

Philosophy Faculty Reading List and Course Outline 2018-2019

PART IB PAPER 03: ETHICS

SYLLABUS

- **Helping and harming:** beneficence I: demands; beneficence II: aggregation; normative powers I: consent; normative powers II: promise; contractualism
- **Early modern moral philosophy:** voluntarism; rationalism; sentimentalism
- **Moral psychology:** moral motivation; virtues, vices and moral learning; practical reasoning

COURSE OUTLINE

This paper covers a wide range of topics in moral philosophy, including metaethics, normative ethics, and moral psychology. These topics are approached from both historical and contemporary perspectives.

The first section, **Helping and Harming**, is concerned with normative questions about the nature and scope of our moral obligations. How demanding are our moral requirements to help people in need? When helping people, are we required to help more people rather than fewer? Can contractualism ground our moral obligations? What principles govern our moral practices of making promises and giving consent?

The second section, **Early Modern Moral Philosophy**, concerns a critical metaethical debate in the history of ethics. We look at three positions in this debate. Very roughly, voluntarists held that moral obligations are grounded in the commands of a superior, moral rationalists held that moral judgment is analogous to belief about mathematics, while moral sentimentalists held that our faculty of moral judgment is analogous to our aesthetic sense.

The third section of the paper, **Moral Psychology**, focuses on motivation, character and practical reasoning. Does moral motivation require that we deliberate about what reasons we have? Is being virtuous a matter of having certain character traits and dispositions? What does psychology tell us about character traits and how we acquire them? Are our reasons for action grounded in our desires and motivations? What is practical reasoning?

Prerequisites

There are no formal prerequisites, but the course builds on material that has been covered in Part IA. Those who have not already taken the Part IA Ethics and Political Philosophy course are strongly advised to study some of the recommended reading for that course.

Objectives

Students taking this paper will be expected to:

1. Acquire a detailed knowledge of some of the central arguments contained in the texts studied on the topics chosen.
2. Acquire an understanding of how the different topics studied relate to one another.
3. Engage in close criticism with the arguments studied.
4. Develop their own powers of philosophical analysis and argument, through study of the readings set for the topics chosen.

Preliminary Reading

ANNAS, Julia, *Intelligent Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs. 1-3. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228782.001.0001>

GILL, Michael, 'Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty?' *Philosophy Compass*, 2 (2007): 16-30.
<http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00052.x>

SCANLON, T.M., 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 103-29. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611964.007>

SINGER, Peter, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1, no. 3 (1972): 229-43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052>

SMITH, Michael, *The Moral Problem* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994). [Especially chs. 3-5]

READING LIST

**Material marked with an asterisk* is important*

HELPING AND HARMING

Topics in this section look at foundational normative questions, both from a consequentialist as well as a deontological perspective.

Beneficence I: Demands and Limits

How demanding are our obligations to others? This topic explores questions as to how demanding morality is, whether we are required to do more than our fair share and whether our personal projects can place limits on how much morality can require of us.

*MURPHY, Liam B., 'The Demands of Beneficence', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 22 (1993): 267-92. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265468>

How demanding are our obligations to others? This topic explores questions as to how demanding morality is, whether we are required to do more than our fair share and whether our personal projects can place limits on how much morality can require of us.

*SINGER, Peter, 'Famine, Affluence, and Morality', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 1, no. 3 (1972): 229-43. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265052>

BARON, Marcia, *Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), chs. 1 & 3.

BUSS, Sarah, 'Needs (Someone Else's), Projects (My Own), and Reasons', *Journal of Philosophy*, 103, no. 8 (2006): 373-402. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/20619955>

CULLITY, Garrett, *The Moral Demands of Affluence* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199258112.001.0001>

HERMAN, Barbara, 'The Scope of Moral Requirement', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 30, no. 3 (2001): 227-56. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557923>

HILL, Thomas E., 'Meeting Needs and Doing Favours', in his *Human Welfare and Moral Worth* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 201-43. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199252637.001.0001>

MILLER, Richard, 'Beneficence, Duty, and Distance', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 32, no. 4 (2004): 357-83. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3557993>

UNGER, Peter, *Living High and Letting Die* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996), chs. 1 & 2. Also available online: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0195108590.001.0001>

URMSON, J. O., 'Saints and Heroes', in A.I. Melden, ed., *Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1958). Also available on [Moodle](#)

WOLF, Susan, 'Moral Saints', *The Journal of Philosophy*, 79 (1982): 419-39. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2026228>

Beneficence II: Aggregation

Some moral choices involve trade-offs between the claims of many and the claims of few. This section looks at different approaches to how we should resolve such trade-offs.

*NORCROSS, Alastair, 'Comparing Harms: Headaches and Human Lives', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 26, no. 2 (1997): 135-67. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2961948>

*SCANLON, T.M., 'Aggregation', in his *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap, 1998), pp. 229-41. Also available on [Moodle](#)

*TAUREK, John M., 'Should the Numbers Count?' *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 6, no. 4 (1977): 239-316. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2264945>

BROOME, John, 'Fairness', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, New Series*, 91 (1990-91): 87-101. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/4545128>

HIROSE, Iwao, 'Saving the Greater Number without Combining Claims', *Analysis*, 61, no. 4 (2001): 341-42. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3329018>

OTSUKA, Michael, 'Saving Lives, Moral Theory, and the Claims of Individuals', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 34, no. 2 (2006): 109-35. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3557998>

PARFIT, Derek, 'Innumerate Ethics', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 7, no. 4 (1978): 285-301. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2264959>

PARFIT, Derek, 'Justifiability to Each Person', *Ratio*, 16, no. 4 (2003): 368-90. <http://doi.org/10.1046/j.1467-9329.2003.00229.x>

VELLEMAN, J. David, 'Well-Being and Time', in his *The Possibility of Practical Reason* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 56-84. Also available on [Moodle](#)

WASSERMAN, David T., and Alan STRUDLER, 'Can a Nonconsequentialist Count Lives?' *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 31, no. 1 (2003): 71-94. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3558035>

Normative Powers I: Consent

By consenting to an action, we make it permissible for another party to perform it. This section examines what morally valid consent is and why it matters. Amongst others, it examines which conditions must be met for consent to be "informed".

*KORSGAARD, Christine, 'Kant's Formula of Humanity', *Kant Studien*, 77 (1986): 183-202. <http://doi.org/10.1515/kant.1986.77.1-4.183>. Reprinted in her *Creating the Kingdom of Ends* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

*O'NEILL, Onora, 'Between Consenting Adults', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 14, no. 3 (1985): 252-77. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265350>

BEAUCHAMP, Tom, 'Autonomy and Consent', in F.G. Miller and A. Wertheimer, eds., *The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 55-78. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335149.003.0003>

CONLY, Sarah, 'Seduction, Rape, and Coercion', *Ethics*, 115, no. 1 (2004): 96-121. <http://doi.org/10.1086/421981>

DWORKIN, Gerald, *The Theory and Practice of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), chs. 6 & 7. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511625206>

MANSON, Neil, and Onora O'NEILL, *Rethinking Informed Consent in Bioethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), ch. 4 'How to rethink informed consent'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511814600.005>

OWENS, David, 'The Possibility of Consent', in his *Shaping the Normative Landscape* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), pp. 164-88. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.003.0008>

PARFIT, Derek, 'Possible Consent', in his *On What Matters*. Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 177-211. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572809.003.0009>

SCANLON, T. M., 'The Value of Choice' *The Significance of Choice, The Tanner Lectures on Human Values* (1986), pp. 177-201 [Online]. Available at: https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/_documents/a-to-z/s/scanlon88.pdf (Accessed: 14 August 2018).

WERTHEIMER, Alan, *Consent to Sexual Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), chs. 6 & 7. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511610011>

WEST, Robin, 'Sex, Law and Consent', in F.G. Miller and A. Wertheimer, eds., *The Ethics of Consent: Theory and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 221-50. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780195335149.003.0009>

Normative Powers II: Promise

Promising is an important part of our moral practice. But why are we morally obligated to keep promises? According to one influential approach, it's because promises raise the other party's expectations. According to another one, it's because promising is a practice that is beneficial to us. A third influential account, locates promissory obligations in our normative powers.

*OWENS, David, *Shaping the Normative Landscape* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2012), chs. 5 & 8. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199691500.001.0001>

*RAWLS, John, 'Two Concepts of Rules', *The Philosophical Review*, 64, no. 1 (1955): 3-32. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2182230>

*SCANLON, T.M., 'Promises and Practices', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 19, no. 3 (1990): 199-226. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2265394>. Reprinted in his *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 7

GILBERT, Margaret, 'Scanlon on Promissory Obligation: The Problem of Promisees' Rights', *Journal of Philosophy*, 101, no. 2 (2004): 83-109. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3655658>

MCCORMICK, Neil, and Joseph RAZ, 'Voluntary Obligations and Normative Powers', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volumes*, 46 (1972): 59-102. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4106798>

NARVESON, Jan, 'Promising, Expecting and Utility', *Canadian Journal of Philosophy*, 1, no. 2 (1971): 207-33. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40230347>

SHIFFRIN, Seana, 'Promising, Intimate Relationships and Conventionalism', *The Philosophical Review*, 177, no. 4 (2008): 481-524. <http://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2008-014>

THOMSON, Judith Jarvis, 'Giving One's Word', in her *The Realm of Rights* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2009), pp. 294-321.

WATSON, Gary, 'Promises, Reasons, and Normative Powers', in D. Sobel and S. Wall, eds., *Reasons for Action* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), pp. 155-78. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511720185.008>

Contractualism

According to contractualism, whether an act is permissible depends on whether it is compatible with a set of principles that no one could reasonably reject. Thus, contractualists try to derive the content of morality from the notion of an agreement of those who are part of the moral domain. The following provides an introduction to Scanlon's contractualism and its most important criticisms.

*PARFIT, Derek, 'Contractualism', in his *On What Matters*. Vol. 1 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 343-70. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:osobl/9780199572809.003.0016>

*SCANLON, T.M., 'Contractualism and Utilitarianism', in A. Sen and B. Williams, eds., *Utilitarianism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 103-29. Also available online at:

<http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511611964.007>. Reprinted in R. Shafer-Landau, ed., *Ethical Theory* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), pp. 644-60.

*SCANLON, T.M., *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), Introduction & ch. 5 'The structure of contractualism'.

ASHFORD, E., 'The Demandingness of Scanlon's Contractualism', *Ethics*, 113, no. 2 (2003): 273-302. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/342853>

BRAND-BALLARD, J., 'Contractualism and Deontic Restrictions', *Ethics*, 114, no. 2 (2004): 269-300. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/379354>

DARWALL, Stephen, *The Second-Person Standpoint* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), chs. 1 & 12.

GAUTHIER, David, *Morals by Agreement* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986), chs. 1 & 6. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0198249926.001.0001>

HAMPTON, Jean, 'Feminist Contractarianism', in her *The Intrinsic Worth of Persons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 1-38. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511618239.003>

KUMAR, Rahul, 'Defending the Moral Moderate: Contractualism and Common Sense', *Philosophy & Public Affairs*, 28, no. 4 (1999): 275-309. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2672874>

WALLACE, R. Jay, 'Scanlon's Contractualism', *Ethics*, 112, no. 3 (2002): 429-70. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/10.1086/338481>

EARLY MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY

General and Background

The following works will help to get an overview of early modern metaethics, and in particular to survey the debate between the rationalists and sentimentalists.

*GILL, Michael, 'Moral Rationalism vs. Moral Sentimentalism: Is Morality More Like Math or Beauty?' *Philosophy Compass*, 2 (2007): 16-30. <http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1747-9991.2006.00052.x>

*GUYER, Paul, 'Early Modern Ethics' *The International Encyclopedia of Ethics* (2013) [Online]. Available at: <http://doi.org/10.1002/9781444367072.wbiee429> (Accessed: 14 August 2018).

DARWALL, Stephen, 'Grotius at the Creation of Modern Moral Philosophy', in his *Honor, History and Relationship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 157-88. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662609.003.0009>

RAWLS, John, 'Introduction: Modern Moral Philosophy, 1600-1800', in his *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000), pp. 1-17.

Voluntarism

Voluntarists explained moral obligations in terms of the will of a superior. It was criticised by rationalist opponents and fell out of favour as a result of these criticisms. It is an important part of the historical and intellectual context for the debate between the rationalists and sentimentalists.

- *PUFENDORF, Samuel, 'Selections from on the Duty of Man and Citizen, and the Law of Nature and of Nations', in J.B. Schneewind, ed., *Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990). Also available on [Moodle](http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199662609.003.0010)
- DARWALL, Stephen, 'Pufendorf on Morality, Sociability, and Moral Powers', in his *Honor History and Relationship* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 157-88. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811579.006>
- GROTIUS, Hugo, 'Selections from on the Law of War and Peace', in J.B. Schneewind, ed., *Moral Philosophy from Montaigne to Kant* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), pp. 88-110. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811579.006>
- IRWIN, Terence, *The Development of Ethics*. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs. 33, 36 & 42.
- SCHNEEWIND, J. B., *Invention of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chs. 4, 5 & 7. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288>

Rationalism

Rationalists claim that there are objective moral truths, that we are obligated to follow these truths, that we know about these truths through our faculty of reason, and that reason by itself can motivate us to act. Many construe morality as analogous to mathematics. An important motivation is the thought that morality is eternal and immutable and that morally worthy action is guided by moral beliefs.

- *CLARKE, Samuel, *Selections from a Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion*. Available on [Moodle](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288)
- *PRICE, Richard, *Selections from a Review of the Principal Questions in Morals*. Available on [Moodle](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288)
- *REID, Thomas, *Selections from Essays on the Active Powers of the Human Mind*. Available on [Moodle](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288)
- IRWIN, Terence, *The Development of Ethics*. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs. 46, 58 & 62.
- SCHNEEWIND, J.B., *The Invention of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), chs. 15 & 18. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288>
- STRATTON-LAKE, Philip, 'Rational Intuitionism', in R. Crisp, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 337-57. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199545971.013.0016>

Sentimentalism

Sentimentalists typically claim that moral distinctions rely on our faculty of moral sentiment, which does not represent a mind-independent moral reality. Many construe morality as analogous to beauty. A key motivation for their view was their claim that desire or emotion was necessary for motivation.

- *HUME, David, *Selections from an Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals*. Available on [Moodle](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288)
- *HUTCHESON, Francis, *Selections from an Inquiry into the Original of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue*. Available on [Moodle](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288)
- BUTLER, Joseph, *Selection from a Dissertation on Virtue*. Available on [Moodle](http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288)
- COHON, Rachel, *Hume's Morality: Feeling and Fabrication* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), chs. 3 & 4. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199268443.001.0001>
- DARWALL, Stephen, *The British Moralists and the Internal 'Ought' 1640 - 1740* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), ch. 10 'Hume: norms and the obligation to be just'. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511608957.011>
- DRIVER, Julia, 'Moral Sense and Sentimentalism', in R. Crisp, ed., *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 358-76. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199545971.013.0017>
- GILL, Michael, *The British Moralists on Human Nature and the Birth of Secular Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), ch. 12, 13 & 19. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511499272>
- IRWIN, Terence, 'Hutcheson: For and against Moral Realism', in his *The Development of Ethics*. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 339-420.
- NORTON, David F., 'Hume, Human Nature, and the Foundations of Morality', in his *The Cambridge Companion to Hume* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 148-81. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1017/CCOL0521382734>
- RAWLS, John, 'Hume: Lectures IV & V', in his *Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993), pp. 21-104.
- SCHNEEWIND, J.B., *Invention of Autonomy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), ch. 16 'The limits of love: Hutcheson and Butler'. Also available online at: <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511818288.017>

MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Moral Motivation

What is it to act from a moral motive? The central disagreement here is between judgment internalists and externalists on whether moral judgments are intrinsically motivating. Judgment internalists say yes. Externalists say no: to be motivated to do what's right also takes the right kind of desire.

- *SMITH, Michael, *The Moral Problem* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1994), chs. 3 & 4.
- BRINK, David O., 'Moral Motivation', *Ethics*, 108 (1992): 4-32.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/2382087>
- KENNETT, Jeanette, 'Autism, Empathy and Moral Agency', *The Philosophical Quarterly*, 52, no. 208 (2002): 340-57. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/3543050>
- NAGEL, Thomas, *The Possibility of Altruism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1970), chs. 5 & 6.
- ROSKIES, Adina, 'Are Ethical Judgments Intrinsically Motivational? Lessons From "Acquired Sociopathy"', *Philosophical Psychology*, 16, no. 1 (2003): 51-66.
<http://doi.org/10.1080/0951508032000067743>
- SCANLON, T. M., *What We Owe to Each Other* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), ch. 1 sects. 7 & 8 and ch. 4 sects. 1-4.
- SCHROEDER, Timothy, Adina L. ROSKIES, and Shaun NICHOLS, 'Moral Motivation', in J.M. Doris, ed., *Moral Psychology Handbook* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 72-110. Also available online at: <http://lib.mylibrary.com/?id=260071>
- SHAFFER-LANDAU, Russ, *Moral Realism: A Defence* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003), chs. 5 & 6. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199259755.001.0001>
- SVAVARSDÓTTIR, Sigrún, 'Moral Cognitivism and Motivation', *The Philosophical Review*, 108 (1999): 161-219. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/2998300>
- VELLEMAN, J. David, 'The Guise of the Good', *Noûs*, 26, no. 1 (1992): 3-26.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2215684>

Virtues, Vices and Moral Learning

A central moral concept is virtue. This section examines the nature of virtue. One central debate concerns how best to understand Aristotle's influential account of virtue as consisting in a 'mean' between extremes. Another, also originating in Aristotle, concerns the question to what extent virtues are unified. Another one concerns whether recent work in social psychology shows that there are no virtues in agents like us, as there are no stable character traits.

- *ARISTOTLE, *Nicomachean Ethics*, edited by R. Crisp (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), bk. 2, chs. 1-7; bk. 6, chs. 9-11.
- ANNAS, Julia *Intelligent Virtue* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), chs. 2, 3 & 6. Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199228782.001.0001>
- BADHWAR, Neera K., 'The Limited Unity of Virtue', *Noûs*, 30, no. 3 (1996): 306-29.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2216272>
- BROADIE, Sarah, 'The Problem of Practical Intellect in Aristotle's Ethics', *Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium in Ancient Philosophy*, 3, no. 1 (1987): 229-52
- DORIS, John M., 'Persons, Situations, and Virtue Ethics', *Noûs*, 32, no. 4 (1998): 504-30.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/2671873>
- FOOT, Philippa, 'Virtues and Vices', in her *Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978), pp. 1-18. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1093/0199252866.003.0001>. Reprinted in R. Crisp and M. Slote, eds., *Virtue Ethics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), pp. 163-77.

- HARMAN, Gilbert, 'Moral Philosophy Meets Social Psychology: Virtue Ethics and the Fundamental Attribution Error', *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, 99 (1999): 315-31. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4545312>
- HURSTHOUSE, Rosalind, 'The Central Doctrine of the Mean', in R. Kraut, ed., *The Blackwell Guide to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2006), pp. 96-115. Also available online at: <http://doi.org/10.1002/9780470776513.ch4>
- KAMTEKAR, Rachana, 'Situationism and Virtue Ethics on the Content of Our Character', *Ethics*, 114, no. 3 (2004): 458-91. <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/381696>
- MCDOWELL, John, 'Virtue and Reason', *Monist*, 62 (1979): 331-50.
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902600>
- NUSSBAUM, Martha C., 'Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach', in M. Nussbaum and A. Sen, eds., *The Quality of Life* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 242-70. Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1093/0198287976.001.0001>
- PAKALUK, Michael, *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), chs. 3-6. Also available online at:
<https://doi.org/10.1017/cbo9780511802041>
- RAILTON, Peter, 'Two Cheers for Virtue: Or, Might Virtue Be Habit Forming?' *Oxford Studies in Normative Ethics*, 1 (2004): 295-330.
<http://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199693269.003.0012>
- RORTY, Amélie O., ed., *Essays on Aristotle's Ethics* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1980). [Particularly articles by Burnyeat, Irwin, Kosman, Nagel, Sorabji, Wiggins]
- RUSSELL, Daniel, 'Phronesis and the Virtues', in R. Polansky, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 203-20. Also available online at:
<http://doi.org/10.1017/CCO9781139022484.010>
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Practical reasoning

What is it that we are doing when we engage in practical reasoning? The answer to this question depends in part on what reasons are. Are they grounded in our desires or in some "external" facts?

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We welcome your suggestions for further readings that will improve and diversify our reading lists, to reflect the best recent research, and important work by members of under-represented groups. Please email your suggestions to phillib@hermes.cam.ac.uk including the relevant part and paper number. For information on how we handle your personal data when you submit a suggestion please see <https://www.information-compliance.admin.cam.ac.uk/data-protection/general-data>.