

# FHIR + Security in NodeJS



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# Asymmetrik Secure FHIR server



**Security  
Focused**



**NodeJS/Express  
Framework**



**Data Source  
Agnostic**



**Extensible**

**Winner of ONC Secure Server Challenge**

Open Source: <https://github.com/asymmetrik/node-fhir-server-core>

# FHIR is making interoperability better



Security is incomplete

SMART on FHIR Authorization: X

← → ↻ ⌂ ⓘ Not Secure | docs.smarthealthit.org/authorization/best-practices/

2.5.2 [RFC6750](#) describes this threat more broadly as “token redirect” – when “an attacker uses a token generated for consumption by one resource server to gain access to a different resource server that mistakenly believes the token to be for it.” To deal with token redirect, it is important for the authorization server to identify the intended recipient (or recipients) of the access token, typically a single RS (or a list of RSs), in the token. This may be done through use of the `aud` parameter or by some other means devised by the authorization server, in coordination with its RSs. Then, upon receipt of an access token, the RS needs to check to assure that the access token it has received is intended to be used by that RS.

## 3.0 Best Practices for FHIR Resource Servers

## 4.0 Best Practices for End Users

### 4.1 Token Protection

4.1.1 Sometimes apps obtain tokens that enable them to access EHR and other sensitive information. While most tokens are effective for only a limited period of time, other tokens remain on a device for a longer period of time. To avoid misuse of the access privileges these tokens

**And now,  
some technical stuff**

Configure the server



Set up audit logging



Define profiles, &  
supported  
FHIR versions



Go!



```
const { VERSIONS } = require('@asymmetrik/node-fhir-server-core/src/constants');
const fhirServerCore = require('@asymmetrik/node-fhir-server-core');
const eventService = require('./audit/event.service.js');
```

```
const config = {
  server: {
    port: 443,
    ssl: { key: 'path/to/key.pem', cert: 'path/to.cert.pem' }
  },
  events: {
    auditEvent: eventService.writeAuditEventRecords,
    provenance: eventService.writeProvenanceRecords,
  },
  profiles: {
    patient: {
      service: path.resolve('./profiles/patient/patient.service.js'),
      versions: [ VERSIONS.STU3 ]
    }
  }
};
// Now start the server
const server = await fhirServerCore(config).catch(console.error);
```

This is available on our Github [Wiki](#)



# How to ensure conformance

Automate conformance statements

Validate payloads

Run conformance tests




## Goal

**Data is trusted by**

- Database
- Client app

# Learn from our mistakes



CHALLENGE

# FHIR is

**a beast**

**+100 Resources**

**+100 Extensions**

**+50 Profiles**

**&**

**evolving**

**Frequent new versions**

**Breaking changes**





WHAT WE DID

# Self-Writing Code

```
var scrollHeight = element.clientHeight + 0.02 * window.innerWidth;  
window.scroll(0, scrollHeight);
```


**Each version of FHIR has JSON Schemas**

**Automated scripts write validation code**

- Added to repo
- Unit tests included

## LESSONS LEARNED

# But robots can't do everything



**We must add  
definitions by hand  
after script runs**

## LESSONS LEARNED

# JSON Schemas are not complete

### Code fields:

- Not enforceable

### Search params:

- Not parseable

✓ **Let's fix  
this!**

```
"language": {  
  "description":  
    "The ISO-639-1 alpha 2 code in lower case for the  
    language, optionally followed by a hyphen and the  
    ISO-3166-1 alpha 2 code for the region in upper  
    case; e.g. \"en\" for English, or \"en-US\" for  
    American English versus \"en-EN\" for England  
    English.",  
  "$ref": "CodeableConcept.schema.json#/definitions/  
    CodeableConcept"  
}
```

## CHALLENGE

# Which versions should you support?

- DSTU2: still used by most EHRs
- STU3: mature, but not widely adopted
- R4: ready any day now





WHAT WE DID

# Why not all of them?

Our server lets you  
implement several at a time

Separate endpoints for each:

- /dstu2/patient
- /stu3/patient
- /r4/patient



## Goal

**Translate between  
versions**



## LESSONS LEARNED

# FHIR doesn't make versioning easy

- Breaking changes between versions
- No version info presented with records
- No client/server version negotiation

✓ **Let's fix  
this!**

## LESSONS LEARNED

# Building a secure OAuth2 in production is hard

- Many dev tools for FHIR consumers
- Few dev tools for FHIR producers

- Need to add patient info
- Several ways to return scopes from tokens
- Limited support from test tools

 **Let's fix this!**

## BEST PRACTICE

# Encrypt your communications

## DON'T



Use self-signed certs in production

It's worth the hassle and cost to get a real certificate

Use **TLS 1.0**

## DO



Always, *always*, *always* use SSL/TLS

At least **TLS 1.2** with **256-bit** AES keys



We recommend **TLS 1.3** support

We recommend **512-bit** AES keys




## BEST PRACTICE

# Filter out bad requests

## DON'T

-  Write URL params directly to the database or the screen
-  Let hackers outside your memory sandbox

## DO

-  Block SQL/No-SQL Injections
  - Filter out database commands
-  Block Cross-Site Scripting (XSS)
  - Filter out JS and other unsafe HTML
-  Block buffer overflow attacks
  - Truncate values longer than your variables can support

## BEST PRACTICE

# Guard against vulnerable packages

## DON'T



Trust that other people's code is secure

## DO



Use a static code analysis tool



Analyze your dependencies for vulnerabilities

We use snyk.io as part of our CI build pipeline

### Asymmetrik FHIR API Server

A Secure Rest implementation for the [HL7 FHIR Specification](https://hl7.org/fhir/). For API documentation see <https://github.com/Asymmetrik/node-fhir-server-core/wiki>.

build passing vulnerabilities 0



The Asymmetrik Extensible Server Framework for Healthcare allows organizations to build healthcare applications that can aggregate and expose healthcare resources via a common HL7® FHIR®-compliant API.





## BEST PRACTICE

# Store logs separate from data

## DON'T

-  Store logs in the same place as your data
  - If your server is ever compromised, a hacker could change your logs
-  Store secrets or PHI in your logs
  - Unless they are stored in a secure place

## DO

-  Store audit, provenance and system logs in a separate database
  - If possible, a separate environment
-  Scrub PHI and secrets out of your system logs

## BEST PRACTICE

# Return token to server to get scopes

## DON'T



Blindly trust OAuth2 tokens

A hacker could spoof and re-sign token if they have the client secret



Send tokens back to the OAuth2 server to verify them



Ask server to give you scopes and patient ID

There are several ways to do this, depending on your OAuth server




## BEST PRACTICE

# Define scopes for every endpoint

## DON'T

-  Allow access to any data without checking user's scopes
-  Allow patients to access the records of other patients

## DO

-  Define and check scopes for every endpoint
  - user/Observation.\*
  - patient/Observation.read
-  Return a 403 Unauthorized code if user doesn't have sufficient scopes
-  Consider allowing finer-grained control based on user object

## BEST PRACTICE

# Hide the existence of records

## DON'T



Allow a hacker to figure out whether a user or patient is in your database

Never say why access is denied

Never imply there are other records the user can't access

## DO

What if a patient visits **/patient/\_search?**



Only return 1 or 0 results

The patient's own record, or no records





Or, completely prevent patients from accessing the patient search endpoint


## BEST PRACTICE

# Test the unhappy paths

## DON'T

-  Assume that incoming requests are valid
-  Assume that the user has permission to access resources

## DO

-  Write tests for:
  - Bad parameters
  - Bad data
  - Unauthorized access
  - Compromised tokens



## PROBLEM

# Let's fix this!



## Make FHIR easier to develop

- Spec entirely parseable
- Versions forward and backward compatible
- More development tooling



## Make FHIR more secure

- Best practices
- Use FHIR checklist
- Security tests
- OAuth2 reference servers

# Please Contribute!

## Code: FHIR Open-Source Secure Server

- <https://fhir.health>
- <https://github.com/Asymmetrik/node-fhir-server-core>

## About Us

- <https://asymmetrik.com/healthcare>

## Asymmetrik Healthcare Podcast

- <https://soundcloud.com/asymmetrik-healthcare>

## Song: We Didn't Start the FHIR

- <https://soundcloud.com/asymmetrik-healthcare/we-didnt-start-the-fhir>

# Thanks!



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