The Routledge Handbook
of Modern Turkey

Edited by Metin Heper and Sabri Sayarı

THE ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF MODERN TURKEY

In recent years, there has been growing interest in Turkey, stemming from the country's developing role in regional and global politics, its expanding economic strength, and its identity as a predominantly Muslim country with secular political institutions and democratic processes. This *Handbook* provides a comprehensive and wide-ranging profile of modern Turkey. Bringing together original contributions from leading scholars with a wide range of backgrounds, this important reference work gives a unique in-depth survey of Turkish affairs, past and present. Thematically organised sections cover:

- Turkish history from the early Ottoman period to the present
- Turkish culture
- Politics and international relations
- Social issues
- Geography
- The Turkish economy and geography

Presenting diverse and often competing views on all aspects of Turkish history, politics, society, culture, geography, and economics, this *Handbook* will be an essential reference tool for students and scholars of Middle East studies, comparative politics, and culture and society.

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INTRODUCTION

Sabri Sayarı

In recent years, there has been growing interest in Turkey's history, culture, politics, and economy. International media coverage of the country has increased significantly during the first decade of the twenty-first century in comparison to previous years. This interest stems largely from Turkey's heightened profile and enlarged role in regional and global politics, its expanding economic strength, and its identity as a predominantly Muslim country that seeks to balance its cultural roots and traditions with a commitment to secularist political institutions and democratic processes.

The changing political landscape of the Balkans, the Caucasus, and Central Asia following the disintegration of the former Soviet Union brought to the surface the ethnic and religious ties that the millions of ethnic Turks and/or Muslims who live in these regions have with Turkey. Many of these communities, particularly those in the Balkans and the Caucasus, viewed Turkey as a kindred state with the potential to act as their protector in the bloody ethno-religious conflicts that erupted in the post–Cold War era. Although their expectations proved to be largely unrealistic, they nevertheless underscored Turkey's expanding regional role and influence during the 1990s. This became even more evident a decade later when Turkey began to pursue an activist policy in the Middle East, to a degree that was unprecedented in its Republican history.

The changes that have taken place in the Turkish economy have similarly enhanced its importance in regional and global affairs. After years of sluggish growth rates marked by recurrent crises and high inflation, the Turkish economy displayed increased strength during the first decade of the twenty-first century despite the worsening worldwide economic conditions resulting from a global crisis. Turkey, which has the sixteenth-largest economy in the world, has proved relatively resilient to the global economic downturn, and is one of the fastest growing countries in the world.

Turkey's political experience has also drawn increasing attention in the wake of the "Arab Spring" and growing demands for political reforms in the Middle East and North Africa. Since it made the transition from authoritarian rule to democracy in the late 1940s, Turkey has maintained its commitment to multiparty politics with free and honest elections. Despite several regime breakdowns through military interventions, Turkey has made significant progress toward the consolidation of its democracy over the years. The Turkish case thus underscores the basic fallacy of the arguments concerning the incompatibility of Islam and democracy. More

importantly, recent political developments in Turkey have shown that the integration of pro-Islamist parties into the political process through democracy can lead them to moderate their ideological orientations and political strategies. The fact that a political party that has an Islamist pedigree but has also chosen to moderate its ideological orientation has governed Turkey with comfortable parliamentary majorities after winning three general elections since 2002 provides an important example in this respect.

The increasing attention that Turkey has received in recent years has been accompanied by a notable growth of academic scholarship in the various sub-disciplines of Turkish studies. Judging by the quantity and quality of the books and journal articles published on Turkey's history, politics, culture, and economy, clear progress has taken place in terms of the expansion of scholarly analysis, knowledge, and understanding in these subjects. In the United States, the field of Turkish studies has flourished over the past decades, and Ottoman history has become "the largest single subfield in the larger field of Middle East history" (Quataert and Sayarı, 2002: viii). Although interest in Turkish studies in Western Europe has lagged behind that in the United States, the field has begun to receive increasing scholarly attention in universities and research centers there as well.

However, the major impetus for the remarkable growth of research on Turkey in the social sciences and humanities has come from the large increase in the number of scholars working in Turkish universities. Since the 1980s, the number of public and private institutions of higher learning in the country has risen rapidly. The number of public universities increased from 28 to 103 between 1980 and 2010; the number of private universities climbed from one in 1984 to 62 in 2010. As new universities have proliferated on the national scene, the demand for faculty members in all fields of learning has registered a sharp rise. In turn, this has led to a quantitative and qualitative increase in scholarly research and publications. The support that the state has provided for research, the growing competition among the country's prestigious universities, and the requirements concerning scholarly publications in international academic journals for promotion in the academic ranks have all contributed to the production of a significant body of literature on Turkey's history, culture, politics, social life, and economy.

The main objective of this Handbook is to serve as a major reference work that provides an overview of a subject area based on the findings of the latest research. The Handbook is not an encyclopedia or a collection of essays on a broadly defined topic. Rather, this volume includes reliable and concise surveys of various important topics in the study of modern Turkey. All of our contributors had to work with a 5,500-word limit for their essays—providing them with a task that was near impossible given the scope and complexity of the topics about which they wrote. Nevertheless, they have succeeded in providing comprehensive summaries of the main findings of state-of-the-art scholarship in their respective fields.

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PART I
History

1

EARLY OTTOMAN PERIOD

Heath W. Lowry

We know virtually nothing about the origins of the Ottomans and little more about the first two centuries of their history. Even at this writing, what has long been accepted as fact is being eroded bit by bit as an ever-increasing number of studies challenging its traditional underpinnings appear. The earliest recorded reference to the founder of what was to become the mighty Ottoman Empire is a laconic reference in a contemporary Byzantine chronicle to a certain "Othman" fighting a skirmish with a Byzantine force near present-day Yalova on 27 July 1302 (İnalcık, 1993, 2010: 49–56).

This much is known: the Ottomans emerged out of obscurity in the last quarter of the thirteenth century in the region of northwest Anatolia known as Bithynia. They did so at a time when the region had been deserted by its Byzantine rulers, who, following the withdrawal of the Fourth Crusaders from Constantinople in 1261, had returned to the city after a 60-year hiatus during which time their capital had been temporarily relocated to the Bithynian town of Nicaea (İznik). It appears that Osman (1302–24) and his followers lost little time in filling the vacuum created by their departure (Finkel, 2005: 2–6).

By the early 1330s they had taken the Byzantine towns of Prusa/Bursa (1326) (Lowry, 2003a), Nicaea/İznik (1331) (Lowry, 2003c: 135–74; İnalcık, 2003: 59–85), and Nicomedia/İznikmid aka İzmid (1338), and by the early 1350s, first as a mercenary force supporting various claimants to the Byzantine throne and then acting on their own, the followers of Osman's son and successor, Orhan Gazi (1324–59), had crossed into southeastern Europe. By the end of the century they had conquered much of the Balkans, thereby leaving Constantinople, the capital of the Byzantine Empire, an isolated Christian island lying in the middle of an otherwise Ottoman Muslim lake.

Orhan's son and successor, Murad Hüdavendigâr (1362–89), continued in his father's footsteps, and by the end of his reign the Ottoman banner flew over most of the Balkans (Lowry, 2008). By the mid-1400s the Ottomans had taken the city of Constantinople, together with the last Anatolian Byzantine outpost of Trabzon (Trebizond) (Lowry, 2009c), and their state stretched westward from Asia Minor in the east to the shores of the Adriatic Sea in the west. Present-day Greece and Bulgaria, the former Yugoslavia, and Albania had been rolled over by this juggernaut-like entity.

Still, most of Anatolia (present-day Turkey) was not yet under Ottoman control. It was governed as a patchwork of Turkish principalities, whose rulers vied with one another, and the

Ottomans, for power. Throughout this period, the Ottomans' primary focus was directed not toward their Muslim neighbors in Anatolia, but rather against the Christian regions of south-eastern Europe. From the moment they first crossed the straits of the Dardanelles and entered the Balkans their drive was westward.

The first real exception to this trend occurred at the end of the fourteenth century, when the fourth Ottoman ruler, Yıldırım Bayezid (1389–1402), attempted (while continuing to conquer in the west), to extend his hegemony over the patchwork of Turcoman principalities in Asia Minor. This premature effort came to an untimely end when the Central Asian conqueror Tamerlane (Timürlenk), moved west and put a decisive end to Bayezid's ambitions at the Battle of Ankara in 1402. It would be another century before an Ottoman ruler would again attempt to shift the state's primary focus from the Christian West to the Muslim East.

It is therefore no exaggeration to say that the Ottoman state came of age in the Balkans, where it shared virtually nothing with the indigenous peoples: neither common languages, religions, histories, nor cultures. Correspondingly, if we are to begin to understand the manner in which the tiny Bithynian principality was transformed into the mighty Ottoman Empire, our starting point must be the Balkans. It was there that the state's institutions were forged, and it is against this background that we must seek to retrace the real Ottoman "origins," i.e., within a geographical and cultural milieu in which the Muslims themselves were a distinct minority.

To facilitate their hold on newly conquered territories, they incorporated large numbers of the preexisting Christian feudal petty nobilities into their military, and made them members of their own ruling class. While within a generation or two these Christian Ottomans (or their descendants) had accepted the religion of the ruling dynasty, this had not been a quid pro quo for their initial acceptance. Rather, they had been granted *timar*s (usufruct of some source of state revenue) in return for providing annual military service and serving as local administrators in the same territories they and their families had ruled for centuries. As *timariot*s (fiefholders), these Christians are virtually indistinguishable in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries from other members of the emerging Ottoman elite (İnalcık, 1954a, 1954b; Lowry, 2008).

When the numbers of Balkan aristocrats were no longer sufficient to fulfill the ever-expanding administrative needs of the state (within one or two generations virtually all of these Christian *timariot*s and their descendants had opted for the religion of the ruler), the Ottomans introduced the periodic levy (*devşirme*) of Christian boys, who were taken into Ottoman service, converted to Islam, taught Turkish, and then sent back to the very places from which they originated to serve as fortress Janissaries (Lowry, 2008). They, like the Byzantine and Serbian aristocrats before them, were rewarded for their service with *timar*s. These newly created Ottomans, not unlike the Christian aristocrats in earlier times, also had the advantage of sharing the language and culture of the local peoples in the regions in which they served (Lowry, 2002, 2008).

From the outset the tiny Ottoman principality was one in which what counted most was not ethnicity, religion, or culture; rather, it was an entity in which (regardless of one's background) the ability to contribute to the overall fruits of conquest, that is, the attainment of plunder, booty, and slaves, determined one's position. Christians, converts and native-born Muslims all came together in pursuit of these shared goals. This reality was given voice as early as the 1340s by the Byzantine chronicler Nicephorus Gregoras, who wrote: "Therein all the Bithynians came together, all the barbarians who were of his [Orhan's] race, and all the *mixobarbaroi* [offspring of mixed Greek and Turkish unions], and in addition all those of our race [Byzantines] whom fate had forced to serve the barbarians" (Lowry, 2003b: 94).

The idea that the early Ottomans were a confederacy of Muslims set on spreading Islam by the sword to the Christian West, while long popular, is today no longer a viable assessment of

early Ottoman history. While religious sentiments may well have served to mobilize the itinerant mendicant dervishes who played a key manpower role in the initial conquests, it is impossible to equate the desire to spread Islam in the Christian West with a system which from the outset so willingly assimilated unconverted Christians into its administrative ranks. If we want to uncover the actual causes of Ottoman growth and success, we must do so on the ground, that is, by following the path of their conquests in the Balkans (Lowry, 2003b: 2–64).

This task is made difficult by virtue of the fact that in the first two centuries of their existence the Ottomans had little concern for recording their deeds. Indeed, it was only in the second half of the fifteenth century that they began to take an active interest in setting down their own history. Prior to that time they had been too busy making it to pay much attention to writing it. The resultant historiography is far more a reflection of what they had become by the end of the fifteenth century than it is an accurate rendering of their origins and rise to power.

Until recently, virtually all studies of the early Ottomans have relied primarily on these later chronicle accounts, most of which were compiled at least two centuries after the events they purport to relate. Only in recent years has scholarship begun to focus on what survives from the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, in an attempt to weigh its testimony against the version of events preserved in the chronicle tradition (Lowry, 2008, 2009a, 2009b; Lowry and Erünsal, 2010).

For the historian desirous of unraveling the story of the rise of the Ottomans, every scrap of evidence must be gleaned. Scattered references in the historiography of the neighboring states with whom they were in conflict, the occasional travel account, and, most importantly, the surprisingly large footprint in the form of architectural remains scattered throughout western Anatolia and the Balkans, dateable to a time prior to the point at which the Ottoman chronicle tradition began, must all be utilized (Lowry, 2008, 2009a, 2009b).

In addition, there is a small but important body of administrative records compiled in the fifteenth-century Balkans, the *tahrir defter*s (tax registers), which provide a detailed listing of all sources of revenue and, up until the sixteenth century, the manner in which their proceeds were distributed to those in service of the state. Only by the careful winnowing of these materials (supplemented by the far larger body of sixteenth-century registers) may we begin to uncover a more accurate view of the manner by which the Ottomans, in the century between 1350 and 1450, brought an end not only to Byzantium and the Serbian empire of Stefan Dušan, but so firmly ensconced themselves in the overwhelmingly Christian Balkans that half a millennium would pass before they were to be dislodged (İnalcık, 1954a, 1954b; Lowry, 2008).

One of the first Ottoman creation myths of which we must disabuse ourselves is the narrative recorded in the later chronicle tradition, which accords all conquest to the Ottoman rulers themselves. In its place a more nuanced narrative is called for: one which, while recognizing the House of Osman as the *primus inter pares* (first among equals), comes to terms with the fact that the actual conquest of the Balkans was largely the project of a group of march lords (*uc bey*s), who from the moment of the Ottoman entry into southeastern Europe, step by step planted the Ottoman banner in their wake. Men such as Hâcı/Gâzi Evrenos and his descendants (Lowry, 2008, 2010; Lowry and Erünsal, 2010), the Evrenosoğulları; the family of Mihal, the Mihaloğulları (Kiprovska, 2008); the family of İshak, the İshakbeyoğulları of Üsküp (Šabanović, 1960, 1964); and, later, the Turahanoğulları (Kiel, 1996) and the Malkoçoğulları (Babinger, 1940), were the engines that drove the Ottoman war machine westward.

By tracing the remains of the built environments created by these march lords, it becomes possible for us to recreate significant aspects of the methods they developed to facilitate the smooth incorporation of the newly conquered lands (Lowry, 2008). Their efforts in this regard were assisted by their willingness to find a niche for local practices, customs, and administrative tools within their own evolving institutional framework.

Even before a region was conquered, its rulers were offered the chance to accept Ottoman suzerainty, in return for guarantees that upon so doing they would at least temporarily remain in control of their territories. The quid pro quo for accepting the proffered "carrot" was the obligation to pay an annual tribute and to supply a stipulated number of troops to the Ottoman war machine. This process was meticulously detailed almost 60 years ago by the doyen of twentieth-century Ottomanists, Halil İnalcık, in his seminal article, "Ottoman Methods of Conquest." In this study he traced the three-stage process of: a) establishment of indirect rule; b) followed within 20–30 years by the imposition of direct rule, i.e., conquest; and, c) then the immediate implementation of a fairly sophisticated system of taxation, details of which were recorded in tax registers drawn up in the aftermath of the final conquest (İnalcık, 1954a, 1954b).

Key to a more nuanced understanding of the actual history of Ottoman growth is the realization that from the mid-fourteenth century onward the Ottoman polity was fully cognizant that the long-term benefits of conquest, typified by a regularized form of taxation and the profits provided by a secure commercial network, were far more advantageous than the short-term financial gains afforded by booty and slaves. While the promise of slaves and booty was an essential element in attracting warriors (many if not most of whom in the opening century were dervishes) to its banner, from the beginning effective steps were undertaken to regularize the long-term fruits of conquest.

While at first glance this may seem paradoxical—that is, a system that held out the promise of slaves and booty for those who joined the endeavor simultaneously being one that, as soon as the initial conquest of a region was realized, set about restoring a regularized system of governance— this was in fact *the* secret of Ottoman success. Their awareness, shaped no doubt by the advice of the numerous representatives of both Islamic (read: Seljuks and the various Turkmen principalities of Asia Minor) and Christian (read: Byzantine, Bulgarian, and Serbian) states who, from the outset, had joined their ranks, that the long-term benefits of conquest were dependent upon the support of the conquered and also the quick restoration of normalcy, both of which were included under the rubric of the *Pax Ottomanica*, was a feature not generally seen in the experience of semi-nomadic and/or nomadic empires that had preceded them. To achieve this goal, the Ottoman rulers in Anatolia, and their march lords in the Balkans, quickly embarked upon a process of establishing a series of institutions designed to forge a new polity in the conquered regions.

None of these was more important than that known as the *zâviye-imâret*, or dervish lodge-cum-soup kitchen. This institution, together with an ever-growing network of *han*s (covered market halls) and *kervansaray*s (inns with large courtyards), soon came to mark the urban landscape throughout both western Anatolia and the Ottoman Balkans. While over time it was the minarets (*minare*s) piercing the sky that came to symbolize the Ottoman presence, it was, in fact, the built environment of dervish lodges, soup kitchens, *han*s and *kervansaray*s that provided the glue that initially served to unite the Balkans.

While charity is an integral element in all Muslim societies, the institution of the soup kitchen, as it developed in its Balkan milieu, was uniquely Ottoman in conception and implementation. For, at a time when the Balkan population was overwhelmingly Christian, its march lord conquerors and other high administrators endowed a broad network of these facilities designed to meet the needs of their own forces (*akıncı* and *guzat*) (Šabanović, 1951), travelers, merchants, wandering mendicants, and the poor. By the beginning of the sixteenth century there was a network of no fewer than 75 *imâret*s (soup kitchens) stretching across what today is northern and central Greece alone. As noted frequently by the seventeenth-century professional Ottoman traveler, Evliya Çelebi, from the outset the services of the Balkan *imâret*s

were open to one and all: in his words, even to "unbelievers (Christians), Jews, Gypsies and fire worshippers" (Çelebi, 2003: 27, 34, 73, 80, 103, 288). His account is confirmed by numerous European travelers and merchants, who waxed eloquent on the free food and lodging they were accorded in the course of their travels (Lowry, 2008: 237).

In the second half of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, it is virtually impossible to distinguish between the *zaviye*s (dervish lodges) endowed on behalf of the dervish *şeyh*s and their followers, and the *imâret*s (soup kitchens) where they, together with the indigenous poor, were fed. Indeed, contemporary documents that refer to them often use the two terms interchangeably (Eyice, 1962; Lowry, 2007b). This "availability" of the services they provided to one and all stands in stark contrast to the practices seen in the older Islamic states of the Middle East, where (as in Christian Europe) charity was something to be bestowed on one's coreligionists.

Indeed, it is no exaggeration to state that the most visible aspect of the Ottoman presence on the ground in this period was the network of *zaviye-imâret*s, which stretched from end to end of the Balkans. Nor does it strain credulity to suggest that it was within their confines and under the influence of their hospitality that the wandering Muslim mendicants shared their heterodox and latitudinarian version of Islam with the Christian poor. As the Turkish scholar Ömer Lutfi Barkan pointed out over half a century ago, these dervishes, in addition to the not insignificant role they performed in the military, were, when not on campaign, performing double duty as the "missionaries" who introduced Islam to the Balkans (Barkan, 1942). Given their own disregard for the niceties of orthodox practice, shunning as they did ritual prayer, fasting, and the prohibition against the consumption of alcohol, coupled with their willingness even to incorporate Christian saints into their own pantheon, the version of Islam they espoused must have seemed particularly attractive to the poorest Christians, those for whom even the moderate taxes demanded by the rulers may well have provided an economic incentive to convert.

By the same token the Christian peasants and townsmen they came into contact with may be viewed as having possessed only a nominal attachment, and minimal exposure, to the niceties of Christian theology, a fact which must have made it easy for many of them to accept the heterodox version of Islam espoused by their dervish interlocutors.

A second key aspect of the establishment of the Ottoman presence on the ground was the manner in which, rather than simply moving into the walled cities that they took by surrender or trickery (they still possessed neither artillery nor experience in siege warfare), the Muslim conquerors immediately set about creating completely new built environments outside the walls of their newly acquired urban centers. This policy—first apparent in the aftermath of the conquest of Bursa in 1326, where indeed, virtually all the surviving fourteenth-century Ottoman monuments are located outside the fortifications, e.g., a) Orhan's *zaviye* complex, from which only the T-shaped "mosque" has survived to the present, located below the walls in the modern commercial city centre; b) the Hüdavendigâr complex of Murad I to the west in Çekirge; c) the Yıldırım complex of Bayezid I to the east; d) the central market area (the Emir Han and Bedestan); and, e) the Ulu Câmii (Friday Mosque), which lay to the north of the walled city—was likewise implemented in the Balkans in the second half of the century.

By examining the immediate post-conquest history of western Thracian and Macedonian towns such as Dimetoka (Didymoticheon), Gümülcine (Komitini), Dırama (Drama), Siroz (Serres), and Selânik (Thessaloniki), all of which surrendered to the forces of Hâcı/Gâzi Evrenos between the years 1360 and 1400, we may trace the manner in which their residents were confirmed in the possession of their homes (within the medieval walled enclosures) and ownership of their churches, as well as the way in which the conquerors immediately set about

creating a totally new built environment some distance outside and below the existing walled settlements.

In these newly conquered towns, a large *câmi* (mosque), together with a *hammâm* (bathhouse), a new water supply in the form of a *su yolu* or *su kemer* (aqueduct), an *imâret*, *han* (large commercial building), *kervansaray* (secure site for merchants and their caravans), and often a *bezzâazistan/bedestan* (covered market hall), were built. The initial mosques were often constructed by the sultans themselves (Yıldırım Bayezid in Dimetoka and Drama), or their march lords (Evrenos in Gümülcine) and commanders (Çandarlı Halil Paşa in Siroz), and quickly became the centerpieces around which the new Ottoman towns were to grow (Lowry, 2008, 2009a).

The rationale behind this policy may well have been to prevent the small groups of Muslim settlers who followed the Ottoman army westward into the Balkans from being submerged in what were overwhelmingly Christian urban centers. Instead, they chose to create their own new built environments (with a mosque as the centerpiece) apart from the Christian areas. This meant that such structures would become the nucleus around which the later Muslim émigrés would settle and, in turn, the hub of the new Ottoman settlement. Indeed, 700 years earlier, the Arab conquerors of Syria had adopted a similar strategy of confirming local Christians' ownership of their homes and churches in walled cities such as Damascus and creating a new built environment for the Muslim community outside the fortifications.

This policy, which worked well in the relatively small towns and cities of western Thrace and eastern Macedonia, which were conquered in the second half of the fourteenth century, was not followed in the case of large walled Byzantine seaport emporia—cities such as Thessaloniki (Selânik, taken in 1430), Constantinople (Istanbul, taken in 1453), or Trebizond (Trabzon, taken in 1461), all of which fell in the mid-fifteenth century. In these seaports, each of which was located on the frontier, and each of which was taken by conquest rather than by surrender, the walled settlements were large, and one of the Christian sanctuaries which lay within their confines was quickly transformed into the new Muslim city's first Friday mosque to meet the needs of its new Muslim arrivals, who for purposes of security also settled primarily within the walls. Stated differently, these cities' locations meant that they were subject to enemy attack, and therefore their preexisting fortifications, rather than being destroyed, were maintained and garrisoned, and the new Muslim arrivals settled within the protection afforded by their walls, thereby replacing many of the older inhabitants of whose religious sanctuaries they likewise took possession.

In these instances, rather than a new built environment growing up beyond the walls (as had been the case in the fourteenth century), the Muslim arrivals appropriated not only the religious sanctuaries of the conquered, but indeed, in so doing, displaced many of the members of their congregations as well. As might be expected, the new Muslim inhabitants tended to congregate in the immediate vicinity of their mosques (Lowry, 2009b: 27–57).

This pattern forces us to reevaluate much of what has long been the accepted wisdom vis-à-vis the nature of the early Ottoman penetration into southeast Europe. First and foremost, we must acknowledge the likelihood that there were not many civilian Muslim settlers flocking to the newly conquered urban centers. Rather than steady waves of immigrants, the first decades of Ottoman control witnessed relatively little settlement and consequently a great deal of continuity on the part of the indigenous inhabitants. This interpretation is fully supported by the testimony of the 67 surviving Balkan fifteenth-century Ottoman *tahrir defter*s, which establish that even a century after its incorporation, most of the region (the major exception being upper Thrace, which, ravaged by close to two centuries of war, was largely depopulated when conquered by the Ottomans, and the topography of which was particularly suitable for the

semi-nomadic Yürük tribesmen who settled there in the late fifteenth and sixteenth centuries) still had relatively few Muslim inhabitants.

Second, by generally allowing the native Christian populations to maintain control of their religious sanctuaries, the Ottoman conquerors may well have been following the policy of *isti-mâlet* ("accommodation" or "good treatment"), a practice that was first described by Halil İnalcık, and one which may well hearken back to the days when Islam first emerged from the Arabian Peninsula into Byzantine Syria and Egypt (İnalcık, 1991: 409; Lowry, 2002: 1–4). One of the earliest references to this Ottoman policy is that found in the anonymous late fifteenth-century chronicle published by Friedrich Giese, where it is described in the following passage: "Ondan Murad Gazi ol hisarun kafiriyle 'ahdleşub 'avretleriyle ogul kızlarıyla istimâlet verub geri yerlerine gonderdiler" [After that Murad Gazi made a truce with the unbelievers of that fortress, blanketing their women, sons and daughters under "accommodation"/"goodwill" they were reestablished in their places] (Giese, 1922: 25).

This passage refers to the aftermath of the 1367–68 (İnalcık, 2006) conquest by the third Ottoman ruler, Murad Hüdavendigâr, of the Thracian fortress of Polunya (Byzantine: Sozopolis or Apolonya; Ottoman: Tañrı Yıkdığı), news of which was brought to the ruler as he sat in the shade of a giant plane tree (Ottoman: Devletlü Kaba/Devletlü Kavak Ağac, modern site of the village of Devletliağaç) (Liakopoulos, 2002: 80–81), i.e., it refers to the same time frame and identical geographical region we are discussing. Based on what we have seen, it could equally be a description of what occurred in the nearby towns of Dimetoka, Gümülcine, Drama, and Siroz, the inhabitants of each of which seem to have experienced similar treatment following their incorporation into the Ottoman polity.

İstimâlet should be viewed as the "carrot" side of the Ottomans' "carrot and stick" approach. When it was accepted by those to whom it was proffered, the pledges that had accompanied it were kept. Had this not been the case, no one would have surrendered. By the same token, when rejected, the "stick" was sure to follow. A good example in the same geographical area and time frame discussed in this chapter was the conquest of the Byzantine fortress of Brysis (Ottoman: Pınarhisar). When it fell, after refusing to surrender, to Murad Hüdavendigâr's forces in 1369, its garrison was taken captive and those who resisted were executed to the man (Parmaksızoğlu, 1974: 136).

İstimâlet should also be seen as part and parcel of a well-designed policy of conquest, one that clearly was at least partially needs driven (as had been that adopted by the Arab conquerors of Syria and Egypt 800 years earlier), i.e., a reflection of the fact that with each conquest, the Ottomans were incorporating ever-expanding Christian populations with whom they shared neither a common religion, culture nor language. They were seemingly aware of the fact that if these newly conquered territories were going to be fiscally exploited in an effective manner, they would need the cooperation of the inhabitants. It was this fact that led to the policy of "accommodation." As part of their desire to create an atmosphere of "goodwill," they may have decided that confirmation of the local Christians in ownership of their homes and religious sanctuaries was an effective method for obtaining their cooperation. While this may partially account for the fact that churches were not converted to mosques in the towns of western Thrace and eastern Macedonia, it does not explain the construction of large mosques in what at the time must have been the empty suburbs of the newly conquered towns/cities before they had any significant Muslim populations. This must be interpreted as a sign of the manner in which the Ottomans viewed their conquests, i.e., as permanent. Both the physical location (outside the security afforded by the preexisting walls), and the very presence of these mosques was a living, indeed visual, reminder to their Christian subjects: "Oh, by the way, we're here to stay."

The major fault line in Ottoman history has long been held to have been the fall of Constantinople (Istanbul) on 29 May 1453. While such a view may be justified from the perspective of Western European historiography, the same is not the case when looked at from the Ottoman side of the ledger. While an important symbol (due to the numerous unsuccessful Muslim attempts at conquering it, which dated all the way back to the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammed), it had stood as a virtual tiny island in an Ottoman lake for most of the previous century. Many of its rulers in that period were little more than Ottoman vassals, paying an ever-increasing annual tribute and even serving in the Ottoman armies. While its fall gave its conqueror, the 21-year-old Sultan Mehmed II (1451–81), enormous prestige throughout the Islamic world—and, indeed, he spent the next 25 years of his reign turning its ruined shell into a fitting capital for his empire—it marked no major changes when viewed from an Ottoman perspective.

Rather, the key fault line in Ottoman history must be seen as having been 1516–17, when the Ottomans turned their backs on what had theretofore been their relentless westward drive and began an equally relentless push against their Muslim neighbors in the east. Within a span of less than two years, Sultan Selim I (1512–20) had driven the emerging Safavid state back into central Persia, the Mamluk dynasties of Syria and Egypt had been defeated, and the three holy cities of Islam (Jerusalem, Mecca, and Medina), were now integral parts of the Ottoman polity. More importantly, with the subsumption of the older Islamic states, the demographic profile of the Ottoman state was inalterably changed. What theretofore had been an empire ruled by a Muslim dynasty but composed primarily of Christians was now transformed into one whose inhabitants were more or less equally divided between adherents of Jesus Christ and those of the Prophet Muhammed.

With this action the Ottoman pendulum had swung from west to east, and the resulting changes were enormous. This shift in focus meant that from the opening decades of the sixteenth century onward, there was a kind of tripartite division in the Ottoman state. The "West" of the Balkans and the "East" of the Arab lands were linked by the fulcrum of the Anatolian heartland. Thereafter, the institutions of the state, which heretofore had been influenced, indeed shaped, by their having been developed in the overwhelmingly Christian milieu of the Balkans, were increasingly reshaped in keeping with practices that had developed in the preceding millennium in the Islamic world. Indeed, a kind of fight for the heart and soul of the Ottoman state was waged. In this battle the pendulum centered in the Anatolian heartland increasingly swung toward the East.

This shift was caused by a variety of factors. For the first time, the Ottomans were faced with a powerful Islamic dynasty, that of Shii Safavid Iran, a state whose latitudinarian practices found willing adherents among the largely heterodox Kızılbaş (Alevi) Turkoman inhabitants of Anatolia, i.e., among the very people who had brought the Ottomans to power, but were now increasingly alienated from the centralizing tendencies of the state. To counter this threat, Sultan Yavuz Selim first employed mass killing in an attempt to ensure that his army's move against the Safavid Şah İsmail would not be threatened from the rear. Only then did he move south against Mamluk Syria and Egypt.

By 1517 the Ottomans were in control of what for centuries had been the heartlands of the Sunni Muslim world. Not only did they rule the ancient capitals of the Umayyids, Abbasids, and Seljuks; they also were in possession of the holy cities of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem. From that vantage point, it was an easy step to begin viewing themselves as the rightful rulers of the orthodox Islamic world polity.

Correspondingly, the pendulum swung to the East. A key part of that shift was in the direction of orthodoxy. Heterodox practices that had developed in light of what up to that

point in time had been the overwhelmingly majority Christian population of the Balkans were not in keeping with those the Ottomans encountered in the Islamic heartlands. Throughout the previous centuries, earlier Islamic dynasties in the East had developed complex formulae for administering Christian subjects. These might be summed up as: separate and not quite equal. Complete with restrictions running the gamut from dress codes to the type of animal one could ride, they were a long way from the practices theretofore seen in the Ottoman "West." Slowly, these practices now began to move westward. The result was the beginning of a new chapter in the long history of the Ottoman Empire.

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2

MODERN OTTOMAN PERIOD

M. Şükrü Hanioğlu

Reconstructing the empire: the end of the premodern state, 1789–1839

In the turbulent year 1789, the "Grand Turk" at the Topkapı Palace could still see himself as the ruler of a vast empire straddling three continents, stretching from Bosnia to the Caucasus and from Eritrea to the Persian Gulf. By the time the Young Turks had executed their revolution and reinstated a constitutional regime, however, the empire had shrunk considerably. Yet despite its receding borders, the Ottoman state still remained as a transcontinental polyethnic polity thanks to several major transformations that took place between 1789 and 1908.

While in the waning years of the eighteenth century the Ottoman sultan proudly considered himself the august sovereign of numerous peoples in an immense geographical area, in practice his reach rarely extended beyond the central provinces of Anatolia and Rumelia, and then only weakly. In the eastern and southern parts of the periphery, fluid boundaries fluctuated in tandem with tribal loyalty. Thus the Ottoman Empire in 1789 more closely resembled the oversized and decentralized empires of the Middle Ages than its modern European counterparts. It was rapidly becoming a conspicuous anachronism. The empire's internal administrative system consisted of a patchwork of regional traditions and customs, and was deeply dependent on local leaders. It functioned as a loose confederation, granting exclusive rights to regional notables and provincial governors. Even in the central provinces, imperial control was often limited. Indeed, over the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries local dynasts and notables had amassed significant power vis-à-vis the central state (Özkaya, 1994: 125ff).

At the peak of their influence in 1808, these notables and dynasts imposed a new settlement on the sultan for sharing and inheriting power through a document called the Deed of the Agreement (S*ened-i İttifak*) (BOA-HH, 1808: 35242). Some historians and scholars of constitutional law have compared the Deed with the Magna Carta of 1215, implying that in the Ottoman Empire a document of this kind was signed several centuries too late. In spite of some astonishing outward similarities between the Deed of Agreement and Magna Carta, such a comparison is only relevant if their different historical contexts and consequences are taken into consideration. Ironically, the victory of the Ottoman notables and dynasts provoked an extensive and ruthless campaign of centralization. Three decades later, the few notables who had managed to escape beheading or banishment were forced to cut deals with the center on very different terms, accepting the sultan's absolute power as a condition for preserving their

economic wealth and serving as agents of the new central bureaucracy (Hanioğlu, 2008a: 17–18). The powerful armies with which they had once threatened the center were disbanded. In the meantime, the center penetrated as deeply as it could into the periphery. Many regions once left to the rule of governors who had turned themselves into virtually independent little sultans, or to the traditional administration of Arab, Kurdish, or Albanian chieftains or tribal leaders, were now brought closer to the center. In the more distant periphery, the center reset the rules on autonomy, sometimes by eliminating the local elites and replacing them with new and more loyal ones. Yet while the success of the imperial center in centralization was remarkable, it could not be uniform. For instance, the central administration was able to put an end to Mamluk rule in Baghdad in 1831 and transform Tripoli of Barbary into a centrally administered province in 1835, but in the wake of humiliating military defeats and foreign intervention it was compelled to grant extensive autonomy to Egypt in 1841.

Along with the attempts at centralization, the half century between 1789 and 1839 witnessed a series of reforms aimed at responding to new military, economic, and social circumstances. The ascendancy of the Ottoman Empire's two traditional rivals, Austria and Russia, and the appearance of new threats posed by naval powers such as Great Britain and France made comprehensive military reform imperative. While a series of defeats at the hands of traditional enemies generated upheaval, it was Bonaparte's shock-and-awe invasion of Egypt in 1798 that convinced the Ottoman Muslim heartland of the invincibility of the new naval powers. Despite the fact that the concepts of "transformation" and "change" were used mainly in a derogatory sense in classical Ottoman political jargon, and clichés such as "in accordance with the old tradition" provided legitimation, the pressing challenges now left no alternative but a major overhaul. In fact when Sultan Selim III (r. 1789–1807) approached 22 prominent men and asked them to pen memoranda on the new order to be implemented in the Ottoman Empire, the authors, producing essays not unlike the French *Cahiers* of 1789, unanimously agreed on the dire need for reorganization (Hanioğlu, 2008a: 42–43). The Ottomans faced anachronism after anachronism on the economic front: provisionism founded on local self-sufficiency, fiscalism based on extensive tax farming, domestic borrowing, debasement of the metal coinage, and the ancient *timar* system funneling agricultural taxes directly to the agents of the state and military. Likewise the *Pax Ottomanica*, resting upon Islamic principles of communal administration and viewed as a munificent covenant by non-Muslim communities in times of religious persecution throughout Europe, not only became obsolete but also started to be perceived as discriminatory in the post-French Revolution world with its glorification of the absolute equality of individuals, much to the dismay of the Ottoman establishment. In a similar vein, social and economic transformation rendered obsolete the Ottoman social system with its accentuation of differences between the ruling class (*askerîs*) and subjects (*re'aya*).

The military reforms aimed at producing a single central army trained in Western military techniques. The 1826 destruction of the Janissaries, who, like Russia's Strel'tsy, had rebelled in a bid to quash the creation of a European-style fighting force, paved the way for the formation of a central army command and further military reforms. The new army, named the Victorious Troops of Muhammad, imitated the organizational structure of the Egyptian army; inspired by the examples of the French and British armies, the Egyptian military was more efficient and capable than its imperial counterpart. In 1834 a reserve army was established with units in various provinces (Kütükoğlu, 1981–82: 127 ff). Likewise, in the same year, following the example of earlier military engineering schools, the sultan succeeded in founding the first military academy to produce officers for the new European-style Ottoman army corps (Mehmed Es'ad, 1892–93: 8–12). In 1838 a military council was formed and charged with the oversight of the military affairs of the empire. A significant consequence of the destruction of the Janissaries and the

emergence of a new military establishment was the sidelining of the *ulamā* (religious scholars), a major power broker in the Ottoman system, who had used the boisterous troops as a strike force. Having lost their tool of enforcement, the *ulamā* were compelled to adopt a more conciliatory stance vis-à-vis the sweeping reforms, and accepted the incontestable domination of the court and the new bureaucracy.

Commenced in the military domain, the reforms prompted similar transformations in the realms of the economy and society. Likewise, the attempts at centralization were also extended to Ottoman economic policies. The financial institutions of the empire became more centralized, especially after 1826. In 1793 the government established a new treasury, named the "New Revenues Treasury." This institution was to finance the new troops and their military campaigns. It was charged with retaining (and not reselling) tax farms and state bonds left by deceased holders, thereby simultaneously liquidating both the *malikâne* system (of granting tax farms for life) established in 1698 and the internal debt. In 1801 the new treasury became the sole authority sanctioned to buy state bonds left as inheritance (Cezar, 1986: 173). The new treasury was also to confiscate *timar*s belonging to deceased holders, and these were to be converted into tax farms or administered directly by the treasury (Ahmed Âsım, 1867: 355–56). The government also granted the new treasury the authority to collect major taxes on various commodities.

In 1805 rising naval expenses compelled the administration to establish an additional treasury, the Arsenal Treasury, which operated along similar lines (Ahmed Cevdet, 1891: 286–88). In 1838 the state allocated cash salaries to all officials; henceforth, all other sources of income were shut down (Ahmed Lûtfî, 1875: 132, 180–81). This was a major step toward a centralized bureaucracy and monetary economy. A further measure in this direction was the allocation of salaries in place of granting taxation rights, though this policy produced severe cash shortages, especially before the start of foreign borrowing. The state further introduced new, standard gold and silver coins of fixed value and banned the circulation of foreign coins. Thus the economic reforms initiated to support the new, modern army and navy resulted in a wholesale change in the Ottoman economic frame of mind. Indeed, this transformation paved the way for the adoption of more liberal policies at the expense of the time-honored Ottoman economic principles of self-sufficiency and provisionism.

Two major results of this transformation were the Anglo-Ottoman Commercial Treaty of 1838 abolishing monopolies and allowing British merchants to buy goods without restriction and at a customs tariff equal to that paid by domestic merchants, and the Ottoman decision to borrow money from European states and economic agents in 1853. The Ottoman social organization founded upon Islamic principles, discriminatory tolerance, and communal administration trembled in the face of the revolutionary changes in Europe. Economic and fiscal reforms further increased non-Muslim economic power at the expense of the Muslims. Thus the stark cleavage between the ruling Muslim *askerî* establishment and the non-Muslim *re'aya* became increasingly meaningless: Greek subjects controlled much of Ottoman naval transportation, which sailed under the Russian flag; large numbers of non-Muslims engaged in commerce as "privileged merchants" under foreign protection; and many non-Muslims obtained tax farms through state auctions (Hanioğlu, 2008a: 26).

Likewise, the emergence of romantic proto-nationalist ideas among the educated non-Muslims of the empire, and the lay elites defying the clerical establishments of their communities, rendered the administration of the non-Muslim subjects more difficult than it had ever been before. Another factor pressuring Ottoman leaders to institute reforms favoring non-Muslims was the transformation of the "Eastern Question" from a solely moral one to a complex fusion of moral concerns and strategic ambitions. In fact, the Greek revolt of 1821 heralded a new era

in which the Great Powers of Europe no longer considered tensions between the sultan and his Christian subjects to be exclusively internal affairs of the empire. Pressured domestically and internationally, the Ottoman center eventually decided to make a bold move to redefine the foundations of the state. The statement, "Je ne veux reconnaître désormais les musulmans qu'à la mosquée, les chrétiens qu' à l'église et les juifs qu'à la synagogue" (From now on I do not wish to recognize Muslims outside the mosque, Christians outside the church, or Jews outside the synagogue) (Engelhardt, 1882: 33), was attributed to Sultan Mahmud II (r. 1808–39), nicknamed the "infidel sultan" by many pious Muslims. It signaled a major transformation in the official ideology of the state. The new requirement to wear the fez, rigorously enforced by the sultan, aimed to produce a new Ottoman identity independent of religious affiliations and social hierarchies. Making a high-ranking Muslim bureaucrat and a non-Muslim porter dress similarly had been unimaginable in a society in which turbans on tombstones reflected the status of the deceased, and non-Muslims yearned to wear yellow shoes like their Muslim compatriots.

In the half century between 1789 and 1839, in addition to launching sweeping military reforms, the empire responded to the challenges resulting from the major political and social upheaval that took place in the wake of the French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. By 1839 the Ottoman Empire was as centralized as a polity of its size could be at the time. It had changed not only its economic and fiscal tools and methods but also its approach to fundamental political values. It was on the verge of adopting a new, secular official ideology: Ottomanism.

The Tanzimat: bureaucratic despotism, economic liberalism, and super-Westernization

On 3 November 1839 an imperial edict was made public in the Rose Garden of Topkapı Palace. Although it conformed in form and tone to the long tradition of edicts promising administrative fairness under the guidance of the sultan (İnalcık, 1964: 611), this proclamation heralded a new era commonly referred to as the Tanzimat (plural of the Arabic *tanzim*, which means "arranging," "regulating," or "reforming"). The edict, issued by Sultan Abdülmecid (r. 1839–61), promised new laws that would guarantee the right to life and property, prohibit bribery, and regulate the levying of taxes and the conscription and service time of soldiers. The edict further pledged the enactment of legislation that would outlaw execution without trial, confiscation of property, and violations of personal chastity and honor. It also promised the abolition of tax farming and the establishment of an equitable draft system. The text of the decree draws inspiration from the sixth, seventh, thirteenth, and seventeenth articles of the French *Déclaration des Droits de l'Homme et du Citoyen*. There are also notable similarities to the Virginia Bill of Rights of 1776 (Abadan, 1940: 52). The imperial edict represented the culmination of the reform process begun under Sultan Mahmud II and marked the inauguration of a bold program to make the Ottoman Empire an integral part of Europe.

While the Tanzimat statesmen continued the policy of promoting centralization by launching new campaigns into the periphery, they also, imitating their role model Prince Metternich, ushered in an era of codification and institutionalization, as well as the development of a new, nondenominational Ottoman identity. These reformists, who transferred power to the Sublime Porte at the expense of the imperial court, produced a hybrid legal system, adopting Western laws and producing new compendia of Islamic jurisprudence. In tandem with centralization, the Ottoman government abolished various privileges granted to different regions or ethno-religious groups and attempted to implement the mandates of the new codes across the board. New regulations ranging from a penal code to provisions for the preservation of antiquities, and

covering areas from the registration of tenancy contracts to the administration of orphans' funds, were issued in order to bring all aspects of life under government control (Düstûr, 1872a: 264–67, 537–97; Düstûr, 1872c: 276–80, 426–28). The reformers, who aspired to create institutions that would provide a stability immune to the uncertainties inherent in the succession of the sultanate, also established a number of bureaucratic-legal institutions, such as the Council of State established in 1869. The Tanzimat statesmen presumed that such institutions would also respond to empire-wide complaints regarding the excesses of the bureaucrats during the domination of the Sublime Porte. Meanwhile, provincial councils formed during the Tanzimat provided only an insubstantial check on the authority of governors sent from the imperial center. Although they allowed limited communal participation, the conservative reformers were adamantly opposed to real representation and constitutionalism (Mehmed Emin Âlî, 1867: 24). In their opinion, genuine representative government would bring about a chaotic struggle among the various ethno-religious groups and thereby sound the death knell of the empire. In fact, when in 1845 the center summoned two notables and headmen from each province to the capital to report on the conditions and needs of their localities, these elected representatives were warned that "their assignment was limited to submitting information regarding the infrastructural needs" of their provinces, and that "entering into discussions about general state affairs was outside the scope of their obligation." Having listened to their presentations, the imperial government sent temporary councils composed of civil and military bureaucrats and *ulamā* to provinces to investigate and propose possible infrastructural projects and reforms in local administration (Ahmed Lûtfî, 1910: 15–17).

The antagonism of high-ranking statesmen toward genuine participation of all Ottoman subjects prompted a constitutional movement led by important intellectuals known as the Young Ottomans. This movement prepared the ground for the promulgation of the first Ottoman constitution a decade later, in the middle of a major diplomatic crisis in 1876. The first constitutional experience lasted for less than a year but played a significant role in the glorification of representative government as the ideal political system.

The credit for the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution does not go only to the constitutionalist movement. By 1876 pressure from the Great Powers on behalf of non-Muslim Ottoman communities had resulted in a partial reversal of decentralization. While the center scored significant successes in penetrating the Muslim periphery, the regions inhabited largely by Christian groups gained new rights tantamount to self-rule. In the words of a leading Tanzimat statesman, Mehmed Fu'ad Pasha, this reverse decentralization produced an *États Désunis de Turquie* (Davison, 1963: 235). Thus constitutionalists and adherents of top-down reform agreed that efforts to transform the entire population from subjects into citizens would serve as a device to ward off European pressure for administrative privileges for Christian groups. The Great Powers, however, paid no heed to the promulgation of the Ottoman constitution, and the deepening of the Eastern Crisis of 1875–77 resulted in the Russo–Turkish War of 1877–78 and the revision of the status quo in the Middle East and the Balkans at the expense of the Ottoman center. By 1878 the Great Powers' collective guarantee of Ottoman territorial integrity, granted by the Paris Treaty of 1856, had long been forgotten, and a new debate centered on the merits of maintaining the empire as a confederation between the Muslim center and autonomous Christian regions, Ottoman only in name.

In the economic realm, the Tanzimat brought about a drastic shift toward a monetary economy regulated on the basis of liberal principles applied by the state. As a result of this awkward state liberalism, monetization gained considerable momentum. In 1840 the government abolished payments of tax in kind (Abdurrahman Vefik, 1912: 49–50). Furthermore, all state officials, including the sultan and members of the royal house, now began to receive monthly

salaries directly from the imperial treasury. These changes, taken together, signified the removal of the last remaining vestiges of the archaic *timar* system. This was formalized in a series of regulations and finally in the Land Law of 1858, which reorganized land ownership, inheritance law, and the issuance of deeds. Henceforth, private ownership of property acquired *de jure* status (Barkan, 1940: 351ff). To increase state control and further monetize the Ottoman economy, the government promoted the establishment of banks to replace traditional moneylenders. In 1856 the Ottoman Bank was established in London, with British capital, to fund commerce between Europe and the Ottoman Empire; it eventually became the de facto central bank of the empire (Biliotti, 1909: 12ff). Likewise, credit unions mushroomed throughout the empire, their conduct governed by a series of government regulations promulgated in 1867 (Düstûr, 1872b: 387–98). The short-lived Ottoman experiences with paper money and the establishment of the Constantinople Stock Exchange demonstrated the will of the reformers to create a modern monetary economy (Düstûr, 1872c: 484–97). In this new economy the government faced tremendous budget deficits. Having exhausted domestic resources, it resorted to borrowing long-term bonds from European governments and banks. These external loans helped stimulate the economy, but they came at a very high price. By 1874 the state had borrowed a total of 238,773,272 Ottoman liras (Lt.), but had received less than Lt. 127,120,220 in revenues after the deduction of commissions (Yeniay, 1964: 51). This sizable debt accumulated quickly and also affected the nature of the relationship between the empire and the Great Powers.

On the fiscal front, the reformers were compelled to retreat to more modest goals after attempting to implement wholesale changes. For instance, the leaders of the Tanzimat had initially proposed direct tax collection through local councils (Abdurrahman Vefik, 1912: 7–25), but when a brief trial resulted in a dramatic decline in tax revenues, they returned to the old system of tax farming. Despite this failure, they changed the basis of taxation. The new system, based on individual capital and actual income, was not only more equitable than the old system of collecting excise taxes levied on landholding, but was progressive as well, since in principle it benefited the lower classes at the expense of landowners, and villagers at the expense of city dwellers. Likewise, cadastral surveys provided a fair basis for taxation while increasing state revenues (Abdurrahman Vefik, 1912: 49–50). The new official ideology, Ottomanism, prompted economic changes such as the abolition of the poll tax on non-Muslims in 1856 (Abdurrahman Vefik, 1912: 197–99), though in practice they continued to pay the tax in return for exemption from military service.

While promoting liberal trade policies, Tanzimat statesmen also sought to initiate industrialization. Despite heavy subsidies, the infant industries could not compete with their Western counterparts due to low customs tariffs, and only a few of them survived. The Ottoman authorities eventually took steps to protect local industry, increasing customs tariffs to 8 percent in 1861 (Süleyman Sûdî, 1889: 83ff) and granting the new factories a 15-year customs exemption on imported capital goods in 1873 (Düstûr, 1872c: 398). Although these measures proved insufficient, they marked a transition during the last decade of the Tanzimat from a policy of laissez-faire to one of protectionism, which, by and large, remained the Ottoman state's standard approach to trade and the economy up to the end of the empire.

The Tanzimat heralded major changes in social and cultural life as well. The Ottoman Law of Nationality issued in 1869 defined citizenship in nondenominational terms (Düstûr, 1872a: 16–18), and while certain privileges of the *askerî* class were maintained, they survived only as a relic of the pre-Tanzimat era. Following on non-Muslim participation in local councils and the appointment of a large number of non-Muslims to bureaucratic positions, the convening of the chamber of deputies composed of Ottoman citizens of various religious affiliations in 1877

marked a major innovation. In main cities the new official ideology called Ottomanism and promoted by the Tanzimat produced a cosmopolitanism remarkably different from the imposed multiculturalism of the pre-reform era with its strong segregationist and discriminatory undertones. Likewise, the adoption of French as the language of high culture strengthened ties among the elites of the various Ottoman communities, who all used this new medium of communication. The Tanzimat also brought many cultural novelties to society. The book became the main means to transmit knowledge, at the expense of the *ʿālim* (religious scholar). Similarly, the plethora of journals and dailies that appeared during this period produced a public opinion remarkably different in character from that of the pre-reform era, which had been based on information transmitted orally as coffee-house gossip. The new culture emphasized the importance of the individual, prompting new literary and artistic genres. The time-honored divan poetry that had best expressed the traditional culture lost its primacy to novels focusing on social problems; likewise drama gained popularity at the expense of the shadow-puppet play. Despite these drastic changes, the Tanzimat allowed the old to remain alongside the new and prompted a peculiar dualism in all aspects of life in the empire.

Extensive borrowings from the West in all fields during the Tanzimat era made elites closely associate the notion of progress with the key concept of "*alla Franca*" (in the Frankish, i.e. artifacts, manners, and fashions in European style). This became a catchword of the era and connoted European supremacy (Ahmed Midhat, 1894: passim). Such perceived superiority made elites adopt an attitude of "super-Westernization," which created a cultural gap characterized by the elites' disgust at the traditional, pious masses. This gap manifested itself both culturally, as one of the main themes of the early Ottoman novel (Mardin, 1974: 403–46), and politically, as a rallying point for middle- and lower-class support of the Young Ottoman opposition (Mardin, 2000: 115).

While building on the earlier reforms, the Tanzimat statesmen had initiated change of such scale and rapidity that all aspects of life were affected. The resulting dualism would generally obscure the radical nature of the process; however, its far-reaching consequences would leave little doubt as to its profound transformative influence.

The Hamidian regime: neo-patrimonialism, pan-Islamism, and economic protectionism

The proroguing of the chamber of deputies in February 1878, just weeks prior to the signing of the San Stefano Treaty with the victorious Russians, marked the inception of the Hamidian regime (Us, 1954: 407). Sultan Abdülhamid II (r. 1876–1909), who had promulgated the constitution without enthusiasm and with the hope of deflecting European pressure, now transferred power back to the court and replaced the Sublime Porte's bureaucratic absolutism with his own neo-patrimonial autocracy. This did not, however, mean a full-fledged return to pre-Tanzimat patrimonialism. In other words, the sultan did not wish only to be the uppermost patron in a patrimonial chain, but rather a unique patrimonial figure, ruling with the help of a rational bureaucracy constrained by laws. Through a personality cult revolving around loyalty to a pious, omniscient caliph-sultan figure, Abdülhamid II established an autocracy that ruled the country with an iron hand. Ironically, while the bureaucracy became more efficient as a consequence of such changes as educational reform, the introduction of new techniques including statistics, and the application of advanced technologies like telegraphy, it also became subservient to a shadow government composed of advisors and favorites of the court. Similarly, while the number of journals increased, a state-sponsored bowdlerization resembling Nicholas I's "terror of censorship" between 1848 and 1855 reduced the vibrant press of the Tanzimat era to a mouthpiece propagating the values of the new regime and glorifying its personality cult.

The creation of the new patrimonialism based on a personality cult was supported by another trend that had begun earlier and reached a peak during the Hamidian regime: the invention of tradition. Many of the "new" traditions such as the imperial coat-of-arms and imperial orders had been invented long before Abdülhamid II's ascension to the Ottoman throne, but he reshaped them, broadened their use, and invested them with a royal significance reminiscent of contemporary European courts. Likewise, some ancient rituals, such as visits to the holy relics preserved in Istanbul, became pompous ceremonies. Even Friday prayers "acquired additional ceremonial trappings inspired by European examples" (Deringil, 1998: 22).

Another important characteristic of the Hamidian regime was the return of Islam to center stage. The concept "Islamic Unity" (İttihad-ı İslâm) became a basic tenet of the regime. Called pan-Islamism by many European statesmen who considered it the new peril threatening Western civilization, it provided a wild card in negotiations with the Great Powers of Europe, which ruled over millions of Muslim subjects abroad. It was in domestic politics, however, that an increasing focus on Islam paid off most handsomely. Through gestures such as the employment of numerous Arabs and Albanians in his service, the conferral of privileges and decorations upon Albanian, Arab, and Kurdish chieftains and sheikhs, and the opening of special schools for their children, Abdülhamid II attempted to strengthen religious brotherhood among Muslims. In this context, the sultan viewed "Islamic Unity" as a proto-nationalist force to hold Muslims together in the face of ethnic nationalisms tending to pull them away from the Muslim community. This also meant redefining Ottomanism, the official ideology of the state, and reversing the secularization of identity set in motion by the Tanzimat statesmen. Hamidian Ottomanism was undoubtedly most attractive to non-Turkish Muslims, such as Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds, for whom it provided a real alternative to nationalism. Naturally, the new Ottomanism was least attractive to non-Muslim ethnic groups, whom in practice it threatened with a diminution of status, theoretical legal rights notwithstanding (Hanioğlu, 2008b: 7).

While the sultan's policies received considerable support from the leaders of various Muslim communities, the Hamidian era also witnessed the emergence of proto-nationalist activities among Muslim Albanians, Arabs, and Kurds. These movements were motivated more by fear than by separatism; for their adherents, the nightmare scenario was either to become second-class citizens in breakaway nation-states dominated by Greeks, Serbians, and Armenians or to be directly colonized by European powers. More radical groups, supported by their non-Muslim kinsmen in the case of the Albanians and Arabs, did promote separatism, but they were never dominant in the proto-nationalist movements before 1908.

A Turkish proto-nationalism emerged during this era as well. While historians reconstructed a long-forgotten but glorious past for the Turks in pre-Ottoman times, the domestic press began to stress the Turks' close ties with Turkic groups outside the Ottoman realm (Kushner, 1977: 27ff). Within the empire, the expression of cultural Turkism was restricted to the confines of official Ottomanism due to the strict censorship that proscribed any discussion of sensitive political subjects. Thus, the real Turkism gained momentum among Turkic groups outside the empire and in Geneva, Paris, and Cairo, cities where Ottoman expatriates known as the Young Turks penned publications that were smuggled into the empire. Among them, a journal called *Türk* (Turk), published between 1902 and 1907, promoted a secular Turkish ethnic nationalism foreshadowing the early Republican principles of the 1920s and 1930s (Hanioğlu, 2001: 64–73). More importantly, the main organization of the Young Turk opposition, the Ottoman Committee of Progress and Union, adopted a similar type of Turkism, especially after 1905 (Hanioğlu, 2001: 173–81). This is a particularly significant development, since this organization, later known as the Ottoman Committee of Union and

Progress (CUP), was to carry out the Young Turk Revolution of 1908 and then rule the empire for a decade, with one brief interlude, until the end of World War I.

Although the autocratic character of the regime and the strict censorship strongly affected intellectual, literary, and cultural activities, major transformations did take place in these realms before 1908. A significant but incongruous development was the acceptance of a hybrid scientistic doctrine based on eighteenth-century French materialism and nineteenth-century German *Vulgärmaterialismus* by a large segment of the Ottoman intelligentsia during the reign of a sultan who attempted to construct an ideology with strong religious overtones. The scientism that affected many members of the Ottoman educated classes during the Hamidian era gained more ground after the 1908 Revolution and was later to exert a profound influence on modern Turkey (Hanioğlu, 2005: 32ff). Despite the use of Islam by the regime for legitimation and identity formation, Islamist intellectual movements, such as Salafism, were confined to the Arab periphery of the empire (Commins, 1990: 49ff); they too acquired strength following the revolution but could not survive the extreme secularization of the early republic.

Two-thirds of the Hamidian era coincided with the Great Economic Depression of 1873–96, the largest long-term price deflation in modern history. Nevertheless, during this period the Ottoman economic system shed its peculiar dualism and adopted a more modern form. Extra-ordinary military expenses during the Russo–Ottoman War and the subsequent Ottoman defeat, coupled with the loss of a sizable portion of European Turkey, precipitated a serious financial crisis. In 1881 the sultan decreed a restructuring of the Ottoman debt. Consequently the debt was reduced from Lt. 239.5 million to Lt. 125.3 million, and yearly interest and amortization payments dropped from Lt. 13.2 million to Lt. 7.6 million. A new and interna-tional Public Debt Administration (PDA), established that year, was to administer all Ottoman debt, including the payment of war indemnities to Russia. Its management consisted of repre-sentatives from the Netherlands and all of the Great Powers except Russia. The PDA assumed collection duties for various Ottoman revenues, such as those accruing from the salt monopoly, the fisheries, and the tobacco tithe, and used them to pay 1 percent of the Ottoman debt itself and 4 percent of its interest each year. It attracted considerable hostility from the public and from intellectuals, who viewed it as a state-within-a-state engaged in turning the empire into a semi-colony; this reaction also played an important role in the emergence of Turkish proto-nationalism (Hanioğlu, 2008a: 135–36).

Under the Hamidian regime economic protectionism gained extraordinary momentum. The state attempted to shield the empire's economy from global competition, boost Ottoman industrial and agricultural production, and increase exports within the constraints imposed by the Capitulations. The manufacturing sector also benefited from this protectionism. Likewise, the state managed to launch major infrastructural investments, such as the Baghdad and Hijaz railways, a large-scale irrigation project in the Konya Valley, and telegraph lines connecting the Ottoman provinces with the center. The development of a more advanced railway network, in particular, facilitated the efficient delivery of goods to domestic markets and ports of export. Partly as a result, production levels of silk, carpets, tiles, glass, and other goods increased. Hea-vier industrial production, such as gas, minerals, and cigarettes, also grew. Nevertheless, this growth did not amount to a major boom in the development of Ottoman industry (Hanioğlu, 2008a: 136–37).

On the monetary front, while the attempt to introduce paper money in 1879 failed, two years later the empire announced a switch from bimetallism to a loose gold standard under which silver coins continued to circulate at a rate set by the state but linked to a gold reserve (Eldem, 1970: 243–44). These efforts demonstrated the Hamidian regime's desire, despite its protectionism, to integrate the empire into the world economic system (Hanioğlu, 2008a: 135–38).

The Hamidian regime officially derided European mores, denounced the blind emulation of "Frankish civilization" (Ahmed Salâhi, 1885: 4), and attempted to imbue society with Islamic values. All these debates, however, took place in a modern context, and a visible Ottoman modernity became an entrenched part of urban middle- and upper-class life. For instance, the regime propagated conservative values among women through a women's magazine, advertisements started filling large portions of newspapers, and many attitudes and materials that had been contemptuously branded "*alla Franca*" became part and parcel of domestic culture. Similarly, the dualism of the Tanzimat all but disappeared in many realms such as literature. Ottoman literary figures under Abdülhamid II engaged wholeheartedly in debates that mirrored those taking place in Europe and reflected the dilemmas of individuals responding to the challenges of modernity. European literary forms such as the sonnet became standard, while classical Ottoman forms were all but forgotten.

The Hamidian regime lasted for three decades and survived a number of foreign interventions, including those that took place during the Armenian crises of 1895 and 1896 and the peak of the Macedonian struggle in 1902–03. The sultan, who initially adopted a policy of non-commitment, resorted to armed neutrality after the Penjdeh crisis (1885) (Yasamee, 1996: 131ff). In general, Abdülhamid II responded to the threat of intervention with considerable diplomatic skill and accepted reform proposals the full application of which he later did his best to prevent. The eventual blow that ended the regime in 1908 came from domestic sources. In that year, as the Great Powers were discussing a sweeping program of reform for Macedonia, the CUP initiated a revolution. The organization, led by middle-ranking army officers in Macedonia, proclaimed "freedom" in the main cities of European Turkey. The sultan had no choice but to accept the move, ordering new elections for the chamber of deputies he had prorogued three decades before (Düstûr, 1911: 1–2). The reinstatement of the constitutional regime in July 1908 marked the end of the long-lived Hamidian regime. The sultan, who restored the constitutional regime at gunpoint, remained on the Ottoman throne until April 1909, but merely as a figurehead.

Much had changed since 1789, but despite all the overwhelming challenges the Ottoman Empire had survived, albeit in a smaller and different form. Unknown to the many who were expecting a major political and social revitalization in the wake of the Young Turk Revolution, however, the empire had not much more time remaining to it. The eventful years between 1908 and 1918 were to prepare the ground for the collapse, and the Great War to deliver the *coup de grâce*.

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