, to the extent that this reference is essential for understanding Bucharest's security strategy. Yet, whereas to "dichotomize" Romania's security is imperative for analytical purposes, in practice, this dichotomy proves neither complete, nor correspondent to a clearly observable division. Similarly, the methodological decision to dichotomize Romanian security does not constitute an additional evaluation: by no means would this paper suggest that Romania's Balkan-orientated problems are more salient than its problems with its northern neighbors. Indeed, the exact opposite can be claimed: most of Romania's contemporary security dilemmas emerge from its relationship with Hungary, Ukraine, Moldova and Russia. Altogether, by virtue of geographic, historic and political considerations, Romania is perceived as an integral part of the Balkan sub-regional security complex, and this research examines its participation in that complex. Hence, the security analysis explores the perceived threats stemming from Yugoslavia's disintegration and the course of the Bosnian and Kosovo wars and discusses Romania's endeavor to have its sense of insecurity diminished.

2. Romania's External Security Environment

Teodor Melescanu, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Romania from 1992 to 1996, on several occasions suggested that Bucharest's primary security concerns sprang from the country's geopolitical position; more precisely, from its location between the former USSR and former Yugoslavia, which have constituted Europe's main arches of crisis.³ Romania's concerns were related not only to the possibility of a local conflict escalating into a regional war in either arch of crisis, but also to the fact that the country could neither defend itself effectively from an external military threat nor count on the security guarantees of any great power or military alliance. The report of the Parliamentary Defense Commission on the State of the Armed Forces (July 1994) suggested the magnitude of the Romanian Army's inefficiency as it revealed, *inter alia*, that only 15% of the aircrafts could be equipped with anti-tank missiles, 45% of the aircrafts were more than 20 years old and 35% were between ten and 20 years old, half of the air-to-air missiles were obsolete, and the armed forces possessed neither modern air-to-surface missiles nor guided bombs.⁴

Besides, despite the fact that the disintegration of the Soviet Union entailed that Romania—for the first time in its recent history—shared no common borders with Russia, Bucharest continued to feel fearful of Moscow and its designs in the area. According to Romania, Russia's fierce opposition to

NATO's eastward enlargement and the presence of Russian troops in Transdniestria (800 km from the Russian border but only 100 km from the Romanian border⁵) indicated Moscow's intention to draw a sphere of influence *à nouveau* and, thus, weighed heavily in Bucharest's perception of a security threat. Afterwards, these fears could not but be reinforced by the uncertainty of Russian domestic politics (a struggle between "Westernizers" and "Eurasianists") and the persistence of the Dniester conflict, which was the pretext for Moscow's open meddling in Moldovan internal affairs. In order to comprehend the interface between Moldovan-Russian relations and Romanian-Russian relations, it suffices to recall not only that Moldova and Romania share strong cultural ties, but also that in the eyes of some Romanians, Moldova represents a second "Romanian" state that, in time, should unify with Romania.⁶

Moreover, for a great segment of the Romanian political elite, Bucharest was threatened by alleged Hungarian revisionism and the desire of Romania's ethnic Hungarians to secede. The perception of a Hungarian threat not only poisoned Bucharest-Budapest relations, but, within Romania, also hindered the peaceful co-existence of the Romanian majority with the Magyar minority.

Finally, Romania was concerned about the resolution of its low-intensity dispute with Ukraine over the ownership of Serpent Island (a small, rocky island surrounded by oil and gas deposits, located in the Black Sea near the mouth of the Danube) and the living conditions of the Romanian minority in Ukraine.⁷ Whereas these disputes with Ukraine were not securitized, they harmed Romania's international image and impeded Bucharest's attempts to ameliorate its domestic (economic and interethnic) problems through international arrangements.⁸

Romania's strategy for countering the external threats to its security centered on its candidacy for membership in the Atlantic Alliance. A consensus was created among all major Romanian political parties that the inclusion of Romania in NATO could help the country overcome its sense of insecurity because it would:

- (i) imply the acquisition of security guarantees from the most powerful military alliance in the current international system against any threat from either arch of crisis;
- (ii) avert the country's placement into a strategic "no man's land" between NATO and Russia in which Moscow would feel invited to reestablish its sphere of influence;⁹
- (iii) impel the restructuring and modernization of the Romanian army;
- (iv) ward off the aggravation of Romania's security dilemmas that could result from Hungary's entrance in the Atlantic Alliance without simultaneous Romanian participation and the subsequent increase of Hungary's military capabilities *vis-à-vis* Romania's;

- (v) contribute to the increase of international investment confidence in the country and, thus, to the reform of the economy;¹⁰ and
- (vi) signify the country's "return" to Europe, which would correspond to the Romanian people's self-perception and desire to be considered civilized, "good," advanced and equal to the Western nations.¹¹

In a nutshell, while regional instability (caused by the dissolution of Yugoslavia and the USSR) and the potential for resurgence of Russian imperialism comprised Romania's main security concerns, its integration into the Atlantic Alliance became the core of the country's security strategy. The discussion therefore continues by describing how the interplay of Romania's threat perceptions and security strategy is reflected on its security policy in the Balkans.

3. The Balkan Dimension of Romanian Security

During the 1990s, Romania was in the unique position of maintaining good relations with every Balkan state. With the exception of some minor environmental problems with Bulgaria (over the pollution in the Ruse-Giurgiu area,¹² the operation of the outdated Kozlodui nuclear power plant and the question of the placement of a second bridge over the Danube river,¹³ which were at no time securitized), Romania had no observable differences with any other Balkan state. Indeed, even in the case of Bucharest-Sofia relations, the existence of contentious issues did not impede the two countries from developing a close partnership. For not only did Bulgaria and Romania sign a Confidence Building Measures Agreement and a Basic Treaty of Good Neighborly Relations (in which Romania acknowledged the territorial status-quo, thus closing the chapter of South Dobrudja, a region that was ceded to Bulgaria after the Second World War¹⁴) but the two countries also cooperated closely for the advancement of their common aspiration towards Euro-Atlantic integration, the implementation of the UN embargo towards Yugoslavia and the reestablishment of the Balkan cooperation initiatives. In the Balkans, then, Romania's security concerns were not derived *per se* from its bilateral relations with the other members of the regional sub-system. Instead, Bucharest's Balkan security policy was preoccupied with the course and ramifications of the Yugoslav conflicts, the significance of Russian intervention in the sub-region and the impact of overall Balkan insecurity upon its application for membership in the Atlantic Alliance.

3.1 Repercussions of the Disintegration of Yugoslavia

In June 1991, Croatian and Slovenian declarations of independence led to the militarization of the Yugoslav crisis when the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) intervened to prevent the two republics from seceding. While the JNA's intervention in Slovenia was aborted 10 days after its inception, the Yugoslav forces' operations in Croatia evolved into an all-out war that lasted until the end

of that year. Despite the fact that the Croat-Serb war was fought far from Romania's border with Yugoslavia, the disintegration of Yugoslavia represented a major security concern for Romania because:

- (i) Croats and Serbs, seeking to blame others for their warfare, accused the Romanian *securitate* of fomenting violence and selling arms;¹⁵
- (ii) the JNA's increased mobilization and sizeable movements for the war's purposes generated unease in Bucharest and prompted Romania to reinforce its borders;¹⁶
- (iii) it was feared that Serb or Croat guerrilla units might seek sanctuary in Romania or try to resupply forces from Romanian territory;¹⁷
- (iv) the disintegration of Yugoslavia could have distressed the 1919–1920 Paris Peace Conference's territorial arrangements (by which, *inter alia*, Romania acquired Transylvania) and the overall post-war European security order that was founded on the Helsinki Final Act (1975) and more precisely, on the principles of the inviolability of borders (unless by peaceful means and with the consent of the involved parties) and of the territorial integrity of states;¹⁸
- (v) the escalation of the conflict could have triggered a mass exodus of refugees to Romania and, especially, to the Banat region that has been largely divided between Romania and Yugoslavia since the First World War;¹⁹ and
- (vi) a deterioration of the Hungarian minority's status in Yugoslavia (Vojvodina) could have influenced the course of interethnic relations in Romania. Notably, Bucharest feared that such a development could instigate either a mass influx of Hungarians from Vojvodina into Transylvania (and possibly destabilize the country's interethnic relations) or the internationalization of the "Hungarian question," referring to the living conditions and demands of the Magyar minorities adjacent to Hungary proper.²⁰

Under these circumstances, Bucharest's foreign policy aimed at encouraging the international community to preclude the dismemberment of Yugoslavia. When the latter proved inevitable, Romania became anxious about the Yugoslav conflict's potential to acquire regional dimensions and, thus, its policy aimed at containment and the peaceful resolution of the crisis. Afterwards, Romania was confronted with an intractable dilemma: namely, how best to express its solidarity with the West, with which it aspired to integrate, while maintaining its traditionally good relations with Serbia.²¹ This dilemma was further complicated by the Russian factor. Specifically, Romania feared that as long as Serbia remained internationally isolated, Belgrade would increasingly rely on Moscow, with which it shared strong cultural, political and historical ties.

For Romania, then, this eventuality represented the possibility of a Russian or Slavic “encirclement,” a constant Romanian fear that was little eased by the increasingly assertive role of Russia in the region (i.e. participation in the UN peacekeeping force in Bosnia, membership in the Contact Group) that it saw as an attempt to draw a sphere of influence in the Balkans.²² In this regard, Romania’s security interests lay in the pursuit of a policy that emphasized its partnership with the West—a *sine qua non* element in the country’s strategy for Euro-Atlantic integration—without, however, impairing its close relationship with Yugoslavia and, thus, contributing unintentionally to the exclusive reliance of Serbia on Russia.²³ All in all, Bucharest understood that its own efforts could in no way suffice to neutralize the security threats that the Yugoslav conflict generated. Romania’s policy, then, was principally supplementary to the existing international initiatives and aimed at the containment of the crisis, a demonstration of conformity with the West and the maintenance of amicable relations with Serbia. Thence, the country’s policy during the Bosnian war maintained the following features.

First of all, Romania adhered to the enforcement of the UN sanctions on Yugoslavia. In this way, Bucharest intended to enhance its chances for Euro-Atlantic integration at the same time that it helped stop the flow of arms and military equipment to the former Yugoslavia.²⁴ Consequently, despite the critical state of its economy, Romania sustained a huge economic cost that implied the loss of revenues of 7–8 billion US dollars. In particular, the observance by Bucharest of the UN embargo on Yugoslavia implied for the country *inter alia*:

- (i) a reduction of the activities of its Black Sea ports;
- (ii) the obstruction of the use of the Danube river, the strategic importance of which was inestimable for Romania as, with its linkage to the Rhine River, it represented the largest waterway in Europe;
- (iii) the stalling of regular economic life in Timișoara and the (Romanian) Banat region, whose development was connected to trade and commerce links with Hungary, Croatia, Serbia and Austria, and its substitution by the growth of substantial smuggling activities;
- (iv) the notable diminution of its energy production due to the closing of the Iron Gates plant (a joint Romanian-Yugoslavian venture);
- (v) a blow to several Romanian industries whose operation depended heavily on access to Western markets;²⁵ and
- (vi) the overall undermining of the government’s effort to realize political and economic reforms.

Romania did not want its abiding by the international sanctions regime to influence the course of its relations with Serbia or to cause the collapse of its own economy. Thus, Romania did not only advocate the easing of the sanctions

towards Serbia but also allowed for limited and veiled breaches in order to facilitate Serbia's economic survival²⁶ and to ease the effects of the sanctions on its own economy.

Besides, Bucharest was uncomfortable with what it perceived as a biased policy of the West against the Bosnian Serbs, who were forced to accept peace plans that corresponded neither to their interests nor to military reality.²⁷ Romania argued that the international community should recognize each party's responsibility in the conflict²⁸ and instead of imposing a pre-determined accord, create conditions that would facilitate the conclusion of an agreement based on the consent of the different parties. In other words, for Romania, the international community's involvement in the Yugoslav conflict should supplement the involved parties' endeavors rather than substitute them.²⁹ Accordingly, for the resolution of the conflict, Bucharest offered its "neutral" mediation to the warring parties³⁰ and Ion Illiescu, then Romania's president, traveled to Belgrade, Zagreb and Ljubljana in 1993 to become acquainted with his counterparts' positions and to induce them to explore a diplomatic solution.³¹

Moreover, Romania suggested that the containment of the crisis represented a shared responsibility among all of Yugoslavia's neighboring states and, consequently, that these states must abstain from any action that might cause the continuation or aggravation of the conflict.³² In that context, Bucharest firmly proclaimed its desire not to get involved in the conflict militarily and, accordingly, its disinclination to take part in any internationally established military operation.³³ Like Bulgaria and Greece, Romania refused to make its territory available for the transit of international military forces that would have intervened in Bosnia. Altogether, albeit pro-Serbian, Romania's position on the Yugoslav war reflected an essentially peaceful and responsible policy in the region.

3.2 The Bosnian Peace Process

The inauguration of the Dayton peace process was received by Bucharest with relief as it suggested that the country's security concerns emanating from the persistence of the Bosnian war would be eased, as would the consequences of enforcing the international sanctions against Yugoslavia. Besides, the end of the Bosnian conflict represented a "window of opportunity" for Romania to develop its relations with Yugoslavia unimpeded by its bid for Euro-Atlantic integration and the advancement of its role in the sub-regional political configurations. In particular, not only did Romania sign a Basic Treaty of Good Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation with Yugoslavia (17 May 1996) to reaffirm the strength of their bilateral relations,³⁴ but it also sought a sound role in the implementing the Bosnian peace process to underscore its ever-growing partnership with the West. For the latter, Bucharest contributed 200 troops (assigned to the mission of helping to reconstruct bridges and roads) to the composition of the Implementation Force (IFOR), made a military airfield at

Timișoara available for the needs of the international force, and allowed IFOR's transit to Bosnia.³⁵ Furthermore, when the pyramid crisis broke out in Albania, Romania followed the same line of action and sent a contingent of 400 troops to participate in the multinational force "Operation Alba."³⁶ Both of these international engagements meant to underscore the similarity of Romania's policy with that of its counterparts from the West and the security-generating nature of its participation in Balkan affairs.

The initiation of the Bosnian peace process allowed for the reestablishment of Balkan cooperation initiatives. Although Romania kept to its traditional policy of supporting the enhancement of regional cooperation in the Balkans, it no longer endorsed the institutionalization of this cooperation. Whereas earlier, Romania's active participation in the Balkans had meant to signify the independent character of its foreign policy—because no great power was a member of the sub-system, the country did not feel the pressure of such a power while taking part in Balkan affairs³⁷—a profound involvement by Bucharest in the regional developments would now entail a danger of separating the country from the West. In other words, Romania perceived that pursuing an ambitious process of institutionalized cooperation in the Balkans would risk isolating the country from Western Europe and preventing it from attaining its strategic objective of Euro-Atlantic integration.³⁸ Moreover, Bucharest feared the possibility that the furtherance of Balkan cooperation could take place at the expense of the development of other sub-regional cooperative schemes, such as the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the Central European Initiative (CEI) and the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA).³⁹ For Romania, the institutionalization of Balkan cooperation could have been detrimental to its national interests if it occurred in a manner competitive to other existing regional configurations that it deemed more important. To illustrate, at the Crete Summit of November 1997, Victor Ciorbea, then Romanian prime minister, expressed reservations toward a widely-supported proposal for the establishment of a secretariat in charge of Balkan economic cooperation because, as he noted, this cooperation was already possible through the existing structures of CEFTA and BSEC.⁴⁰ However, the Balkan cooperation process had different membership from CEFTA or BSEC and neither the focus nor the range of its projects would necessarily have overlapped with the activities of these institutions.

All the same, Bucharest appreciated that a certain degree of cooperation in the Balkans was indispensable for resolving interstate differences in the region and for preventing the outbreak of a regional conflict. This explains why Romania participated actively in the South Eastern European Summits, and suggested an increase in the regularity and frequency of these events (Thessaloniki Summit).⁴¹ What is more, at the Crete Summit Ciorbea proposed the creation in Bucharest of a NATO-coordinated South East European center for the prevention of crises.⁴² In this way, if Balkan cooperation were to have any institutional dimension, it would emphasize the prevention of regional conflicts

and would definitely be attached to NATO structures. However, since the conclusions of the Crete Summit concerned the intensification of Balkan cooperation *per se*, Romania declined to sign a joint decision and proposed instead the adoption of a short, non-compulsory declaration.⁴³

3.3 The Kosovo War

The Democratic Convention-led coalition government that was formed after the November 1996 elections was even more determined than its predecessor to achieve the country's swift integration into Western structures. Despite the fact that in July 1997 Romania was not among the countries that NATO invited to accede to its ranks, Bucharest nonetheless followed a policy of even greater cooperation and approximation with the West, as was manifested during the Kosovo war. In particular, while Romania felt threatened by the emergence of another war in Yugoslavia, Bucharest identified this conflict as a window of opportunity for the advancement of its candidacy for integration into Western structures. Romania believed that if it could not influence the course of the Kosovo war, it could at least transform it to its own advantage by adopting a stance that demonstrated its unequivocal partnership with the West and affirmed the country's geo-strategic importance for stabilizing the region. For Emil Constantinescu, Romanian president at the time, Romania no longer needed to balance its Western orientation with its close relationship with Yugoslavia in order to prevent a "Slavic encirclement." Instead, Constantinescu believed that his predecessor's balancing act between the Atlantic Alliance and Yugoslavia had harmed the country's bid for swift Euro-Atlantic integration, which represented the best warranty against "Slavic encirclement." Therefore, Romania espoused an overt pro-NATO stance during the Kosovo crisis that had the following main features:

- (i) endorsement of the Western mediation efforts and of NATO's military intervention in Yugoslavia;
- (ii) condemnation of Milošević's role in the outbreak of the crisis and the proposition of a sharp distinction between the Yugoslav authorities on the one hand, and the Yugoslav people on the other, for whom Bucharest expressed its affinity and sympathy;⁴⁴
- (iii) observation of the oil embargo that NATO and the EU imposed *à nouveau* on Yugoslavia;⁴⁵
- (iv) granting NATO unlimited access to Romanian airspace as well as use of Romanian airports for the implementation of the air strikes against Yugoslavia (in violation of the provisions of the Romanian-Yugoslav Basic Treaty);⁴⁶
- (v) an expressed willingness (the war had come to an end by the time Romania was ready to implement this policy) to host up to 6,000 refugees from Kosovo in temporary camps with the financial assistance of the international community;⁴⁷

- (vi) sustenance of huge economic losses, amounting to some 50 million US dollars per week, due to the war (for example, the bombing of bridges interrupted river traffic on the Danube);⁴⁸ and
- (vii) a commitment to deploy 250 troops in Kosovo during the post-war process of peace-building.⁴⁹

Altogether, although Romania did not participate directly in the NATO military operations against Yugoslavia (partly because it did not want to be entangled in a regional conflict and partly because neither would Romanian society have approved such an engagement, nor was the Romanian army in adequate shape) it went to greater lengths to pursue a policy of siding with the Atlantic Alliance than did some NATO member states such as Greece or Hungary.⁵⁰ In this way, Romania hoped to build a partnership with the West that would have immediate effects on Romanian security. Bucharest's position during the Kosovo war came at great cost to the governing coalition because it evoked the frustration of the majority of the Romanian people, who identified emotionally with the Serbian people. It led to a strengthening of the nationalist parties who opposed the war and to the deterioration of the country's relations with Yugoslavia. Consequently, considering that Romania's posture had no visible short-term effects on the course of NATO-Romanian relations, Constantinescu felt disappointed by what he called the West's "contradictory messages" and "disadvantageous" treatment of his country.⁵¹ Therefore, Romania's unconditional support to the Atlantic Alliance during the Kosovo War did not neutralize its immediate threat perceptions. While Romania succeeded in building a strong case for its entrance into NATO in the next round of enlargement, it would have to cope until then with the redefinition of its bilateral relations with Yugoslavia which its policies had brought into question.

4. Conclusions

To sum up, the threats to Romanian security that originated in the Balkans were not related to the country's bilateral relations with any single state of the sub-system. Instead, Romania's sense of insecurity had to do with the ramifications of the Yugoslav crises and the potential for the outbreak of a regional war. Romania opted to manage its insecurity by upholding its application for membership in the Western security structures (NATO, WEU) rather than by institutionalizing Balkan cooperation. Even though the country felt frustrated about being excluded from the first round of NATO enlargement, Bucharest maintained a policy of intensely approaching and seeking integration with the West. For this reason, Romania espoused the Atlantic Alliance's approach to the Kosovo war that implied a condemnation of Yugoslavia and thus the deterioration of Belgrade-Bucharest relations. Inasmuch as Romania did not bargain for providing assistance to NATO's military intervention, the country

acquired no concrete immediate benefits and its relations with Yugoslavia remained “chilled” as long as Milošević stayed in power.

¹ For a comprehensive review of scholarly works that deal with the geopolitical position of Romania see *inter alia* the books of Armand Lévy (1883), Joseph Partsch (1904), Albrecht Penck and Erwin Hanslik (1915), Otto Freiherr von Dungern (1916) and Ernest Lémonon (1931), cited in Melescanu, T., “Romania’s Option for the European and Atlantic Integration: The Significance of the Romanian-German Partnership,” *Südosteuropa* vol. 45, no. 11–12 (1996), pp. 773–780.

² *Ibid.*, pp. 777–779.

³ See *inter alia* Melescanu, T., “Romania: New Challenges,” *International Politics: A Balkan Review of Current Affairs* (Spring 1993); Melescanu, T., “The National Security of Romania—Priorities and Legitimate Concerns,” *Central European Issues* vol. 1, no. 1 (Autumn 1995), p. 26.

⁴ Lefebvre, S., “Changes in the Romanian Armed Forces,” *Jane’s Intelligence Review* vol. 7, no. 1 (January 1995), p. 10.

⁵ Melescanu, T., “The National Security of Romania.”

⁶ For an excellent analysis of Romanian-Moldovan relations see *inter alia* King, C., “Moldovan Identity and the Politics of Pan-Romanianism,” *Slavic Review* vol. 53, no. 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 345–368.

⁷ Baleanu, V. G., *Romania 1996: From Autocracy to Democracy* (Surrey: Conflict Studies Research Centre, October 1996), pp. 15, 29.

⁸ Nelson, D. N., “Insecurity after Communism and the Romanian Case,” *Mediterranean Quarterly* vol. 3, no. 1 (Winter 1992), p. 77.

⁹ Baleanu, *Romania 1996*, p. 20.

¹⁰ Gross, P. and Tismaneanu, V., “No NATO Shelter for Romania,” *Transitions* vol. 4, no. 7 (December 1997), p. 26.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 28.

¹² Baleanu, V. G., *Romania: Perspectives 1994* (Surrey, Conflict Studies Research Centre, June 1994), p. 8.

¹³ Bonnefous, M., “La Roumanie, Cousine Lointaine,” *Défense Nationale* vol. 52, no. 10 (October 1996), p. 116.

¹⁴ Baleanu, *Romania 1996*, p. 16.

¹⁵ Nelson, “Insecurity after Communism,” p. 65.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

¹⁷ *Ibid.*

¹⁸ Pascu, I., “Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict,” *International Security* vol. 3, no. 1 (Spring 1994), p. 156.

¹⁹ Ibid., p. 158.

²⁰ Ibid.

²¹ Watts, L., "Romania and the Balkan Imbroglio," in Danopoulos, C. P. and Messas, K. G. (eds), *Crises in the Balkans: Views from the Participants* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997), p. 233.

²² Baleanu, *Romania: Perspectives 1994*, pp. 8–9.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ Tudor, I., "Balkan Security Problems and Perspectives: A Romanian View," *Balkan Forum* vol. 1, no. 4 (September 1993), p. 70.

²⁵ Watts, "Romania and the Balkan Imbroglio," p. 232.

²⁶ Gallagher, T., "A Feeble Embrace: Romania's Engagement With Democracy, 1989–94," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* vol. 12, no. 2 (June 1996), p. 162.

²⁷ Ibid.

²⁸ Tudor, "Balkan Security Problems."

²⁹ Pascu, "Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict," pp. 159–160.

³⁰ Foreman, A., "Romania: The Ability to Surprise," *The World Today* vol. 48, no. 8–9 (August-September 1992), p. 160.

³¹ Pascu, "Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict," p. 160.

³² Tudor, "Balkan Security Problems," p. 71.

³³ Pascu, "Romania and the Yugoslav Conflict," p. 156.

³⁴ *Yugoslav Daily Survey*, 20 May 1996, accessed 21 May 1996 at: <http://www.yugoslavia.com/News/YDS.htm>.

³⁵ Beaver, P., "Romanian Engineers to Join Bosnia Peace Force," *Jane's Defence Weekly* vol. 25, no. 4 (24 January 1996), p. 11.

³⁶ *Albanian Telegraphic Agency*, 25 April 1997, accessed 26 April 1997 at: <http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/ata/>.

³⁷ Yiallouridis, Ch. and Alifantis, S., *Διεθνείς Σχέσεις στα Βαλκάνια [International Relations in the Balkans]* (Athens: Dania Publishers, 1987), p. 107.

³⁸ Fragonikolopoulos, Ch. "Ρουμανία: Πολιτική, Οικονομία και Σχέσεις με την Ελλάδα [Romania: Politics, Economy and Relations with Greece]," *Epetirida Amintikis kai Eksoterikis Politikis* (1998), p. 174.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ *RFE/RL Newslines* vol. 1, no. 152 (4 November 1997), accessed 5 November 1997 at: <http://www.rferl.org>.

⁴¹ Tsardanides, Ch., "Η Εξωτερική Πολιτική της Ρουμανίας [The Foreign Policy of Romania]," *Agora Horis Sinora* vol. 2, no. 4 (Spring 1997), accessed 20 January 2000 at: <http://idec.gr/iier/tsardanidis.htm>.

⁴² *Rador Press Agency*, 4 November 1997, accessed 5 November 1997 at: <http://indis.ici.ro/romania/news/rador.html>.

⁴³ Fragonikolopoulos, “Πουμάνια.”

⁴⁴ *Evenimentul Zilei (On Line's English Version)*, 27 March 1999, accessed 28 March 1999 at: <http://www.expres.ro/press/evzilei/english/Welcome.htm>.

⁴⁵ *Evenimentul Zilei (On Line's English Version)*, 24 and 29 April 1999, accessed 25 and 30 April 1999 at: <http://www.expres.ro/press/evzilei/english/Welcome.htm>.

⁴⁶ *Evenimentul Zilei (On Line's English Version)*, 21 and 22 April 1999, and 6 May 1999, accessed 22, 23 April 1999 and 07 May 1999 at: <http://www.expres.ro/press/evzilei/english/Welcome.htm>.

⁴⁷ *Evenimentul Zilei (On Line's English Version)*, 10 April 1999, accessed 11 April 1999 at: <http://www.expres.ro/press/evzilei/english/Welcome.htm>.

⁴⁸ Gallagher, T., “Romania, NATO and Kosovo: Right Instincts, Wrong Tactics?” *Foreign Policy Quarterly* vol. 3, no. 7–8 (Fall–Winter 1999/2000), accessed 12 July 2000 at: <http://sar.ong.ro/articole2.htm>; Ibid.

⁴⁹ *Evenimentul Zilei (On Line's English Version)*, 2 June 1999, accessed 3 June 1999 at: <http://www.expres.ro/press/evzilei/english/Welcome.htm>.

⁵⁰ Not only did Greece and Hungary refuse the participation of their forces in the alliance's military operations, but the Greek government also expressed on several occasions its clear opposition to NATO's military campaign. See *inter alia* Murphy, B. “Kosovo Crisis Has Balkans on Razor's Edge,” *Associated Press*, 13 April 1999, accessed 14 April 1999 at: http://www.boston.com/c/s.dll/new_passiton.cgi?story_url=/dailynews2/103/world/Kosovo_crisis_has_Balkans_on_r:.shtml.

⁵¹ *Evenimentul Zilei (On Line's English Version)*, 14 July 1999, accessed 15 July 1999 at: <http://www.expres.ro/press/evzilei/english/Welcome.htm>.