

## CHAPTER-II

### THE CONCEPT OF *DHARMA* IN *PŪRVAMĪMĀMSĀ*

In previous chapter we have discussed about *dharma* in general. The present chapter will deal with the concept *dharma* in accordance with *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* system. The prime focus of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* system is to discuss about *dharma*. This system begins with the *sutra*: ‘*athāto dharma jijñāsā*’.<sup>1</sup> The term ‘*atha*’ means *ānantarya* i.e. afterward the study of *Veda*. The verb ‘*jñā*’ in the term ‘*jijñāsā*’ means ‘*jñāna*’. And the suffix ‘*san*’ means will. *Jñāna* is not such that is achieved by desire i.e. *jñāna* is not achieved one’s desire. Hence, the implicative meaning of the term ‘*jijñāsā*’ residing in the term ‘*dharma jijñāsā*’ is to judge. The meaning of the term ‘*dharma*’ is the meaning of the statement of the *Veda* which is the subject of inquiry in this system. Now the question: why – afterward i.e. afterward the study of the *Veda*? In this *sutra* the great sage Jaimini has told that after the study of the *Veda* we must judge the meaning of the statements of *Veda*. Otherwise, the study of the *Veda* becomes meaningless.<sup>2</sup>

Here a question arises: There is no necessity to judge the famous phenomenon like *dharma*. It is true that intelligent persons do not have enquiry about the phenomenon which is established already in all aspects. Though the phenomenon *dharma* is established but problem arises regarding the nature of *dharma*. *Dharma* is recognized by most of the persons. But divergence of opinion is found regarding what exactly the term *dharma* means. Someone thinks that to worship a particular tree of cremation ground is *dharma*, on the other hand someone considers that to perform the sacrificial rites is *dharma*. *Dharma* is needed as it is the tool of achieving human pursuit. Hence, it is necessary to judge *dharma* due to its doubtful nature. Something is proved by its definition (here definition stands for *lakṣṇa* or

sign) and proof. The existence of knowable object depends on its proof or verification. On the other hand, proof or verification depends on the definition of knowable object. The *ācāryas* say: ‘*mānādhīnā meyasidhirmānasidhiśca lakṣaṇāt*’ i.e. in the case of knowing the nature of unknown object it has to be known the definition of that object first. After knowing the nature of an object, verification may be applied for that object.<sup>3</sup> Hence, it has been stated first the existence of knowable object is proved by its verification. And by definition the verifiability / authenticity of an object is proved.

The definition always becomes free from the fallacy of impossibility, wideness, and narrowness. *Dharma* cannot be defined like an ordinary worldly thing so far as *Mīmāṃsā* system is concerned. *Dharma* cannot be known by perception as it is not endowed with colour, etc. That which is not, at all object of perception either fully or partly cannot be the object of inference, etc., as in each *pramāṇa* perception serves as a promoter by virtue of its *pramāṇajyeṣṭhatva* (being eldest among the *pramāṇas*). It cannot be argued that verbal testimony is the proof for it. For, if a super-sensuous object is expressed through words, it cannot make sense to others or it cannot be the object of awareness of others. If an animal indicated by the term ‘go’ (cow) were not at all familiar, the ‘cow’ would not have been object of inference or testimonial knowledge. It may be argued that the object which is beyond any proof cannot be discussed. For removing of all these objections the great sage Jaimini has given the *sūtra* about *dharma* in the following way: ‘*Codanālakṣaṇo’rthah dharmah*’ i.e. *codanā* is the proof for *dharma*.<sup>4</sup> The Vedic injunction which makes us inclined or declined doing any work is called *codanā*. That whose proof is *codanā* is called *dharma*. If this meaning is taken into account, the *codanā* alone can become the proof. If it is said that *codanā* is the only *pramāṇa* of *dharma* (*codanā lakṣaṇam pramāṇam pramāṇameva yasya*), it indicates that the *codanā* itself is *pramāṇa*, but not *apramāṇa*.<sup>5</sup>

By the term ‘*artha*’ in the *sūtra* there have been denied the cause of non-desired situation. Any type of action sanctioned by Vedic injunction is not regarded as *dharma*, which is indicated through the incorporation of the term ‘*artha*’. If an action, though sanctioned by the *Vedas*, leads to the non-desired situation is not at all *dharma*. Hence, *dharma* is always associated with the good.<sup>6</sup> The instruction of harmful action like *śyenjāg* etc for the purpose of killing the enemy available in the *Veda* is not considered as *dharma*. To kill the enemy is malicious act. There is a *Śruti*: ‘*mā himsyāt sarvva bhūtāni*’<sup>7</sup>

In the first *sūtra*, it has been stated the justification of *adharma* along with that of *dharma*. ‘*athātaḥ + dharmajijñasā = athātadharma jijñasā*’, ‘*athātaḥ + adharmajijñasā = athātahdharma jijñasā*’. If we add a hidden ‘*a-kār*’ in joining between the two words, we get the justification of *adharma* along with that of *dharma* in the same *sūtra*. And that is why; Jaimini did not give the definition of *adharma* separately.<sup>8</sup>

The action sanctioned by the *Veda* leads to good is called *dharma* i.e. the action prescribed by the *Veda* for the wellbeing of the humanity is *dharma*. Hence, *yāg*, *dān*, *hom* etc. sanctioned by the statement of the *Veda* is called *dharma* since by the performance of such action the desire of men is fulfilled. In the following of Jaimini’s *sūtra* Laugākṣi Bhāṣkar in his book ‘*Arthasaṁgraha*’ has given the definition of *dharma* which is as follows: ‘*vedapratipādyah prayajana vadartha dharmah*’ i.e. that which is sanctioned by the *Veda* and brings the good is *dharma*.<sup>9</sup> That which is prescribed by the *Veda* and by which the need of men is fulfilled is *dharma*. If this definition of *dharma* is taken into account, it becomes too wide. In this case, then, the attainment of heaven also considered as *dharma*. But attainment of heaven is not *dharma*. Hence, in the definition of *dharma* the term ‘*prayajanvat*’ is added. The fruit of *yajña* like *jyotiṣṭam* etc. is attainment of heaven. Hence, *yajña jyotiṣṭam* is that which is needed. Attainment of heaven is needed for the *yajña jyotiṣṭam*, but it itself is not something needed. Heaven does not have any need as it itself is something happiness.

There is a significance of adding the term ‘*vedapratipādyā*’ in the definition of *dharma* given by Bhāṣkar. If it is not added, any type of necessity of men is considered as *dharma*. Accordingly, taking food etc. would have been included as *dharma*. And hence, the definition of *dharma* falls in too wide. Man feels inclination to food for having attraction to food. For this, there is no necessity of the instruction of the Veda. Hence, the term ‘*vedapratipādyā*’ is added. In the definition of *dharma*, there is an intention of adding the term ‘*artha*’ also. If the term ‘*artha*’ is not added, all things prescribed by the Veda as necessity would have been considered as *dharma*. For this, *śyanyajña* etc would have been treated as *dharma*.

One thing is important here that anything is not considered as *dharma* though it is mentioned in the Veda. Mentioned in the Veda is not the same with sanctioned in the *Veda*. *Vedapratipādyā* means that which is sanctioned in the Veda so far as the author of *Arthasaṃgraha* is concerned. *Śyanyajña* etc is mentioned in the *Veda*, but not sanctioned in the *Veda*. The *Yajña* sanctioned by the Veda make the man related to the heaven by the injunction (*vidhivākya*) ‘*yajata svargakāmaḥ*’ etc. *Yajña* etc is called *dharma*, in the like manner the injunction (*vidhivākya*) for that *yajña* is also called *dharma*. *Śyanyajña* etc is malicious action, not *dharma*. Such actions are mentioned in *Atharva Veda*. These are not mentioned in the *trayīvidyā* (the first three Vedas). Śābara swami etc. commentators call such actions as ‘mentioned in the *Veda*’ (*Vedakta*) but not ‘sanctioned in the *Veda*’ (*Vedavihita*).

A question may be arisen here that the definition of *dharma* by Laugākṣi contradicts the definition of *dharma* by Jaimini. The term ‘*codanā*’ is mentioned in ‘*Mīmāṃsāsūtra*’, but the author of *Arthasaṃgraha* has given the term ‘*veda*’ instead of the term ‘*codanā*’. The term ‘*codanā*’ indicates the injunction (*vidhivākya*) only. Śābara swami has understood *codanā* as the sentence which make impulsion to perform *yajña*. But Laugākṣi think that *codanā* means all the sentences of the *Veda*. He thinks that all the

sentences of the Veda make impulsion to perform *yajña* directly or indirectly. Hence, there is no inconstancy between the term ‘*codanā*’ and the term ‘*veda*’.

The *Mīmāṃsakas* has told that the Vedic sentence is the proof for *dharma*. Śābara swami has shown that the Vedic sentence alone the proof for *dharma* accepting the term ‘*lakṣaṇa*’ as the meaning of both definition and proof in the *sūtra* ‘*Codanālakṣano’rthah dharmah*’. According to him we can get both the definition and proof for *dharma* in this *sūtra*. Here, an objection may be arisen that it falls in ‘*vākyabheda*’ if both definition and proof are accepted by one *sūtra*. In response to this question, *Kumārila* told in ‘*Ślakavartika*’ that there is no question of *vākyabheda* because the definition of *dharma* is the literal sense of the *sūtra* and the proof for *dharma* is meaning sense of the *sūtra*.

Generally, the *Veda* is divided into two parts which are *mantra* and *brahmaṇa*. We come across these two parts in each Veda – *Ṛk*, *Sām*, *Yaju* and *Atharva*. Someone considers *Atharva Veda* is the part of *Ṛk Veda*. And hence, *Veda* is called *trayīvidyā*. Generally, the *mantra* part is called *saṁhitā* and the *vidhi* part is called *brahmaṇa*. One part of the *brahmaṇa* is called *āraṇyaka*. The study of this part of the *Veda*, as if, was often held on forest (*aranya*). And all the *Upaniṣads* are taken from the two parts: *saṁhitā* and *brahmaṇa*.<sup>10</sup>

In the *brahmaṇa* part of the Veda there are four *śruties* such as: *vidhi*, *nāmdheya*, *niṣedha* and *arthavāda*. Hence, there are five sentences available in the Veda including *mantra*. The *śruties* which are executed for ceremonial purpose is called *mantra* (*taccedakeṣu mantrakṣa*). According to *Kumārila* the sentences in which there are invitation (*āmantran*), salutation (*stuti*), number (*saṁkhyā*) etc are called generally *mantra*. The sentences of the *Veda* which make sense that which is unknown are called *vidhi* (*aprāpte śāstramarthavad*). *Vidhi* is that which makes the sense about unknown object by other *pramānas* (*pramāṇāntarānadhigathārtha viśyatvaṁ vidhitvaṁ*).<sup>11</sup> The *śrutis* that point out the name of

different *yajña* is called *nāmdheya*. *Niṣedha* is the prohibitive sentences of the Veda which make a sense of refutation to action that leads a man to undesired situation. ‘*na kalañajam bhakṣayet*’ i.e. ‘do not eat *kalañaja*’. ‘*Kalañaja*’ means ‘the flesh of animal or bird’, or the red garlic (*laśun*). If one eats *kalañaja*, one must fall in worried situation. Hence, the prohibitive sentences of the Veda stand as the maker for removing the worry of man. Hence, there is necessity for *niṣedha vākya* just like that for *vidhi vākya*. The sentences of the Veda which produce eager to perform *yajña* are called *arthavāda*. In these sentences eagerness of the result of *yajña* has been expressed. After hearing the praise of the result of *yajña* even an idle person feels inclination to perform *yajña*.<sup>12</sup>

Of these varieties of sentences of the Veda (mentioned before) *vidhi* sentences occupy a central position on account of the fact that *vidhi* sentences are the direct justifiers (*pratipādaka*) of *dharma* while the others are auxiliary to *vidhi*. *Vidhi*, *codanā*, *preranā* and *upadeś* – these all are equivalent in meaning. The sentence which makes impulsion to perform action is called *vidhi*. ‘*codanālakṣaṇo’rthah dharmah*’. Here *codanā* means the Vedic injunction which inspires us in action. Śabara Swami has said ‘*kriyāyāḥ prabartakam vacanam codanā*’ i.e. *codanā* is the sentence which make impulsion to perform action. The Vedic sentences which inspires to perform action, or not to perform action is called *codanā*.<sup>13</sup> We have discussed earlier that *vidhi* is that which make the sense about unknown object. ‘*Agnihotraṁ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ*’.<sup>14</sup> It is known by this *śruti* (*vedavākya*) that the person who desires to attain heaven, he will perform the *yajña* named *agnihotra*.

*Vidhi* is the instruction of action leading to wellbeing of the person and it inspires him to perform the action. Hence, in the discussion of *dharma* it is necessary to determine the nature of *vidhi*. Now understanding *vidhivākyas* requires first understanding the meaning of the *vidhivākyas*. We have mentioned earlier that the sentence which makes the sense about unknown object is called *vidhi*. And the meaning of *vidhi* is called *bhāvanā*. *Bhāvanā* is a

technical term in *Mīmāṃsā* system. The term *bhāvanā* means *niyaga*, *preranā*, *prayajana* i.e. persuasion. The verb is considered as principal than any other parts of speech in the sentence. The verb consists of two parts: i) the *dhātu* and ii) the *pratyaya*. Of these two the *pratyaya* is regarded as principal. The *pratyaya* can again be divided into two parts: a) *ākhyātatava* and *liṅtva*. Of these two *liṅtva* is treated as principal. The ancient grammarians like Yusk consider *ākhyātata* as *dhātu*. But the later grammarians consider that *ākhyātatava* is present in ten *lakāras*. These *lakāras* are – *lat*, *lit*, *lut*, *lṛt*, *lañ*, *let*, *lot*, *liṅ* etc. These are called *lakār* in the sense that ‘la’ is present before each *pratyaya*. The *pratyaya* part stands for number and modifier of the verb. *liṅtva* is present only in *liṅ lakār*. Both the *ākhyāta* and *liṅ* produce the understanding of *bhāvanā* so far as Laugākṣi is concerned. And that is why, a person feels inclination towards performing the *yajña* (sacrifice) which is the cause of attainment of *svarga*. *Ākhyātatva* is the *vyāpaka dharma* and *liṅtva* is the *vyāpya dharma*.<sup>15</sup>

*Bhāvanā* has been defined in *Arthasaṃgraha* as the *vyāpāra* of the producer (agent) which is conducive to the production of that is being produced (*bhāvanā nāma bhaviturbhavanānukūlo bhāvayiturvyapāraviśeṣaḥ*).<sup>16</sup> The word ‘*bhāvanā*’ suggests that which is conducive to production (*utpatti anukūla*). That which generates the inspiration to produce is called *bhāvanā*. Let us take the ordinary example. Yajñadatta says Devadatta – ‘*gāmānaya*’ i.e. bring the cow. Devadatta hears the sentence uttered by Yajñadatta and thinks that Yajñadatta wants to produce the inclination (*pravṛtti*) to bring the cow in him and that which will inspire (*preranā*) him to bring the cow. Consequently, Devadatta grows the inclination towards the *vyāpāra* which is conducive to bringing the cow (*gavānayanānukūla*). Here, we see that Yajñadatta’s specific intention helps in producing Devadatta’s inclination centering round bringing the cow. In other words, a specific *vyāpāra* is *bhāvanā*. ‘*Bhāvanā*’ means to be produced, or the effort of agent. This *bhāvanā* can be of two kinds: i) *Śābdibhāvanā* and ii) *Ārthibhāvanā*. *Śābdibhāvanā* has been defined as the *vyāpāra* of the

*prayojaka* sentence that which is conducive to the inclination of the person concerned.<sup>17</sup> There are three elements in *śābdībhāvanā* viz. i) *sādhya* i.e. thing to be established, ii) *sādhana* i.e. means for doing it and iii) *itikartavyatā* i.e. duties to be performed for it or how to do it. *Liṅ* contains two properties viz. *liṅtva* and *ākhyātatvā*. *Ākhyātatva* resides in the ten *lakāras*, but *liṅtva* resides only in *liṅ*. The meaning of *ākhyāta* is the *ārthībhāvanā* and the meaning of *liṅ* is *śābdībhāvanā*. The term ‘*artha*’ refers to the person possessing the desire concerning the result (*phalakāmānāyuta*). *Bhāvanā* of such a person is called *ārthībhāvanā*. Accordingly, the intention (*yatna*) residing in the agent who is the producer of the action is *ārthībhāvanā* and this produces the desire towards the result (*phalabhāvanā*).<sup>18</sup> *Ārthībhāvanā* also consists of three parts viz. i) *sādhya*, ii) *sādhana* and iii) *itikartavyatā*. The desire concerning *sādhya* gets fulfilled in *svarga*, *sādhana* gets fulfilled in the sacrifice and the desire concerning *itikartavyatā* gets fulfilled in the secondary acts. One can elucidate these parts as follows. Proclivity grows in the person out of *ārthībhāvanā* and then the person gets the result in the form of *svarga* and this is the *sādhya*. It is worthy to mention here that *svarga* itself does not arise out of sacrifice. *Svarga* exists even before the sacrifice is performed. It is rather by performing the sacrifice the agent attains his desired object i.e. *svarga*.

The way to attain *svarga* is performing the sacrifice. From the sentence ‘*yajeta svargakāmaḥ*’ we come to know that attainment of *svarga* is possible from performance of sacrifice and accordingly *sādhana* of the *sādhya* is sacrifice. A question arises here. Does the agent attain *svarga* immediately after the performance of the sacrifice? Certainly, there is a gaping of time between performing the sacrifice and attainment of *svarga*. But then we accept the principle that *sādhana* must immediately preceed the result. Here, *Mīmāṃsakas* introduce the concept of *apūrva*. After performing the sacrifice there arises a special property called *apūrva* in the agent and agent attains *svarga* after his death on the basis of this *apūrva*. Hence, *sādhana* refers to the sacrifice. After the knowledge of *sādhya* *sādhana* the desire

arises as to how the *sādhya* can be attained. *Itikartavyatā* is an answer to this question. The form of *itikartavyatā* is that by performing the secondary acts like *prayajā* etc. one can attain *svarga*.

The *codanā* existing in *vidhivākya* has got a magnificent power is indicated by the *bhāṣyakāra* which has been discussed in earlier. *Codanā* is capable of indicating that which is past, present, or future, and also which subtle, hidden or remote, etc. The object which cannot be revealed by sense-organs is capable of being revealed through *codanā*.<sup>19</sup> It cannot be said that what is indicated by *codanā* may be true or false, just as the ordinary sentences like ‘there are fruits on the bank of the river’ may be true or false. For, it is self-contradictory to give the statement that ‘*codanā* asserts and asserts what is false’. If it is said that the Vedas assert something, it means that they become the media or means of knowing something. If the means of knowing something gives rise to knowledge of something, the means makes the object known. If there is injunction that ‘heaven can be attained through the performance of *agnihotra* sacrifice, there is no point in saying that it may be false. Here, Śābara has raised a logical defect of contradiction. If it is known to us that heaven follows from the performance of *agnihotra*, it is contradictory to say that heaven may not follow from it. If there is doubt, how can it be regarded as ‘knowledge’? Moreover, it is also contradictory to say that something is not at all present, yet known to us. The very form of the sentence ‘*sargakāmo yajet*’ indicates that there is no uncertainty in it. If there were uncertainty, the form of the sentence would be of different types like ‘Heaven may or may not follow from the performance of sacrifice’. As in the injunction there is no such linguistic expression which may convey us the sense of probability, it can be taken as certain.<sup>20</sup> If a cognition, just after its origination, becomes sublated by the consequent cognition, it is called false. What is expressed through the injunction is not at all sublated by the knowledge of any person in different situation or time. Hence, *codanā* or idea conveyed through it can never be false.

Such is not the case in the case of ordinary sentences that may be sublated by others in different time or circumstances.<sup>21</sup>

From the above discussion it can be said that the term *codanā* indicates the word-in-general, but not the sentence giving injunction due to its not having power to reveal the object of past, present and future. Śabara at first has shown that perception etc. fail to prove dharma and then he has tried to show that the word-in-general or sound-in-general (*śabdasāmānya*) has got capacity to reveal the object of past, present or future. After providing the validity of *śabdasāmānya* he has shown the *prāmānya* of *śabdaviśeṣa* which also exist in *codanā*.<sup>22</sup> It is also accepted in the *Ślokavārtika*.<sup>23</sup> According to *Nyāyaratnākara*, sound can give rise to the idea of objects like hare's horn, etc., though they are absolutely non-existent.<sup>9</sup> As *śabdasāmānya* has power to reveal the object of past, present or future, the *śabdaviśeṣa* will also have such power. Hence, *codanā* can reveal them both as the capacity of *śabdasāmānya* and *śabdaviśeṣa*.<sup>24</sup>

The function of *sāstric* injunction is to produce action in an individual. An individual may feel inclined to an action without depending on the *codanā*. Sometimes the end-in-view (*prayojana*) serves as a promoter for involving a man in action. In such cases there is no necessity of *codanā* and hence *codanā* is not always cause of an individual's inclination to action. In reply, the *Mīmāṃsakas* argue that the results like heaven, etc., are to be understood by the term *prīti* i.e. satisfaction as per principal. *Prīti* is that in which an individual becomes satisfied. The result in the form of heaven etc. which becomes the cause of satisfaction of an individual cannot be injuncted (*coditāh*) on account of the fact that he inclines to it automatically out of attraction towards them. (*tasya lipsā arthalakṣaṇā*).<sup>25</sup> The *codanā* is not essential for this actions, which is indicated in the *Nyāyamālākara* commentary: '*na bhavyāṃso vidheyah syādrāgāttatra pravarttanāt.*' The *codanā* is essential in respect of *kāraṇa* and *itikartavyatā*, for, these, being complicated, are not desired

automatically by an individual. But the knowledge of *sādhya*, the cause of satisfaction, leads a man to action and hence, there is no necessity of *vidhi*.<sup>26</sup> The means of attaining result and performance of duties regarding it may be seem to be troublesome for a person. In these cases the inspiration or direction from Vedic injunction may become the cause of making a man inclined to action. In other words, the *śruti* has given injunction to an individual being so that he may feel inclination to perform actions which, though not at all trouble-free, can conjoin him with his well-being. This type of injunction is called *codanā*,<sup>27</sup> which is *dharma*.

As performance of sacrifice etc. being full of trouble, cannot be most desired thing to an individual, one does not want to do it automatically. If it is asked in which method an individual may think of having heaven, it may be said through *codanā* that he will do so with the help of sacrifice. The suffix '*liṅ*' in *yajeta* indicates the means of *persuasion* (*preraṇā*). That which makes a man involved in action is called *preranā* or *codanā*. This knowledge of *preraṇā* is caused by the utterance of the suffix *liṅ* etc. In other words the potency of the suffix '*liṅ*' is known from the fact of generating *preraṇā* in an individual. When an individual feels *preraṇā* in performing action, it indicates the existence of some power in the suffix '*liṅ*' etc. and in the Vedic sentences or injunction also.

From the forgoing discussion it can no longer be said that *dharma*, not capable of being proved, cannot be taken into consideration. For, it is already proved that *dharma* capable of being proved can easily be taken into consideration. It can never be said that *dharma* being super-sensuous in character cannot be revealed through verbal testimony. Sometimes a non-familiar word is understood if it is uttered with the familiar words and if there is expectancy (*ākāṃkṣā*), compatibility (*yogyatā*) and contiguity (*sannidhi*) among the words. In the sentence in the form: "*iha sahakārataru madhuni madhukaraḥ pivati*" i.e., in this mango tree the bee drinks honey, there are many words. If someone does not understand the meaning of the word '*madhukaraḥ*' and can understand the meaning of the rest, he can

easily assume the meaning of the word ‘*madhukaraḥ*’ as ‘bee’ as it is associated with other familiar words. In the like manner, one can understand the meaning of the terms ‘*agnihotra*’ and ‘*soma*’, as specific type of sacrifice in the injunctions ‘*agnihotram*’ ‘*juhuyāt*’ and ‘*somena yajeta*’ etc. If the meaning of the terms like soma etc. is understood properly, it leads us to the understanding of the term ‘*dharma*’. In this way, the meaning of the *codanā* comes to the awareness of an individual.<sup>28</sup>

It has been stated that the means that leads us to the wellbeing like attainment of heaven, etc., is called *dharma*. That sacrifice can conjoin us to the heaven etc. is known only through *codanā*. If an individual performs an action as per direction of the *śāstra*, and if the action leads him to his wellbeing, it would be treated as *dharma*. As the *śāstra* is only guideline through which one can know which is *dharma* or which is not, the *codanā* has got a prominent role in the whole *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* system of Philosophy.

It is almost clear to us how *codanā* makes an individual inclined to action. It is very much significant that the Mīmāṃsakās sometimes used the term ‘*preraṇā*’ instead of *codanā* in the same sense. So, the English rendering of the term ‘*codanā*’ would be both ‘*persuasion*’ and ‘*inspiration*’, which I think, are equally relevant in the *Mīmāṃsā* system. Sometimes one may feel inclined to action out of persuasion received from the Vedic injunctions. It has already been stated earlier that an individual cannot feel to do hard action, as it involves some troubles. Hence, it is the sacred duty of the *śāstra* to persuade a person through the injunction. Just as fire loses its burning property if there is moon-stone, an individual does not feel to do action as misery in performing action becomes an obstacle to him. In order to defunct the effect of moonstone in the previous case some stimulant in the form of sunstone is essential. In the like manner, the *śāstric* injunction may serve the function of a stimulant of mild character after persuading him in action. In another way, an individual may also feel inspiration (*preraṇā*) when he hears the injunction. The miseries or troubles in performing

action may be overcome if someone received inspiration from the *śāstra*. Moreover inspiration is the primary thing in performing actions. If someone is convinced through persuasion, he feels inspiration to do action. Hence, persuasion may make an individual inclined to action through inspiration. The persuasion without inspiration and inspiration without persuasion (in doing troublesome actions) cannot lead him to action. Hence, by the word '*codanā*' both the sense should be taken into account.

Moreover, the inspiration received through persuasion is the cause of action, which will connect us with our well-being. In ancient time *śrutis* were only the sources of inspiration and persuasion. I think this source of inspiration and persuasion may be extended to non-Vedic statements also. One may feel inspiration to do troublesome action with the words or advices received from superiors. Can it be treated as '*codanā*'? It is also a kind of *codanā*, because it can inspire us to perform action which may create '*priti*' or satisfaction in us and which is related to our well-being. The immoral action cannot be prescribed as they are not connected with the well-being of all of us. In ancient time the Vedic injunctions were the only source through which the moral and immoral actions were determined. Hence, the Vedic injunctions were taken as sources of inspiration. Afterwards, one may feel inspiration from the prescriptions given by Manu or others to do any action connected with his well-being. That *yajña* is not merely something ritual is substantiated by term *ādi* attached to the word '*yāgādikarma*'. Hence, *yajña* as well as various types of actions connected with our wellbeing may be treated as dharma. Accordingly, it is unwise to think that action means only *yajña* i.e., sacrifice (something ritual). Now-a-days one may not feel inspiration to perform sacrifice for having some desired object. In order to get desired object one may feel inspired to do any action which is the cause of his well-being and satisfaction. Hence, we may take liberty of interpreting *karma* as 'any action' and of treating both Vedic and non-Vedic statements as the cause of *codanā* provided the action is connected with our well-being.

Besides this, we have to understand the inner meaning of *yajña*. Normally one may think that *yajña* is the offering of *ghee* into the fire, or killing of animal for Gods, or ritualistic part of religion. In any religion, there are some external practices and rituals. Most of them are symbolic. Unfortunately, with the passage of time, customs and rituals are mechanically observed without understanding their meanings as well as the spirit underlying them. In this connection, we will discuss briefly the view of Aurobindo who understands *yajña* symbolically. He things of *yajña* as one of the cardinal Vedic values. It is the inner sacrifice and offering of what one has and is by the mortal to the immortal as a means of divine consummation.<sup>29</sup> *Yajña* is also a battle. Aurobindo says:

“*Yajña* is the giving of man of what he possesses in his being to the higher and divine nature and its fruit is the further enrichment of his manhood by the lavish bounty of the gods. The wealth thus, gained constitutes a state of spiritual riches, prosperity, felicity which is itself a power for the journey and a force for the battle”.<sup>30</sup>

There are varies kinds of sacrifices. It was also used later on, as political weapon, for instances, *Aśvamedha* and *Rājsuya* sacrifices. These extensions of the use of *yajña* show that *Yajña* was not an ordinary ritual among other rituals. It was a public institution. In the *Bhagavadgītā* the concept of *yajña* has been elaborated in such a way that we come across several *yajñas* i.e. sacrifices which have moral social and spiritual significances. *Yajña* or sacrifice is taken as the essence of ethical life. In a society, there cannot be harmony if each and every social being cannot sacrifice for each other. This view has been beautifully elaborated by P. N. Srinivasachari. He says:

“*Yajña* or sacrifice is the essence of ethical life. The human body is moulded out of the cosmic stuff and is, therefore, a microcosm or

miniature cosmos. The constituents of the physical organism of the *Jīva* are taken from the physical universe. The cell is reproduced from the parental life. Its food is gathered from the vegetables and the animal kingdom. Its mind stuff is derived from the cosmic source...The self is a social being and cannot sustain itself without social help...In this way, the cosmos is one single organism or systematic unity in which there is no gap between atom, cell, sense, self and society. All these are inner-connected and form a single universe as opposed to the multiverse of the pluralist... *Yajña* is only a grateful offering made by the *Jīva* as the moral self to the universe for what it has received from it in its psycho-physical make up.<sup>31</sup>

Various Vedic references to *yajña* give us the proper meaning of it. *Yajña* was allegorically and symbolically understood in the Vedas themselves. The so called killing in sacrifices is to be understood symbolically. The killing of *paśu* in *yajña* clearly means the killing of the animal in man. After killing the beasts in man, one has to dedicate and devote oneself to the divine task of spiritual and moral upliftment of society. Thus, *yajña* was not only a way of worship, but it was also a way of life.

Let us turn to the etymology of the word '*yajña*'. It is derived from *yaj* meaning *devapūjā-sangatikaraṇa dānesu*. The first meaning of *yajña* is *devapūjā* i.e., reverence for the divine and the learned. It is stated in *Śtapatha Brāhmaṇa*: '*satya samhitā vai devaḥ satyamayā u deva vidvānso hi devaḥ*'.<sup>32</sup> Hence, *devapūjā* connects respect for the learned and the wise. Secondly, *yajña* stands for *sangatikarṇa*. It means to make a friendly union of human beings. This connection of *yajña* emphasizes the concept of 'get together'. In this context, Kunhan Raja's view on *Soma Yajña* is worthy to mention. He says:

“*Soma Yajña* was one of the national institutions. It was the occasion for the poets and thinkers to come together and to discuss the profound problems relating to the nature of the universe and the relations of the man to the nature, etc.”<sup>33</sup>

Thirdly, *yajña* also involves the value of *dāna* i.e., giving. It is the value of sharing wealth with our fellow-beings. In every society, there are the disabled and debilitated persons. They must not be allowed to starve. It is the duty of the healthy and able-bodied persons in society to uplift them.

According to Yaska *yajña* is also called *adhvara*. *Dhvara* means violence. *Adhvara* is the negation of *dhvara*.<sup>34</sup> One *Ṛgvedic* verse contains the following import. It states, ‘O God, you pervade those sacrifices (deeds) which do not involve killing.’<sup>35</sup> Another synonym of *yajña* is *medhā*. The term ‘*medhā*’ has been used at least in three different senses – in the sense of pure intellect, in the sense of bond of love or unity among the people and in the sense of killing. But unfortunately, the term is used by most of the people today in the third sense. *Yajña* also means *ātmajajña*. In this connection, Yama is the ideal figure or model of a self-sacrificing person who refused immortality for the sake of humanity. He voluntarily sacrificed his life for the good of humanity.<sup>36</sup> Viśvakarman also sacrificed himself for the welfare of the mankind.<sup>37</sup> We know ‘five-fold-*yajña*’ i.e., *Brahmayajña*, *Pitṛyajña*, *Devayajña*, *Bhūtajajña* and *Nṛyajña* as described in *Mahābhārata* are obligatory for all the householders.<sup>38</sup> Hence, *yajña* is a *dharmic* value par excellence. It harmonizes the individual with the society and joined the mortal with the immortal.<sup>39</sup>

Though, in fact, *vidhi* is understood only Vedic *vidhi* (Vedic sentences) but *laukika vidhi* (moral sentences) was not ignored. One is capable of performing Vedic action after performing moral action at first. Dishonest person becomes failed to obtain the result

even though he performs Vedic action. The aim of *laukika vidhi* is to control all types of conduct and action in order to attain happiness in this mundane world. The commentator Śabara Swami of *Mīmāṃsāsūtra* tells that the deeds performed in this world for welfare such as to make house for taking the rest of the passengers, to dig the well, to dig the ponds, to make the street, plantation in the street for getting shadow etc. are regarded as pious action sanctioned by the *laukika vidhi*. Practical utility is the criterion of *laukika vidhi*. From the aforesaid instances of the deeds sanctioned by *laukika vidhi*, it is clear that the Mīmāṃsākas does not accept personal sensual happiness as a standard. In according to *Mīmāṃsā* system in case of *laukika vidhi* there is much value of the societal existence of the person.<sup>40</sup>

Some of these rituals, it is true, are to be performed in order to enjoy Heaven hereafter or to obtain worldly benefits such as rainfall. Here, the *Mīmāṃsā* ethics reaches, through ritualism, the highest point of its glory, namely the conception of duty for duty's sake. Like Kant, the *Mīmāṃsā* system believes that an obligatory action is to be performed not because it will benefit the performer but because we ought to perform it. Like him again the *Mīmāṃsā* system believes that though an obligatory duty is not to be done with any interested motive, yet the Universe is so constituted that a person who performs his duty does not ultimately go unrewarded. The difference is that while for this purpose the *Mīmāṃsā* system postulates in the universe the impersonal moral law of *karma*, Kant postulates God.<sup>41</sup>

All activities for welfare of the humanity are considered as *naimittika karma* (action performed for the purpose of specific cause). The *Mīmāṃsā* has emphasized on the maxim 'duty for duty sake'. All *Mīmāṃsā* agree the same view regarding *nitya* and *naimittika karma*, but they do not agree the same view regarding *kāmya karma*. In according to Bhāṭṭa *kāmya karma* is performed for the attainment of result. On the other hand, according to Prāvēākara, *kāmya karma* also will have to be performed for the sake of duty. The purpose of *kāmya karma* is not the desire of fruit, but the knowledge that it must be

obeyed by the instruction of the *Veda*. Here, Vedic *vidhi* is a categorical imperative, but not the commandment of attaining heaven.<sup>42</sup>

According to *Mīmāṃsāka*, *svarga* is not a place beyond this world, rather it is nothing but the state of happiness. *Svarga* and *Naraka* are obtained in this world. Continuation of happiness is *svarga* and all types of suffering or sorrow are *naraka*. The *vidhi* sentence '*svargakāma yajet*' means '*sukhakāma yajet*' so far as *Mīmāṃsākas* are concerned. *Yajña* is the means of the attainment of happiness. Man feels inspiration to perform *yajña* as it is cause of fulfilling the desire of man (*iṣṭa*). The desire of man is happiness.<sup>43</sup> All men generally seek for happiness. Hence, Jaimini has attracted men to the happiness of *svarga* which is more lasting and attractive than general happiness. Though the attainment of heaven i.e. the attainment of happiness is *svkāma karma* (the action which is desired for having fruits), it is desired. Men at first become engaged to perform the action which brings fruits. Later on, men become capable of performing action which is not desired for fruits. And in this state man is liberated. Early *Mīmāṃsākas* admit three pursuits of man i.e. *dharma*, *artha* and *kāma*. They do not admit *moksa*. But later *Mīmāṃsākas* admit *mokṣa*. They have told that the performance of action desire for the fruits make leads a man in the state of performing an without the desire for fruits.<sup>44</sup>

Here, a question arises: what is the proof of that the sentences prescribed by the *Veda* are connected with wellbeing? In response to this question, it is stated that *Veda* is nothing but the knowledge of the eternal truth. In this context, Vivekananda says that *Veda* is a spiritual truth discovered by *Ṛṣis*. That which is prescribed in the *Veda* is attained by the Vedic seers through their spiritual striving. Accordingly, it is not possible that the statement prescribed by the *Veda* is not connected with wellbeing. Here one may ask that the sentences prescribed by the *Veda* do not have ethical value since those are not generated by the will of moral agent; rather those are predetermined by the *Veda*. In response to this question the

same view can be stated that though those are pre determined by the Veda, those are connected with spiritual wisdom. Moreover, it is also stated that though those are not generated by the conscience of moral agent, stipulated by the Veda, become promoter to determine the duty of the people in-general. In the case of determining the duty it is right that an educated moral conscious person will be guided by his conscience, but in the case in-general people it is good if there is a predetermined universal injunction.

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3. *Ibid*, p. 21.
4. *Mīmāṃsāsūtra*, 1/1/2.
5. Cf. Prabhā on Śabarabhāṣya: *sūtra*, 1/1/2, p. 15. and Ānandāśramagranthavali series no. 17.
6. *Codanājanya pramāviṣayaḥ puruṣaṇiḥ-śreyasa hetubūtaścayaḥ sa dharma iti prati jñāyata iti bhāvaḥ. Prabhā, Ibid.*
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23. *Atyantāsatyapi jñānamarthe śabdaḥ karoti hi / Ślokavārtika*, 1/1/2/6.
24. *Śabdasāmānyasya jñānajanakatvena prāmāṇyasambhavāccodanāyāśca śabdatvādataḥ sambhavatyevatindriye dharma codanayaḥ pramanyamiti / Prabhā*, *Nyāyaratnākara on Vārtika*, 1/1/2/1.
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