

[In the Name of Allah]

AKHLĀK (plural of *khulūk*, “innate disposition”), ethics.

(i) SURVEY OF ETHICS IN ISLAM.

1. Islamic ethics took shape only gradually and the tradition of the different elements of which it is composed was not finally established before the 5th/11th century. Unlike the Greek world, in which popular ethics were refined and reshaped by philosophical reasoning without any breach between them, and with no perceptible influence of any foreign doctrine, so that eventually philosophy came to express the moral values by which the lives of the educated classes were governed, in Islam ethics appear in their matured state as an interesting and, on the whole, successful amalgamation of a pre-Islamic Arabian tradition and Qur’ānic teaching with non-Arabic elements, mainly of Persian and Greek origins, embedded in or integrated with a general-Islamic structure. The praise of, and value attached to, good character (*ḥusn al- khulūk*) is common enough among traditionalists, mystics, philosophers, and those writers who aim at giving practical advice to rulers and “civil servants”. But their ideas of moral perfection are drawn from widely different sources, although all of them, in various ways, try to conform to the basic standards of Islam (which are in themselves not static); hence the process of assimilation and eventual integration of these different and sometimes conflicting trends extended over a considerable time.

2. It would be erroneous to assume that the different kinds of morality which found literary expression in successive periods from the age of the pre-Islamic poets to the 5th/11th century present a cumulative process, in the sense that each new type as it emerged replaced or suppressed the earlier types. On the contrary, they co-existed for a long time, in varying strength. The tribal *sunna* of the pre-Islamic Arabs, based on usage and custom, described by I. Goldziher (*Muhammedanische Studien*, i) and others (e.g. B. Farès, *L'honneur chez les Arabes avant l'Islam*, Paris 1932), by no

means died out with the advent of Islam; and since pre-Islamic literature eventually became part of the accepted Arabic humanities, the values expressed in it were never entirely forgotten: a high sense of personal honour [see 'IRḌ], courage [see ḤAMĀSA], loyalty to one's fellow tribesmen [see ḲABĪLA], hospitality [see ḌAYF], endurance [see ṢABR], self-control [see ḤILM], and a secular spirit which could never be completely quelled by the prevailing religious morality [cf. also MURUWWA]. The preaching of Muḥammad obviously produced a radical change in moral values as well, based on the sanctions of the new religion, and fear [I:326a] of God and of the Last Judgment: kindness and equity, compassion and mercy, generosity, self-restraint, sincerity, moral fellowship of the Believers are among the new virtues to replace tribal morality, and to become the pillars of an ethical society or, at least, the programme for such a society.

The religious ethic of the Ḳur'ān was subsequently expanded and pointed in immense detail by the traditionists in the form of *ḥadīths* [q.v.], professedly based upon and expounding the *sunna*, or model behaviour, of the Prophet, but frequently supplementing this source by traditions of the Companions and by adaptation of materials from the cultural traditions of the older religions. The importance of the *Ḥadīth* in forming and maintaining the common ethical ideas of the Muslim Community in all ages and all regions has been incalculable; but in addition it was largely responsible for the ethical framework of the developing Islamic Law [see *SHARĪ'A*], and for laying the foundations which made possible the process of integration described above. It may be said broadly that the whole corpus of *Ḥadīth* constitutes a handbook of Islamic ethics, inasmuch as in the general Muslim view the correct performance of religious duties and the right understanding of religious doctrine are inseparable elements of the moral life. Within this comprehensive structure, however, certain forms of conduct were more particularly designated by the term *adab* [q.v.], which in this early religious context had a definitely ethical connotation (see, e.g. Wensinck's *Handbook*, s.v.

Adab). It is tempting to surmise (though it might be difficult to prove) that it was the capture of this term for the very differently motivated ethic of Persian origin expounded by the 2nd/8th century writers (see § 4 below) which led to the substitution of the term *akhlāq*, which appears in various traditions extolling “good *akhlāq*” (see Wensinck, *Handbook*, 11a and B. Farès, *Makārim al- Aḥlāq*, *Rend. Linc.*, 1937, 417 = *Mabāḥith ‘Arabiyya*, Cairo 1939, 21 ff.). The tradition of the Prophet used as a proof-text by later writers on Islamic ethics: “I have been sent to fulfil the virtues which go with nobility of character (*makārim al- akhlāq*)”, does not occur in the canonical books of tradition (cf. B. Farès, loc. cit.). Under this title several collections of ethical *ḥadīths* were made from the 3rd/9th century onwards, e.g. by Ibn Abi ‘l- Dunyā (Brock., I, 160), al- *Kharā’iṭ* (Brock., S I, 250), and al-Ṭabarsī (Brock. I, 513; S I, 709), the last-named being the classical *Shī‘ite* book on the subject (cf. also B. Farès, 411-2).

3. The refinement and development of moral thought on the basis of the *Ḥadīth* was carried further by both of the religious movements which began to develop within *Sunnī* Islam in the 3rd/9th century. In theological circles, on the one hand, the conflict with the antideterminist trend of the Mu‘tazila [*q.v.*], and the consequent emphasis laid by the Mu‘tazilite theologians on moral decision and individual responsibility, produced an elaborate discussion and analysis of these topics [see *ḲADAR*]; and it was through both the Mu‘tazilite movement, which in its turn was connected with Greek thought and Christian-Hellenistic apologetic works, and the orthodox reaction to it [see *KALĀM*] that the reception of Greek philosophical ethics was prepared and made possible. On the other hand, the anti-intellectual and ascetic mystical movement of *Ṣūfism* [see *TAṢAWWUF*] produced a somewhat divergent type of Islamic ethics, which was gradually to become more and more influential and eventually almost dominated in the Islamic world. For the *ṣūfī* preachers, poverty, [I:326b] self-humiliation, and complete surrender of personality became the highest values in life. It may be sufficient here to mention one eminent early *ṣūfī* writer, al- Muḥāsibī (d. 213/857), who had a decisive

influence on al-Ghazālī when he made ṣūfism a definite part of Islamic ethics in his fundamental *Revivification of the Religious Sciences* (see M. Smith, *An early Mystic of Baghdad*, London 1935, and *JRAS*, 1936, 65).

4. The introduction of Persian moral thought into the Islamic tradition preceded the acquaintance with Greek ethics. Its main representative is Ibn al- Muḳaffa' [q.v.], and—apart from *Kalīla wa-Dimna*, a work which deserves to be mentioned in this context—its main content is to be found in the two *adab* works ascribed to him, the *Adab al- Kabīr* (Fr. translation by C. F. Destrée, Brussels 1902, from the Dutch of G. van Vloten; German trans. by O. Rescher, *MSOS*, 1917) and the *Adab al- Ṣ aghīr* (German trans. by O. Rescher, 1915), whose authenticity has been doubted but not disproved by G. Richter (*Isl.*, 1930, 278) and F. Gabrieli (*RSO*, 1932, 219 ff.). These works [cf. also *ARDASHĪR*, *BUZURDJMIHR*] are not based on any philosophical principle, but rather remind the reader Greek rhetorics, giving the rulers, “civil servants” and persons who wish to advance in life advice on how to be successful. The Islamic allusions contained in this literature are at first scanty and formal, but the connection of this tradition with religion is steadily emphasized; Islam is regarded accordingly in the character of a state religion, linked to the sovereign power as religion had been linked with political power in the old Persian state (cf. A. Christensen, *L'Iran sous les Sassanides* 2, Copenhagen 1944, ch. iii): “religion and government are sisters”.

The advice, conveyed in a pleasing and effective style, is based on opportunist considerations and the recognition of force, which the intelligent man (*al- 'ākil*) will know how to deal with properly. In the course of a century or so, however, this originally foreign *adab* tradition was more or less adapted to Islamic standards, and was finally received into the accepted body of Islamic *adab* in the *ʿUyūn al-Akḥbār* of Ibn Ḳutayba (d. 276/889-90). This work, which may be called the first comprehensive manual of Islamic ethics, brought together and to a remarkable degree integrated the Ḳurʾānic, *ḥadīth*, pre-Islamic and

Persian contributions, and by excluding the irreconcilable elements of the two latter, practically defined and standardized the component elements of the orthodox morality in its prephilosophical and pre-*ṣūfistic* stage. Related types of literature are the “Mirrors of Princes” [see MALIK] and popular wisdom in apophthegmatic form [see *ḤIKMA*].

5. Philosophical ethics, derived from the Greeks, was introduced at first by the limited circles who devoted themselves to the study of philosophy. The details of its development amongst the Muslim *falāsifa* are studied in the next section. As is pointed out in §§ 8-10 of that section, philosophical ethics exercised an influence on *adab* literature and what is of even greater importance, philosophical ethics in the form given to it by Miskawayh was fully excepted by such an influential theologian as al-*Ghazālī* and in this way was integrated with religious tradition. Miskawayh's doctrine became known also through another channel, viz. the Persian works of authors such as al- *Ṭūsī* and al- *Dawwānī*. On the other hand, the purely *ṣūfistic* morality gained through the great Persian poets an [I:327a] immense influence in the eastern Islamic world, including Turkey —an influence which was paralleled and reinforced in all countries by the powerful social position occupied by the *ṣūfī* orders and the extension of their lay membership to all classes.

6. During the last century, the strong revulsion from *ṣūfism* in orthodox Muslim circles has had a parallel effect on Muslim ethical thought, which in reaction from the extreme passivity of the *ṣūfī* ethic has tended to swing towards an activist ethic, rather guardedly expressed by such leaders as *Djamāl al- Dīn al- Afghānī* and Muḥammad ‘Abduh, and in more outspokenly “ Mu‘tazilite” terms by others. Outside theological circles, the same trend, reinforced by the influence of western philosophies, together with internal social and political developments, has stimulated more evolutionary types of ethical theory, notably those of the Turkish sociologist Ziyā Gökalp and of the Indian poet Muḥammad

Iḳbāl, all of which, however, are most properly to be regarded as representing transitional phases in modern Muslim thought.

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(ii) PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS.

1. In the classification of the various branches of philosophy, *akhlāḳ* is considered, together with politics (*al- ʿilm al- madanī*, see MADĪNA) and economics (*tadbīr al-manẓil* [*q.v.*]), as a part of practical philosophy.

Galen's work *Fī 'l- Akhlāḳ* is described in Ḥunayn's treatise on the Syriac and Arabic Galen-translations in the following terms: "Galen dealt in it with different $\Theta\eta$, their causes, signs and treatment" (ed. Bergsträsser, no. 119; cf. Seneca, Epist. xcv, 65). Al-Ghazālī uses almost the same words when he says (*al- Munkidh*, 99) that *akhlāḳ* as a branch of philosophy consists in "defining the characteristics and moral constitutions of the soul and the method of moderating and controlling them". The same definition still occurs in Ibn Ṣadr al- Dīn al- Shīrīwānī (d. 1036/1626-7), quoted by Ḥādīdjī Khalīfa, s.v. *akhlāḳ* : "It is the science of virtues and the way how to acquire them, of vices, and the way how to guard against them.

Its subject is: the innate dispositions (*akhlāḳ*), the acquired virtues, and the rational soul as far as it is affected by them". *Akhlāḳ* as a philosophical doctrine of ethics appealed at first only to the limited circles of persons interested in Greek philosophy. But since its representatives insist that philosophical ethics are not meant to contradict Islam but either to supplement or confirm it, these ideas could eventually be integrated with the religious tradition and retain some influence even in later centuries.

2. Greek moral philosophy was conveyed to the Arabs in several different ways which eventually converged. Standard works of the classical days of Greece read in the late philosophical schools, like Plato's *Republic*,

Timaeus, *Laws*, were known in the original and in commentaries and summaries (cf. AFLĀṬŪN). Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, divided into eleven books, were known in Ishāḳ b. Ḥunayn's translation. Books viii-xi of the Arabic text, corresponding to vii-x of the usual division, have been traced in a Moroccan manuscript (cf. A. J. Arberry, in *BSOAS*, 1955, 1 ff.). The same manuscript contains a summary of the *Nicomachean Ethics* by Nicolaus of Damascus (1st century B. C.). Porphyry's commentary (cf. *Fihrist*, and J. Bidez, *Vie de Porphyre*, Gand-Leipzig 1913, 56*-58*) was translated into Arabic and most probably extensively used by Miskawayh in chapters 3-5 of his *Tahdhīb [I:327b] al- Akhlāk* (see § 7 below). The Arabs knew also a late Greek summary of the *Nicomachean Ethics* ("Summary of the Alexandrines"): extracts in MS Taymūr Pasha, *akhlāk* 290, no. 16; this work was translated into Latin by Herman the German in 1243 or 1244 (cf. *Aristoteles Latinus*, ii, Cambridge 1955, 1308). Al-Fārābī wrote a commentary on the introduction of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which is referred to by Spanish authors of the 12th century (cf. M. Steinschneider, *Al-Farabi*, St. Petersburg 1869, 60). Ibn Rushd's Middle Commentary (written in A. D. 1177) is preserved in a Latin translation by the same Herman in 1240 (cf. *Aristoteles Latinus*, ii, 1308) and in a Hebrew translation of 1321 by Samuel b. Judah of Marseilles (M. Steinschneider, *Die hebr. Übersetzungen*, 217).

Among Greek works less known in the Western tradition but widely read in the Arab world are three treatises by Galen. (1) Περὶ ἡθῶν, *Fi 'l-Akhlāk*, lost in the Greek original and preserved only in Arabic guise. (Arabic Epitome published by P. Kraus in *Bull. of the Fac. of Arts of the Univ. of Egypt*, v/1, 1939; cf. R. Walzer, in *Classical Quarterly*, 1949, 82 ff.; idem, in *Harvard Theological Review*, 1954, 243 ff.; S. M. Stern, in *Classical Quarterly*, 1956.) (2) *How a man may discover his own vices* (cf. *Corpus Med. Graec.*, v, 4, 11; Ḥunayn, *Risāla*, no. 118). (3) *Good men profit by their enemies* (lost in the Greek original; Ḥunayn, no. 121).

Both of these two latter treatises were used by al- Rāzī (see § 5 below), all three by Miskawayh (§ 7 below). A treatise by Themistius is quoted under a wrong name by Miskawayh (see below); another one attributed to him survives in Arabic (ed. L. Cheikho, *Mash.*, 1920, 887-9, tr. M. Bouyges, *Arch. de Philosophie*, 1924, 15 ff.). There were, no doubt, some other late Greek books from which middle-platonic Greek thought, only slightly touched by neoplatonic ideas, was handed down to the Arabs. Among other pre-neoplatonic treatises studied by Arabic writers on moral philosophy are the *Pinax* of Cebes (“ Kābis the Platonist”), reproduced in Miskawayh's *Djāwidhān Khirad* (ed. Badawi, 229 ff.; separate editions by Elichman, Leiden 1640 and R. Basset, Algiers 1898); the neopythagorean Bryson's *Oikonomikòs*, preserved only in Arabic translation and extensively quoted by Miskawayh (ed. M. Plessner, Heidelberg 1928); the *Golden Verses* ascribed to Pythagoras [see FUTHĀGHŪRAS] and a pseudo-platonic *Exhortation concerning the education of young men*, two “pythagorean” documents by which Miskawayh was impressed (cf. F. Rosenthal, in *Orientalia*, 1941, 104 ff., 383 ff.).

3. Al- Kindī's ethical treatises (*Fihrist*, nos. 190-1, 193-6, cf. also F. Rosenthal, *al- Sarakhsi*, ii A, 10-2, 16-7) were apparently appreciated by subsequent Islamic writers. His treatise *On freedom from Grief* (ed. H. Ritter-R. Walzer, *Studi su Al Kindi II*, Rome 1938; M. Pohlenz, in *GGA*, 1938, 404 ff.) was used by Miskawayh (*Tahdhīb*, 70 ff.), Ibn Sīnā and others. Another quotation in Miskawayh (61) may derive from al- Kindī's lost work *Fi 'l- Akhlāk* and is also known to al- Ghazālī (F. Rosenthal, in *Orientalia*, 1940, 186 ff.). Al- Kindī (cf. *al- Hudūd*, in *Rasā'il*) (Abū Rīda), 177-8 and elsewhere in his *Rasā'il* bases his moral philosophy, not unlike the Stoics, Galen and other late Greek philosophers, on the threefold platonic partition of the soul into a rational, spirited and appetitive part or soul or faculty, and on a platonic definition of the four cardinal virtues, wisdom, valour, temperance and justice [cf. FADĪLA]; these in their turn are each associated with a number of subordinate virtues. This scheme may, though [I:328a] different in detail, be compared to the Stoic

arrangement of the virtues and vices, or, e.g., to the pseudo-Aristotelian *De virtutibus et vitiis* (transl. in the 11th century by Ibn al-Ṭayyib (Brock., S I, 884). The Aristotelian definition of virtue as the mean between two extremes is combined with the platonising view (cf. Porphyry, Ἀφορμαί, ch. xxxii, 2 and 1. Goldziher, *Maʿānī al-Nafs*, 20). Although the evidence available in the few extant works of al-Kindī is obviously slight, it seems probable that Miskawayh based himself in the first chapter of *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq* on al-Kindī's treatment of the virtues and vices. There is on the whole nothing ultra-neoplatonic in al-Kindī's platonising popular philosophy, in which platonic, peripatetic and stoic elements are blended in a way not uncommon in hellenistic and later popular Greek moral treatises.

4. The Christian Ḳuṣṭā b. Lūḳā's treatise *About the causes of the differences which exist between men with regard to their characters, ways of life, desires and considered moral choice* (ed. P. Sbath, in *BIE*, 1941) is based on the Platonic tripartition of the soul and on the whole on ideas to be found in Galen.

5. Al-Kindī's treatise *On Spiritual Medicine* appears to be lost but al-Rāzī's brilliant treatment of the same subject is available in a critical edition of the Arabic text (*Opera Philosophica*, ed. Kraus, 15-96, Eng. tr. by A. J. Arberry, *The spiritual Physick of Rhazes*, London 1950). As was to be expected in this Muslim "Platonist", it is written in an uncompromisingly platonic vein, and the Aristotelian elements found in al-Kindī and Miskawayh are missing. It should be studied together with his autobiographical defence of the philosophical way of life (*Opera*, 98-111; French transl. by P. Kraus in *Orientalia*, 1935, 300 ff.; English tr. by Arberry in *Asiatic Review*, 1949). Al-Rāzī's version of Greek moral philosophy did not, however, influence the main trend of philosophical ethics in Islam.

6. The treatise *Fī Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq* of the Jacobite philosopher Yaḥyā b. ʿAdī represents another variant of late Greek thought. There are no specifically Christian ideas in it; Aristotelian influence is, as in al-Rāzī,

non-existent. It is based on the platonic tripartition of the soul, but the 21 virtues and corresponding vices are neither specifically referred to the three souls nor subordinated to the four cardinal virtues and their contraries (which are listed among them). This scheme probably depends ultimately on some lost pre-neoplatonic Greek original. His concluding chapter on the perfect man who bases his life on the requirements of his intellectual soul and has trained himself to love every human being combines stoic and neoplatonic language, and is not very different from the thought of al- Fārābī [q.v.].

7. The most influential work on philosophical ethics is *Tahdhīb al-Akhlāq* of Miskawayh (d. 421/1030) (analysis of its contents in de Boer, 507, and Donaldson, 127-133; Eng. tr. by A. J. M. Craig in course of publication). Miskawayh firmly rejects the pre-Islamic Arabic poets as educators, but is not unsympathetic to the Persian tradition of ethics. In many striking passages he insists on the agreement of Greek moral philosophy with the basic tenets of Islam. He tries, however, to reconcile revealed and philosophical truth on the basis of rational thought, and for this reason his views are not acceptable to a primarily religious thinker, except with a certain shift of emphasis. The few Greek writers mentioned by name and quoted, sometimes at considerable [I:328b] length, are all of the later centuries of the Roman Empire: Galen (see § 2 above), Bryson (on the right upbringing of children; *ibid.*), Porphyry as a commentator on Aristotle's *Ethics*, and Themistius, wrongly quoted under the name of Socrates (cf. F. Rosenthal, in *IC*, 1940, 403). References to Plato and Aristotle occur within the context of these late works. Although al- Kindī is only twice mentioned by name, Miskawayh is probably in al-Kindī's debt to a much greater extent (see § 3 above). In chapters 3-5 he follows rather closely a neoplatonic commentator on certain sections of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, which recalls the known teaching of ethics in the later Peripatos and the extant commentaries on the *Ethics* without being identical with any of them. But at the same time he stresses the platonic elements to be found in the *Ethics* to make out Aristotle to be a more

decided platonist than he was. Miskawayh's own contribution to this inherited interpretation, if any, was (apart from demonstrating the compatibility of Greek philosophy with Islam) to emphasise the neoplatonic aspects of this moral philosophy still further (cf. R. Walzer, *Some aspects of Miskawaih's Tahdhib al- Akhlāq*, *Mélanges Levi della Vida*, Rome 1956).

8. The influence of philosophical ethics on *adab* literature has been noted by de Boer, who singles out as an instructive example *Adab al- Dunyā wa 'l- Dīn* by al- Māwardī (d. 450/1058). In this work the presentation of the traditional ethical materials is refreshed and “modernized” by the inclusion of materials from the later centuries, including both philosophical and ascetic ideas; these are combined with the older materials somewhat unsystematically, but in a direction not dissimilar from that taken later by al-Ghazālī. (German transl. by O. Rescher, 1932-3.) 9. A much more far-reaching and fundamental synthesis was carried through by al- Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), who on the one hand discarded the merely formal and superficial elements of the *adab* tradition, and on the other firmly based his exposition on the penetrating spiritual analysis developed by the *ṣūfī* teachers (see sect. i, § 3 above). At the same time, he evidently regarded Miskawayh's treatise as “reasonable in itself and supported by proof”, and agreed that its contents “did not contradict the Book and the *Sunna*”. Hence the philosophical ideas of Greek origin which Miskawayh discusses and explains became part of the generally-accepted educational theory to be found in the *Iḥyā' 'Ulūm al- Dīn*, in which the section on self-discipline (2nd book of the 3rd quarter) is based on Miskawayh's *Tahdhīb al- Akhlāq*.

Miskawayh's influence is also unmistakably traceable in other works of al-Ghazālī, and his ethical theory was in this way eventually integrated with the religious tradition. (Cf. A. J. Wensinck, *La Pensée de Ghazzali*, Paris 1946, esp. chap. ii; M. Plessner, op. cit.; H. Ritter, *Al Ghazzali, Das Elixier der Glückseligkeit*, Jena 1925; and see AL- GHAZĀLĪ.) 9. How successful the

Ghazālīan synthesis was in influencing later ethical literature and thought is a question which still awaits investigation. The literary evidence suggests *prima facie* that its influence, if anything, was indirect, and that the diverse trends of ethical thought continued to exist side by side. The influence of Miskawayh's work was perpetuated chiefly in Persian literature; the Shīite Avicennian, Naṣīr al- Dīn al- Ṭūsī, follows Miskawayh closely, as he himself avows, in the section on ethics of his *Akhlāq-i Nāṣirī* (completed 633/1233) (cf. Plessner, loc. cit.). Two centuries [I:329a] later, al- Dawwānī (d. 907/1501), the author of the *Akhlāq-i Djalālī* (Eng. trans., with valuable notes, by W. F. Thompson, *Practical Philosophy of the Muhammadan People*, London 1839; short analysis by Donaldson, 184), selected his basis material from Ṭūsī's work, but he also refers to al-Ghazālī as an additional Islamic authority. (For Persian *akhlāq* literature cf. H. Ethé, in *Gr. I. Ph.*, ii, 346 ff.) (R. Walzer) to (i) and (ii): No comprehensive history of Islamic ethics has yet been written. D. M. Donaldson, *Studies in Muslim Ethics*, London 1953, is of unequal value. There is a brief but suggestive survey by T. J. de Boer in Hasting's *Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. v, 1912, s.v. Ethics and Morality (Moslem).

Scattered materials are to be found in a number of works in addition to those mentioned in the article, different aspects are dealt with in the following: G. Richter, *Studien zur Geschichte der älteren arabischen Fürstenspiegel*, Leipzig 1932 D. B. Macdonald, *The Religious Attitude and Life in Islam*, Chicago 1909 C. E. von Grünebaum, *Mediaeval Islam*, Chicago 1946, etc.

L. Gardet, *La Cité Musulmane*, Paris 1954.

TAKLĪF (A.), a term of the theological and legal vocabulary denoting the fact of an imposition on the part of God of obligations on his creatures, of subjecting them to a law. The corresponding passive participle *mukallaf* is used of someone who is governed by this law and in this connection, in legal language, it denotes every individual who has at his disposal the full and entire scope of the law (cf. J. Schacht, *An introduction to Islamic law*, Oxford 1964, 124).

The Ḳur'ānic origin of the term, though indirect, is beyond doubt. On six occasions (though differently expressed) the Ḳur'ān says that God only imposes on every man what he is capable of (*lā yukallifu llāhu nafsan illā wus'ahā*, II, 286; cf. similarly II, 233; VI, 152; VII, 42; XXIII, 62; LXV, 7). Out of the various possible meanings of this root *k-l-f* the one which in this case is relevant is that which denotes the idea of a difficult task, requiring a great effort to perform. The *L'A* defines *taklīf* as the fact of ordering someone to do something which is hard for him (*mā yashuḡḡu 'alayhi*). Al- Djuwaynī gives the same meaning and suggests *ilzām mā fīhi kulfa* (*al- Burhān fī uṣūl al- fiḡh*, Cairo 1400/1981, k 26).

From the theological point of view, the existence of *taklīf* principally raises three questions: 1. How do we know the obligations which God imposes on us? The Mu'tazilīs reply: in two ways, by our reason (*bi 'l- 'aql*) and by revelation (*bi 'l- sam'*, or *bi 'l- shar'*). It is our reason which teaches us, for example, that we must be upright, pay back a deposit, be grateful to a benefactor. Revelation adds the specific obligations of the Islamic religion: the five daily prayers, the fast of Ramaḍān, etc. There are therefore, as 'Abd al- Djabbar loves to say, two sorts of *taklīf*, a *taklīf 'aqlī* and a *taklīf sam'ī* (cf. *Mughnī*, xiv, 149, l. 13 and 150, ll. 2-3; Ps. 'Abd al- Djabbar, *Sharḡ al- uṣūl al- khamṣa*, Cairo 1965, 70, l. 11; Ibn Mattawayh, *al- Maḍimū' fī 'l- Muḥīṭ*, i, Beirut 1965, 7, l. 3). From the Sunnī side, the Māturīdīs essentially maintain an identical point [X:139a] of view. The Ash'arīs, on the other hand, affirm that no obligation is

known by reason; the Law as revealed is the only foundation for good and evil.

2. Why does God impose obligation on us? The *Ash'arīs* refuse to answer this question, by virtue of their principle that we have not to look for motives (*'ilal*) in any divine action. For the *Mu'tazilīs* the answer is simple: God acts in everything for the good of mankind and it is therefore also for their good that He imposes duties. The reason advanced by al-*Djubbā'ī* [q.v.] and his disciples is that because of that, God has given man the power to reach the highest form of bliss. He certainly would have been able to create man directly in Paradise, but happiness which is granted directly is less keen than that which is preceded by pain and which is its recompense.

For al-*Djubbā'ī* and his disciples, contrary to other *Mu'tazilīs* who submitted to the so-called *al- aṣḥaḥ* thesis (from all points of view God is obliged to do whatever is most advantageous to man), God was not bound at the outset to impose a law on man. If He did that, it was purely out of favour (*tafaḍḍul*) towards them. But having done it, in this situation He set about the obligation of making for them *al- aṣḥaḥ fī dīnīhim*, that is to say, to provide them from now onwards with the means and all assistance necessary to help them discharge the duties to which He had subjected them, and thus to "remove every excuse" for their not doing so.

3. Can God oblige man to do the impossible? This is the most serious question, the so-called *taklīf mā lā yuṭāqu*. *A priori* the answer should be consistently in the negative, seeing that there had appeared in the *Qur'ān* itself six times "God only asks of each one what he is capable of". This is certainly the *Mu'tazilī* point of view, on behalf of the principle of the divine justice (*'adl*), a cause which they champion. It is precisely this justice which lays the obligation on God, as mentioned above, of providing man with all the means to obey his commandments. The point of view of the *Māturīdīs* is also fundamentally in agreement with the

Mu'tazilīs on this point. This, however, was not the view of al- Ash'arī and certain of his disciples for the following reasons.

Firstly, in favour of their thesis, there is the Ash'arī principle of absolute divine liberty. Al- Ash'arī said that no rule applied to God; he could do whatever He wanted; everything that He does is just and it would be equally just if He did the opposite. Nothing prevents Him, therefore, from compelling man to do the impossible, whether it be a matter of logical impossibility (*taklīf al- muḥāl*) like bringing together opposites, or a matter of physical impossibility (*taklīf al- 'ādijiz*) like commanding a lame man to walk.

Secondly, the way in which al- Ash'arī represents human power and its relation to action leads him to allow the principle of *taklīf mā lā yuṭāqu* by using another expedient. Contrary to the Mu'tazilīs (for whom all power is necessarily the power of an action or its converse, and power therefore necessarily precedes the action), al- Ash'arī considers, as did al- Nadjdjār before him, that all human power is contemporaneous with the action which corresponds to it; it is therefore only power for this action and not for its converse. The result of this is that just when the unbeliever produces an action of unbelief this has not the power of the converse of unbelief; nevertheless, at that very moment God commands him to believe, which is certainly compelling him to do the impossible. The impossibility under the circumstances would not be of the same order as the preceding hypothesis. Al- Ash'arī [X:139b] explains (here again following the theories of al- Nadjdjār) that, if at the moment the unbeliever did not have the capacity to believe, it was because he had made a deliberate choice to have “no belief”. It would be a question in the case of a *taklīf al- tārīk* (*tark* meaning the fact of accomplishing the converse of a given act) as distinct from the *taklīf al- 'ādijiz*.

(It is worth noting that to avoid ending up with *taklīf mā lā yuṭāqu*, certain theologians—one of whom is said to have been Abū Ḥanīfa—while supporting the thesis of the “non-anteriority” of the power in

relation to the action, at the same time nevertheless maintained that identical power was a power of opposites, not simultaneously, but by the substitution of the one for the other. This thesis was called *albadal*.) Finally, there is the fact of eternal divine foreknowledge. God knows from time immemorial that this or that person will never believe. It is therefore for all time impossible that they will believe (unless the possibility was conceded that God could be mistaken), and yet God commands them to believe. In the same way, He did not stop commanding Abū Lahab to believe, even after having announced in *Qur'ān*, CXI, 1-3, that he would roast in Hell. One would imagine that, this time, even the Mu'tazilīs would have to recognise in this a situation with an obligation to do the impossible. However, this was not the case: according to al- *Ash'arī* (*Maḳālāt*, 2nd ed. Ritter, 243, ll. 14-15, and 561, ll. 14-15), all with just one exception were of the opinion that, in the matter of a man whom God knew would never believe, the order to believe was addressed to him as well, and he too had the power to believe.

(D. Gimaret)

BUKHL (Ar.; also vocalised *bakhl*, *bakhal*, *bukhul*) and *bakhīl* (pl. *bukhalā*?; less often *bākhil*, pl.

bukhkhāl) mean respectively 'avarice' and 'avaricious, miserly'. Just as in the ancient poems the virtue of generosity is constantly sung, so avarice furnishes a theme for satire which is widely exploited by the poets, though it seems that this fault, at least in its most sordid forms, was scarcely widespread among the ancient Arabs. It is however a fact that it

is castigated in a number of Qur'ānic verses aimed at combating avarice in the full sense (xvii, 102/100; lvii, 24) or simple hoarding (ix, 35, civ, 1 ff.), or at the encouragement of generosity in general (ix, 77/76; iix, 9) and almsgiving in particular (iii, 40/38, 175/180; iv, 127/128; lxiv, 16 f.); moreover, numerous *ḥadīth* s against avarice are attributed to the Prophet (especially *ayy u dā'* in *adwa' u min al- bukhhl* ?). These condemnations and exhortations, however, seem to result less from an absolute moral principle than from the necessity in which the newly-founded Islamic community found itself of receiving spontaneous gifts and then of collecting regularly the contributions of its members (see *ṢADAQA* , *ZAKĀT* , and cf. *bāb al- zakāt* in the *ḥadīth* -collections).

After the conquests the Arabs were brought by the entry into Islam of new racial elements into contact with peoples of a somewhat different temperament, and when, brought before the bar, they had to put up a defence, shrewder minds did not fail to single out the generosity of the Arabs in order to contrast it with the avarice of the non-Arabs. It is doubtless not by mere chance that, under the 'Abbāsids, it is the *Khurāsānīs* who supply the anthologies with anecdotes about misers. The relationship: generosity = Arabs/avarice = non-Arabs takes practical shape in the polemics of which *al- Djāḥiẓ* gives several specimens in his remarkable *Kitāb al- bukhālā'*, the first and probably the only attempt in Arabic literature to analyse a character and portray him through anecdotes, though with political undertones. This psychological analysis which had its origin in *al- Djāḥiẓ*, was ignored by later writers who, in their *adab* -books and then in the popular encyclopedias, confined themselves to reproducing the Qur'ānic verses, *ḥadīth* s, anecdotes, and poems about misers (see for example *Ibn 'Abd Rabbih*, *Ikḍ, passim*; *al- Abshīhī*, *Mustaṭraf*, i, 233), not omitting, however, to mention that history knows but four [*sic*] Arab misers: *al- Ḥuṭay'a*, *Ḥumayd al- Arḡat*, *Abu 'l-Aswad al- Du'alī*, and *Khālīd b. Ṣafwān*.

(Ch. Pellat)

KHAṬĪʾA (pls. *khaṭāyā* and *khaṭīʾāt*), moral lapse, sin, a synonym of *dhanb* (pl. *dhunūb*). The root *kh ṭ* means “to fail, stumble” (in Hebrew, Prov. xix, 2), “make a mistake” (e.g., one says *akhṭaʾa* of an archer whose arrow misses the target); [see **KHAṬAʾ**].

The form *khaṭīʾa* appears five times in the **Qurʾān**, and the root *kh ṭ* is frequently found there. It combines within itself the three meanings of “error” (*khaṭaʾ*, e.g., XVII, 33), “culpable lapse” (*khiṭʾ*, e.g., XVII, 31; cf. *khaṭīʾa*, XCVI, 16), and “sin” (*khaṭīʾa*, II, 81, IV, 112, VII, 161; XXVI, 82; LXXI, 25). However, “sin” is more often conveyed by *dhanb*, *dhunūb*; a *sayyiʾa* is an evil action, and an *ithm* a very grave sin, a crime against God.

We likewise find sometimes *khaṭīʾa*, but more often *dhanb*, and occasionally *ithm* or *sayyiʾa*, in works on *ʿilm al- kalām*, *fiqh* and *taṣawwuf*. It would be tedious [IV:1107a] to study each of these terms separately; sufficient to say that in endeavouring to pin down the idea and the theological aspect of sin in Islam, reference should be made above all to the article **DHANB** rather than to that on *khaṭīʾa*.

I. Qurʾānic references.

On one hand, sin brings down divine anger and punishment (for *khaṭīʾa*, see II, 81; IV, 112; LXXI, 25), but on the other hand, it nevertheless remains within the operative sphere of the divine mercy.

Thus Abraham says, “It is He whom I ardently desire to forgive me my sins (*khaṭīʾātī*) on the Day of Judgment” (XXVI, 82; cf. VII, 161). God, through His apostles and prophets, summons mankind to Himself in order to pardon their sins (XIV, 10; XLVI, 31; LXXI, 4). If a man avoids

grave sin (*ithm*) and depraved actions, he will receive pardon from his Lord (LIII, 32). **God** gives absolution from sin (*dhanb*) and accepts repentance (XL, 3), and He forgives sins (*dhunub*) completely (XXXIX, 53).

God is the All-Pardoning One whose power to pardon is endless, *al-ghafūr al-ghaffār*, two of the “Most beautiful names” upon which pious Muslims like to meditate [see *AL-ASMĀ’ AL-ḤUSNĀ*].

However, one sin is unpardonable, sc. the rejection and the disavowal of **God** and His Oneness (IV, 48, 137; XLVII,34). Impious persons, guilty of *kufṛ* and *shirk* , will only receive pardon if they repent (VIII, 38). Those who have perpetrated an evil action (*sayyi’a*) and remain “encompassed” within their sin (*khaṭṛ’a*) will bring down on themselves the torments of everlasting hell-fire (II, 81).

Thus there are three types of sins mentioned in the text of the **Ḳur’ān**: (1) minor sins, not affecting a man's **faith**, which can be submitted to the divine mercy (LIII, 32); (2) grave sins (*kabā’ir al-ithm*, according to XLII, 37) and “depraved actions” which **God** may pardon immediately or may punish for a specific period, according to His mysterious will (cf. II, 284; III, 129); and (3) *kufṛ* and *shirk* , attacks on the Divine Oneness, which cannot be wiped out except through repentance (*tawba*) and which, failing this last, remain under the threat of eternal hell-fire: “those guilty of *kufṛ* will be rounded up in Gehenna” (VIII, 36).

II. The traditions.

There are numerous *ḥadīth* s which stress the idea of sinfulness and the fate reserved for the sinner, out of which two main themes emerge:

(1) Faith and sinfulness.

There is a certain amount of self-contradiction here. (a) Some traditions stress salvation through **faith**. The divine pardon is assured, provided that there is not rejection of **faith** in the One **God**. Thus the Prophet related

that **Djibrīl** appeared before him and comforted him by this assurance: “Every 6 member of your community who dies professing the Oneness of God will enter paradise”. The Prophet replied, “Even if such a person is guilty of adultery and theft?” **Djibrīl** replied, “Even if he is guilty of adultery and theft” (Muslim, *Īmān*, 113). Certain *ḥadīth* s (*ibid.*, 201-8) go so far as to affirm that God “does not take into account” sins of simple intention, seeing that the thoughts involved are not expressed in words not realised in deeds. The delicate conscience of the believer who discovers in himself “evil thoughts” which he is “too scrupulous to express”, is praised as an act of faith (*ibid.*, 209). (b) However, according to another chain of traditions, “grave sins” are considered as an attack against faith itself: “The Messenger of God said that whoever is guilty of fornication is not a believer, any more than he who steals or drinks wine” (*ibid.*, 100, cf. 101-5, [IV:1107b] and al- Bukhārī, *Hudūd*, i, 6, 20, etc.). (c) In any case, the Prophet's intercession at the Last Judgment for the sins of his community is emphasised in many *ḥadīth* s [see *SHAFĀʿĀ*].

(2) What are the “grave sins”?

The **Qurʾān** mentions clearly and on several occasions the *kabāʾir* or “grave sins”, grave sinfulness (*ithm*) and “depraved actions” (*fahshā*), and gives various examples of each class, but without setting forth a precise table. One *ḥadīth*, which has been seen as a version of the “seven capital sins” of Christian morality, enumerates them thus: “The Messenger of God said, Avoid the seven deadly [sins] (*mūbiḳāt*). When he was asked what these were, he replied, 'Associating others with God (*shirk*); sorcery; unlawful homicide (except when there is a legal reason); despoiling an orphan of his property; practising usury; flight from a battle being waged against the enemy; and taking advantage of the weakness and credulity of virtuous women (*muḥṣanāt*)’” (Muslim, *Īmān*, 144; al- Bukhārī, *Waṣāyā*, *bāb* 23). The tendency towards a laxity which tends to blur the distinction between grave and lesser sins is condemned: “Anas related: Indeed, you commit sins which are only a single hair's weight

according to your own view, but in Muḥammad's time we used to consider them as grave sins” (al- Bukhārī, *Riḳāḳ*, *bāb* 32).

III. *Tafsīr* and *‘ilm al- kalām* .

Discussions and elaborations went on through the course of the ages, emphasising such-and-such Qur’ānic verse or such-and-such *ḥadīth* , according to the tendencies of the different schools of thought.

(1) *The distinction between grave sins and lesser ones* (*kabā’ir* and *ṣaghā’ir*).

This distinction, which appears in both the Qur’ān (e.g., LIII, 32) and *ḥadīth* , was developed at great length by the various schools. The exact definition of *kabā’ir* remained variable. It can be said that the generally-accepted idea of moral lapse or sin was one of disobedience (*ma’ṣiya*) to the prescriptions of the divine law, to the point that *ma’ṣiya* often becomes a synonym for *khaṭī’a* or *dhanb*. It was then readily explained that it was the hardening of the heart and persistence in evil-doing which constituted the seriousness of the sin, expressed by Ibn ‘Abbās as “Everything forbidden by God, once persisted in, becomes a grave sin”. Moreover, it is related from ‘Umar and Ibn ‘Abbās (text cited by al-Nawawī) that “No sin is a grave one, if one asks pardon for it; but no sin is a venial one if the sinner persists in it”. In other words, persistence in minor sins makes them become grave ones.

Is there, then, only a difference of degree between great and small sins? Mu’tazilī tradition, as represented by the *ḳāḍī* ‘Abd al- *Djabbār*, states that a man whose acts of disobedience (*ma’ṣiyāt*) on the whole outweigh his acts of obedience (*ṭā’āt*) is guilty of “grave sin”, whereas, on the other hand, a man whose acts of obedience outweigh his acts of disobedience is only guilty of “lesser sin” (*Sharḥ aluṣūl al- ḳhamsa* , ed. ‘Abd al- *Karīm* ‘*Uṭhmān*, Cairo 1384/1965, 789). For the *Ash’arī* al- *Djuwaynī* (*Irshād*, ed. Luciani, Paris 1938, 331), every sin is necessarily grave, in relationship to the divine Majesty. Sin is a failure of duty towards God, and every failure of duty towards God is necessarily grave. However,

there are sins of greater or lesser degrees of gravity. The two views expressed here are certainly completely divergent, but it seems that one might posit a simple difference of degree amongst the “acts of disobedience”.

The leading members of the various schools nevertheless attempted to lay down different kinds of sins.

[IV:1108a] (a) For the *Khāridjīs* and *Muʿtazilīs*, the “actions of the limbs” form an integral part of *faith* [see *īmān* , 1170-1, § § 1, 3]. Consequently, grave sins which are destructive of *faith* are deliberate acts of disobedience against the *Qurʾānic* injunctions, above all, against the *ʿibādāt* “pillars of Islam”, and against those prescriptions whose non-performance is punishable by the *ḥudūd* . (b) The usual *Sunnī* trend of thought seeks to establish a list of sins which are, as such, grave, but even here, there is some variation. The *Shāfiʿī* jurist *Taḳī* 'l- Dīn al- *Shahrazūrī* puts forward this tautology: “Every sin which has grown so grave that one can call it a grave sin is in fact a grave sin” (cf. al- *Bādjūrī*, *Hāshiya ʿalā* ...

Djawharat al- tawḥīd , ed. *Cairo* 1352/1934, 114). As for lists of *kabāʾir*, these vary amongst writers; al- *Bādjūrī*’s popular manual gives two differing enumerations, and asserts the validity of both (*ibid.*, 102, 104). These lists refer almost invariably to the *ḥadīth* about the *mūbiḳāt* mentioned above, and to *Qurʾān*, VI, 151, and they freely admit that the number seven is not a limiting one. One may state that the following are unanimously considered as “grave sins”: apostasy from the *faith*, *kufṛ* and *shirk* , insults to the Prophet, *fornication* and *adultery*, sins against *nature*, murder, usury and black magic; very often, the use of fermented liquors, theft on a serious scale, and flight from the battle field, are added to these.

Al- *Nawawī* relies on *Muḥammad b. ʿAbd al- Salām* in his commentary (ii, 170) in order to set forth this criterion: if there is any doubt about the

gravity or lightness of any sin which has been committed, it should be compared with the “seven capital sins” of the *ḥadīth*. If it proves to be less serious than the least grave of those, it belongs to the *ṣaghā’ir*; in the opposite case, to the *kabā’ir*.

Other authors define these last as sins connected by the *Qur’ān* with hell-fire, the divine anger, malediction or punishment. Others stress the subjective attitude of the sinner: every sin is grave which is committed without signs of fear or circumspectness, or committed in a heedless fashion; only involuntary acts of negligence in the domain of the control of speech or the passions can be accounted *ṣaghā’ir*. Finally, others (such as Abu 'l- Ḥasan al- Wāḥidī) note that the sacred law itself calls certain sins “grave” and describes others as venial, but that it omits to apply either description to several other sins mentioned in it. The prudent believer should therefore eschew all sin, lest he suddenly finds that he has committed one of the gravest possible ones.

(2) *Sinning and repentance.*

The idea of repentance (*tawba*) is common to the varying schools. For example, we find it expressed in identical terms in ‘Abd al- Djabbar (*Sharḥ al- uṣūl* , 791), just as in al- Īdī-al- Djurdjānī (*Sharḥ almaw ākif*, ed. Cairo 1325/1907, viii, 314). This formulation is “regret for an act of disobedience (against God) in itself, combined with the firm intention of avoiding it in the future”. Cf. also in the *Ta’rīfāt* of al- Djurdjānī, ed. Flügel, Leipzig 1845, 74, the two definitions of *tawba* and sincere *tawba* .

But although the notion of repentance is shared, the degree of the necessity to repent is formulated variously by the different schools.

(a) The Khāridjīs and Mu’tazilīs, relying on *Qur’ān*, II, 81, condemn to hell-fire everyone who remains “encompassed” by his own sin, and for those who have committed grave sins, only repentance accepted by God can avoid eternal hell-fire. When a moderate Mu’tazilī like al- Zamakhsharī comments on the words “He pardons whomsoever He wills

(*Qurʾān*, III, 129), he explains, "... in *tawba* , for God is only inclined [IV:1108b] to extend His pardon to those who repent"; and he strongly opposes the interpretation attributed to Ibn ʿAbbās—"God extends His pardon for grave sins to whomsoever seems good to Him, and punishes whomsoever seems good to Him in regard to venial sins". According to the *Muʿtazila*, it is not that the *tawba* is efficacious in itself, but because of his justice, God is bound to accept it when it is sincere. The *Muʿtazilīs* of *Baghdād* explain in general that He remits the punishment on the grounds of repentance (cf. ʿAbd al- *Djabbār*, *op. cit.*, 790).

(b) The *Ashʿarī* school, on the contrary, insists on absolute freedom of action by the Almighty. Only the sins of *kufr* and *shirk* necessitate a "turning-back" of the heart before they can be pardoned. If one wanted to establish an equivalence with Christian terminology, one would have to say that, according to the dominant *Sunnī* trend of thought, only these last-named sins really merit being called "mortal sins" (though the ideas at work here do not really correspond).

A comparison with the "capital sins" certainly fits the *kabāʾir* better, and every "capital sin" is not in itself (in Christianity) a "mortal sin". In *Sunnī Islam*, God, in His mercy, can therefore either pardon every "grave sin" apart from *kufr* and *shirk* , or else, in His justice, punish it by a period in hell-fire. It is for these sins that the Prophet's *intercession* can be invoked. Must the believer repent of them? Certainly, if he wishes to remain faithful to the divine prescriptions and regain complete purity of heart and intentions (*ikhhlās*). The rules concerning *tawba* [*q.v.*] are very numerous. In regard to perfecting the purity of a man's faith, it is necessarily required. Furthermore, if *tawba* for grave sins is strongly urged, these last can nevertheless be "wiped away" by *istighfār* "asking for pardon". Thus al- *Bādjūrī*, for instance, states that it can be achieved by repeating 1000 times "He is God, the One", and this is the "great act of achieving release"; by making the pilgrimage to Mecca; or by "fighting in the way of God" (*djihād*). In regard to venial sins, these can be wiped

out by the single act of abstaining from grave sins (or by repenting of them); by faithfully observing the religious obligations (*ʿibādāt*); or by ritual ablutions. In regard to these, *tawba* , whilst doubtless praiseworthy, is not required, even for purity of *faith*.

All this concerns judgments made on the perfection of the believer's status. But one must point out that according to the consensus of Sunnīs, and contrary to the Khāridjīs and Muʿtazilīs, *tawba* for grave sins is not necessary for salvation. If the sinner repents, and if God accepts his repentance, the sin is “wiped out”; it requires neither reparation nor penitence, for it no longer exists. For, as al-Djurdjānī remarks, if God's pardon “were to come into effect after (the sinner's) repentance, it would no longer be an act of pardon” (*Sharḥ al- mawāḳif*, viii, 311). It is when “grave sins” are wiped out neither by *tawba* nor *istighfār* that God can, if He wills, show Himself as Pardoner. To sum up: on one hand, divine punishment of grave sins which have not been repented of is not necessarily obligatory (cf. Fakhr al- Dīn al- Rāzī, *Mafātīḥ al- ḡhayb* , on *Qurʾān*, II, 82), and on the other hand, if the punishment does not come into effect, it can only be temporary. Consequently, “it is untrue that *tawba* is necessary for the pardoning of sins, with the exception of *shirk* ” (*ibid.*, v, 455), and one finds the same teaching in other Sunnī *tafsīr* s. According to al- Bayḍāwī on *Qurʾān*, II, 81, the “encompassing” by sin of those threatened with (eternal) hell-fire refers only to those impious per- [IV:1109a] sons guilty of *kufr* or *shirk* . Those believers who have committed grave sins do not come under the verdict of this verse.

On all these points, the Ḥanafī- Māturīdī trend of thought is very close to the Ashʿarī attitude, with one difference, however (cf. L. Gardet, *Dieu et la destinée de l'homme*, Paris 1967, 304 and ref.). For the Ashʿarīs, everything is submitted to the inscrutable Divine Will which may, just as it pleases, pardon straight away or punish for a period of time the believer who is guilty of prevarication; and there are no reservations here. It is therefore *possible* that for a *certain* period of time, there will be sinning believers in

hell-fire, but it is not certain. For the Ḥanafī- Māturīdī theologians, God's promises must always come into effect, and God has threatened punishment for grave sins, even when committed by a believer. Hence it is “obligatory that certain individuals out of those who have committed grave sins will be punished” (Māturīdī thesis adopted by the Ash‘arī al-Laḡānī, *Djawharat al- tawhīd*, verse 117). It is uncertain whether such a prevaricating believer will be condemned to spend some time in hell-fire, but it is certain that some sinning believers will spend some time there.

IV. *Taṣawwuf*—a few examples.

We find in the works on the spiritual life and on mysticism abundant classifications and analyses of the various kinds of moral sins. In Ṣūfism also the most frequently-employed term is *dhanb*, *dhunūb*, rather than *khaṭī‘a* (e.g. al- Kalābādhī, *Kitāb al- Ta‘arruf*, ed. Arberry, Cairo 1934, 64). One may cite as an example al- Ghazālī, who in his *Ihyā’ ‘ulūm al- dīn* (iv, treatise on *tawba*, ed. Cairo 1325/1933, 2- 53), takes over the analyses in Abū Ṭālib al- Makkī's *Kūt al- ḡulūb* and endeavours to classify these sins according to their nature and to lay down a precise list of *kabā‘ir*: (1) *The classification of sins (dhunūb)*.

According to Abū Ṭālib al- Makkī and al- Ghazālī, these are of four kinds (a) the “lordly” (*rabbūbiyya*) ones, such as pride, scorn, boastfulness, arrogance, love of praise, love of life, ambition and despotic behaviour; (b) the “satanic” (*shayṭāniyya*) ones, such as envy and deceitfulness; (c) the “bestial” (*bahīmiyya*) ones, such as greed, covetousness, anger and concupiscence; and (d) those attributable to “wild beasts” (*sabu‘iyya*), such as furious anger, lust for battle and murder.

(2) *The enumeration of the “grave sins”*.

Al-Ghazālī firmly maintains the distinction between grave and lesser sins (*Ihyā’*, *ibid.*, 28 ff.). The list of grave sins which he puts forward is not governed by the number seven for the *mūbikāt* in the *ḥadīth*.

He proposes lists varying between four and eleven, and cites al- Makkī's view that there are seventeen. In this last case, they can be grouped as follows: four come from the heart, sc. the sin of *shirk*, persistence in evil-doing, lack of confident belief in God's Mercy and lack of any fear of His power to punish; four come from the tongue, sc. bearing false witness, misusing an upright man (*muḥṣan*), perjury and sorcery; three stem from the belly, sc. drinking wine and intoxicants, despoiling orphans of their wealth and practising usury; two are connected with the genitalia, sc. *fornication* and homosexuality; two with the hands, sc. murder and theft; one with the feet, sc. flight from the battle field; and finally, one is connected with the whole body, sc. disobeying one's parents.

In regard to moral sin, certain extremist *Ṣūfī* traditions oscillate between two attitudes which are opposed in principle, but which are at the same time often apparently mixed together in fact. An attitude of laxity carried to excess, with which one might [IV:1109b] accuse those called the *Ibāḥiyya*, asserts that anyone who attains to union with God no longer has to worry about the fear of sinning, nor about the prescriptions, injunctions and prohibitions of the law.

Opposed in this is the rigorism of a special variety of the *Malāmātiyya*, which is characterised by a deeply-rooted care to shun the praise and admiration of men; in order to achieve this, such a person will make no attempt to avoid actions which seem to be scandalous, but will indeed indulge in them.

In the first case (the attitude of laxity), we have the abandonment of all asceticism, and in the second “rigorism”), we have ascetic behaviour which goes to the point of being perfectly content with disdain and disapproval, shunning what are undoubtedly sins, but embarking on acts which look like sins in the eyes of men.

However, the dominating fact in the counsels and adjurations of the *Ṣūfī* masters is the necessity of avoiding any kind of voluntary sin, and this

goes to the point of a refined scrupulosity of heart (*wara'*). Man, the '*abd*', is fallible and a sinner before God, hence he must take account of this feebleness and his small stature as a created being, in relationship to the greatness of the Almighty.

Self-control, awareness of one's spiritual condition (*murākaba*), is necessary. From the time of al- Muḥāsibī onwards, examination of one's conscience (*muḥāsaba*) is willingly prescribed, and al-Ghazālī insists upon it (*op. cit.*, 336-61, esp. 346; cf. Asín Palacios, *La espiritualidad de Algazel* , iii, Madrid-Grenada 1940, 80-103). Al-Ghazālī goes on to say that the heart is like a mirror which is pitted and spoilt by rust, and which must therefore be cleaned and polished, so that the superior world can be reflected in it.

(A.J. Wensinck* [L. Gardet]) given in the article.

ṢABR (A.), usually rendered “patience, endurance”. The significance of this conception can hardly be conveyed in a West European language by a single word, as may be seen from the following.

According to the Arabic lexicographers, the root *ṣ-b-r*, of which *ṣabr* is the *nomen actionis*, means to restrain or bind; thence *ḵatalahu ṣabran* “to bind and then slay someone”. The slayer and the slain in this case are called *ṣābir* and *maṣbūr* respectively. The expression is applied, for example, to martyrs and prisoners of war put to death; in the *Ḥadīth* often to animals that—contrary to the Muslim prohibition—are tortured to death (e.g. al- Bukhārī, *Dhabā'ih*, *bāb* 25; Muslim, *Ṣayd*, trad. 58; Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, *Musnad* , iii, 171). The word has a special technical application in the expression *yamīnu ṣabrin*, by which is meant an oath imposed by the public authorities and therefore taken unwillingly

(e.g. al- Bukhārī, *Manāḳibal- Anṣār*, *bāb* 27; Aymān, *bāb* 17; Muslim, *Īmān*, trad. 176).

In the *Ḳur'ān*, derivations from the root *ṣ-b-r* frequently occur, in the first place with the general meaning of being patient. Muḥammad is warned to be patient like the Apostles of God before him (XXXVIII, 16; XLVI, 34; “for Allāh's threats are fulfilled”, is added in XXX, 60). A double reward is promised to the patient (XXXIII, 113; XXVIII, 54; cf. XXV, 75). In XXXIX, 16; it is even said that the *ṣābirūn* shall receive their reward without *ḥisāb* (which in this case is explained as measure or limitation).

The conception is given a special application to the holy war (e.g. III, 140; VIII, 66); in such connections it can be translated by “endurance, tenacity”. Form VIII is also used in almost the same sense, e.g. XIX, 66, “Serve him and persevere in his service”. The third stem is also found (III, 200; see below).

The word is next found with the meaning resignation, e.g. in the *sūra* of Joseph (XII, 18) where Jacob, on hearing of the death of his son, says “[My best course is] fitting resignation” (*fā- ṣabr* un *djamīl* un).

Sometimes *ṣabr* is associated with the *ṣalāt* (II, 42, 148). According to the commentators, it is in these passages synonymous with fasting, and they quote in support the name *shahr al- ṣabr* given to the month of Ramaḍān [*q.v.*].

As an adjective, we find *ṣabbār* in the *Ḳur'ān*, [VIII:686a] associated with *shakūr* (XIV, 5 etc.); cf. thereon al- Ṭabarī, *Tafsīr*, “It is well with the man who is resigned when misfortune afflicts him, grateful when gifts of grace become his”; and Muslim, *Ṣuḥd*, trad. 64, “Wonderful is the attitude of the believer; everything is for the best with him; if something pleasant happens to him, he is thankful and this proves for the best with him; and if misfortune meets him, he is resigned and this again is for the

best with him.” The ideas of *ṣabr* and *shukr* are also associated in *al-Ghazālī*, see below.

The later development of the conception is, of course, also reflected in the commentaries on the *Qurʾān*; it is difficult to say in how far these interpretations are already inherent in the language of the *Qurʾān*. In any case, the conception *ṣabr*, in all its shades of meaning, is essentially Hellenistic in so far as it includes the *ἄταραξία* of the Stoic, the *patience* of the Christian and the self-control and renunciation of the ascetic; cf. below. In place of many other explanations of the commentators, we will give here only that of *Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī* (*Mafātīḥ al-ghayb*, Cairo 1278, on III, 200). He distinguishes four kinds of *ṣabr*: (1) endurance in the laborious intellectual task of dealing with matters of dogma, e.g. in the doctrine of *tawḥīd*, *ʿadl*, *nubuwwa*, *maʿād* and disputed points; (2) endurance in completing operations one is bound or recommended by law to do; (3) steadfastness in refraining from forbidden activities; and (4) resignation in calamity, etc. *Muṣābara* is, according to him, the application of *ṣabr* to one's fellow-creature (like neighbours, People of the Book), refraining 4 from revenge, the *amr bi'l-ma'rūf wa'l-nahy ʿani'l-munkar*, etc.

The high value laid upon *ṣabr* is also seen in the fact that *al-Ṣabūr* is included among the beautiful names of God. According to the *Lisān*(s.v. *ṣ-b-r*), *Ṣabūr* is a synonym of *ḥalīm*, with the difference that the sinner need not fear any retribution from *al-Ḥalīm*, but he is not sure of such leniency from *al-Ṣabūr*. God's *ṣabr* is in the *Ḥadīth* increased to the highest degree in the saying that no one is more patient than He towards that which wounds His hearing (*al-Bukhārī*, *Tawḥīd*, *bāb* 3).

In the *Ḥadīth*, *ṣabr* is, in the first place, found in general connections, like, to him who practises *ṣabr* God will grant *ṣabr*, for *ṣabr* is the greatest charisma (*al-Bukhārī*, *Zakāt*, *bāb* 50; *Riḳāk*, *bāb* 20; *Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal*, iii, 93); in the *Ḥadīth* also, *ṣabr* is applied to endurance in the holy war. A man asked *Muḥammad*: “If I take part in the *Djihād* with

my life and my property and I am killed *ṣabran* and resigned, rushing forward without fleeing, shall I enter Paradise?” And Muḥammad answered: “Yes”. (Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, iii, 325). The word is found in other passages in the sense of enduring, e.g. towards the public authorities, “after my death ye shall suffer things, but exercise *ṣabr* until ye meet me at the heavenly pool” (*ḥawḍ*) (al- Bukhārī, *Riḳāḳ*, *bāb* 53; *Fitan*, *bāb* 2; cf. *Aḥkām*, *bāb* 4; Muslim, *Imāra*, trads. 53, 56, etc.). The word here usually has the meaning of resignation, as in the oft-recurring saying, “The (true) *ṣabr* is revealed at the first blow (*innamā 'l- ṣabr 'inda 'l- ṣadmatī 'l- ūlā*, or *awwalī ṣadmatin* or *awwalī 'l- ṣadmatī*, al- Bukhārī, *Djanā'iz*, *bāb* 32, 43; Muslim, *Djanā'iz*, trad. 15; Abū Dāwūd, *Djanā'iz*, *bāb* 22, etc.).

Significant, in other respects also, is the story of the epileptic woman who asked Muḥammad for his *du'ā'* for her healing; he replied to her that, if she refrained from her request and exercised *ṣabr*, paradise would be her portion (al- Bukhārī, *Marḍā*, *bāb* 6; Muslim, *al-Birr wa 'l- ṣila*, trad. 54). The word is often found in this connection associated with the proper word for [VIII:686b] resignation, viz. *iḥtisāb* (e.g. al- Bukhārī, *Aymān*, *bāb* 9; Muslim, *Djanā'iz*, trad. 11); with this should be compared the following *ḥadīth kudsī*, “If my servant is deprived of the light of both his eyes, I grant him paradise in compensation” (al- Bukhārī, *Marḍā*, *bāb* 67; Aḥmad b. Ḥanbal, iii, 283).

In conclusion, we may remark that in the canonical *Ḥadīth* the meaning renunciation is exceedingly rare, a meaning which receives so great an importance in ethico-ascetic mysticism (cf. what has already been said above on *sūra* II, 42, 148). *Bāb* 20 of al- Bukhārī's *Kitāb al- Riḳāḳ* (which, like the chapter *zuḥd* in the other collections of traditions, represents the oldest stage of this tendency in Islam) has in the *tardjama*: ‘Umar said, “We have found the best of our life in *ṣabr* .” Here we already can trace the Hellenistic sphere of thought for which

renunciation was the kind of life fitting the true man, the wise man, the martyr.

What the *Ḳur'ān* and *Ḥadīth* say about *ṣabr* recurs in part again in ethico-mystical literature ; but the word has here become, so to speak, a technical term and to a very high degree, as *ṣabr* is the cardinal virtue in this school of thought. As with other fundamental conceptions (see the series of definitions of *Ṣūfī* and *Ṣūfism* given by Nicholson in *JRAS* [1905]), we find numerous definitions of *ṣabr* , definitions which often point rather to fertility of imagination than give an exhaustive exposition of the idea, but are of great value for the light which they throw upon the subject like lightning flashes.

Al- *Ḳushayrī* in his *Risāla* , ed. 'A.H. *Maḥmūd* and M. Ibn al- *Sharīf*, *Cairo* 1385/1966, 397-404, gives the following collection: "The gulping down of bitterness without making a wry face" (al-*Djunayd*); "the refraining from unpermitted things, silence in suffering blows of fate, showing oneself rich when poverty settles in the courts of subsistence"; "steadfastness in fitting behaviour (*Husn aladab*) under blows of fate" (Ibn 'Aṭā'); "bowing before the blow without a sound or complaint"; "the *ṣabbār* is he who has accustomed himself to suddenly meeting with forbidden things" (*Abū 'Uthmān*); " *ṣabr* consists in welcoming illness as if it were health"; "steadfastness in God and meeting His blows with a good countenance and equanimity" ('Amr b. 'Uthmān); "steadfastness in the ordinances of the Book and of the Sunna" (al- *Khawwās*); "the *ṣabr* of the mystics (literally, lovers) is more difficult than that of the ascetics" (*Yaḥyā* b. Mu'ādh); "refraining from complaint" (Ruwaym); "seeking help with God" (*Dhu 'l- Nūn*); *ṣabr* is like its name i.e. [bitter] like aloes (*ṣabr* ; see the next article) (*Abū 'Alī al- Daḳḳāk*); "there are three kinds of *ṣabr*, *ṣabr* of the *mutaṣabbir*, of the *ṣābir* and of the *ṣabbār* (*Abū 'Abd Allāh* b. *Khafīf*); " *ṣabr* is a steed that never stumbles" ('Alī b. *Abī Ṭālib*); and " *ṣabr* is not to distinguish between the condition of grace and that of

trial, in peace of spirit in both; *taṣabbur* is calm under blows, while one feels the heavy trial“ (*Abū Muḥammad* al- *Djurayrī*; cf. ὀταραξία).

Al- Ghazālī treats of *ṣabr* in Book II of the fourth part of the *Ihyā'*, which describes the virtues that make blessed. We have seen that, already in the *Ḳur'ān*, *ṣabr* and *shukr* are found in association. *Al-Ghazālī* discusses the two conceptions in the second book separately, but in reality in close connection. He bases the combination, not on the *Ḳur'ānic* phraseology, but on the maxim “belief consists of two halves: the one *ṣabr* and the other *shukr*”. This again goes back to the tradition “ *ṣabr* is the half of belief” (cf. the traditions given above which also associate *ṣabr* and *shukr*).

Al- Ghazālī comprises the treatment of *ṣabr* under the following heads: (1) the excellence of *ṣabr*; (2) its [VIII:687a] nature and conception; (3) *ṣabr*, the half of belief; (4) synonyms with reference to the object of *ṣabr*; (5) kinds of *ṣabr* as regards strength and weakness; (6) opinions regarding the necessity of *ṣabr* and how man can never dispense with *ṣabr*; and (7) the healthfulness of *ṣabr* and means of attaining it. This division is virtually adopted by Bar Hebraeus [see IBN AL- 'IBRĪ] in his *Ethikon* for the *msaybrānūtā* (see A.J. Wensinck, *Bar Hebraeus' Book of the Dove*, Leiden 1919, pp. cxvii-cxix).

Only the following out of these sections can be given here. *Ṣabr*, like all religious *maḳāmāt*, consists of three parts, *ma'rifa*, *ḥāl* and *'amal*. The *ma'ārifa* are like the tree, the *aḥwāl* the branches and the *a'māl* the fruits. Out of the three classes of beings, man alone may possess *ṣabr*. For the animals are entirely governed by their desires and impulses; the angels, on the other hand, are completely filled by their longing for the deity, so that no desire has power over them and as a result no *ṣabr* is necessary to overcome it. In man, on the contrary, two impulses (*bā'ith*) are fighting, the impulse of desires and the impulse of religion; the former is kindled by Satan and the latter by the angels. *Ṣabr* means adherence to the religious as opposed to the sensual impulse.

Ṣabr is of two kinds: (a) the physical, like the endurance of physical ills, whether active, as in performing difficult tasks, or passive, as in suffering blows, etc.; this kind is laudable; and (b) the spiritual, like renunciation in face of natural impulses. According to its different objects, it is called by synonyms like *ʿiffa*, *ḍabt al-naḥs*, *shadjāʿa*, *ḥilm*, *saʿat al-ṣadr*, *kitmān al-sirr*, *zuhd* and *ḵanāʿa*. From this wide range of meanings, we can understand that **Muḥammad**, when asked, could answer, “*īmān* is *ṣabr*”. This kind is absolutely laudable (*maḥmūd tāmm*).

As regards the greater or less strength of their *ṣabr*, three classes of individuals are distinguishable: (a) the very few in whom *ṣabr* has become a permanent condition; these are the *ṣiddīkūn* and the *muḵarrabūn*; (b) those in whom animal impulses predominate; and (c) those in whom a continual struggle is going on between the two impulses; these are the *muḍjāhidūn*; perhaps **Allāh** will heed them.

One of the gnostics (says **al- Ghazālī**) distinguishes three kinds of *ṣābirūn*: those who renounce desires, these are the *tāʾibūn*; those who submit to the divine decree, these are the *zāhidūn*; and those who delight in whatever **God** allows to come upon them, these are the *ṣiddīkūn*.

In section VI, **al- Ghazālī** shows how the believer requires *ṣabr* under all circumstances; (a) in health and prosperity; here the close connection between *ṣabr* and gratitude is seen; and (b) in all that does not belong to this category, as in the performance of legal obligations, in refraining from forbidden things and in whatever happens to a man against his will, either from his fellow-men or by God's decree.

As *ṣabr* is an indication of the struggle between the two impulses, its salutary effect consists in all that may strengthen the religious impulse and weaken the animal one. The weakening of the animal impulse is brought about by asceticism, by avoiding whatever increases this impulse, e.g. by withdrawal (*ʿazla*), or by the practice of what is permitted, e.g. **marriage**. The strengthening of the religious impulse is brought about (a)

by the awakening of the desire for the fruits of *mudjāhada*, e.g. by means of the reading of the lives of saints or prophets; and (b) by gradually accustoming this impulse to the struggle with its antagonist, so that finally the consciousness of superiority becomes a delight.

(A.J. Wensinck*) Besides the references in the text, [VIII:687b] see Sprenger, *Dict. of the techn. terms*, i, 823 ff.

M. Asín Palacios, *La mystique d'al-Gazzali*, in *MFOB*, vii, 75 ff.

R. Hartmann, *al- Kuschairīs Darstellung des Sūfitums*, Türk. Bibl., xviii, Berlin 1914, index L. Massignon, *Al-Hallaj, martyr mystique de l'Islam*, Paris 1922, index *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane*, Paris 1954, index 'Umar al- Suhrawardī, *Awārif al- ma'ārif*, Beirut 1966, 480-1 Ibn Ḳayyim al- Djawziyya, *Madāridj al- sālikīn*, ed. al- Fīkī, Beirut n.d., ii, 152-70 Ibn 'Arabī, *al- Futūḥāt al-makkiyya*, Cairo 1329, ii, 28-9, 206-8 P. Nwyia, *Exégèse coranique et langage mystique*, Beirut 1970, index H. Ritter, *Das Meer der Seele*, Leiden 1978, 235-7: Annemarie Schimmel, *The Triumphal Sun. A study of the works of Jalaloddin Rumi*, London-The Hague 1980, 304-7 eadem. *Mystical dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill N.C. 1981, 124-5 R. Gramlich, *Das Sendschreiben al- Quṣayrīs über das Sufitum*, Stuttgart 1989, 263-70 idem, *Schlaglichter über das Sufitum*, *Abū Naṣr al- Sarrāḡs Kitāb al- Luma'*, Stuttgart 1990, 96-7, 258-61 Barbara R. von Schlegell (tr.), *Principles of Sufism by al- Qushayrī*, Berkeley and Los Angeles 1990, 147- 56. On the divine name *al- Ṣabūr*, see D. Gimaret, *Les noms divins en Islam*, Paris 1988, 422.

ḤILM (A.), a complex and delicate notion which includes a certain number of qualities of character or moral attitudes, ranging from serene justice and moderation to forbearance and leniency, with self-mastery

and dignity of bearing standing between these extremes. The term, which is sometimes linked with *ilm*, more however from stylistic considerations and a taste for paronomasia than from any conceptual association, is basically contrasted with *djahl* [see *DJĀHILIYYA*] and *safah* or *safāha*; a derivative from the latter root appears in the expression *saffaha 'l- ahlām*, which can be translated “to put the most imperturbable out of countenance, to make them lose their temper”. The Arabic dictionaries give only fragmentary definitions of *hilm*; in the *LA*, it is “levelheadedness and reason”, whilst *halīm* is glossed by “patient”; for the *TA*, *hilm* consists of controlling oneself and not allowing any violent emotion or anger to burst out; for the *Muhīt*, it is “the state of the soul which preserves its calm and does not easily allow itself to be carried away by anger” (see also Ibn Abi 'l- Ḥadīd, *Sharḥ Nahḍj al- balāgha*, iv, 290, 335 [III:391a] and *passim*). From these definitions it emerges that the lexicographers consider the basic element of *hilm* to be self-mastery, dignity, detachment (though without the last of these going as far as the *ataraxia* of the Greeks, as T. Izutsu suggests in *The structure of the ethical terms of the Koran*, Tokyo 1959, 26; revised version under the title: *Ethico-religious concepts in the Qur'ān*, Montreal 1966, 31, 69); but they make no reference to the pardoning of offences, whilst in the modern period (as probably for many centuries) the word *hilm* generally connotes the qualities associated with patience, leniency, understanding (cf. H. Wehr, *Wörterbuch*, s.v.), or even gentleness (*ibid.*; Beaussier, s.v.). In a recent work, S. H. al-Shamma (*The ethical system underlying the Qur'ān*, Tübingen 1959, 7) gives it simply the meaning of “good conduct”.

The problems posed by this word are however not so simple. I. Goldziher (*Muh. Stud.*, i, 319 ff.; analysis by G.-H. Bousquet, in *Arabica*, vii/3, 246-9), in studying the concept of *djāhiliyya*, very justly contrasts *djahl* with *hilm*, which implies “an idea of physical solidity, and then of moral integrity and solidity, of calm dispassionate reflexion and gentleness in social intercourse. The *halīm* is the civilized man”, as opposed to the *djāhil*, the “barbarian”. Goldziher adds that *muruwwa*

[*q.v.*] allowed it to be known in what cases it was permissible however to resort to *djahīl*, that is to say to allow oneself to be carried away by a somewhat crude spontaneity, for *hilm* could be a mark of weakness (cf. al- Maydānī, i, 220; *al- ḥalīm maṭiyyat al- dījahūl*).

Now B. Farès (*L'honneur chez les Arabes avant l'Islam*, Paris 1932, XXI), who had used only the second volume of *Muh. Stud.*, makes *hilm* one of the four elements of honour, along with generosity, intelligence and courage (*op. cit.*, 56). While noting (*ibid.*, 55) that *hilm* “consisted in not giving way to one's anger”, this writer recognizes that it sometimes went beyond simple moderation to “become identical with forbearance; in that case, the chief willingly suffered insults and refrained from avenging them, regardless, strange as it may seem, of his own honour”. For this attitude, so much at variance with the toughness of the ancient Arabs, B. Farès finds an explanation in the fact that dishonour provoked by the practice of *hilm* enhanced the group's prestige, while the tyranny of the chief was averted. In reality this form of *hilm*, the scorning of insults, cloaks a considerable moral force, since indifference can, if he possesses a certain nobility of character, administer a more profitable lesson than a physical penalty to the guilty man, but it can only be an aristocratic virtue.

Tradition indeed relates numerous anecdotes in which important personages can be seen turning a blind eye to faults of greater or lesser gravity, while in similar circumstances, according to the writers, men of the common sort would be carried away and take to fighting. Abu 'l- 'Atāhiya (*Dīwān*, 286-7, verses 3 ff.) relates *hilm* to silence (*ṣamt*), “in which the *ḥalīm* finds a protection against all that might injure his honour (*ʿird*)”. Before Islam, therefore, *hilm* seems to have been compounded of a mixture of characteristics which conferred upon those who possessed them, and who were *sayyid* s, an incontestable moral authority.

With Islam, if one is to judge by the interpretations of it that have been given, *hilm* was to change its character entirely, at least in principle. The

word itself is absent from the **Qur'an**, and the adjective *ḥalīm*, qualifying **Allāh** (*passim*), **Abraham** (IX, 115/114, XI, 77/75), **Isaac** (XXXVII, 99/101) [III:391b] and **Shu'ayb** (XI, 89/87), is generally rendered by “long-suffering”, “patient”, “gifted with tolerance”, “slow to punish”; it is also the 33rd of the *asmā' ḥusnā* [q.v.]. Thus the **Qur'an** does not appear to impose the virtue of *ḥilm* on the Muslims; but in strict logic, granted that **Islam** is opposed to *Djāhiliyya* and that *djahl* is the fundamental characteristic of that period, it follows that *ḥilm* must be the essential feature of **Islam**. This is the reasoning that is followed by Goldziher (*op. cit.*), for whom the new religion “desired the triumph of a *ḥilm* superior to that known by Arab paganism”. This original opinion has recently been revived and developed by T. Izutsu (*op. cit.*, 25), who thinks that “Muhammad's whole work on its ethical side may very well be represented as a daring attempt to fight to the last extremity with the spirit of *jāhiliyyah*, to abolish it completely, and to replace it once for all by the spirit of *ḥilm*”. Indeed, the notion of *ḥilm* is simply implicit in Islamic **ethics** and can be deduced *a contrario* from the use of the word *djahl* and its derivatives in the **Qur'an**; but it also emerges from certain verses, the most characteristic of which is certainly the following (XXV, 64/63): “The [true] servants of the Beneficent are those who walk the earth modestly and who, when addressed by the *djāhil*, answer 'peace!'”. In fact, to eradicate the tendencies of the Arab people, it was fitting to substitute a “civilization” for the “barbarism” of the *djāhiliyya*, to make the Arabs civilized men, capable of holding their instincts in check and of pardoning insults, in short of spreading abroad the virtue of *ḥilm* hitherto restricted to an élite; this reform of manners was to be favoured by the belief in the Last Judgement, which imposes a rule of life on earth, and in **Allāh**, Who combines in Himself all the elements of *ḥilm* and of responsibility for avenging men by chastising the guilty.

This analysis of **Muslim ethics**, suggested by Goldziher and restated more systematically by Izutsu, does not provoke any major objection, except that the Muslims do not appear to have consciously made *ḥilm* a

directing principle of their conduct, even though their behaviour in fact corresponded with the definition of this multiple virtue and, in practical life, a true **Muslim** is necessarily *ḥalīm*.

The proof of the survival of the pre-Islamic notion of *ḥilm* without any **Muslim** admixture is to be found in the first place in the facts put forward to explain the origin of the saying (al- Maydānī, i, 229): *aḥlam min al-Aḥnaf*. This noble Tamīmī (d. 67/686-7 [see **AL- AḤNAF**]) still represents the typical pre-Islamic *ṣayyid*, and the *ḥilm* which has made him proverbial contains the following elements: selfmastery, leniency in respect of his enemies, repression of anger, inclination towards the serious, discretion, and hostility to denunciation. After him, the man who seems to have been regarded as most *ḥalīm* is Mu'āwiya; but, on the one hand, this **caliph** belonged to a dynasty which had not yet shed all its bedouin character and, on the other hand, an analysis of his *ḥilm* shows that he had made of it a political principle: he succeeded through his leniency in disarming certain of his enemies, and through his liberality in securing the submission of others, saying that war is more costly than generosity; such a *ḥilm* can in no way be regarded as a **Muslim** virtue (cf. H. Lammens, *Études sur le règne du calife omayyade Mo'āwia I*). **Al- Djāḥiẓ**, who of all the ancient authors took the greatest pains to analyse sentiments and traits of [III:392a] character, has no difficulty (*Faḍl Ḥāshim* 'alā 'Abd *Shams*, in *Rasā'il*, ed. Sandūbī, 104) in destroying the legend of the *ḥilm* of **al- Aḥnaf** and **Mu'āwiya** by observing that neither of them fulfilled the conditions of a true *ḥalīm*, who must in fact possess a combination of qualities which he enumerates, notably in a fine passage in the *Kitmān al-sirr* (ed. Kraus- Ḥādḡirī, 40), and which incidentally have nothing specifically **Muslim** about them. The *adab* writers subsequently name various other great men renowned for their *ḥilm*, in particular **al- Ma'mūn** (see **al- Ibshīhī**, *Mustaṭraf*, **Cairo** n.d., i, 262), but in general they base themselves primarily on tradition, either pre-Islamic or dating from the very first centuries of **Islam** (see particularly Ibn Ḳutayba, *Uyūn*, *passim*; **Ibn 'Abd Rabbih**, *Tkd*, **Cairo** 1346/1928, ii, 75). Even in

al- *Djāhiz*, in the passage just referred to, there appears a new element, but one to be expected from a Mu‘tazilī: it is reason which must curb the passions. In his *Tahdhīb al- akhlāk* (25), *Miskawayh* lists *ḥilm* among other qualities and defines it (232) as “the consultation of reason” (*istishārat al- ‘aql*); al- *Ghazālī*, in his *Ihyā’* (book xxv) brings together anger, hatred and jealousy, but links *ḥilm* with anger and defines it as the plenitude of reason, the mastery of self, the subjection of the passions to reason. Ibn Sīnā introduces it into the system of Greek philosophy [see *FALĀSIFA* , at p. 766b]. Al- *Harawī* (*K. al- Tadhkira al-harawiyya fi ‘l- ḥiyal al- ḥarbiyya*, ed.-tr. J. Sourdél- Thomine, in *BÉt.Or.*, xvii (1961-2), 236, 246) regards *ḥilm ba‘d al- kudra* as one of the qualities of the ruler. The author of a popular encyclopaedia such as al- *Ibshīhī* in the 36th chapter of his *Mustatraf* (i, 252-65) groups together pardon, *ḥilm* , good-nature and the repression of anger, and quotes a certain number of memorable sayings which all go back to the first centuries of *Islam*, with the conclusion that each must try to acquire these qualities and to imitate the Prophet who was the most *ḥalīm* of men.

Thus it appears that *ḥilm* is naturally regarded as a praiseworthy quality but not as a cardinal virtue in Islamic morality; in popular estimation generally restricted to self-control and the forgiving of insults, it is a quality whose effects are turned outwards; however, the thinkers and moralists tend to make it a sort of internal restraint, of mastery over the passions, thanks to the intervention of reason, which must decide the conduct to be followed in any particular circumstance.

(Ch. Pellat) in the article. Also, Ch. Pellat, *Concept of ḥilm in Islamic ethics* , in *Bull. of the Inst. of Isl. St.*, nos. 6 and 7 (*Aligarh* 1962-3).

MUHĀSABA (A.), literally, “accounting”.

1. In mystical theology.

Here the term is more precisely *muḥāsabat al-naḥs*, “inward accounting, spiritual accounting”.

The concept is connected both with the Qur’ānic symbolism of *commerce* and with that of the final end of man. It should be noted that, like all the verbal nouns of the *mufā’ala* type, linguistic creations in the fields of the Arab-Islamic sciences and of spirituality, the word *muḥāsaba* belongs neither to the lexicon of the Qur’ān nor to that of the Tradition. Qur’ānic vocabulary and the vocabulary of the Tradition only uses verbal nouns derived from form III (*fā’ala*) of the *fi’āl* type, and when a *mufā’ala* is a doublet of a *fi’āl*, the semantic difference is usually that of the abstract and the concrete, the moral and the physical. But, in both cases, it is a *matter* of a transitive action, a putting of something into effect, or sometimes an interaction (see the linguistic remarks of *al-Kushayrī* with regard to the word *mushāhada*, inward vision, in his *Risāla* , 43). *Muḥāsaba* is the learned doublet of *hiṣāb*, the “accounting” of *God* on the Day of Resurrection, to which allusion is made in the recommendation, generally attributed to ‘Umar, “Take account of your souls yourselves (*ḥāsibu anfusakum*) before account is made of them, weigh them before they are weighed (sc. in the Divine Balance, *al-Mīzān*), and prepare yourselves for the supreme examination!” (cf. *al-Tirmidhī*, *Sunan* , 38, Book of the Resurrection, ch. 25; the two first phrases are found, reversed, in a *khutba* of ‘Alī, *Nahdj al-balāgha* , ed.

with *Muḥammad* ‘Abduh's commentary, *Beirut* n.d., i, 159; the first phrase is attributed to the Prophet by Ibn ‘Arabī, in ch. 32 of his *Futūḥāt*).

It is to [al- Ghazālī](#) that we owe the most detailed study of the concept and practice of *muḥāsaba* , in Book 38 of his *Iḥyā'* (iv, 336-61) entitled “On spiritual surveillance (*murāqaba*) and inward accounting”. He takes up and develops a certain number of formulations of [al- Hārith b. Asad al- Muḥāsibī](#), “the man of *muḥāsaba*” (in his *Ri'āya*, ch. 7, 36-43), and of [Abū Ṭālib al- Makkī](#) (in his *Kūt al- Kulūb*, i, ch. 23, 114-22). It is the concept of *murābaṭa* (a learned doublet of *ribāṭ* , literally, “to mount guard”) which is fundamental in al- [Ghazālī](#)'s exposition, and Book 38 is divided into 6 chapters, corresponding to the six degrees of *murābaṭa* or “measures of vigilance”: *mushāraṭa*, which is simply the anticipatory accounting of the soul (*al- muḥāsaba ḵabl al- 'amal*) made in the morning every day, and which consists of instructing it in the engagements that it is to fulfill, like a trader who specifies to his associate what he is to do and the responsibilities that are incumbent upon him. The second measure of vigilance is *murāqaba* , spiritual surveillance, intervening notably before action and submitting the soul to three questions, sc. why? how? for whom? (cf. [al- Makkī](#), *Kūt*, i, 121, 155). It is an examination of the motives of the action and the soul's hidden intentions, in order to reject everything that would serve to satisfy egoism or any passion and that is not performed with a view to [God](#) alone. The question “how”? concerns the action's methods, which ought to conform with precise and detailed divine prescriptions, and not surrender to ignorance and individual opinions.

The third measure of vigilance is *muḥāsabat al-naḥs ba'd al- 'amal* , inward accounting after the action.

This examination of conscience, which should take place at the end of each day, is aimed at evaluating “gain” or “loss” realised on the spiritual level and which may lead in future life to bliss or misfortune. Spiritual “capital” is constituted by the ritual acts of canonical obligation (*al- farā'id*), “gain” [VII:465b] being supererogatory works (*al- nawāfil*) and virtues (*al- faḍā'il*), while “loss” is constituted by transgressions (*al-*

ma'āṣi). This recapitulatory inventory should thwart the soul's tricks and sift the slightest deeds performed during the day, such as as looks, and the smallest fleeting or considered thoughts and even silences. The fourth and fifth *measures* of vigilance are immediately connected with the accounting of actions and thoughts each day: they are intended to chastise the soul for its inadequacies, *mu'āḳabat al-naḳḳs 'alā taḳḱīrihā*, so that it does not persevere in them. Practically, the penitence to be inflicted will correspond to the organ or member which has sinned or tried to sin. If 4 the examination of conscience reveals a certain negligence in the pursuit of virtues or in the accomplishment of acts of devotion, one must conduct spiritual struggle, *al- muḱjāhada*, in order to impose on oneself further efforts and to multiply pious works. The sixth measure will consist of reprimanding and admonishing the soul constantly, *tawbīḱh al-naḳḳs wa- mu'āṭabatuhā*, for it was created as an “inciter to evil”, *ammārat an bi 'l- sū'*. Thus it is proper not to leave it a single moment without reproaching it.

The practice of inward accounting is not the act only of beginners in the spiritual way. It is associated with the greatest saints throughout their life. Here we may cite the testimony of Ibn 'Arabī, who confides in ch. 32 of his *Futūḱhāt* that his masters were accustomed, after the *night* prayer, to write down in a notebook all that they had said and all that they had done during the day, and that he himself used to do it for all the thoughts (*ḱhawāṭir*) that had occurred to him. This testimony is taken up by al-Munāwī [q.v.] in his commentary *al- Fayḱ al- ḱadīr* on al- Suyūṭī's collection of traditions *al- Djāmi' al- ṣaghīr*, with reference to *ḱadīth* no. 6468 (v, 67) in which it is stated “The prudent man is he who submits his own soul to *judgment* and who acts with consideration for what will happen after death”.

(R. Deladrière)

SHUKR (A.), thankfulness, gratitude; acknowledgment (pl. *shukūr*); it also has the meaning of praise, which is gratefulness with the tongue.

1. As a religious and mystical concept.

As a *Ṣūfī* term for an internal state and its external expression, *shukr* is a station (*maḳām*) of the wayfarer (*sālik*) and has all the above meanings when referring to human beings.

However, *shukr* on the part of *God* signifies the “requiting and commending [a person]” or the “forgiving” a man: or the “regarding” him “with content, satisfaction, good will”, or “favour”: and hence, necessarily, the “recompensing”, or “rewarding, him”. The saying *shakara ' llāhu sa'yahu* signifies “May *God* recompense, or reward, his work or labour” (Lane).

In the *Ḳur'ān*, *God* is *al- Shākir*(II, 158; IV, 147) and *al- Shakūr* (XXXV, 29-30; XXXV, 34; XLII, 23; LXIV, 17) the latter also being one of His Most [IX:497a] Beautiful Names, meaning “He who approves, or rewards, or forgives, much, or largely; He who gives large reward for small, or few works; He in whose estimation small, or few, works performed by His servants increase, and who multiplies His rewards to them” (Lane). *God* is *al- Shakūr* “in the sense of widely extending His favours, not (thankful) in a literal sense”, giving thankfulness for thankfulness, “just as He has stated, 'The recompense for an offense is one equal thereto' (XLII, 40)” (*al- Ḳushayrī*, 384, tr. Von Schlegell, 132). “Only *God* ... is absolutely grateful, because His multiplication of the reward is unrestricted and unlimited, for there is no end to the happiness of paradise” (see LXIX, 24) (*al- Ghazālī*, tr. of *al- Maḳṣad*, 101) “The one who rewards a good deed manifold is said to be grateful for that deed, while whoever commends the one who does a good deed is also said to be grateful” (*ibid.*). So *God's* reward, His praise

for a good deed is praise for His own work, “for their works are His creation” (*ibid.*).

As for human beings, whose qualities are derived from the divine qualities “the thankful one (*alsh ākir*) is he who is thankful for what is, and the very thankful one (*al- shakūr*) is he who is thankful for what is not” (*al- Kūshayrī*, 385, tr. Von Schlegell, 134).

The importance of *shukr* is clearly expressed in XIV, 7: *And when your Lord proclaimed: “If you are thankful, surely I will increase you, but if you are thankless, my chastisement is surely terrible”*. It is called the key to Paradise on the basis of XXXIX, 74: *And they shall say: “Praise belongs to God, who has been true in His promise unto us, and has bequeathed upon us the earth, for us to make our dwelling wheresoever we will in Paradise! How excellent is the wage of those that labour!”* *Al- Ghazālī* in his *Ihyā’* has a comprehensive chapter on *ṣabr* [q.v.] and *shukr*, which are characterised as the two parts of *īmān* (which equals *yakīn*, see *al- Makkī*, 421) which support and complement each other, *ṣabr* being the precondition for *shukr*. Since these are divine qualities and yield two of God's Most Beautiful Names (*al- Ṣabūr*, *al- Shakūr*), ignoring them means ignoring not only *īmān* but also the qualities of God.

Since *al- Ghazālī* uses the material of the important *Ṣūfī* compendiums (mainly *al- Kūshayrī* and *al- Makkī*; see Gramlich, *Stufen zur Gottesliebe*, 4 ff.), structuring it in a clear, logical order with many additions and clarifying similes of his own, this comprehensive chapter will be used here as a basis.

Although mentioned in different ways before, it was one of *al- Ghazālī*'s most important original ideas to give a clear exposition of the three parts of *shukr*: (1) *ilm*, “knowledge”, (2) *ḥāl*, “(the right) state” and (3) *amal* “acting”, and their interrelation with each other.

4 (1) Knowledge is the real understanding that nothing except God has existence in itself, that the whole universe exists through Him and that

everything that happens to a person (including afflictions) is a benefaction from Him. This leads to knowledge of God and His acts, *tawhīd*[q.v.], and the ability to thank Him which also is a divine benefaction requiring gratitude. Constant awareness of this connects the term with invocation (*dhikr*), and those who have gratitude in every situation are those who give praise (*ḥāmidūn*). *Shukr* as knowledge of the impossibility of really thanking God is expressed in the words of Moses: “O Lord, how can I thank you while being unable to thank you except with a second benefaction from you?” God's answer is: “If you know this, you have already thanked me” (*Iḥyā'*, iv, 83, l. 16) Whoever has this knowledge in its absoluteness is a pure *shākir*.

[IX:497b] (2) Deriving from this knowledge is the second part of *shukr*, the state of joy in the benefactor (not in the benefaction or the act of grace), with the attitude of *khudū'* “humility” and *tawādu'* “modesty”. Joy in the benefactor, not for Himself but for the caring that prompted Him to give is the state of the *sāliḥūn*[q.v.] who are grateful for fear of punishment and hope for reward. The highest degree of the state of joy lies in using the benefaction as a means to reach God's presence and gaze at His face eternally (al- *Shiblī*: “*Shukr* means vision (*ru'ya*) of the benefactor, not vision of the benefaction” [*Iḥyā'*, iv, 81, l. 23]). Thus *shukr* is connected to *dhikr*, the only healthy state of the heart (*sūra* II, 152: *Therefore remember Me, I will remember you, give thanks to Me and reject Me not*).

(3) The action in accordance with the state of joy deriving from complete knowledge of the benefactor has three aspects: the (hidden) action of the heart which is intending the good; the (manifest) action of the tongue which is praise of God; and the action of the members of the body, which is using them in obedience for Him and as a means against disobedience as expressed in *shakwā* “complaint”, which is thereby diametrically opposed to *shukr*.

Ignorance of the real meaning of *shukr* as explained above, and thus neglect and misuse of God's benefactions, is *kufṛ*. The increasing proximity to God through *shukr* and the increasing distance from God through *kufṛ* is expressed in *sūra* XCV, 4-6: *We indeed created man of the fairest stature. Then We restored him to the lowest of the low—save those who believe, and do righteous deeds; they shall have a wage unfailing.*

Understanding of the difference between *shukr* and *kufṛ*, which, ultimately, has to be an understanding with the heart, is based on knowledge of all the principles of the religious law brought about by hearing the verses/signs of God and relying on them, which cannot be done without the prophets sent by God. Through this, God's wisdom in all existing things and the true meaning of His benefaction and its different kinds can be understood, which leads to seeing with the eye of certainty.

(Alma Giese)

(A.K. Reinhart)

1. As a religious and mystical concept.

Abū Ṭālib al- Makkī, *Kūt al- kulūb*, Cairo 1381/1961, 413-32, tr. R. Gramlich, *Die Nahrung der Herzen*, 2 vols., Stuttgart 1992-4, ii, 81-107
 Ẹushayrī, *al- Risāla al- Ẹushayriyya*, Cairo 1385/1966, 383-9, tr. Gramlich, *Das Sendschreiben al- Qu'ayrīs über das Sufitum*, Wiesbaden 1989, and B.R. von Schlegell, *Principles of Sufism*, Berkeley 1990, 131-9
 Ghazālī, in *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al- dīn* (*Kitāb al- ṣabr wa 'l- shukr*), iv, Cairo n.d., 59-138 for *shukr*, 78-124, tr. Gramlich, *Muḥammad al- Ġazzālīs Lehre von den Stufen zur Gottesliebe* [= Books 31-6 of the *Iḥyā'*], Wiesbaden 1984, 139-293
 Ghazālī, *al- Maḥṣad*, Beirut 1971, tr. D.B. Burrell and Nazih Daher, *The ninety-nine beautiful names of God*, Cambridge 1992
 D. Gimaret, *Les noms divins en Islam*, Paris 1988
 Gramlich, *Schlaglichter über das Sufitum* (= Abū Naṣr al- Sarrādj's *Kitāb al- Luma'*), Stuttgart 1990 for Ibn al- 'Arabī's views on *shukr*, see *al- Futūḥāt al-makkiyya*, Cairo 1911, 202-4.

DHIKR , reminding oneself. “Remind thyself of (*udhkur*) thy Lord when thou forgettest” (*Qur’ān* , XVIII, 24). Thus: the act of reminding, then oral mention of the memory, especially the tireless repetition of an ejaculatory litany, finally the very technique of this mention. In *taṣawwuf* the *dhikr* is possibly the most frequent form of prayer, its *muḳābal* (“opposite correlative”) being *fikr* [*q.v.*], (discursive) reflection, meditation. In his *Tawāsīn*, in connexion with Muḥammad's “nocturnal ascension”, al- Ḥallādj declares that the road which passes through “the garden of *dhikr*” and that which takes “the way of *fikr*” are equally valid. For the Ṣūfīs the Qur’ānic basis of the *dhikr* is the above-quoted text (cited, among others, by al- Kalābādhī) and XXXIII, 41: “O ye who believe! Remember (*udhkurū*) Allah with much remembrance (*dhikr* an *kathīr* an)”. *Hadīth* s are often quoted in support and in praise of the practice.

As an ejaculatory litany tirelessly repeated the *dhikr* may be compared with the “prayer of Jesus” [II:224a] of the oriental Christians, Sinaitic then Anthonic, and also with the *djapa- yōga* of India and the Japanese *nembutsu*, and this quite apart from historical threads which may have played a rôle in one direction or another. One may recognize in these *modes* of prayer, without denying possible influences, a universal tendency, however climates and religious beliefs may differ.

Traditions of the Brotherhoods: —The *dhikr* may be uttered aloud (*djalī*) or in a low voice (*khafī*). At the beginning the formula must always be articulated. In the Muslim brotherhoods (*ṭarīqa*) [*q.v.*] there is a double tradition: that of solitary *dhikr* (aloud or whispered). and that of collective *dhikr* (aloud). It is the first which the major texts of the great spiritual writers envisage: “The Ṣūfī retires by himself to a cell (*zāwiya*) ... After sitting in solitude he utters continuously ”God (*Allāh*)“ being present with his heart as well” (al-Ghazzālī, *Iḥyā’* , iii, 16-7). Several

brotherhoods (the *Shadhiliyya* and their offshoots *Khalwatiyya*, *Darḳāwa*, etc.) stress the advantages of solitary *dhikr* and seem to make it a condition of the *dhikr al-khaw āṣṣ* (of the “privileged”, those well advanced along the spiritual path). Others (*Rahmāniyya*, etc.), without excluding the entry into solitude, stress the dangers of it and recommend, at least for a long time, “sessions” (*ḥaḍra*) or “circles” (*ḥalka*) of collective *dhikr* . The latter is without doubt as old as the solitary *dhikr* ; but in its liturgico-technical form, with prescribed attitudes regulating the respiratory rhythm as well as the physical posture, it seems to have been born at a relatively late date, about the 8th/13th century, betraying Indo-Iranian influence among the *Mawlawiyya* (“Whirling Dervishes”) of Konya, and Indian through Turko-Mongol influence (cf. the descriptions by the Mongol ex-functionary Simnānī, 13th-14th centuries). This technicality, which must have been introduced progressively, extends its influence to the experience of the solitary *dhikr* itself (cf. in the Christian Orient the connexions between the “prayer of Jesus” and the hesychastic technique).

The “sessions” generally take the form of a kind of liturgy which begins with the recitation of Qur’ānic verses and prayers composed by the founder of the brotherhood. This is the *ḥizb* or the *wird* [qq.v.], often accompanied by the “spiritual oratorio” (*samā’*). *Wird*, *samā’* , and physical posture during the recitation of the *dhikr* vary with the brotherhoods (see, for the *Maghrib*, Rinn, *Marabouts et Khouan*). For the *dhikr* itself the best summary is the *Salsabīl al- mu’īn fi’l- ṭarā’iḳ al- arba’in* of Muḥammad al- Sanūsī (d. 1276/1859) printed on the margin of the same author's *Masā’il al- ‘ashr*, where there is a condensed account of the essential characteristics of the *dhikr* practised by the forty preceding brotherhoods, of which the *Sanūsiyya* claim to have adopted the essential. The collective *dhikr* sessions described by Western writers are generally classifiable as “ *dhikr* of the commonalty (*al- ‘awāmm*)”. One of the best-observed accounts is that of the *Rahmāniyya* by W. S. Haas. It requires correction and completion (*e.g.*, in connexion with the

interpretation of the formula used); in any case it can hardly exhaust the subject.

Description of the experience: 7 —Whether collective or solitary, the recitation of the *dhikr* presupposes a preparation. This is the aim of the *hizb* and *wird* in the “sessions”. But a general preparation is necessary (“renouncing the world to lead an ascetic life” says al- Ghazzālī) and always the [II:224b] *intention* of the heart (*niyya*). The part played by the *shaykh* (“spiritual director”) is a capital one. It is he who directs and regulates the recitation in the collective sessions; it is he who must guide the solitary disciple step by step. The beginner is recommended to close his eyes and to place the image of his *shaykh* before his mind. The disposition of the “circle” in the collective *dhikr* is carefully regulated. He who recites the *dhikr* in solitude is enjoined to sit in an attitude of *tarabbu‘* (with legs crossed) or on his heels. The position of the hands is specified. It is recommended that the disciple should perfume himself with benzoin and wear ritually pure clothing.

The formula chosen may vary according to tradition and according to the spiritual advancement attained by the *Ṣūfī*. A customary formula for the commencement is the “first *shahāda*”, *lā ilāh illā ' llāh*. The *Shādhilī* method is: “One begins the recital from the left side (of the chest) which is, as it were, the niche containing the lamp of the heart, the focus of spiritual light. One continues by passing from the lower part of the chest on the right upwards to the upper part, and so on to the initial position, having thus, so to speak, described a circle” (Ibn ‘Iyāḍ). There is another (slightly different) description of the *Shādhilī dhikr* by al- Sanūsī, and a description of the Raḥmānī *dhikr* (same formula) in the late work of Bāsh Tārzi, *Kitāb al- minah*, 79-80, etc.

A formula for advanced adepts (sometimes for solitary beginners, sometimes from the beginning of “collective” sessions) is the “Name of Majesty” *Allāh* . The utterance is accompanied by two movements, says Bāsh Tārzi (ibid., 80): (1) “strike the chest (with the head) where the

corporeal heart (which is cone-shaped) is, saying *Allāh* with the head inclined over the navel; (2) raise the head as you pronounce the *hamza* (ʾA) and raise the head from the navel up to a level with the brain, then pronounce the remainder of the formula (*llāh*) on the secret navel". The *dhikr* known as that of the Ḥallādjīyya, according to al- Sanūsī, is: *Allāh* , with the suppression of *Al* and with the vocalization *lāha, lāhi, lāhu* (cf. L. Massignon, *Passion d'al- Ḥallādj*, 342). Al- Sanūsī warns that this procedure may only be used in solitude and by "a man aware of what the result will be". (It appears that the modern 'Alīwiyya brotherhood of Mostaghanem has re-adopted this procedure).

Other formulae are proposed by Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh of Alexandria, Simnānī, Bāsh Tārzī, etc. in accordance with gnostic hierarchies where spiritual progress is matched with the vision of "coloured lights" which is the sign of it: *Huwa, al- Ḥakk, al- Ḥayy, al- Kayyūm, al- Kahhār*.

The duration of the experience is regulated either by the *shaykh* , or, in solitude, by numbers, with or without the help of a rosary (*subḥa*): 300, 3,000, 6,000, 12,000, 70,000 repetitions (cf. the 6,000 or 12,000 "prayers of Jesus" daily of the "Russian Pilgrim" and the Japanese liturgy "of the million" (*nembutsu*). The invocation may finally become unceasing, without care about the exact number. Control of the respiration seems mostly to be concomitant, but it appears more deliberate in the Hamaylī *dhikr* (6th/12th century) and Simnānī's descriptions and also in the counsels of Zayn al- Milla wa 'l- Dīn (no doubt Khawāfī) the commentator on Anṣārī's *Manāzil* .

The *dhikr* as an internal experience: —One of the best sources is the *Miftāḥ al- falāḥ* of Ibn [II:225a] 'Aṭā' Allāh of Alexandria, the second Grand Master of the *Shādhilī* order. Reference may also be made, on the one hand, to al- Kalābādhī's chapter on the *dhikr* and the matter-of-fact description of Ghazzālī, and, on the other hand, to the numerous gnoses of later times (Zayn al- Dīn, Bāsh Tārzī, Amīn al- Kurdī Naqshbandī, etc.). Three main stages may be distinguished, each being subdivided; it

is to be noted that these progressive stages are found again in the writings of Malay Ṣūfism.

(1) *Dhikr of the tongue* with “intention of the heart” (the mere “*dhikr* of the tongue” without *niyya* is rejected, for it would be “just routine, profitless”, says Bāsh Tārzī). (a) At the first step, there is a voluntary recitation, with effort, in order to “place the One Mentioned in the heart” according to the exact *modes* of utterance and physical postures taught by the *shaykh* ; it is firstly to this level that the foregoing descriptions apply. (b) At the second step the recitation continues effortless. The disciple, says Ghazzālī (*Ihyā’* , iii, 17), “leaves off the *movement* of the tongue and sees the word (or formula) as it were flowing over it”.

Cf. the similar testimony of those who have experienced the “prayer of Jesus” and the Japanese *nembutsu*. However, three elements are still present: the subject conscious of his experience, the state of consciousness, and the One Mentioned: *dhākir* , *dhikr*, *madhkūr* (cf. the triad of *Yoga- Sūtra*, i, 41: receptive subject, act of reception, object received). The “effortless” step may be compared with the *dharāṇā* stage of Yoga experience, “fixation” (of mental activity).

(2) *Dhikr of the heart* “The Ṣūfī reaches a point where he has effaced the trace of the word on his tongue, and finds his heart continuously applied to the *dhikr* (al- Ghazzālī, *ibid*. Same testimony in *Account by a Russian Pilgrim*). Here also there are two steps: (a) with effort (cf. Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh, *Miftāḥ*, 4), *i.e.*, with the obscure desire to “maintain the formula” which results in something like a pain *felt* in the physical heart; (b) effortless: this presence is expressed in a sort of hammering of the formula by the beating of the physical heart (same in *Russian Pilgrim*) and by the pulsation of the blood in the veins and the arteries, with no utterance, even mental, of the words, but where the words nevertheless remain. This is a mode of “necessary presence“, where the “state of consciousness“ dissolves into an *acquired* passivity. Cf. the step of

”absorption“ (*dhyāna*) of Yoga. Al- Ghazzālī's analysis in the *Iḥyā'* halts at this stage. ”It is in his (the disciple's) power to reach this limit, and to make the state lasting by repulsing temptations; but, on the other hand, it is not in his power to attract to himself the Mercy of the All- High“. This important distinction is reminiscent of al- Ḥallādj's exclamation to God: ”You are my ravisher, it is not the *dhikr* which has ravished me!“ (*Dīwān* , 53). Later traditions no longer draw this distinction. Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh's monograph speaks of a third stage, for which the second is an effective preparation.

(3) *Dhikr* of the “inmost being” (*sirr*) The heart (*ḳalb*) was the seat of the “knowledge of divine things”; the “inmost being” (*sirr*), “a substance more subtle than the spirit (*rūḥ*)” will be the place of the “vision” (*mushāhada*) of them. It is also the place where the *tawḥīd* takes place, the declaration of divine unity and the unification of the self with the self, and the self with God. The writers often associate this third stage of the *dhikr* with the state of *iḥsān* , spiritual perfection and beauty. The “arrival” of the “ *dhikr* of the inmost [II:225b] being” is known by this, that “if you leave off the *dhikr* it does not leave you, and the whole being of the Ṣūfī becomes 'a tongue uttering the *dhikr*” (*Miftāḥ*, 6). The slave of God “has disappeared (*ghā'ib*) both from the *dhikr* and the very object of the *dhikr*” (ibid.). Thus no duality must remain. But a twofold step is distinguished even here: (a) *fanā'* ‘an al- *dhikr wa 'l- madḥkūr ... ilā ' llāh*, annihilation away from the *dhikr* and its object ... towards God; (b) *fanā'* ‘an al- *fanā'* ... bi' llāh, annihilation away from the annihilation ... in God.

It seems that this state may be compared with the entry into *samādhi* of Indian Yoga (or at least the “ *samādhi* with seed”; any equivalence with the “ *samādhi* without seed” should be more closely examined): “becoming one alone” (cf. the Indian *kaivalya*) conceived as abolition in God, generally in the line of “monism of the Being” (*waḥdat al- wudjūd*). The personality of the Ṣūfī has, it as were, “disappeared” in the act of

abolishing all acts. Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh's description of the *dhikr al-sirr* goes as far as possible in expressing this.

Accompanying phenomena and explicatory gnoses: —Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh describes the *dhikr* of the tongue as sounds of voices and rhythms “within the periphery of the head”. Explanation: “the son of Adam is a mixture of all substances, noble and base”, and the sounds heard come from each of the “constituent elements of these substances” (*Miftāḥ*, 5); the *dhikr* liberates the harmony established between the microcosm and the macrocosm (cf. the period of “cosmization” of Yoga). The *dhikr* of the heart resembles “the buzzing of bees, without a loud or disturbing noise” (ibid.) and is accompanied by luminous and coloured phenomena, at this stage intermittent. Al- Ghazzālī drew attention to this apparition of “lights” which “sometimes pass like a flash of lightning and sometimes stay, sometimes last and sometimes do not last, sometimes follow each other different from one another, sometimes blend into one single mood” (loc. cit.). He explains them as “gleams of truth” released by God's good will, but other authors later describe them as intrinsically and obligatorily bound up with the *dhikr* experience.

Later writers describe these luminous phenomena as being even more brilliant at the step of the *dhikr* of the inmost being, of which they become the particular mark. This time “the fire of the *dhikr* does not go out, and its lights do not flee ... You see always lights going up and others coming down; the fire around you is bright, very hot, and it flames” (*Miftāḥ*, 6). Yoga describes similar phenomena.

Moreover it would be rewarding to make a comparison and a distinction between the Ṣūfī analyses and either the Buddhist “objective” illumination or the “uncreated light of the Thabor” of the oriental forms of Christianity. Various late authors establish other successive stages from the *dhikr* of the inmost being which are also marked by variously coloured luminous phenomena. The descriptions vary with the texts and do not seem to affect the structure itself of the experience. This is the

hierarchy proposed by Simnānī: grey smoke (corporeal envelope); blue (physical soul); red (heart); white light (“inmost being”); yellow (spirit [*rūḥ*]); black (subtle and mysterious principle, *khafiyya*); green (reality [*ḥaqīqa*]), the state of the perfect soul “which sums up all the other states” as Bāsh Tārzī states).

These rising and falling lights are held to be “divine illumination”; no longer a gift from Mercy, [II:226a] as al- Ghazzālī believed, but an effect linked to the experience according to the extent to which the *dhikr* of the inmost being has liberated the divine element in the human spirit directly “emanating” from God (cf. the “trace of the One” of Plotinus). The *dhikr* also effects a direct communication with the “worlds” [see ‘ĀLAM , § 2]. The *dhikr* of the tongue and its “cosmization” effects entry into the world of *djabarūt* , All-Power. The higher stages introduce into the domain of *malakūt* “angelic substances”; they may even lead to *lāhūt* , the world of the Divine Essence. “If you recite the *dhikr* with your inmost being, recite with yourself the Throne with all its worlds until the *dhikr* unites with the Divine Essence (*dhāt*) (*Miftāḥ* , 7). One is reminded here of the entry into the “Pure Land” of the *Jōdo* promised to the disciples of the Japanese *nembutsu*.

These gnostic visions, which in Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh are relatively sober, later become involved in the extreme, as in the above-quoted text of Ibn Amīn al- Kurdī.

Interpretations: —Al- Ḥallādj, al- Kalabādhī, etc., speak of the *dhikr* as a *method* of reminding one's self of God, of helping the soul to live in God's presence; but without for this reason underestimating the discursive method of *fikr* . Al- Ghazzālī portrays the *dhikr* as *the* way of the Sufis, but still preserves, so it seems, the *method* aspect of its nature: a method of unifying the disciple's spirit and preparing him to receive, if the Lord wills, the supreme Mercies. Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh informs us at the beginning of the *Miftāḥ* that to the best of his belief no monograph has yet been devoted to the *dhikr* . If this is true, then the developments *ex*

professo in the theory and practice of the *dhikr*, and the absolutely capital importance assigned to it, may be dated from the 6th/12th century. Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh no longer speaks of it as a preparatory or concomitant method, but as an effective technique, up to its consummation: entry into the domain of *lāhūt*. Later works insist even more on technique—voice, breathing, posture, etc., give themselves up to long disquisitions on the gnostic theme, and never cease to see in the *dhikr* pursued to its last steps a “guarantee” of attainment. This emphasis on technique (where non-Muslim influences are at work) dates from the period when Ṣūfism was dominated by the One-ness of Being (*waḥdat al- wudjūd*); man, in respect of his most “spiritual” aspects, is considered to belong by nature to the divine.

Now the direct effect of experiencing the *dhikr* seems to be a monoideism working on the One Mentioned, “realizing” that perpetual (conscious) “re-remembering” which the first Ṣūfīs demanded of it (cf. the “prayer of Jesus” of the Sinaitic Fathers). But as techniques progressed the ever more numerous analyses are marked by the “cosmization” of the *dhikr* of the tongue, the influence of the *dhikr* of the heart on the circulatory system, and the probable influence of the *dhikr* of the inmost being on the para- and ortho-sympathetic systems, and it seems as though we are in the presence of a control by this monoideism on the individual's subconscious, not to say unconscious, zones. In this case we are dealing with an equivalent of the *djapa-yoga*, almost certainly bringing about a twistingback of self on self towards an ineffable grip of the first act of existence. The conceptualizations of the *waḥdat al- wudjūd* remain faithful to their monist view of the world by calling this movement of “enstasis” *fanā’* ... *billāh*.

[II:226b] This “attainment” is the fruit of a difficult technique of natural spirituality based on long asceticism.

It is understandable that certain brotherhoods should have sought the equivalent (or what they thought to be the equivalent) by purely physical

procedures: the sacred dances of the **Mawlawiyya**, the cries of the “Howlers”, not to mention stimulating and stupefying drugs. Thus one arrives finally at veritable counterfeits which have not been without effect on the opposition by the *nahḍa* of contemporary **Islam** to the brotherhoods and its distrust of Ṣūfism.

To sum up: we find, in the course of the history of Ṣūfism, two distinct lines of utilization of the *dhikr*.

The first and oldest makes it simply a method of prayer, without excluding other methods, where technique appears only in rudimentary form. The second, which became dominant, sees in it a **guarantee** of efficacy in attaining the highest “states” (*aḥwāl*) by virtue of a seeking after *ittiḥād* conceived as a (substantial) identification with the divine. This latter tendency often yields to the attraction of “procedures” and gnoses which become ever more extravagant. The testimony of **Ghazzālī** in the *Iḥyā’* stands at the hinge of the two lines—nearer to the first, and yet bearing witness already to the appearance of technique.

(L. Gardet)

ZUHD (A.) , the material and spiritual asceticism facilitating closer association with the divine.

Zuhd constitutes one of the “spiritual virtues” considered not only by the mystics, but also by a large [XI:560a] number of believers, as essential to religious life in **Islam**. As such, it occupies a dominant place in the biographies of saints of the first centuries of the **Hidjra**. The term embraces numerous nuances, divided between two principal meanings: on the one hand, “renunciation” in the sense of detachment, of

indifference to things of this inferior world; on the other, “asceticism” in the sense of privation, mortification, tests imposed on the carnal soul (*nafs*). The two terms of K̤ur’ānic origin, *‘ābid and nāsik*, have often been employed as equivalents of *zāhid* , although the former (in the plural *‘ubbād*) serves to denote the devotees of God, and the latter, more specifically, the one who performs sacrifices and performs rites. *Zāhidīn* (K̤ur’ān, XII, 20), the sole occurrence of the root, describes the merchants who sold Joseph after finding him in the pit in which his brothers had thrown him, “attaching no value to him” and therefore not considering him worth keeping. Their detachment here takes on a profane sense. To denote a certain form of spiritual renunciation, the K̤ur’ān uses paraphrases, as in the verse (LVII, 23): “Do not despair in that which escapes you and do not exult in that which has been given to you.” Reference could also be made to III, 14; XV, 8; XVI, 96; XVIII, 7; XX, 131; XXIII, 55, 56; XXVIII, 60, 83; XXXI, 33; XLIII, 33-5.

Literature specifically devoted to renunciation comprises, out of 63 titles listed for the period between the 2nd/8th and the 10th/16th centuries (27 of which have survived to this day), 37 works dating from the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries. Their titles include, in addition to the word *zuhd*, which appears 45 times, one instance of *taṣawwuf* (taken as a synonym of *zuhd*); two of *bukā’* (weeping) and *dhamm al- dunyā* (contempt for this inferior world); four of *wara’* (abstinence through religious scruple); and, finally, eight occurrences of *raḳā’ik* (actions that elevate man), which would thus seem to be the closest equivalent, and the singular of which (*raḳīka*) can, as Roger Deladrière has pointed out, denote the precariousness of the life of ascetics. On the other hand, the anthology of al- Bayhaḳī (d.

458/1065 [q.v.]) throws light on the various nuances attributed to *zuhd* in the 4th-5th/9th-10th centuries: contentment with little (*ḳanā’a*); isolation (*‘uzla*); the effacement of self (*khumūl*); opposition to the lower soul and to passion (*mukhālāfat al-nafs wa ’l- hawā*); the limitation of hopes (*ḳaṣr*

al-amal); the pressure to finish works before the end of life (*al- mubādara li 'l- 'amal kabla bulūghal- adjal*); zeal in obedience (*al- idjtihād fi 'l- ṭā'a*); safeguarding the status of a servant (*mulāzamat al- 'ubūdiyya*); scrupulous piety (*wara*^۴); and vigilant piety (*taḳwā*). Some added poverty (*fakr*), which denotes external deprivation as much as the absence of desire for riches; the latter includes, in a spiritual sense, the absence of desire for the blessings of the other world. On the other hand, Sahl al- Tustarī (d. 283/896 [*q.v.*]) draws a clear distinction, on the basis of a prophetic tradition, between *zuhd* and *taḳashshuf* (mortification of the flesh).

Expressing an opinion on the subject of renunciation has never been the exclusive preserve of the Ṣ ūfīs. Declaring that in the *Kitāb al-Ṣ uhd al- kabīr* of al- Bayhaḳī, it is a traditionist, Abū 'Abd Allāh al- Ḥāfiẓ (d. 412/1021), and not a Ṣ ūfī who supplies most information concerning the renunciation of ascetics, mystics and gnostics, Deladrière has thrown light upon the essential role of the *ḥuffāẓin* the elaboration of this literature. This affinity is confirmed by the fact that, in Twelver Shī'ī circles, *zuhd* was reckoned among the qualities required for the transmitter (*rāwī*) of Imāmī traditions.

[XI:560b] The earliest works, such as those of Ibn al- Mubārak (d. 181/797 [*q.v.*]), are primarily concerned with the actions and gestures of the Prophet Muḥammad—who appears to an increasing extent, in the course of the development of mystical literature, to be the most consummate model of the “renouncer”—and of his Companions, as well as certain epigoni, the one most often cited being al- Ḥasan al- Baṣrī (d. 110/728 [*q.v.*]). The work of Ibn Ḥanbal (d. 241/855 [*q.v.*]) adds to this the renunciation practised by eleven sanctified individuals, from Adam to Jesus, and by the Umayyad 5 caliph 'Umar b. 'Abd al- 'Azīz. It is principally from the 4th/10th century onward that the leading protagonists of this literature become the mystics of the two preceding centuries: *Dhu 'l- Nūn* al- Miṣrī, Ibn Adham, Fuḍayl b. 'Iyād, *Bishr* al-

Ḥāfī, Sarī al- Saḡaṭī, Yaḥyā b. Mu‘ādh, Sahl al- Tustarī, al- Djunayd and al- Shiblī.

Goldziher advanced the hypothesis according to which the earliest prophetic traditions, those possessing the strongest guarantee of authenticity, tended towards a rejection of *zuhd*, whereas only late forgeries endorsed or extolled it. It is in any event certain that a large number of ḥadīth, corroborated by Ḳur’ān, XXV, 67, stressed the necessity of limiting the practice of asceticism and of observing a high degree of moderation.

In regard to the first four centuries of the Hidjra, it is difficult to establish a decisive distinction between the corpus of work emanating from the Ḥanbalīs or other traditionists and that of the mystics proper. The distinction was accentuated during the Mamlūk period, at which time the Ṣūfī or the walī only received the epithet of zāhid when he had distinguished himself through extreme corporeal asceticism. E. Geoffroy has declared that at the end of this period, Ḥanbalī authors, making abundant use of the terms zāhid and ‘ābid, effected a very fine demarcation between adherence to Ḥanbalism and attribution of the term Ṣūfī, especially in Syria, while in the Ottoman period there was a general rapprochement between Ḥanbalism and Ṣūfism. In practice, being an ascetic has never implied adherence to Ṣūfism, although the consensus among mystics has always stressed the importance of this quality.

For the Persian Djāmī (d. 898/1492 [*q.v.*]), who clearly differentiates *zuhd* from true Ṣūfism, “ascetics consider the beauty of the other life in the light of faith and of certitude and do not despise this inferior world, but they are still veiled by the pleasure that is afforded them by the contemplation of Paradise; on the other hand, the true Ṣūfī is separated as by a veil from these two worlds, by the vision of primordial Beauty and of eternal love” (*Nafahāt al-uns*, ed. Tawḥīdpūr, Tehran 1957, i, 10).

It is especially in the determination of the sphere of application of *zuhd* that the greatest differences arise. In the 2nd/8th and 3rd/9th centuries, two interpretations of the term were established: for some, it meant above all renunciation, not only of agreeable clothes, accommodation and foodstuffs, but also of comfort, sleep and all human relationships, sometimes including marriage; for others, it was a more internal and subjective asceticism, the renunciation of intentions and desires, which led to the concept of *tawakkul* [q.v.]. However, for many mystics, the two aspects were seen as going hand-in-hand.

Ibrāhīm b. Adham (d. 165/782 [q.v.]) is generally credited with a subdivision of *zuhd* into three stages, which is also found in the works of al-Sarrādj and could emanate from a later source: (1) renunciation of the world; (2) renunciation of the joy of having [XI:561a] devoted oneself to renunciation; and (3) the stage at which the world becomes so insignificant in the eyes of the ascetic that he is no longer interested in it. His disciple, Shakhī al-Balkhī, reckoned to be the first to have spoken of mystical states (*‘ulūm al- aḥwāl*), declares that *zuhd* constitutes the most elementary stage of those who practise sincerity (*ahl al- ṣidq*). It is followed by the stages of fear, of desire for Paradise, and of love of God. The beginning of *zuhd* consists in the training of the body to experience the hunger which will give release from the other preoccupations of this inferior world.

The Malāmatiyya [q.v.], just like the Khurāsānī spiritual leader al-Tirmidhī (d. 318/930) proposed a conception of *zuhd* which was to serve as a model for numerous mystical systems from the 3rd/9th century onward: genuine *zuhd*, that of the Prophet and of his Companions, is presented as a particular type of renunciation, which does not imply in any way a visible and material practice of asceticism, but a profound detachment, an attitude of the heart; ascetic practices may be admitted, if considered necessary, as a preparatory stage, as is affirmed, in a different context, by al-Djunayd.

Such a form of renunciation presents an aspect that is entirely spontaneous, linked to a divine grace.

Abū Saʿīd al- Kharrāz (d. 286/899 [q.v.]) adopted the same classification as did **al- Balkhī**: renunciation is followed by fear, and it consists in “the progressive detachment of the heart from every desire concerning this inferior world”. The “renouncers” are subdivided according to three categories: “Some act thus in order to liberate their heart from all preoccupation other than obedience to **God**, the mention of His name and His service; others desire, through this influence, to become light and to pass quickly over the bridge which traverses **Hell**, knowing that those who are weighed down will be delayed and subjected to interrogation. Finally, others act thus through the desire for Paradise. They deprive themselves of the life of this inferior world and dedicate themselves to awaiting the reward of **God**. But the most elevated degree of renunciation consists in consenting totally to the love of **God** and accepting without reserve the state of servitude by the understanding of His will” (*K. al- Ṣidq*, ed. ‘Abd al- Ḥalīm **Maḥmūd**, Cairo, 43).

For **Ibn ‘Aṭā’ Allāh al- Iskandarī** (d. 709/1309 [q.v.]), renunciation consists in liberating the heart from the love of this inferior world and from the jealousy it may feel in regard to other people and the benefits they enjoy: “O ignorant one, cease to envy the creatures of this inferior world for what they have received. Your heart is preoccupied with what they possess and you become even more ignorant than they. In fact, they are preoccupied with what they have received and you, you are preoccupied with what you have not received” (*Tādj al- ‘arūs, ‘alā hāmish al- Tanwīr*, 11).

Ẓuhd has gradually acquired a place in the succession of mystical stations, but differences exist between one thinker and another, although all consider it as associated with the beginning of the way.

In Twelver Shīʿī traditions, it appears to be the least of the virtues of the believer, its highest level corresponding to the lowest level of “contentment with little” (*kanāʿa*), while Dhu ’l- Nūn al- Miṣrī (d.

245/859 [q.v.]) states that the “ladder of *waraʿ* gives access to *zuhd*”. For al- Dārānī (d. 205/820), spiritual heir of al- Ḥasan al- Baṣrī, the pinnacle of *zuhd* is abandonment to trust in God (*tawakkul*); it would be the same for al- Ghazālī (d. 505/1111), giving it precedence over [XI:561b] *fakr*. Al- Ḥakīm al- Tirmidhī considers *zuhd* as the outcome of repentance (*tawba*) and the stage preceding combat against the carnal soul (*ʿadāwat al-naḥs*). We have here a stage of the heart. “The world appears worthless in the eyes of renouncers, since an invisible part has been revealed to them.

They therefore do not concern themselves in the least with the subsistence that could fall to their lot, and on this matter they trust in their Lord with an utterly tranquil heart. He who does not direct his regard towards the other life and magnifies in his own eyes the life of this world, even if he is completely withdrawn from the life of here below, wears nothing but rags and eats only grass, is not a true renouncer but only a man who compels himself to renounce” (*Nawādir al- uṣūl, aṣl* 106, *fi ḥaqīqat al-zuhd*, Beirut, 144).

Ibn al- ʿArabī (d. 638/1240 [q.v.]) likewise envisages *zuhd* as one of the first stages of the way. It is situated in the wake of isolation (*ʿuzla*), of retreat (*khalwa*) and the practice of scruple (*waraʿ*).

According to him, it also precedes *tawakkul*.

Thus for Muslim as well as for Christian spiritual seekers (desert anchorites and mystics), interior renunciation is held to be much more important than spectacular practices of asceticism. The latter have, however, persisted into the present day in response to precise functions, for the ascetic himself as for his entourage.

Examples of extreme mortification are not lacking among the accounts of the lives of the early Ṣūfīs; it used to be said, for example, that [Shāh](#) al-Kirmānī (d. between 270/883 and 300/912) spent forty years without sleeping; Rūzbihān Baqlī (d. 606/1209 [q.v.]), told the story of a saint who had fasted totally for seventy days; [Abū Saʿīd b. Abi ʿl- Khayr](#) (d. 441/1049 [q.v.]), a [Khurāsānī](#) Ṣūfī and disciple of al- Sulamī, practised ascetic exercises over a period of seven years, in particular the *ṣalāt maḳlūba* which consists of reciting the [Ḳurʿān](#) and praying while suspended by the feet in a dark place.

Numerous Egyptians mystics, among others, are renowned for their impressive feats of asceticism.

[Shaykh Murshid](#) declared to [al- Shaʿrānī](#) that he had not eaten more than one raisin per day over a period of forty years, to the point where the skin of his stomach adhered to that of his back. [Al- Sayyid al- Badawī](#) (d. 675/1276), the famous saint of *djantā* who had adopted voluntary celibacy, possessed nothing of his own and burned out his eyes by staring at the sun from his terrace, spent forty days without drinking, eating or sleeping. He never took off his clothes or his [turban](#), waiting for them to fall to pieces by themselves. His disciples, including [Abū djartūr](#), were renowned for their asceticism. In this context, some mystics took it as a point of [honour](#) to surpass [Jesus](#), regarded by the majority of Ṣūfīs as a model of poverty, of mortification and of detachment from the concerns of this world. These manifestations of the [Badawiyya](#), as those of numerous other mystical orders, have been subjected at all times to the censure of the *ʿulamāʾ*, whose efforts have been pursued, to little effect, into the present day.

(GENEVIÈVE GOBILLOT) [ʿAlḳama b. Marthad](#) (d. 121/738), *Ṣuḥd al- thamāniya min al- tābiʿīn*, ed. [ʿAbd al- Raḥmān al- Furāwāʿī](#), [Medina](#) 1983 [Muḥammad ʿAbd al- Raḥīm Muḥammad](#), *al-Ṣuḥd li ʿl- Ḥasan al- Baṣrī*, [Cairo](#) 1991 [ʿAbd Allāh b. al- Mubārak](#), *al-Ṣuḥd wa ʿl- raḳāʾiḳ*, ed. Aʿzamī, [Beirut](#) 1967, ed. [Aḥmad Farīd](#), al- Riyāḍ 1995 [Wakīʿ b. al-](#)

Djarrāh (d. 197/812), *K. al-Ẓuhd*, ed. al- Furāwā'ī, **Medina** 1984 **Asad b. Mūsā** = **Asad al-Sunna** (d. 212/827), *K. al-Ẓuhd*, [XI:562a] ed. R.G. Khoury, Wiesbaden 1976 **Ibn Ḥanbal**, *al-Ẓuhd*, ed. Basyūnī Zagh̃lūl, **Beirut** 1986 *al- Wara'*, ed. **Zaynab Ibrāhīm al- Kārūt**, **Beirut** n.d.

Ḥammād b. al- Sārī al- Kūfī al- Tamīmī (d. 243/857), *K. al-Ẓuhd*, ed. 'Abd Allāh b. Ibrāhīm al- Anṣārī, **Dawḥa** 1986 **al- Ḥusayn b. Sa'īd al- Ahwāzī** (d. 301/913), *K. al-Ẓuhd*, ed. **Djalāl al- Dīn 'Alī al- Ṣagh̃r**, **Beirut** 1993 **Abū Bakr Aḥmad b. Abī 'Āṣim**, *K. al-Ẓuhd*, ed. 'Alī 'Abd al- Ḥamīd, **Beirut** 1988 **Bayhaḳī**, *K. al-Ẓuhd al- kabīr*, ed. **Sh. 'Āmir Aḥmad Ḥayḍar**, **Beirut** 1987, tr. R. Deladrière, *Bayhaḳī, l'anthologie du renoncement*, **Paris** 1995 **Sahl al- Tustarī**, *al- Mu'āraḍa wa 'l-radd 'alā ahl al- firāḳ*, ed. **Kamāl Dja'far**, **Cairo** 1980, 88, 122 **al- Ḥakīm al- Tirmidhī**, *Manāzil al- 'ibād min al- 'ibāda*, ed. 'Abd al- Raḥīm al- Ṣā'ih, **Cairo** 1988, 68-72 **Abū Sa'īd al- Kharrāz**, *K. al- Ṣidq*, ed. 'Abd al- Ḥalīm **Maḥmūd**, **Cairo** n.d., 42-5 **Kulaynī**, *al- Uṣūl min al- Kāfi*, *K. al- Īmān wa 'l-kufr*, *bāb dhamm al- dunyā wa 'l-ẓuhd fihā*, **Beirut** 1985, ii, 128-37 **Makkī**, *Kūt al- kulūb*, i, 242-71 **Kushayrī**, *Risāla*, 67 **Abū Naṣr al- Sarrādj**, *al- Luma'*, *bāb maḳām al-ẓuhd*, 70-2 **Ghazālī**, *Iḥyā' 'ulūm al- dīn*, iv, 154-71 **Ibn al- Djawzī**, *Talbīs Iblīs*, **Cairo** n.d., 150-60 **Ibn al- 'Arabī**, *Futūḥāt makkiyya*, ii, 177-8 **Ibn Taymiyya** (d. 729/1328), *al-Ẓuhd wa 'l- wara' wa 'l- 'ibāda*, *Fatāwā al- kubrā*, selections, **Zarkā'** and **'Ammān** 1987 **Ibn 'Aṭā' Allāh al- Iskandarī**, *Tādj al- 'arūs*, *'alā hāmish al- Tanwīr*, **Cairo** 1948, 11 I. Goldziher, *De l'ascétisme aux premiers temps de l'Islam*, in *RHR*, xxxvii (1898), 314-24 L. Massignon, *Essai sur les origines du lexique technique de la mystique musulmane*, 1Paris 1954, 21999, 191, 212, 227 idem, *Recueil de textes inédits*, **Paris** 1929, 17, 146-8 P. Nwyia, *Exégèse coranique et langage mystique*, **Beirut** 1970, 216-24, 291 **Abū Zayd 'Alī Ibrāhīm**, *Ẓuhd al- mudjdjān fi 'l- 'aṣr al- 'abbāsī*, **Cairo** 1986 C. Mayeur-Jaouen, *Al-Sayyid al- Badawī*, **Cairo** 1994, 232-5 E. Geoffroy, *Le soufisme en Égypte et en Syrie*, **Damascus** 1995, 287-91 Annemarie Schimmel, *Mystical dimensions of Islam*, **Chapel Hill** 1975, 110-24, Fr. tr. *Le soufisme ou les dimensions mystiques de l'islam*, **Paris** 1996, 150-62.

SUKŪT (A.), lit. “silence”, a term of Islamic law. Here, *sukūt* refers to an individual's action of not actively expressing an opinion when involved in an action or contract that requires acceptance or rejection. This “tacit” manifestation of will can only be clarified by circumstance. The concept is highlighted by the legal maxim that states “no statement can be ascribed to a silent person, but **silence** when a need arises is a manifestation of will”. The application of this rule can be found in the **silence** of a landlord who demands an increase on the former rent. The continuation of tenancy is viewed as including positive acceptance of the old rent (*Madjalla* , art. 438). In contrast to this is the **silence** of the owner who is asked to lend his property; this is considered to mean a negative answer (*Madjalla* , art. 805). This appears to create a situation in new cases when the arbitrary decision of the **judge** is the only factor for deciding what needs manifestation and what does not.

The contrasting variation of the “value” of **silence** in Islamic law seems to place significant importance on the psychological “state” of individuals performing contracts. This is best represented in the *sukūt* that is taken as acceptance (*riḍā*) in wedding ceremonies when a virgin bride is asked, “do you take this man to be your husband?” This is based on the grounds that she is too embarrassed to say “yes”. This contrasts with the previously married woman who is expected explicitly to declare her will.

(M.Y. Izzi Dien) Salīm Rustum *Bāz al- Lubnānī*, *Sharḥ al- Madjalla*, repr. Beirut 1986, 344, 447, 244, 1180 A. Zaydān, *al- Madkhal li- dirāsāt al- Sharīʿa al- Islāmiyya*, *Baghdād* 1967, 94.

TAḤSĪN WA- TAḲBĪḤ (A.) , “determining something to be good or repellent”, a phrase referring in shorthand fashion to the controversy over the sources of the moral assessment of acts.

Some argued for an assessment of things according to the dictates of common sense (*‘aql*) or utility (*naḥ*), and this led some to hold that the *ḥusn* or *kubḥ* of an act was part of its ontology as an accident of *essence* or as an aspect (*wadḥ*) of the thing itself. Others argued that it is only the deontic divine command (*sharʿ*) that gives moral value to acts.

The “sources” of this discussion are impossible to establish; certainly, the rudiments of the problem are already found in Plato’s *Euthyphro* but the problem is common to all of the Revelational religions, whose Scripture does not reach in literal form to all possible acts. For Muslims, who had come by the 4th/10th century to believe that the *Ḳurʿān* contained an assessment (*ḥukm*) for every act, the problem took a particularly acute form. The *Muʿtazila*, in particular, for whom God’s goodness required that He require only what was best (*al- aṣḥ*) for His bondsmen, the immediate pointlessness of ritual also constituted an incentive toward the consideration of this problem. There were consequently two *Muʿtazilī* positions on the question. The *Baghdādīs*, especially al- Kaʿbī [*q.v.*], took the position that the *‘aql* could assess acts, but they were in fact proscribed (*maḥẓūr*) before Revelation came to give mankind permission to perform them. The *Baṣrans* urged that acts could be assessed, and that they were, in default of some *‘aqlī* indication to the contrary, permitted (*mubāḥ*).

Of course, at issue was the category of acts which were not mentioned in revelation.

Despite the attempts of later biographical and heresiographical sources to conceal early diversity, it is clear that Sunnī school positions for theological/legal schools did not begin to form until the 5th/11th century, with **Hanbalīs**, for example, defending “Mu‘tazilī” positions into the 6th/12th century (e.g. Abu ‘l- **Khaṭṭāb** Maḥfūẓal- Kalwadhānī, d. 510/1117). By the 7th/13th century, the **matter** had sorted itself out so that **Shāfi‘īs** and **Hanbalīs** generally took the **Ash‘arī** position that the **intellect** could not assess the moral value of acts, and **Hanafīs**/ **Māturīdīs** took an intermediate position that gave common sense the ability to assess acts, with-out that assessment having soteriological significance. **Imāmī** and **Zaydī Shī‘īs** embraced the **Baṣran Mu‘tazilī** position that the performance of useful acts, in default of revelation, was permitted.

(A.K. Reinhart) R. Brunschvig. *Mu‘tazilisme et optimum (al- aṣḥab)*, in *St. Isl.*, xxxix (1974), 5-23 R.M. Frank, *The metaphysics of created being according to Abū l-Hudhayl al- ‘Allāf, a philosophical study of the earliest kalām*, Leuven 1966 G.F. Hourani, *Islamic rationalism. The ethics of ‘Abdaljabbār*, Oxford 1971 idem, *Reason and tradition in Islamic ethics*. Cambridge etc. 1985 idem, *The rationalist ethics of ‘Abd al- Jabbār*, in *Islamic philosophy and the classical tradition, in Essays presented by his friends and pupils to Richard Walzer on his seventieth birthday*, ed. Hourani, Stern and Brown, Columbia, S.C. 1973, 105-15 A.K. Reinhart, *Before [X:114b] revelation*, Albany 1995 (and sources cited therein) idem, “*Thanking the benefactor*”, in *Spoken and unspoken thanks. Some comparative soundings*, ed. J.B.

Carmanand F.J. Streng, Cambridge and Dallas 1989, 115-33 Abu ‘l- **Khaṭṭāb** Maḥfūẓb. **Aḥmad al- Kalwadhānī** al- **Hanbalī** (d. 510/1117), *al- Tamhīd fī uṣūl alfiqh*, ed. **Muḥammad b. ‘Alī Ibrāhīm**, 4 vols., **Djudda** 1406/1985.

MISKAWAYH, philosopher and historian who wrote in Arabic, born in Rayy around 320/932.

His full name was Abū ‘Alī Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. Ya‘kūb, which seems to refute Yāqūt, who describes him as “Mazdaean converted to Islam”, whereas it was probably one of his ancestors who was converted. Miskawayh (Miskōye/ Mushkōye), and not Ibn Miskawayh as he is commonly designated, performed the tasks of secretary and librarian under the viziers al- Muhallabī (340-52/950-63) [*q.v.*], Abu ‘l- Faḍl (353-60/951-70) and Abu ‘l- Faṭḥ (360-6/970-6) [see IBN AL- ‘AMĪD] and finally under the Būyid ‘Aḍud al-Dawla (d. 372/983 [*q.v.*]); he also frequented not only the Arabo-Persian aristocracy of the age, but also the most remarkable representatives of Islamic culture such as al- Tawḥīdī, al- ‘Āmirī, Ibn Sa‘dān, al- Ṣāḥib Ibn ‘Abbād, Abū Sulaymān al- Manṭikī, Badī‘ al- Zamān, Abū Bakr al- Khw ārazmī and many others; he studied in particular the work of al- Ṭabarī [*q.v.*] under the direction of Ibn Kāmil, who was a pupil of the famous historian, which perhaps explains his interests in universal history.

If we are to believe Yāqūt, he died on 9 Ṣafar 421/16 February 1030, aged then a hundred.

As both philosopher and historian, he is, in fact, one of the very rare intellectuals in the Arabic language who is known to have practised the two disciplines with competence and with a resolve to embark on the most complex ethico-political reflection. This is why it would be arbitrary today to separate, on the pretext of specialisation, what the author combined and practised in a single intellectual endeavour.

It is true, however, that the philosophical work is [VII:143b] more abundant and better elaborated than the *Taḍjārīb al-umam* (partial ed. L. Caetani, Leiden 1909-17, 3 vols.; with the continuation of Abū Shudjā‘ al- Rūdhrawārī, ed.-tr. H.F. Amedroz and D.S. Margoliouth, *The experiences of nations*, 7 vols., in their series *The eclipse of the Abbasid Caliphate*,

Oxford-London 1920-1), a universal history from the Flood to the year 369/980, whose originality only appears in the last part dealing with the Būyids.

As a philosopher, Miskawayh is distinguished by the central importance he attached to ethics. In his *Treatise on ethics* (*Tahdhīb al- akhlāq wa- taḥhīr al- a'rāq*, ed. C. Zurayq, Beirut 1967, Fr. tr. M. Arkoun, 2nd ed. Damascus 1988), he pleaded with conviction for the organising of philosophical education around and beginning with ethics. In fact, this work compels recognition in Arabic literature as the most didactic, the fullest and most open to the Greek, Iranian, Arab, Muslim traditions, which Miskawayh knew perfectly, as is confirmed by his anthology *al- Hikma al- khālida* "The eternal wisdom" (ed. 'A. Badawī, Cairo 1952) or *Djawīdhān khīrad* [q.v. in Suppl.], Al- Ghazālī was largely inspired by it in his *Mīzān al- 'amal* and Naṣīr al- Dīn al- Ṭūṣī (d. 672/1274) summarised it in Persian in his *Akhlāq-i Naṣīrī*, as did al- Dawwānī or al- Dawānī (d. 908/1502 [q.v.]) in his *Akhlāq-i Djalālī*. Nearer our own time, Muḥammad 'Abduh used the *Tahdhīb* in his teaching. We will also remark that no equivalent treatise was composed in Arabic until our own age. This is explained by the abandonment of the philosophical perspective in Arabic thought after Ibn Rushd (the *Ishrāqī* line followed by the Shī'ī thinkers did not respect the classical philosophical attitude as much as the *falāsifa* did).

In order the better to appreciate the contribution and originality of Miskawayh, we must set his activity within the particularly brilliant intellectual generation who worked in Būyid Persia and 'Irāq from 350 to about 430/961-1039. We know the lifelike and interesting portrait that al- Tawhīdī has left us of this generation; Būyid princes, viziers and intellectuals of all schools and all conditions were participating in the liveliness of a cultural and intellectual life which in many of its aspects contributed to the humanism of the Renaissance in the West (see J.L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the renaissance of Islam. The cultural revival during the*

Buyid age, Leiden 1986). The salient fact is the emergence of a philosophical *adab*; one reads a large number of works composed directly in Arabic in addition to the major texts translated from Greek and Syriac. The reader is less delayed by philosophical and technical analyses; the abstract themes of metaphysics are less deeply explored, but by contrast, there is a larger number of didactic, popularly accessible accounts on the practical problems of the search for supreme happiness, the administration of the city, domestic economy, the education of children, the struggle against sadness, spiritual medicine and preparation for death. In an exchange of questions (*al- Hawāmīl*) and answers (*al- Shawāmīl*), Miskawayh and al- Tawḥīdī demonstrate the diversity and extent of the horizons of knowledge, always cultivated in a philosophical setting. Recourse to an autonomous reason, the mistress of categories, concepts and methods for establishing the profound realities (*ḥakā'ik al- umūr*), contrasts with religious reason, subject to revealed evidence, in the religious sciences. The “humanists” extol autonomous reason for going beyond blind passions and partisan struggles which split the numerous confessional groups.

Miskawayh led the struggle with the constancy and serenity of the sage. His privileged position in the rich library of Abu [VII:144a] 'l- Faḍl Ibn al- 'Amīd allowed him to extend his information and look at the society of his time lucidly, and less indignantly, than al- Tawḥīdī.

In a consistently very didactic style, he is equally interested in three main metaphysical questions in a more modest work than the *Tahdhīb*, his *al- Fawz al- aṣghar*, ed. Ṣāliḥ 'Udayma, Fr. tr. R. Arnaldez, Tunis 1987, demonstrating the existence of God; the soul and its states; and the prophets. In some still briefer epistles, he dealt with the intellect and the soul (ed. Arkoun, in *BEO*, Damascus 1961-2), the intellect and the intelligible (ed. Arkoun, in *Arabica*, 1964/1), and justice (ed. M.S. Khan, Leiden 1964).

The global vision held by Miskawayh is that of the *Nicomachean ethics* linked with the Psychology of Plato, the ideas of Galen on the relationship between psychology and physiology, and of Bryson on domestic economy and the education of children. Psychosomatic considerations, cosmology, the theory of climates and alchemy all supply an arsenal of arguments whose articulation leads to this unity (*al- waḥda*) which inspired all the sages nourished on Greek science, Persian *adab* and monotheistic religious sensibility.

The pictures of virtues and vices that he gives in his *Tahdhīb al- akhlāq* brings together in a systematic form the four cardinal virtues (wisdom, temperance, courage and justice) defined as the just means (*wasat*) between two extremes representing the vices (*radhā'il*). He also invents a technical lexicon of ethics in which the definitions of the virtues and vices known in the Arab tradition come to be joined with those, more philosophically elaborated, of the *Nicomachean ethics*. Justice (*'adāla*, *'adl*) and love and friendship (*maḥabba*) are the subject of particularly elaborate chapters. The idea governing all the analyses is that the reasoning faculty (*'aql*) should achieve the maintenance of equilibrium (*i'tidāl*) between the irascible (*kuwwa ghaḍabiyya*) and lustful (*shahawāniyya*) faculties so as to ensure man's certain advance towards supreme happiness (*al- sa'āda al- kuṣwā*) the object of the wise man's quest. This advance is at one and the same time commanded by philosophical knowledge and the ethical conduct that illuminates it.

One is always agreeably struck by the serenity of Miskawayh's tone, by a very clear, very accessible and at the same time very rigorous style. When he describes the social and economic consequences of Būyid policy, or when he reports an abstract philosophical theory, he always succeeds in avoiding the use of technicalities which discourage the reader and the pedantry which obscures the subject. He also combines philosophical seriousness, scientific competence and concern with didactic communication, to the point that all these writings recall those of the best

modern Arab prose writers. It may be objected that he loses in profundity and acuteness what he gains in explanatory, and even persuasive, effectiveness; but one should not lose sight of the fact that the socio-political functions of philosophical *adab* are as necessary and fruitful as the deeper, but less accessible, research of the great names of *falsafa*.

It is through philosophical *adab* that religious reason was able to assimilate certain contributions of philosophical knowledge without provoking the rejection constantly repeated by the jurist-theologians who were champions of "orthodoxy". From this point of view, Miskawayh and the intellectuals of his generation remain of current importance in Arabic and Islamic thought; faced with the militants of religious orthodoxy who are more numerous than ever, the philosophical attitude and knowledge, as in the [VII:144b] 4th/10th century in Baghdād, Rayy and Iṣfahān, would allow one to pass by dogmatic conflicts whose religious vocabulary conceals principally political stakes.

(Ed.) (M. Arkoun) (ed.) Yāqūt, *Irshād*, ii, 89 ff. = *Udabā'*, v, 5-19 Kifṭī, *Hukamā'*, 331 Tawḥīdī, *Imtā'*, i, 35-6, 136, ii, 39, iii, 227 and *passim* idem, *Ṣadāka*, ed. Kaylānī, Damascus 1964, 67-8 idem, *Mathālib*, ed. Kaylānī, Damascus 1961, 18-19, 228, 306 and *passim* Khw ānsārī, *Rawḍāt al- djannāt*, Tehran 1307, 70-1 Amedroz, *Note on the historian*, in the Caetani ed. of the *Tadjārib al-umam*, i, xvii ff.

idem, in *Isl.*, v (1914), 335-57 Margoliouth, *Lectures on Arabic historians*, Calcutta 1930, 128-37 M.S. Khan, *Miskawayh's use of the Ta'riḫ of Thābit b. Sinān*, in *Bull. Inst. Isl. Studies*, vi-vii (1962-3), 49-57 B.H. Siddiqi, *Ibn Miskawayh's theory of history*, in *Iqbal*, xii (1963), 71-80 De Boer, *Geschichte der Philosophie im Islam*, 116 ff.

Brockelmann, S I, 582-4 (with list of the works of Miskawayh) Abdul Haq Ansari, *The ethical philosophy of Miskawayh*, Aligarh 1964 M. 'Izzat, *Ibn Miskawayh : falsafatuh al- akhlāqiyya wa- maṣādiruhā*, Cairo 1946 M. Arkoun, *Deux épîtres de Miskawayh*, ed. in *BEO Damas* (1961) idem,

Contribution à l'étude de l'humanisme arabe ay IV e/X e siècle: Miskawayh philosophe et historien 2, Paris 1982 F. Rosenthal, *A history of Muslim historiography* 2, Leiden 1968, 141-2 J.L. Kraemer, *Humanism in the renaissance of Islam* idem, *Philosophy in the renaissance of Islam. Abū Sulaymān al- Sijistāni and his circle*, Leiden 1986.

SHAKĀWA (A.) means misfortune or misery; equivalents are *shakwa*, *shakā'* and *shaka* n. The concept is the opposite of *sa'āda* [q.v.]. According to Qur'ān, [IX:247a] XX, 122, he who follows God's "right guidance" (*hudā*) escapes from the situation of unhappiness and "does not become unhappy". Accordingly, in the story of the Fall, Adam's expulsion from Paradise is described as "misfortune", into which he ended up for not having followed God's admonition (XX, 117 ff.). But in the Qur'ān the derivations from the root *sh- k-w* (*shakāwa* itself is not found) are mainly used eschatologically: the "unhappy one" (*shakiyy*) will find himself in the fire of Hell, in contrast to the "blissful" (*sa'īd*), who will stay in Paradise (XI, 105/107 ff.).

In the *ḥadīth*, this eschatological usage is taken up in the doctrine of God's predestination; following a prophetic tradition, "the blissful are placed [by God] in a position in which they are able to act as the blissful do, but the unhappy ones can only act as the unhappy do" (Muslim, *Ṣaḥīḥ*, *kitāb al- ḳadar*, no. 6).

The deterministic usage of *shakāwa* is also taken up by Islamic theology, where distinction is made between the divine attributes *al- ḳaḍā' wa 'l- ḳadar* [q.v.], which determine the contents of the "preserved table" (*al-*

lawḥ al- maḥfūz [q.v.]) on the one hand, and “what is written down” (*al- maktūb*) on the “preserved table” on the other; the latter is a human attribute “in the form of bliss or misfortune” (*sa‘adat an aw shaḳāwat an*) which can be changed into its opposite by the acts of man (see Abu 'l-Layḥ al- Samarḳandī, *Sharḥ al- fiḳh al- absaṭ li- Abī Ḥanīfā*, ed. H. Daiber, *The Islamic concept of belief in the 4th/10th century*, Tokyo 1994 [= *Studia culturae islamicae*], Arabic text, ll. 301 ff., 319 ff.).

In his commentary on the *Ḳur‘ān*, the scholar alRāghib al- Iṣfahānī (d. 5th/11th century [q.v.]) connects the concept of *shaḳāwa* in analogy with *sa‘ada* (cf. Daiber, *Griechische Ethik in islamischem Gewande*, in *Historia philosophiae*, ed. B. Mojsisch and O. Pluta, Amsterdam-Philadelphia 1991, 184-5), with the hereafter and with this world, and he divides the “unhappiness of this world” into three kinds: unhappiness of the soul (*nafsiyya*), unhappiness of the body (*badaniyya*) and external (*khāridjiyya*) unhappiness (see *Mu‘djam mufradāt alfāz al- Ḳur‘ān*, ed. Nadīm Mar‘ashlī, (n.p. 1972, 271, s.v.).

To sum up, the term *shaḳāwa* is used both in the meaning of a situation in this world and also of the situation in the hereafter, which is determined by God but for which man is responsible through his behaviour. The term does not therefore play a role in the Islamic discussions on theodicy (see E.L.

Ormsby, *Theodicy in Islamic thought*, Princeton 1984).

In astrology, the concept of “misfortune” is described by *naḥs*, pl. *nuḥūs*. The question is discussed whether unlucky stars (such as Saturn and Mars [see AL- MIRRĪKH]) dominate the hour of birth, and whether they are able to exercise their calamitous influence (*nuḥūsa*). See *Rasā'il Iḳhwān al- Ṣafā'*, ed. Ziriklī, iii, Cairo 1928, 341, tr. S. Diwald-Wilzer, *Arabische Philosophie und Wissenschaft in der Enzyklopädie Kitāb Ihwān aṣ- ṣafā'* (iii), Wiesbaden 1975, 468. See also Abū Ma‘ar, *The Abbreviation of the Introduction to astrology*, ed. and tr. Ch. Burnett, Keji Yamamoto and

Michio Yano, Leiden 1994 (= IPTS, XV), index of Arabic terms. s.v. According to Abū Ma'shar, the (evil as well as good) influence of the planets does not exclude chance or freedom (see R. Lemay, *Abu Ma'shar and Latin Aristotelianism in the twelfth century*, Beirut 1962, 125 ff.).

(H. Daiber) Given in the article.

SA'ĀDA (A.), happiness, bliss, a central concept in Islamic philosophy to describe the highest aim of human striving, which can be reached through ethical perfection and increasing knowledge. In nonphilosophical literature, the term (as opposed to *shaḳāwa*, *shaḳwa*, *shaḳā'*, *shaḳā*) describes either happy circumstances in life (see for instance Ibn Ḥanbal, *Musnad*, ed. Cairo 1313/1895-6, i, 168, 29-30, iii, 407, last section), the unexpected happiness of a long life (*Musnad*, iii, 332, 28), preservation from temptations (*ibid.*, i, 327, 9-10; Abū Dāwūd, *Sunan*, *Kitāb al-Fitan*, 2, Ḥimş 1973, iv, no. 4263), or the eternal stay in Paradise.

The last meaning is based on the Ḳur'ān (e.g. sūra XI, 105/107, 108/110), whose eschatological implications led to the newly-created term *yawm al- sa'āda* = "Day of Resurrection" (cf. Dozy, *Supplément*, i, 654). The Ḳur'ān, and occasionally *ḥadīth* (e.g. al- Tirmidhī, *Sunan*, *Tafsīr al- Ḳur'ān*, ed. Ḥimş, ix, no.

[VIII:658a] 3341), already indicate that mankind, because of divine predestination, is divided into "happy" inhabitants of Paradise and "unhappy" dwellers in Hell. However, the impact of predestination is mitigated by utterances according to which an active effort of the human being is required. Next to human acceptance (*riḍā* [q.v.]) of what God has

predestined, *Musnad*, i, 168, 26-7, also mentions the prayers to God for obtaining what is good (*istikhāra* [q.v.]) as a characteristic of *sa'āda*.

Under the influence of various classical doctrines (cf. Spaemann), namely of Platonic political philosophy, of Aristotelian ethics, of Neo-Platonism, and partly also of Islamic mysticism, the possibility for a human being to strive after *sa'āda* is often described in Islamic philosophy as the pursuit of “assimilation to God” (ὁμοίωσις θεῷ, Plato, *Theaet.*, 176 B), of nearness to God, and of knowledge of God through a virtuous life. At the beginning of Islamic philosophy, this interpretation is found in al-Kindī's works. His *Risāla fī hudūd al- aṣḥyā' wa- rusūmihā* (ed. Abū Rīda, *Rasā'il*, i, 177 ff. = *Cinq épîtres*, 37 ff.), his utterances transmitted in the *Muntakhab Ṣiwān al- hikma* of Abū Sulaymān al- Sidjīstānī (ed. Dunlop, §§ 246-8), his *Risāla fī alfāz Suḡrāt* (ed. Fakhry, *Dirāsāt*, 45-60), his *Risāla fī Alkibiades wa- Suḡrāt* (cf. Atiyeh, 123 ff., Alon, 131 ff.; Butterworth, in *Political aspects*, 32 ff.) and his *Risāla fī 'l- ḥīla li- daf' al- aḥzān* (ed. Walzer-Ritter, 1938), which goes back to a lost Hellenistic treatise, describe a concept of virtue which is inspired by the Platonic cardinal virtues. Socrates is named as the ideal of moderation and of spiritual values, which are superior to worldly possessions. The person who turns his attention to intelligibles, and who in his doings keeps to the virtues, will “not be unhappy (*shaḡiyy*)” in the hereafter, will be near to his Creator and will know Him (*Muntakhab*, § 248, Eng. tr. Atiyeh 1966, 225). This image of Socrates was adopted, with some modifications, by Abū Bakr al- Rāzī [q.v.] in his *al- Sīra al-falsafīyya* (ed. Kraus, *Rasā'il*, 99 ff.; tr. Arberry, *Aspects*, 120 ff; cf. Walker in *Political aspects*, 77 ff.). The person who leads a moderate life and who, as far as possible, restrains his passions, “assimilates himself to God as far as possible” (*Rasā'il*, ed. Kraus, 108, 8 ff.). In his *Maḡāla fī amārāt al- iḡbāl wa 'l-dawla* (= “political success”), Abū Bakr al- Rāzī expresses this as follows (*Rasā'il*, ed. Kraus, 145, 8): “progress (*tanakḡul*) and knowledge (ilm) belong to the symptoms of ”happiness“ (*iḡbāl*) and indicate that a person ”is attentive to happiness“

(*tayakkuz al- sa'āda lahu*).” Knowledge and justice are named as the main aims of the human being.

This ideal of virtue was adopted by Abu Bakr's opponent, the Ismā'īlī Abū Ḥātim al- Rāzī [*q.v.*], with one alteration: the bearer par excellence of the Platonic cardinal virtues and of the Aristotelian principle of the golden centre is the Prophet Muḥammad, who possesses knowledge revealed by God. He who follows him and does not rely upon his own intuition, is able to understand the religious laws and can be sure of salvation (*naḍjāt*) (Abū Ḥātim, *A'lām*, ed. Al-Saww, 77 ff., esp. 110, 9 ff.; cf. Daiber, 1989).

The high appreciation of reason as the guideline for a practical philosophy, understood as ethics in the first place, is characteristic of the philosophers mentioned so far, and culminates in al- Fārābī's [*q.v.*] thesis of the ideal sovereign as philosopher and prophet (cf. Daiber, *Ruler*). His knowledge, inspired by the divine active intellect, enables him to govern the Ideal State by ordering religious laws. Religion appears as the imitating picture (“imitation”) and the “instrument” of philosophy, which is essentially understood [VIII:658b] here as practical philosophy and as ethics of the individual person in the State. In this way, philosophy, thus understood, realises itself through religion and becomes an ethical insight into “what is good and evil in the actions usually performed by human beings” (al-Farabi, *Mabādī*, ed. Walzer, 204, 1-2). As was the case with Aristotle (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1144a, 5-6), philosophy is not exclusively “scientific perception” or theoretical philosophy; rather, it provides a human being with an ultimate degree of happiness (*al- sa'āda al- kuṣwā* = *eudaimonía*; cf. Daiber, *Prophetie*, 733-4; Shahjahan) with the help of the above-mentioned ethical insight, i.e. practical philosophy. When al- Fārābī speaks of “political happiness” (see Galston, in *Political aspects*, 100 ff.), he has in mind the Aristotelian concept of the human being as *ὁν πολιτικόν* (*Politics*, 1253a, 2), who needs the help of his fellow-citizen in

an Ideal State, governed by a philosopher who possesses prophetic knowledge.

This “political happiness” is reflected in the practical aspect of al-Fārābī's concept of *sa'āda*. It is part of the ultimate happiness, namely that of the hereafter; the human being can reach this when his soul liberates itself from its corporeal existence, actualises its potential intellect and arrives at the level of the active intellect. But happiness, in its complete form, is at the same time practical perfection. For practical philosophy, on the one hand, shows the way to theoretical perfection, to contemplation; on the other, theoretical perfection is the signpost towards practical philosophy, the ethical insight into the Perfect State. The latter's sovereign, the prophet-philosopher, transmits it to his subjects, the state's citizens, in the form of religious laws, religion being the sum total of these laws.

In this way, theoretical philosophy develops into practical-ethical perfection through practical philosophy and through religion that is, through the guidance of religious prescriptions, transmitted by the philosopher-prophet. At the same time, practical-ethical perfection in the Ideal State, in society, is the prerequisite for theoretical perfection, i.e. contemplation. The theoretical and practical aspects of knowledge, of moral-ethical insight respectively, are thus inseparably united in al-Fārābī's concept of *sa'āda*.

This link between ethics and knowledge is also found in the *Epistles* (*Rasā'il*) of the Ikhwān al-Ṣafā' [q.v.], possibly composed in A.D. 959-60. Their political philosophy betrays the influence of al-Fārābī (Enayat; Abouzeid), but they accentuate more strongly the Neo-Platonic elements and are eschatologically inspired. Through “purification” of his soul and reform of his character, the human being acquires increasing knowledge of “intelligibles” (*al-umūr al-akliyya*), for it is only knowledge (*ma'rifa*) of God which leads to ultimate happiness and to salvation in the hereafter (*Rasā'il*, iii, 241, 322-3; tr. and comm.

Diwald, 203 ff., 419 ff.). For this, a human being needs as a preliminary step the fraternal society, a society which is aware of its solidarity in being obedient to the divine law (*nāmūs* [q.v.]), and jointly pursues “the good of the religion and of the world” (*ṣalāḥ al- dīn wa 'l- dunyā*) (*Rasā'il*, i, 223, 16).

The stronger accentuation of individual ethics, already expressed by the *Ikhwān al- Ṣafā'*, led Miskawayh [q.v.], in his *Tahdhīb al- akhlāk*, to declare that a human being certainly does need the help of his fellowcitizen, and therefore must live with him in love (*maḥabba*) and friendship (*ṣadāqa*), but also that inequality is the reason why everyone must strive after his own happiness by bringing his character to perfection (*al- kamāl al- khulqī*) (*Tahdhīb*, 72, 10 ff.). For the individual in society, he thus offers ethics which are inspired by the Platonic-Aristotelian doctrine of virtues (Fakhry, 1991, 107 ff.). Just and virtuous acts and increasing knowledge of the “spiritual things” (*Tahdhīb*, 83 at the end) purify the soul of the “physical things” (*al- umūr al- ṭabī'iyya*; see *Tahdhīb*, 91, 18; cf. Plotinus, *Enn.* I, 6), lead to “tranquility of the heart” (*Tahdhīb*, 40, 5) and to “nearness to God” (*djīwārrabb al- 'ālamīn*; see *Tahdhīb*, 13 at the end). This is the state of perfect knowledge and of wisdom, in which the human being resembles the divine first principle, the divine intellect (*Tahdhīb*, 88-9); Miskawayh called it the ultimate happiness, which is preceded by several preliminary steps (*sa'ādāt*) (Miskawayh, *al- Sa'āda*; Ansari 1963; Fakhry, 1991, 121 f.).

Among the Islamic thinkers who followed Miskawayh's ethics (Fakhry, 131 ff.), mention may be made here of al- Rāghib al- Iṣfahānī [q.v.]. In his *Kitāb al- Dharī'a ilā makārim al- sharī'a*he offers an original adaptation of Greek ethics as it was known to him through al- Fārābī, Miskawayh and the *Rasā'il Ikhwān al- Ṣafā'*, to the statements of the *Qur'ān* (Daiber, *Griechische Ethik*). He replaces Miskawayh's Platonic-Neoplatonic concept of the assimilation to God by the *Qur'ānic* concept of *khilāfa* (sūra II, 30; VI, 165).

As the “representative” (*khalīfa*) of God in this world, the human being imitates God as much as he is able to, by following the *sharīʿa* and by concerning himself about his sustenance on this earth (cf. sūra XI, 61/64: *istaʿmarakum*). Thus a human being acquires happiness in this world which, as in Miskawayh, is a preliminary to the “real happiness” in the hereafter (*al- Dharīʿa*, 128, 4 ff.; cf. *Tafṣīl al- nashʿatayn*).

In al- Rāghib al- Iṣfahānī's ethics, by which al- Ghazālī [*q.v.*] was deeply impressed, a mystical tendency can be detected which was already visible in the *Rasāʾil Ikhwān al- Ṣafāʾ* and in Miskawayh's work. There is not so much concern about the rôle of the individual in society, but rather about striving after the happiness lying in the knowledge of, and the nearness to, God, which is a happiness of the hereafter.

This corresponds to the Neoplatonic ἀπράγμων βίος ideal of the philosopher who withdraws from society (cf. Kraemer 1986, 128).

In accordance with this view, the prophet, for Ibn Sīnā, is a Ṣūfī who preaches the divine laws as a way to the mystical path, to the liberation of the soul from the body, to its intellectual perfection, and to the vision of God (Ibn Sīnā, *Risāla fi ʿl- saʿāda*; Ansari 1962-3; E.I.J. Rosenthal, 144 ff.). But for Ibn Sīnā too, life in society remains an indispensable preliminary to happiness in the hereafter. Obedience to the lawgiver, to the prophet, is a postulate, as is the fulfilment of duties towards God and towards the fellow man. According to Ibn Sīnā's view, which is clearly associated with that of al- Fārābī, the sovereign, who is a prophet and a Ṣūfī, unites in his person practical and theoretical wisdom (Morris, in *Political aspects*, 153 ff.). This union creates happiness (*al- Shifāʾ, al- Ilāhiyyāt*, ii, 455, 14), but is also a postulate for the sovereign, who combines it with prophetic qualities.

It was the Andalusian philosopher Ibn Bādīdīja, and, above all, his younger contemporary Ibn Ṭufayl [*q.vv.*], who drew the final conclusion from the increasingly mystical-Neoplatonic orientation of the *saʿāda*

concept. Society is no longer a postulate for the individual to strive after happiness. On the contrary, it is only the isolated philosopher (*al-mutawahhid*), the Ṣūfī, who, withdrawing from society, obtains ultimate [VIII:659b] happiness through his self-government (*tadbīr*) and his vision of the truth (Altmann; Daiber, *Autonomie*, 242 ff.; Harvey, in *Political aspects*, 199 ff.). For him, it is possible to achieve a mystical ascent to higher forms of knowledge, namely by liberating the soul from the matter and by the union (*ittiṣāl*) with the divine active intellect, which is an emanation from God. Society is only a place to meet (*liḳāʾ, iltiḳāʾ*), which may be useful for the individual and may stimulate his emulation in striving after intellectual perfection. In opposition to Plato's view, the citizen no longer serves society; at best, society can stimulate the individual in his striving after happiness, to be found in intellectual perfection.

In his philosophical novel *Ḥayy Ibn Yaqẓān*, Ibn Ṭufayl (cf. Fradkin, in *Political aspects*, 234 ff.) consequently developed the thesis that the individual's philosophy and society's religion are not contradictory, but do not support each other either. Ibn Ṭufayl's compatriot Ibn Rushd, who was twenty years his junior did not share with him this radical turning-away from al- Fārābī (Daiber, *Autonomie*, 246-7). In his *Epistle on the possibility of conjunction with the active intellect*, he declares that in this life, too, it is possible to strive after happiness as long as this is not hampered by society. For this, theoretical study should be combined with acts (tr. Bland, 108-9). The aim of such a striving is the immortality of the soul, which is achieved when the soul increasingly unites its acquired knowledge with the active intellect. This union, which is the most perfect form of human cognition, is possible because the active intellect is the form of the *intellectus materialis*, which in its turn is the form of the soul, i.e. its eternal potentiality. It is not only remarkable that Ibn Rushd denies (against al- Ghazālī) the individual immortality, deriving this denial from the union of the soul with the eternal form of the active intellect; much more important is his conclusion that striving after philosophical

knowledge, i.e. after happiness, is not a duty of individuals or of individual states, but a task of mankind. This philosophical knowledge is the most perfect form of the universal human knowledge of religious truth which is reflected in the *sharʿa*. Accordingly, the Ideal State, i.e. the Philosophical State, comprises all mankind; the best Islamic State, a State which only existed during the period of the first four caliphs, is at best an imitation of such a Philosophical State.

Ibn Khaldūn [q.v.], the last great Islamic thinker, incorporated into his philosophy of history Ibn Rushd's universalistic opinion, as well as al-Fārābī's and Ibn Sīnā's doctrines (Mahdi, 1957). He put new accents and, by introducing the term *ʿaṣabiyya* [q.v.], he gave a new significance to the concept of society. The *polis*, the state, is indispensable for the entire human society, for its progress (*Muḥaddima*, iii, 54 at the end: *iṣlāḥ al-baṣhar*) and for its preservation. In his philosophy, which he preaches to mankind in the form of “political laws” (*aḥkām al-siyāsa*), the sovereign of the Ideal State, the prophetic lawgiver, deals with the well-being of the world (*maṣāliḥ al-dunyā*) and with the “salvation” of mankind “in the hereafter” (*ṣalāḥ ākhiratihim*) (*Muḥaddima*, i, 343). Philosophy, understood as ethics and politics, as well as religion and the society of the state, are seen here as indispensable materials for the well-being of all mankind in this world and for their happiness (*saʿāda* : *Muḥaddima*, i, 343, 4) in the hereafter.

(H. Daiber)

TAWAKKUL (A.) , verbal noun or *maṣdar* of Form V of *wakala* “to entrust [to someone], have confidence [in someone]”, a concept in Islamic religious terminology, and especially that of Ṣūfism, with the

sense of dependence upon **God**. Tor Andrae pointed out that the verb *tawakkala* meant “to trust someone in the same way as I would trust my *wakīl*”, i.e. the person whom I have chosen to be my procurator or *homme d'affaires*, to look after my business and to govern and dispose on my behalf.

Here he was drawing largely on al- Ghazālī’s etymological analysis of *tawakkul* in his *Iḥyā’*, **Cairo** 1352/1933, iv, 223, where he states that it is derived from *wakāla*, power of attorney or deputyship, “hence one says that one entrusts one’s affairs (*wakala*) to someone, i.e. one [X:377a] relies on him. The one to whom one consigns one’s affairs is called an agent or trustee (*wakīl*). With respect to the one in whom one trusts, one says that one abandons oneself to one’s agent. Thus one entrusts one’s soul to him and depends firmly on him...Hence *tawakkul* expresses the heart’s confidence in the One Trustee (*al- wakīl al- wāḥid*)” (sc. **God**).

In the earliest **Ṣūfī** writings is found just such a conception of “religion as *tawakkul*”, the sum of all acts of pious devotion, the **essence** of the feeling of “absolute dependence”, which, as Schleiermacher observed, itself is religion. In the **Ḳur’ān** and *Ḥadīth* trust in **God** is a central topic. In the **Ḳur’ān**, *tawakkul* is mentioned some 60 times (II, 256, 283, III, 75, 122, 159-61, etc.), with such typical admonitions as “So put your trust in **God**, if you are believers” (V, 23). In *Ḥadīth*, we find e.g. “If you trust in **God** Almighty as it truly demands, He will certainly supply your daily bread just as He provides the birds who fly forth with empty stomachs in the morning but return surfeited at dusk” (*Iḥyā’*, iv, 211).

In early **Ḳur’ānic exegesis**, in al- Sulamī’s recension of the *Tafsīr* ascribed to Dja’far al- Ṣādīq [*q.v.*], his description of the interior topography of the heart anticipates later **Ṣūfī** conceptions of *tawakkul* as an inner spiritual attitude rather than an external practice (ed. P. Nwyia, in *MUSJ*, xliii/4 [1967], 181- 230); and early debates in **Ṣūfism** on the propriety of *tawakkul* in the spiritual life often focussed on the **exegesis** of **Ḳur’ānic** verses, e.g. Sahl al- Tustarī (d. 283/896 [*q.v.*]) on XI, 6, “As long as one

who trusts in God (*al-mutawakkil*) perceives secondary causes (*al- asbāb*), he is a false claimant”.

From early Islamic times onwards, there were heated debates about the respective virtues of “earning a living” (*kasb*, *takassub*, *iktisāb* [see KASB]) versus pure trust in God (*tawakkul*) (summary of these in Abū Ṭālib al-Makkī, *Ḳūt al- ḵulūb*, Beirut n.d., ii, 5-6). Like other technical terms in Islamic thought, these discussions partook of the parity phenomenon, where ideas were discussed in terms of linguistic pairs of opposites representing contrary philosophico-mystical or mystico-theosophical positions, so that *tawakkul/kasb* was often paired with *djabr/ ikhtiyār* , determinism vs. freewill (see e.g. the tale of the lion and the beasts of the chase in Rūmī’s *Mathnawī*, ed. and tr. Nicholson, i, vv. 900-1200, 1263-1371). It was the ‘Irāqī school of Baghdād, followers of al- Djunayd (d. 298/910 [q.v.]) and his reliance for sustenance on God’s Providence alone, who became the main exponents of the doctrine of *tawakkul* in early Islam, whereas the Khurāsānian school of Nīshāpūr, following the teachings of Abū Yazīd Ṭayfūr al- Bisṭāmī (d. 260/874 [q.v.]) based their doctrine on *malāma*, blame, and advocated the virtues of *kasb* . But these were general tendencies rather than clear-cut divisions, and we find individuals who did not fit easily into this categorisation; thus Abū Turāb Nakhshabī (d.

245/859), although a member of the Khurāsān school, was also famed for his *tawakkul* (*Djāmī*, *Nafahāt al-uns*, Tehran 1370/1991, 49). Those fearful, like the Baghdādī Ruwaym (d. 298/310), of reliance on excessive *tawakkul*, stressed the Prophet’s *sunna* on the virtues of *kasb* , and debates on the limits of *tawakkul* abounded in the 3rd-4th/9th-10th centuries. According to Hudjwīrī, *Kashf almaḥdījūb*, tr. Nicholson, Leiden and London 1911, 146, Abū Ḥamza al- Khurāsānī, an early advocate of *tawakkul*, reportedly fell into a pit and refused to call out to be rescued by a party of travellers lest he be thought to have committed himself to

anyone but **God** (cf. further, Nicholson, *The mystics of Islam*, London 1914, 41 ff.).

[X:377b] 3 Perhaps the best-known advocate of *tawakkul* within the **Baghdādī** school was **Ibrāhīm al-Khawwāṣ** (d. 290/903), who carried the idea of self-abandonment to **God** to its extreme; **al-Djunayd** commented on his death that “the expanse of *tawakkul* on the surface of the earth has been rolled up” (‘**Abd Allāh al-Anṣārī al-Harawī**, *Ṭabaqāt al-ṣūfiyya*, Tehran 1362/1983, 348). But most **Ṣūfīs** by now were increasingly aware of the subtlety of the *tawakkul* doctrine, literal interpretation of which they tended to regard as naive. Thus **al-Hallādj** found it objectionable that **al-Khawwāṣ** based his entire mystical doctrine on *tawakkul*, taking it as “real faith” (**Hudjwīrī**, *Kashf*, 290). A subtle point was raised in such critiques as this and others: the sincerity of one’s own devotion is blemished by consciousness of one’s own reliance, and the annihilation of self (*fanā*’ [q.v.]) must underlie true realisation of *tawakkul*. It is clear that most **Baghdādī** **Ṣūfīs** acknowledged the subtle connection of the two.

It was not long before many mystics began to criticise the classical doctrine of *tawakkul* as wanting in spiritual sophistication, especially those **Khurāsānians** who had little regard for the concept anyway.

Abū Bakr al-Wāsiṭī (d. 320/931) considered it, with *zuhd*, renunciation, *riḍā*, contentment, and *taslīm*, submission, as one of the four stations which he regarded as unbefitting of true wisdom (*maʿrifa*), i.e.

it was suitable only for dull pedestrians along the **Ṣūfī** path.

But the dominant attitude which prevailed amongst the mystics was that it was the interior reality, not the external paraphernalia, of *tawakkul* which really mattered. The great **Ṣūfī** poet **Bābā Ṭāhir** (fl.

5th/11th century [q.v.]) devoted the 26th chapter of his *Aphorisms* (*Kalimāt-i kiṣār*, ed. **Dj. Mashkūr**, Tehran 1354/1975) to the topic of trust, and voices the idea paradoxically: *al-tawakkul nāfy al-tawakkul* “trust

in **God** is the negation of trust in God”, explained by a commentator as “the one who truly trusts in **God** denies himself any attachment to *tawakkul* in the sense that he has neither confidence in, nor pays attention to, his own trust”. Here, the poet approaches al- Wāsiṭī’s view that *tawakkul* is unbecoming of wisdom. It was also recognised that *tawakkul* and *tawhīd* were interconnected and involved the attainment of perfect inner peace, as emphasised by al- **Ghazālī** in *Iḥyā’*, iv, 210 (cf. A.

Schimmel, *Mystical dimensions of Islam*, Chapel Hill, N.C. 1975, 119).

Whilst there were debates about the degrees and authenticity of *tawakkul*, the classical Ṣūfīs nonetheless generally concurred that there was a moral quality which involved abandonment of freewill and volition whilst beholding **God** as the supreme source of causality, as the definitions cited by ‘Abd Allāh al- Anṣārī, *Ṭabaḳāt*, 338, show; in these last, human force and will are negated in favour of absolute divine Providence and Power. Thus *tawakkul* came to be considered a key component, a pillar of faith, “*mān*, as by al- **Ghazālī**, who devoted over 40 pages of his *Iḥyā’* to the subject of al- *tawhīd wa ’l-tawakkul* and who laid down four degrees of *tawhīd* revealed through the *‘ilm al- mukāshafa*, science of mystical unveiling. A similar schema of four degrees, with *tawakkul* corresponding to one of them, was laid down by the 8th/14th century author Maḥmūd **Shabistarī** [q.v.] in his short Persian philosophical treatise *Ḥaḳḳ al- yaḳīn* (Tehran 1365/1986, 310-11), and nearly all the Ṣūfī manuals, whilst enumerating the “stations” (*maḳāmāt*) in different orders, list *tawakkul* as amongst the initial stages of the Ṣūfī way, preceded by *zuhd* (cf. e.g. Hudjwīrī, *Kashf*, 181).

Al- **Ghazālī** further discerned three degrees of trust: (1) that of the confidence (*thiqa*) of a client in his legal agent; (2) a [X:378a] stronger kind, like the absolute reliance of an infant on its mother, which is however unconscious and lacks any deep knowledge of her abilities; and (3), the highest degree, when the devotee trusts in **God** “like a corpse in the hands of the corpse-washer”, but is nevertheless conscious that his

soul is being moved by the Eternal Will of the Divine Power. This tripartite typology of *tawakkul* proved, in fact, very popular in later *Ṣūfī* expositions, such as that of the great *Čishtī* saint Nizām al- Dīn Awliyā' (d.

725/1325 [q.v.]).

(L. Lewisohn, shortened by the Editors) (in addition to references in the article): L. Gardet, *L'abandon ā Dieu (tawakkul): texte d'al- Ghazzālī*, in *IBLA*, xiii (1950), 37-48 (= partial tr. of the section of the *Ihyā'* on *tawhīd* and *tawakkul*); Dihkhudā, *Lughat- nāma*, v, 6267-8, s.v.; B. Reinert, *Die Lehre vom tawakkul in der älteren Sufik*, Berlin 1968; Darshan Singh, *The nature and meaning of tawakkul in Sufism*, in *IC*, lvi (1982), 265-74; Dj. Nūrbakhsh, *Ma'ārif alṣūfiyya*, v, London 1986, 59-84.