Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2018-2019

PART IA PAPER 03:
MEANING

SYLLABUS

- Analyticity, a priority, and necessity
- Verificationism
- Intention and convention
- Conditionals
- Frege and Russell on names and descriptions
- Causal theories of names

Course Outline

The notion of meaning is central to the philosophy of logic and to the philosophy of language in general. This compulsory course explores meaning from several directions.

We consider whether there is a stable distinction to be drawn between analytic truths, which are true solely in virtue of their meaning (e.g. all vixens are foxes), and synthetic truths, which require the world to be a certain way (e.g. no fox has been to the moon). We also ask how this relates to two other distinctions: between necessary and contingent truths, and between a priori and a posteriori truths.

These distinctions were of central interest to the verificationist program, which tied meaning to the possibility of verification. We explore the successes and failures of their approach. We also consider whether we can think of meaning purely in terms of individual speaker's intentions, and/or conventions between groups of speakers and listeners.

Finally, we consider several case studies of particular aspects of language. For example: Under what circumstances is a conditional (an "if…, then…" construction) true? Can this come apart from the circumstances under which it might be appropriate to assert a conditional? What is the meaning of a given name? Is there a significant difference between names and descriptions? And how do names refer to their bearers?

Objectives

Students will be expected to:
1. Begin studying philosophical issues in logic and language
2. Explore and critique key ideas and distinctions
3. Develop key skills in writing philosophical essays

Prerequisites

There are no procedural pre-requisites. However, every topic uses elementary notions from formal logic. These notions are fully covered in Part IA Paper 5 (Formal Methods); students who are taking Paper 3 but not taking Paper 5 should either attend the Part IA lectures on Formal Logic, or work through *forallx* independently (see below).

Preliminary Reading

As mentioned under Prerequisites, familiarity with elementary formal logic is assumed. This will be adequately covered by sitting Paper 5; but those who are not taking Paper 5 will want to work through:

MAGNUS, P.D., and Tim BUTTON, 'Forallx: Cambridge' [Online]. Available at: http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/tecb2/forallxcam.pdf. (Accessed: 8 September 2018).

Otherwise, no preliminary reading is expected. Still, students may enjoy:

PRIEST, Graham, *Logic: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), chs. 1-4 & 7. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/actrade/9780192893208.001.0001
SAINSBURY, R. Mark, *Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic*. 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), chs. 1-4.

ANALYCITY, A PRIORITY, AND NECESSITY

(A) Basic Reading

We need to distinguish three distinctions: analytic / synthetic; a priori / a posteriori; and necessary / contingent. For introductions, see:

JUHL, Cory, and Eric LOOMIS, *Analyticity* (London: Routledge, 2010), ch. 1 'Conceptions of analytic truth'.
PAPINEAU, David, *Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), chs. 4 & 5. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com
REY, Georges, 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', sects. 1 & 2, in E.N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2013 Edition)* [Online]. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/analytic-synthetic/ (Accessed: 10 September 2018).

The classic empiricist view is that necessity, analyticity and a priority come as a single package. For a defense of this view, see:

AYER, A.J., *Language, Truth and Logic*. 2nd ed. (London: Gollancz, 1946), ch. 4 'The *a priori'*. Reprinted in P.K. Moser, ed., *A Priori Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

HUME, David, *Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding*, edited by P.H. Nidditch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), sect. 12, part 3. Also available online at: http://pm.nlx.com

Kant, however, argued that there must be synthetic a priori truths:

KANT, Immanuel, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B-1-B14 (i.e. Introduction, sects. I-IV). Various translations are available, of which the most widely used are those by N. Kemp Smith (London: Macmillan, 1929), also available online at: http://staffweb.hkbu.edu.hk/ppp/cpr/toc.html and by P. Guyer and A.W. Wood (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), also available online at: http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511804649

And Kripke argued that there are contingent a priori and necessary a posteriori truths:

KRIPKE, Saul, 'A Priori Knowledge, Necessity, and Contingency', in P.K. Moser, ed., *A Priori Knowledge* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), ch. 7. [Excerpt of his *Naming and Necessity*]

(B) Further Reading

An excellent response to Kripke is:

CASULLO, Albert, 'Kripke on the *a Priori* and the Necessary', *Analysis*, 37 (1977): 152-59. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3327344

For further discussion of Kripke, see:

AHMED, Arif, *Saul Kripke* (London: Continuum, 2007), ch. 3 'Necessity'. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=327232

PAPINEAU, David, *Philosophical Devices: Proofs, Probabilities, Possibilities, and Sets* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), ch. 6 'Naming and Necessity'. Also available online at: www.dawsonera.com

Then, for a rich (but very rapid) survey on analyticity, try:

RUSSELL, Gillian, 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', *Philosophy Compass*, 2, no. 5 (2007): 712-29. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2007.00093.x

And then move into the Verificationism topic (below), with a particular focus on Quine.

VERIFICATIONISM

(A) Basic reading

Two classic, early defences of verificationism are:

AYER, A.J., *Language, Truth and Logic*. 2nd ed. (London: Gollancz, 1946), Introduction and ch. 1.

SCHLICK, Moritz, 'Meaning and Verification', *Philosophical Review*, 45 (1936): 339-69. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2180487. Reprinted in H. Feigl and W. Sellars, eds., *Readings in Philosophical Analysis* (New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1949).

For some quick surveys, look at:

HACKING, Ian, *Why Does Language Matter to Philosophy?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 9 'A.J. Ayer's verification' (pp. 93-102). Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511627873.010

HART, W.D., 'Meaning and Verification', in E. Craig, ed., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* [Online]. Available at: https://www.rep.routledge.com/articles/thematic/meaning-and-verification/v-1 (Accessed: 7 August 2018).

For richer treatments, see:

HEMPEL, Carl G., 'The Empiricist Criterion of Meaning', in A.J. Ayer, ed., *Logical Positivism* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1959), pp. 108-32.

MISAK, Cheryl, *Verificationism: Its History and Prospects* (London: Routledge, 1995), especially ch. 2 available on Moodle

(B) Further Reading

These two articles combine philosophical discussion with helpful background:

CREATH, Richard, 'Logical Empiricism', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2013 edition)* [Online]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2013/entries/logical-empiricism/ (Accessed: 7 August 2018).

SOAMES, Scott, *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*. Vol. 1. *The Dawn of Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), chs. 12-13. Also available online at: https://www.dawsonera.com

The most famous attack on logical empiricism comes from Quine. He targets the notion of analyticity, so this will also help with the topic of **Analyticity, A priority, and Necessity**:

QUINE, W.V., 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism', *Philosophical Review*, 60 (1951): 20-43. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2181906. Reprinted in his *From a Logical Point of View* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1953; 2nd ed. 1963).

QUINE, W.V., *The Ways of Paradox* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1966), ch. 10 'Necessary truth'. Also available on Moodle

Here are some helpful discussions of Quine:

GRICE, H. Paul, and Peter F. STRAWSON, 'In Defence of a Dogma', *Philosophical Review*, 65 (1956): 141-58. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2182828
JUHL, Cory, and Eric LOOMIS, *Analyticity* (London: Routledge, 2010), ch. 3 'Analyticity and its discontents'.
REY, Georges, 'The Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2018 edition)* [Online]. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/analytic-synthetic/ (Accessed: 7 August 2018). Sects. 1-3.
RUSSELL, Gillian, 'Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction', in G. Harman and E. Lepore, eds., *A Companion to W. V. O. Quine* (Malden, MA: Wiley Blackwell, 2014), pp. 181-202. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.1002/9781118607992
SOAMES, Scott, *Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century*. Vol. 1. *The Dawn of Analysis* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2003), ch. 16 'The analytic and the synthetic, ...'. Also available online at: https://www.dawsonera.com

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INTENTION AND CONVENTION

(A) Basic Reading

You must start with the classic:

GRICE, H.P., 'Meaning', *Philosophical Review*, 66 (1957): 377-88. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2182440

For critical discussion, see:

MILLER, Alexander, *Philosophy of Language* (London: Routledge, 2018), ch. 7 'Sense, intention, and speech acts'. Also available online at: https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351265522
PLATTS, M., *Ways of Meaning*. 2nd ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997), ch. 3 'Shades of meaning'.

And for a development of Grice's view, which shifts from intention to conventions, see:

BLACKBURN, Simon, *Spreading the Word* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1984), ch. 4 'Conventions, Intentions, Thoughts'. Also available on Moodle

(B) Further Reading

The pioneer of convention-based approaches was Lewis; and it might help to read Lewis alongside Rescorla's survey:

LEWIS, David *Convention: A Philosophical Study* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1969), chs. 1 & 4. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1002/9780470693711
RESCORLA, Michael, 'Convention', sect. 7, in E.N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition)* [Online]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/convention (Accessed: 6 August 2018).

And this article explores some post-Gricean attempts to offer intention- (and possibly convention-) based approaches to semantics:

BORG, Emma, 'Intention-Based Semantics', in E. Lepore and B.C. Smith, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 250-67. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199552238.003.0012

CONDITIONALS

(A) Basic Reading

For some very brief introductory remarks about the material conditional, read:

PRIEST, Graham, *An Introduction to Non-Classical Logic: From If to Is.* 2nd rev. ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), sects. 1.6-1.10. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511801174

The absolute must-read article is by Grice, in which he introduces the idea of a controversial implicature:

MAGNUS, P.D., and Tim BUTTON, 'Forallx: Cambridge', sects. 9 & 11.5 [Online]. Available at: http://people.ds.cam.ac.uk/tecb2/forallxcam.pdf (Accessed: 8 Septmeber 2018).
GRICE, H. P., *Studies in the Way of Words* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989), ch. 2 'Logic and conversation'. Also available online at: http://hdl.handle.net/2027/heb.08428. Reprinted in F. Jackson, ed., *Conditionals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

The readings by and about Grice, in the Intention and Convention topic (above), may help here. For further discussion, try:

SAINSBURY, Mark, *Logical Forms: An Introduction to Philosophical Logic.* 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 2000), ch. 2, especially sects. 4-8.

SMITH, Peter, *An Introduction to Formal Logic* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003; 2009), chs. 7, 14 & 15.

(B) Further Reading

Three good discussions are:

LEPORE, Ernest, *Meaning and Argument* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2003), chs. 3, 4, 6 & 7.

JACKSON, Frank, 'Indicative Conditionals', in E. Craig, ed., *Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (1998) [Online]. Available at: www.rep.routledge.com/article/X017 (Accessed: 7 August 2018).
WOODS, Michael J., *Conditionals* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997), chs. 1, 2 & 4.

Jackson developed his views further here:

JACKSON, Frank, 'On Assertion and Indicative Conditionals', *Philosophical Review*, 88 (1979): 565-89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2184845. Reprinted in F. Jackson, ed., *Conditionals* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1991).

After that, look at the following; it is wonderfully rich, and will (at least) convince you of the *depth* of these issues:

EDGINGTON, Dorothy, 'Indicative Conditionals', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2014 Edition)* [Online]. Available at: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/conditionals/ (Accessed: 7 August 2018).

Finally, this (advanced) discussion Grice's notion of conversational implicature helps clarify just how to understand Grice (and helps with the topic *Intention and Convention*).

SAUL, Jennifer M., 'Speaker Meaning, What Is Said, and What Is Implicated', *Noûs*, 36 (2002): 228-48. http://www.jstor.org/stable/3506193

FREGE AND RUSSELL ON NAMES AND DESCRIPTIONS

For some historical background, you may want to read:

POTTER, Michael, 'The Birth of Analytic Philosophy', in D. Moran, ed., *The Routledge Companion to Twentieth Century Philosophy* (London: Routledge, 2008), pp. 43-75. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=183799

(A) Frege: Basic Reading

FREGE, Gottlob, 'On Sense and Reference', in M. Black and P. Geach, eds., *Translations from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), pp. 56-78. Also available on Moodle. Reprinted in A.W. Moore, ed., *Meaning and Reference* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993); and in P. Ludlow, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

(B) Frege: Further Reading

DUMMETT, Michael, *Origins of Analytical Philosophy* (London: Duckworth, 1993), ch. 7 'Sense without reference'.
KENNY, Anthony, *Frege* (London: Penguin, 1995), chs. 6 & 7.
NOONAN, Harold, *Frege: A Critical Introduction* (Cambridge: Polity, 2000), chs. 4 & 5.

(A) Russell: Basic Reading

RUSSELL, Bertrand, *Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1919), ch. 16 'Descriptions'. Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); also in G. Ostertag, ed., *Definite Descriptions: A Reader* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), ch. 3; and in A. P. Martinich, ed., *The Philosophy of Language* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
SAINSBURY, R. Mark, 'Philosophical Logic', in A. Grayling, ed., *Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), sects. 2.1-2.3.

(B) Russell: Further Reading

There is a classic debate between Russell and Strawson:

STRAWSON, Peter, 'On Referring', *Mind*, 59 (1950): 320-44. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251176
RUSSELL, Bertrand, 'Mr Strawson on Referring', *Mind*, 66 (1957): 385-89. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251489

Then look at these two landmark discussions of Russell's approach to descriptions:

DONNELLAN, Keith, 'Reference and Definite Descriptions', *Philosophical Review*, 75 (1966): 281-304. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2183143
KRIPKE, Saul, 'Speaker's Reference and Semantic Reference', *Midwest Studies in Philosophy*, 2 (1977): 255-76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-4975.1977.tb00045.x. Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997); and in G. Ostertag, ed., *Definite Descriptions: A Reader* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).

For commentary, consider:

LUDLOW, Peter, 'Descriptions', in E.N. Zalta, ed., *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018 Edition)* [Online]. Available at: https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/descriptions/ (Accessed: 7 August 2018).

SAINSBURY, R. Mark, 'Philosophical Logic', in A. Grayling, ed., *Philosophy 1: A Guide through the Subject* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), sect. 2.4.

CAUSAL THEORIES OF NAMES

(A) Basic Reading

The most famous advocate of the causal theory of names is Kripke:

KRIPKE, Saul, *Naming and Necessity* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1980), Lecture 1 and 2. Reprinted in P. Ludlow, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

Around the same time, Putnam also criticised descriptivism, though focussing more on natural kind terms (e.g. "water") than proper names for individuals (e.g. "Aristotle"):

PUTNAM, Hilary, *Mind, Language, and Reality* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), ch. 12 'The meaning of "meaning"'. Also available online at: http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625251

For discussion, try:

EVANS, Gareth, 'The Causal Theory of Names', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Suppl. Vol.*, 47 (1973): 187-225. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106912

MORRIS, Michael, *An Introduction to the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 4 'Kripke on proper names'. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=239517

(B) Further Reading

It will help you to understand the descriptivist target if you have read some of the material from the section on Frege and Russell. But here are a few more descriptivists, who you might want to look at (at least briefly):

GEACH, Peter, *Mental Acts* (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1957), ch. 16 'Judgments involving identifications'.

SEARLE, John, 'Proper Names', *Mind*, 67 (1958): 166-73. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2251108. Reprinted in P.F. Strawson, ed., *Philosophical Logic* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1967); and in P. Ludlow, ed., *Readings in the Philosophy of Language* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997).

WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig, *Philosophical Investigations*, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe (Oxford: Blackwell, 1953), sect. 79. Also available online at: http://pm.nlx.com

There are some excellent discussions of the causal theory of names, e.g.:

AHMED, Arif, *Saul Kripke* (London: Continuum, 2007), ch. 2 'Names'. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=327232

MCCULLOCH, Gregory, *The Game of the Name* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), chs. 4 & 8.

For further discussions, you might consider:

DEVITT, Michael, and Kim STERELNY, *Language and Reality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), ch. 4 'A causal theory of reference: names'.

LYCAN, William G., *Philosophy of Language* (London: Routledge, 2000), chs. 3 & 4. Also available online at: http://lib.myilibrary.com/?id=35447

We welcome your suggestions for further readings that will improve and diversify our reading lists, to reflect the best recent research, and important work by members of under-represented groups. Please email your suggestions to phillib@hermes.cam.ac.uk including the relevant part and paper number. For information on how we handle your personal data when you submit a suggestion please see https://www.information-compliance.admin.cam.ac.uk/data-protection/general-data.