

15. Deleuze's Time, or How the Cinematic Changes Our Idea of Art

John Rajchman

After the War

How does the cinematic change our idea of art? Citing Paul Valéry, Walter Benjamin begins his great 1934 essay on mechanical reproduction with this question. The problem was not so much whether cinema is an art, the so-called seventh one, but how, starting in the nineteenth century, it helped transform what we think art is, and in particular, how one thinks in the arts or with the arts. For Benjamin already, the problem of the cinematic was inseparable from the whole question, at once aesthetic and political, of how one thinks with the new mass industrial audiovisual means of film and projection.

We might think of Deleuze as taking up this question again after World War II, when there arose not simply a new cinema in France, but also new styles of thinking—a new “image of thought.” The “upheaval in general sensibility” that followed the war would lead to “new dispositions of thought.”¹ Filmmakers invented new ways of thinking with film and projection at the same time as others, in other domains, started to invent related ideas, creating a whole new zone of interference and exchange. Deleuze's two volumes on cinema are a monumental attempt to see the new European cinema in terms of this constellation, to isolate the notions of image, space, and time they involved, and so show the distinctive ways filmmakers took part in this larger mutation in thought.

Even though Deleuze wrote his study of cinema in the 1980s, the basic philosophical notions he uses go back to his 1956 essay on the problem of difference in Bergson, written at a time when Alain Resnais was making documentaries like his great study of Van Gogh's suicide as well as, of course, *Night and Fog*. These films would play a key role

in Deleuze's analysis of cinema and, in particular, for the principle that "the cinematographic image is never in the present."² Deleuze thought Resnais had perhaps gone the furthest in this principle, for in his documentaries, as well as in the fiction-films he would go on to make, we find not only new kinds of images, but also a new function for them: that of rendering a past, at once indeterminate and violent, irreducible to anyone's memory, any *prise de conscience*.

The war is thus a dividing point not only for Deleuze's inventory of new signs and images in cinematic thinking, but also, at the same time, for his sense of a particular problem in postwar philosophy and in his philosophy: the problem of the peculiar "time that takes thought."³ In effect, cinema makes visible the problem philosophy developed at the same time, for which Deleuze himself would try to work out a new logic of "events" and their sense. If, especially in France, postwar cinema developed in tandem with postwar philosophy, following its peculiar twists and turns through psychoanalysis and structuralism, it was because, Deleuze suggests, postwar cinema was itself an original audiovisual way of thinking—a peculiar relation of thought to *aisthesis*, a whole aesthetics. That is why the great filmmakers needed to be confronted not simply with writers or painters, but also, at the same time, with thinkers and questions of thought. The signs and images they invented involved a new sense of what a creative image is and what it means to think. Even the crisis in cinema brought on by television, and then by digital images, had to be posed on this aesthetic level as a problem of images that do not force us to think, or that keep us from thinking, as with the "presentifying" tendencies Deleuze saw in most television.⁴ "What I call Ideas are images that make one think," Deleuze declared at the start of his study.⁵ To write about cinema was to identify these images and to examine the larger "apparatuses" or *dispositifs* through which cinema manages to pose them.⁶ The problem of the new televisual-digital regime must be analyzed in this way and not simply "media-logically," as, more generally, in Deleuze's approach to the question of technology and, in particular, to the problems of information and control to which his study of cinema led him. For machines, unlike simple mechanisms, always have an indeterminate sensory or aesthetic component through which they participate in larger fields, larger sorts of arrangements of our senses, our bodies and brains. Cinema is a way of having ideas with images that introduces a new "psychomechanics," a new way of affecting us and our nervous systems. Central to this arrangement was the invention of new determinations of space and time

as forms of sensibility in relation to thinking. At the heart of Deleuze's analysis of cinematic images and their *dispositifs*, we find the problem of a determination of a time no longer defined by succession (past, present, future), of a space no longer defined by simultaneity (distinct elements in closed or framed space), and of a permanence no longer based in eternity (instead given as a form of a complex variation).⁷ Such were the new sorts of images that postwar filmmakers gave us to think with, and with which they started to work themselves.

Deleuze, then, might have responded to Valéry's question in the following way. Cinema changed the idea of art because of the new ways it invented to show or render movement and time, participating in a distinctive manner in a larger aesthetics of duration, connected not simply with new technologies or new forces, but also with new ways of thinking, new questions and paradoxes, new political uses. Across all the arts, whether "expanded" or not, we see these changes, these new sorts of determinations of space and time, this larger aesthetics, in which filmmaking, starting in its early spaces, and with its early means, would play a key role.⁸ As earlier with Walter Benjamin, there was a Kantian element in this aesthetic field, but one that comes from Deleuze's new reading of Kant or his new idea of the sense in which we are still Kantian. Indeed, the crucial distinction between time and movement elaborated in the books on cinema is first introduced in *Difference and Repetition*, in which Deleuze proposes to see as central to Kant's revolution the problem of a "time out of joint." Later, Deleuze would declare that the war offered cinema the condition to effectuate its own Kantian revolution in a much shorter interval, its own audiovisual way of freeing the idea of time from subordination to any prior movement, any extensive space.⁹

Kant had already taken space and time as forms of intuition or as a priori conditions of an *aisthesis*, or of what he already called "sensibilia." The forms of sensation are thus distinct from the categories of the understanding and can only be linked to them through the workings of a mysterious "schematism" or through the "productive imagination." What matters for Deleuze is the independence of these forms from the understanding and not the way they figure in a unified consciousness. In freeing time from its subordination to the identities of movement in a closed world, and in associating it with forces or virtualities of another sort, the great postwar filmmakers would thus free the forms of sensibilia themselves from any such schematic link with the understanding, making them, instead, a matter of artistic experimentation

or invention in relation to another kind of thinking—precisely that of “ideas.” The “time that takes thought” would be freed from categories of causality or even teleology; the postwar filmmakers would link it, instead, to a whole new relation to character, milieu, space, and action. What is new in Kant for Deleuze, then, is how, with the disjunction between our sensibilia and our categories for understanding substance or causality, there arises a new experimental zone where other sorts of determinations of space and time (as when, in music or literature, one “occupies without measuring” a sensory milieu) are linked to ideas.¹⁰ Dostoevsky’s “Idiot,” for example, not only moves in a much altered novelistic space and time, but in the process, is also obliged to think, just because there are no schemata to govern his actions—a situation Deleuze sees Kurosawa later exploring in cinema. The cinematic lies in the distinctive ways filmmakers invented to disjoin the forms of sensation from the understanding, using them, instead, to give us “ideas” and so new “personae” in thinking, like the Idiot. We see this, for example, in Deleuze’s demonstration of how Marguerite Duras or Straub-Huillet turned the disjunction between sound and visual images into a veritable “idea in cinema,” a whole new exploration of the peculiar postwar intersection of “stories without places” and “places without stories.”¹¹ Indeed, it is precisely this sort of “nonrelation” between what we see and what we say that shows why it is so misleading to think of cinema as language, rather than as a “signaletic material.” Deleuze was no textualist or narratologist; the signs and images he finds in cinema are given by no theory of language or code; rather, in each case, they are the result of a singular invention. Even in literature, he thought we should look not to linguistics or narratology, but rather, to the ways great writers invent a “foreign language” in our language, tied up with the invention of new percepts and affects, as with the “complicated time” in Proust, or the “crack-up” of the characters in Fitzgerald, or their peculiar relation to a “secret past” in Henry James’s short stories, later exploited in film by Joseph Mankiewicz. The cinematic, in short, is this strange, great complex of signs and images that filmmakers invented to explore the problem that arises when space and time, regarded as forms of our sensibilia, are disjoined from the schemata that tie them to our understanding and are linked, instead, to another kind of thinking, governed by logic not of propositions and truths, but of the sense (and non-sense) of what is happening to us.

Deleuze’s study of cinema was his attempt to elaborate this problem at once philosophical and aesthetic. He saw filmmakers as developing

an original way of exploring what Kant called the “paradox of inner sense,” or of the peculiar way we can be said to be “in time”—a problem in which he thought Resnais had gone further than Proust or Bergson. The question of the sense in which we are “in time” was, of course, also a central one in modern philosophy; in his books on film, Deleuze takes up this issue by contrasting the ways Husserl and Bergson each formulate it in relation to science and mathematics. Husserl still imagined the forms of space and time as being centered in a consciousness, whereas Bergson offered a new idea of image freed from this assumption, closer to the way filmmakers explore acentered spaces prior to anyone’s point of view. The cinematic is found in images that make visible or palpable this “acentered” condition or that “sensibilize” us to it. The images in cinema are thus forms that explore a strange sort of movement in our lives that is irreducible to translation in extended space, the lines of which are freed from starting and ending points, instead tracing trajectories, at once fictive and real, in indeterminate milieus; they thus call for a time or a duration based not in chronology and succession, but rather, in an interlocking topology or overlapping seriality. That is how cinema posed the question of how we actually think, how we are oriented and disoriented in thinking, in our lives, our relations with ourselves, and to one another. In *Cinema 1* and *Cinema 2*, Deleuze tried to analyze how, through the possibilities of camera movement, framing, editing, and projecting, cinema would invent a whole new “psychomechanical” way to make visible such times and spaces in our worlds, situations, or milieus, prior to (and immanent in) our conscious selves as individuals or groups.

The principle that “the cinematographic image is never in the present,” for which Deleuze would find such a striking application in the troubling “sheets of time” in *Night and Fog*, was thus part of a larger transformation in the very idea of image itself in all the arts, in painting, photography, or literature as well as new practices that would break away from such traditional media. We know, for example, that Soviet cinema would be seen to play a key role in the process in the 1920s and 1930s that Walter Benjamin analyzed in the avant-garde when he spoke of the new function of author as producer.¹² At the same time, the principle of “not being in the present” was a philosophical matter that concerned the very concept of image and the way it presents things before they are represented for a unified subject or consciousness. Deleuze’s conception of “images” in cinema breaks from the idea that they are inner representations in our minds or brains, linking them, instead, with new

questions explored in neurology and psychology—fields of knowledge, including especially psychoanalysis, with which cinema would have so many relations throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.¹³ To introduce movement and time into the very idea of image was inseparable from a long neuroscientific literature of how images figure in our bodies or brains, or in the ideas of consciousness and unconsciousness, in which the new memory sciences played a key role, as, for example, in Deleuze's discussion of Pierre Janet. Indeed, that is how the "cinematic," regarded as a way of thinking with the forms of sensibilia, could be seen to extract itself from the great stupefying explosion of images in our lives that mechanical reproduction facilitated (before the "control" of the postwar information-type machines) with its cliché pictures and ordered words and its relations with propaganda or advertising. If, as Deleuze proposes, the invention of a cinematic sensibilia arises from the crisis in psychology concerning the status of image, it is developed through and within the new industrial mass means that we see, at the same time, in the psychological or social sciences.

In philosophy, already in the 1920s, Martin Heidegger had shown how time and the problem of "inner sense" were central to the Kantian enterprise and to his own attempt to move beyond its still metaphysical enclosure. But Deleuze's writings on difference in Bergson suggested a fresh way of taking up the question of time, which moves away from Heidegger's idea of a constitutive finitude or the "*Dasein*" of a *Volk* disclosed in and through the work of art. Deleuze tried to develop an ungrounded element in the kind of time and movement the cinematic image makes visible. In cinema, as in philosophy, he discovers something at once inhuman and vital. It is already to be seen in the kind of movement Vertov explored through the intervals in his editing or "montage," or with the ability of the camera to capture "acentered" worlds with "indeterminate" zones, for example, in Orson Welles. He tried to work out an original notion of world the way it appears, closer to Leibnizian perspectivism than to Husserlian grounding in a life-world, with which cinema would be peculiarly concerned. Cinema not only invents images; it surrounds them with a world—a world that, for Deleuze, has become light or deterritorialized, irreducible to our "being-there."

We are thus "in time" in a peculiar way, irreducible to the familiar division between subjective (or lived) and objective (or clocked) time. The problem is, rather, how we are affected by time and "affect ourselves through it" at once objectively and subjectively; it is the problem of time itself as this uncontrollable potential in who we are or may

become. The function of cinematic images is to show the workings of this time in our lives and our worlds. That is why the time-images in cinema are ones that defeat the presumed coincidence of subjective and objective images on which a whole tradition of story or narrative has rested; rather, such relations between space and viewing are undone as description of space frees itself from the presumption of a single objective viewpoint, and the form of narration frees itself from domination of a single narrative voice, as if in a free, indirect style. The forms of description and narration, in other words, depend on the role of mobility and indetermination in the images, and so with the sense and non-sense of what is happening. In Bergson (as well as in the Russian city of Vertov's *Man with a Movie Camera*), Deleuze finds a multiple, moving universe in which things appear without appearing as such to anyone, or to any one point of view. He finds images that make visible a world that cannot be united or made fully present to our conscious selves, the sense of which is nevertheless unfolded in time, through movement and the forms of sensibilia that are images. It is such a world of illumination without revelation that would later be taken up in time-image cinema. The topological superposition of "sheets of time" in Resnais shows, in particular, in a vivid way, the sense in which a terrible past coexists with the present, in a manner irreducible to flashbacks or conscious recollection, rendering the present uncertain, forcing us to think, dispossessing us of our ability to say "I" or "We." Time is no longer either a matter of Man's finitude or of God's infinite understanding—neither humanist nor salvationist, it is directly linked to questions of life and death themselves.¹⁴

In exploring how, through the means available to it, cinema makes sensible this kind of time in worlds, Deleuze thus develops an original view of space and time as forms of sensibilia that cause us to think. He frees those forms from their Kantian subordination to what he saw as the two great functions played by the philosophical idea of the subject—the functions of "consciousness" and "individualization."¹⁵ The world that cinema shows us is an impersonal (or "pre-personal") world prior to consciousness and individualization. In this way, cinema takes part in Deleuze's larger attempt to put the question of "a life" in the place of the classical notion of the subject or the self—a life that contrasts precisely with "*the* life of the corresponding individual," as with the conscious self, yet remains as a concrete question and possibility for our bodies, as for our brains.¹⁶ Thus the *espaces quelconques*, or "any-spaces-whatever," that Deleuze isolates especially in postwar cinema (as well

as in “structural film”) involve spatial and temporal distributions that are indeterminate, or *quelconque*, just in the sense that they precede the supposed unities of conscious selfhood, or of static, grouped, definite, or definable individuality, exposing worlds, situations, or milieus prior to them. Indeed, that is why any-spaces-whatever are populated with a new, less definite kind of character and action that requires a new art of indefinite description, realistic without being naturalistic. Cinema thus maps the workings of a time once preindividual and unconscious. Deleuze offers an inventory of images that show this time, irreducible to destiny, providence, causality, or predictability, even statistical or probabilistic, which nevertheless affects us in ways we do not normally perceive. Such is the sort of time given by series and juxtapositions (rather than succession) and by indeterminate spaces of displacements and departures (rather than a “situated” intersubjectivity or world). It is the kind of temporality that requires a change in nature of belief—a turn to a more pragmatist belief-in-the-world, without need for salvation or historical destiny.

We see this time already in *Night and Fog*. Resnais’s juxtapositions of a past shown through black-and-white archival materials, with a present given by cinematic mapping of mental spaces (in color and with his famous tracking shots of the peculiar mental spaces of the concentration camps), and with the uncertain future given through Cayrol’s famous voice-over, thus form an early dramatic part in the constitution of cinema as a postwar kind of audiovisual thinking. If, as Deleuze argues, in this great documentary, we can see the sum of the different ways of avoiding “the piety of the recollection image,” it is because of the way image and thinking discover in it a new relation to the past and the way it figures in the present. The aim is no longer to recapture or recollect the past in a consciousness, individual or collective, which would have succeeded it, but on the contrary, to prevent any such closure within private memory or public commemoration, showing, rather, the sense in which it is still at work in the present. This function that affects fiction as well as documentary, undoing the usual distinctions between the two, forms part of the new “realism” in postwar cinema that Deleuze contrasts with an earlier naturalism. Indeed, Resnais would go on in his great fiction films to explore this past coiled within the present that seems to haunt our banal lives like a terrible secret; he would explore how it forces his characters to think, as if they had come back from the dead, moving about in a world without salvation or redemption, providence, or phenomenological grounding. He would thus pose a

new question, at once philosophical and cinematic, in which, across a whole range of arts and practices, Deleuze sought to introduce into the very idea of an image what it means to think in and with images in a mass industrial society.

Cinema Today

Today it would seem that the situation of cinema is no longer quite what it was for Deleuze in 1984, any more than it was for Walter Benjamin in 1934. Cinema is no longer alone; it no longer has the key role that fell to it between silent film and television. It forms part of a larger complex of images and spaces, where it discovers new roles to play, geared to altered geographies and responding to new forces on a global scale—Deleuze now belongs to World rather than simply European cinema. As with anything new, there is nostalgic talk of a “postcinematic” condition. The history of film has itself become a matter not simply of preservation and distribution, but also of an art of obsolescence that looks back to what it has been, as if illustrating Marshall McLuan’s old dictum that when a technological medium is over, it is turned into an art. Deleuze himself tried to resist such nostalgia back in 1984, when there was already much talk of a crisis of cinema. His quarrel with Godard on the last pages of *Cinema 2* is one indication. The crisis meant not death of cinema (its corpse to be put into edited *histories* in melancholic anticipation of a more hopeful time), but rather, new possibilities inseparable from the larger fate of the kind of aesthetic thinking Deleuze had tried precisely to work out in cinema. The time had come to ask not simply, what is cinema? but also, and more important, what is philosophy? The great filmmakers had used new technical means to invent a mode of an audiovisual way of thinking, which formed part of a larger aesthetic, to which it then seemed important for Deleuze to turn. What in fact does it mean to “have an idea” in and with the arts, in relation to other arts and other practices? This is the larger problem that Deleuze would go on to explore, together with Félix Guattari, in *What Is Philosophy?*

This problem of “thinking in and with the arts” is already to be found in Deleuze’s treatment of the abstract, experimental, or expanded cinema traditions, which tried to use filmic techniques in ways closer to the practices of the visual arts. While Deleuze does not focus on these traditions, what he does say is suggestive. He was drawn to Artaud’s enthusiasm in the 1930s for silent film (as seen in his own role in Carl Dreyer’s great *Joan of Arc*), when he argued for the superiority of such

works with respect to an abstract cinema still content to ape developments in painting as too “cerebral.” Artaud thought that the peculiar “witchcraft” of silent film was much closer to the “cruelty” in gesture and word that he was seeking in the theater, and Deleuze sees this idea as part of a larger invention of “theatricality” peculiar to cinema, as seen in “bodily attitudes” and their relation to time, explored in different ways in many arts. Abstract and experimental film figures in Deleuze’s study when, not content to imitate what other arts are doing, it takes part in the ways the cinematic changes our ideas of theater or art, as Deleuze thought was the case for structural film in its relations with the “perception-image.”¹⁷ In other words, abstract film is not abstract in a simple modernist or self-referential sense, but rather, in the ways it experiments with the very spatiotemporal conditions of sensibilia and thought themselves that the great postwar filmmakers exploited for their own purposes, and in that sense, it is quite concrete. Indeed, the very term *espaces quelconques*, which Deleuze develops in a striking way, for example, in his discussion of Antonioni, derives from experimental film. It is not hard to imagine extending the problem of empty, disconnected spaces that Deleuze already sees in another way in Bresson to a range of other arts and art practices around the same time as structural film. Rather than a stark opposition between narrative and abstract work, there is an exchange or connection made on the basis of common exploration of forms of sensibility, explored at the same time in different ways in many arts at once. It is perhaps something like this larger exchange that we see today in a situation in which cinema no longer dominates or in which it is no longer alone. What, then, would it mean to take up Deleuze’s idea of the cinematic today, in altered circumstances, in relation to current or contemporary questions and to new wars and kinds of war? What role might cinema and philosophy yet play in a situation that some have perhaps been too quick to characterize as “postcinematic” and “posttheoretical”?

I would like to look at how this question might be formulated in relation to the visual arts. How did the cinematic, regarded as a postwar *dispositif* to render the workings of time, help transform the very idea of the “visual” in the visual arts? And in what ways does it continue to be involved in the new “conditions of visibility” of today? No doubt, this is itself a complex question, with several parts that go off in a number of directions. First, there is the whole question of how to think with movement- and time-images. In what ways have they changed our understanding of what might be called “unmoving

pictures"? How do questions of time and movement change the very idea or sense of images in painting, photography, or drawing as well as our ways of seeing and talking about such things? Such questions have been explored in a variety of domains: in Eisenstein's discussion of Asian scroll paintings as well as the Corbusian "architectural promenade"; with the study of movement in Klee's *Pedagogical Sketchbooks* or with Duchamp's gestalt-defeating Rotoreliefs and his descending nude; and in another way, in certain practices of kinetic art or in futurism. More recently, they have been taken up by Yves Michaud in his analysis of Aby Warburg's *Atlas* and his related Beaubourg theme show about "Images on the Move."¹⁸ Deleuze himself develops this question, of course, through his account of how Francis Bacon renders the forces of time in relation to figures through the asignifying zones of possibility in the "pictorial facts."

Even Deleuze's treatment of the "expanded" sensibilities in structural film in terms of "molecular perception" and the role of drugs can itself be read along these lines, or again in his account of the peculiar bodily, sexed, or gendered theatricality of duration explored not simply by Andy Warhol, but also by Chantal Akerman, whose encounter with the experimentations in art and film in New York in the 1960s helped determine her own approach to questions of time in cinema and, later, in her installations. At the same time, there is perhaps something peculiarly "Asian" in the fixed frame and long duration, which Deleuze works out in Ozu, to be found in the early cinema techniques to which Warhol returned, and more generally, in the priority Deleuze accords time with respect to narration; indeed, Wu Hung has recently argued for a kind of protocinematic sense in Asian hand scroll paintings.¹⁹ We find a related strategy in Deleuze's own treatment of the encounters of cinema with old masters' painting, as, for example, the striking pages in *The Time-Image* in which Deleuze connects the problem of depth of field in Orson Welles's invention of time-images to the decenterings of space in the Baroque, as read by Heinrich Wofflin. There are also many references to modernist painting, as, for example, with the way the whole problem of the "inhuman" in Cezanne's sensations would be taken up in turn by Vertov and the Kinoks, or again, in the way that close-ups and affection-images in Eisenstein's films may be analyzed in terms of the questions of pathos or "faciality"—a key point of encounter with Deleuze's book on Francis Bacon, who himself was struck by images from *Battleship Potemkin* in his effort to paint the scream, not the horror.

A context and impetus today for going back to look at such encounters of cinema with the visual arts is the wave of interest in moving pictures in art-spaces today. Assisted by technical and distribution possibilities that appeared only after Deleuze wrote his cinema books, filmmakers and artists now have a new exhibition arena outside the traditional darkened room of the movie theater or familial televisual viewing-spaces. Raymond Bellour and Giuliana Bruno have each analyzed the role of the actual room and its architecture in such practices and in their relation to earlier forms or *dispositifs* of image-installation.²⁰ Let me add to their analyses two brief remarks about how Deleuze's general picture of having ideas in cinema might be used in these circumstances. First, there is the issue of how the new uses of art-spaces to exhibit time intersect with larger questions of movement and time themselves that Deleuze develops in relation to postwar cinema; it is perhaps significant that while Deleuze wrote nothing about such practices, his work remains popular among certain artists working with them, for example, Pierre Huyghe. On the other hand, these practices are tied up with the larger process through which "contemporary" came to be distinguished from "modern" art or art-practices. Visual art and art-spaces played key roles in the 1960s in a series of attempts to free the idea of art from a series of distinctions in which it had seemed enclosed—from traditional media and skills, from studio production, and from exhibition in "white cube" spaces as well as from traditional divisions of art from mass or popular culture, from critical discourse, or from information or everyday life. Cinema participated in these movements, in Robert Smithson's questions of site and nonsite, the violence of Matta-Clark's "anarchitecture," or in another way, in Hélio Oiticica's interventions. Current work must also be understood in relation to such changes. In contrast to, say, Godard (who is still making great films), Pierre Huyghe uses film as part of a range of practices similar to the ways in which he uses Japanese manga images, introduces advertising signs in urban spaces, or orchestrates participation in parades.

Deleuze had posed the question of projection in terms of the larger *dispositif* of camera movement, framing, and editing as they appear in the early history of film and are then transformed. He was interested in how projection-practices, along with editing and framing, freed themselves from the conventions of "natural perception" (and from the mimetic conception of projection itself) to invent new sorts of images affecting our nervous systems. We see that from the start, there is a sense in which the screen was less an illusionist window or ersatz classical stage than

a moving frame with an "out-of-frame" that allows movement and time to be rendered in new ways that would move beyond the conceptions of space in classical painting or theater, or suggest alternatives to them. Thus Deleuze argues that the relation of cinema to a classical theater-space (and "theatricality") is poorly posed as a matter of a loss of, or substitution for, live presence; rather, we find a new *dispositif* for creating images and spaces (and so of "having ideas") with links or interferences with one another, which are connected to the two great efforts in theater to create new kinds of image and space—Artaud's theater of cruelty and Brecht's epic theater, each of which are related to the cinematic exploration of time in "bodily attitudes."²¹ Using the techniques of shooting, editing, and projecting, cinema found a peculiar way to undercut the divisions between objective and subjective viewpoints, or between the sound- and image-space, to explore other spaces and times, which, even in darkened rooms, can strike our nervous systems in ways that are just as intense or cruel as live performances themselves, which can often seem rather more predictable. If we try, then, to set current practices in a larger history of "theatrical uses" of exhibition-spaces, we need to include the whole problem in terms of the question of "images that force us to think," which Deleuze worked out in postwar cinema.

The darkened room of theatrical cinema might be seen, then, as one highly successful *dispositif* in a larger history of image installation, itself conceived in terms of different ways of thinking in the arts. In this role, it became a laboratory to fabricate creative images—images to free our brains from patterns of clichés or order-words, which in turn serve to control our perceptions and affects, reducing them to easily identifiable opinions. Just as the filmic image is not, for Deleuze, a code or a language, but rather, an original way of expressing times and spaces that cannot be contained in natural perception or affection, so filmic-space, even in the darkened room, is more than a simple story-and-illusion apparatus. It is rather a *dispositif* that introduces a new "psychomechanics" that directly affects the brain, as Eisenstein and then Artaud imagined, and to which Jean-Louis Scheffer would later attest in his picture of the postwar cinema goer. The cinematic "autonomization" of images offered new ways to think, and to make visible, the role of time and space in thinking, and, indeed, it is just from this angle that Deleuze takes up the question of cinema as a mass, industrial art. Deleuze himself had already analyzed the whole question of rendering a "complicated time" in signs and images in relation to a new kind

of “intelligence” learned without prior method—an intelligence that always “comes after” through encounters that force us to think—in his study of “signs” in the Proustian novel.²² But when the same sort of problem (and notion of sign) is transferred, via the cinematic, to mass society, this kind of artistic intelligence encounters at the same time new enemies and rivals and must be inserted into new circuits. It must also contend with a new conception of the public (typified in TV ratings), a “statistical public” characterized by a whole new professionalization of vision and a new massive machine of control over what we can see and say, and so think and do. In this way, Deleuze argues that, after the war, Syberberg goes beyond Walter Benjamin’s preoccupations with mechanical reproduction and aura to ask, more generally, how cinema can create relations or arrangements of seeing, saying, and acting irreducible to larger arrangements of information, communication, and its publics.²³ It is also why he thinks the history of cinema is a long “martyrology” in the struggle to create new images, and why there is so often in cinema the dramatization of a conspiracy against this attempt—an ongoing battle with the institutional forces of mediocrity in which an encounter with the visual arts or visual art-spaces can offer one avenue of escape. The problem of cinema as mass art, “postindustrial” as well as “industrial,” is not simply a matter of the role that the cinematic *dispositif* figures in changing technical machines of production and reception; at the same time, it has to do with the very idea of “mass” itself—to the changing relations between having ideas and “collective arrangements of enunciation,” and hence between intellectuals and the masses. What is distinctive for postwar time-image cinema for Deleuze, in this regard, is a new political principle, seen in altered relations between filmmakers and their actors and publics. Unlike the “mass-subject” of an Eisensteinian epic or the “subjected masses” of a Leni Riefenstahl rally, or the much calculated numbers of a Hollywood blockbuster, the problem Deleuze associates with “thinking with cinema”—and in a singular way, thinking with time-image cinema—is that “the people are missing”; they must yet be invented along with making the film itself. In his analysis of the new relations of directors to actors—as well as to their publics—in “minority” and “third world” cinema, Deleuze tries to work out these changes, at once aesthetic and political. His sense of Straub-Huillet as great “political” filmmakers is a striking case of this view, as is his account of how the very idea of “minority” breaks open the whole genre of ethnographic and documentary films toward new aesthetic forms, beyond the fiction-document division. “Mass” becomes

indeterminate, irreducible to "class," at the same time as there arises new ways of making it visible. We might imagine extending this idea to the global situation of the cinematic today, where, for example, beyond the division of fiction and documentary, artists or filmmakers invent images to get at "events" where an often violent, indeterminate past is tied up with the "fabulation" of peoples irreducible to fixed classes or groups, or related religious divisions or "clashes of civilization," moving in and across borders. Deleuze's study of postwar cinema may be read as a kind of aesthetic workbook for the question of the multiplication of such situations in cinema and in their relation with the visual arts and visual art-spaces.

New Analyses

How, then, does cinematic change our idea of art? What would it mean to take up this question again today in new situations, for example, in relation to transformations in the visual arts? What role might theory or philosophy yet play with respect to notions of art to which the cinematic might be linked? To what kinds of new uses might we put his larger problem of "showing time" through images that "cause us to think"? In what ways, in the process, might we refashion the larger postwar image of thought that underlies Deleuze's analysis? One side of such questions concerns the style of analysis Deleuze forges in these volumes.

In the first place, there is a question of method. While Deleuze's books range over the entire history of cinema since the late nineteenth century, and are shot through with many historical, technical, social, and political arguments, they are not themselves history books or the books of an historian. They have another selective aim: to extract from the generality of films those singular nonlinguistic signs and images invented by great filmmakers to express time or movement in our own situations, milieus, or worlds. They are thus not ahistorical; rather, they are abstract in another way, tied not to eternity, but with the present and new problems, at once artistic and philosophical, brought with it. It seems important to preserve this experimental aesthetic zone of questioning with which history is linked but to which it is not reduced.

In Deleuze's case, the new problems intersect in an increasingly complex spiral around the questions of time and thinking that link postwar cinema to philosophy (and the "theory" to which it gave rise). In this way, the war itself becomes more than an event in historical, legal, or religious discourses. It becomes, at the same time, an "aesthetic"

matter—a turning point in the very nature of the images and having ideas in which the cinematic would play a key role, especially, but not exclusively, in France. Thus the war—*this* war (with its mass destruction, its shame, the terrible secrets it left within and with respect to official histories)—figured in postwar cinema not simply in the manner in which Paul Virilio analyzes it as a “field of vision” or as a technological and propaganda machine, anticipating the real-time wars of today, but precisely as the kind of upheaval in sensibility that called for the invention of new “dispositions of thought.” Cinema would play a key role in the invention of a postwar aesthetic, exploring the ways a violent and indeterminate past figures in our very psyches, the very way we think in the early films of Resnais, for example, in the Boulogne-Algeria relations of *Muriel* as well as, of course, in *Hiroshima Mon Amour*.²⁴ For along with camps, the questions of decolonization that the war brought with it belonged to that aspect of the past with which cinema was concerned. Beyond his work with Marguerite Duras, this is what links Resnais, in documentary and fiction, to the larger sort of question developed in literature by Maurice Blanchot, who had his own sense of “not-being-in-the-present,” tied up with the disaster that would befall the very possibility of friendship in thought or of the “philia” in philosophy. The philosophical concepts Deleuze forges in cinema (the new sense of the image itself in its relations with fact, truth, and “realism” as well as ourselves, our bodies and brains, characters, and situations, the new spaces they inhabit, no longer governed by sensorimotor schemata, the new relation of thinking to history or narrative) no doubt come from this situation; they are not reduced to it. Indeed, that is one reason why Deleuze insisted that the overlapping inventions and problems that he was trying to get at “in cinema” nevertheless had to be fabricated independently of it and its history, in relation to other practices and inventions yet to come. To extract the peculiar kinds of philosophical invention that Deleuze called “concepts” is to give them a life of their own, as indeed with the many earlier philosophical inventions that, apart from Bergson, Deleuze himself mobilizes in the course of his study. Theory departs from history in this way just when it ceases to be a reflective metadiscipline (as still with Kant) and instead becomes a source of new questions, encounters, interferences, and exchanges, which cast older problems in a new light. That is what Deleuze seems to have in mind when he declares that “the life and survival” of cinema lies in its struggles with the informational regime of control he feared, and which constituted a new rival to the very activity of thinking.

Deleuze's film books are thus not themselves narratives, and to take up the problems or concepts that they work out in cinema does not require that one insert oneself in any one story or history. They can be (and, indeed, have already been) used in many different ones. Not a history of cinema, Deleuze's film books are rather "montage books" of a roving philosophical spirit that tries to introduce into the criticism (or reading) of film something of the collage approach and the "stratigraphic time" that Deleuze had worked out for the history of philosophies, as in his famous image of a "nomad" style of thinking. He thought there no more exists an intrinsic narrative in the history of the arts than in the history of philosophy, whose melancholy themes have long tended to overdetermine what Deleuze took to be the false problem of the "end of art" (or "the end of philosophy"). Part of the force of fabricating concepts "in cinema" for uses outside of it was precisely to free them from the sort of intrinsic or internalizing history, or with the sense that cinema is a fixed language or medium whose only critical gesture would be to examine itself. The critical relation of the fabrication of concepts to the present is of a different sort. It is more a matter of introducing new histories into given ones. It supposes that there exist situations in which the usual stories no longer suffice, and where monolithic histories start to break off into many complicated paths. In this respect, the cinema books continue the strategy of many overlapping "rubrics" that Deleuze adopts in his study of Francis Bacon, each going off in different directions, with sometimes unrecognized precursors and unforeseen applications, such that (in one such rubric) he can declare that each new painter recapitulates the history of painting in his or her own way. Against the search for a single great story or history in art or philosophy, reflected in the great nineteenth-century European dream of a great encyclopedic Library or Museum containing all words and images in ordered sequence, Deleuze opposed a new sort of pedagogy of images and concepts to complexify the present, disrupting its classificatory presuppositions in a process from which the invention of new kinds of images and thoughts is always emerging.

Deleuze adopts two interrelated principles in his cinema books to exemplify this approach. The first says that "all criticism is comparative," and one must thus examine the cinematic in its larger overlaps with other arts and practices since there is "no work that doesn't have its continuation or its beginning in others."²⁵ The second, found in the last sentences of his study, asserts that "it is on the level of interferences with many practices that things happen, beings, images, concepts, all kinds

of events.”²⁶ Together, they encapsulate a preoccupation in Deleuze’s writings in the 1980s with a reactive moment associated with the idea of “postmodernism,” in which, as if unable to create any further movement, thinking would retreat back into meta-reflection or meta-art, or else ironic reappropriations of past inventions. The notion of “interferences and resonances” worked out in this analysis of the signs and images of cinema, and then developed in *What Is Philosophy?*, may even be regarded as a kind of antidote to this tendency, an attempt to get things moving again, to suggest sequences in which the cinematic might yet be inserted—“we all need our interceders,” he declared.²⁷

Deleuze’s study of cinema is itself filled with such interferences and overlaps with many disciplines and practices such that the cinematic lies precisely in the peculiarities of the way film figures in larger complexes, at once aesthetic, social, technical, or political. When Deleuze calls postwar cinema “modern,” he thus does not mean “modernist,” here as elsewhere, a derivative sequence or problem in his great problem of signs and images in the arts. He does not at all see modern cinema as a melancholy retreat, turning in on itself in the face of kitsch. Its relation to “clichés,” its forms of abstraction, are of a different kind, linked rather to making visible new zones of space and time, and the new kinds of characters who inhabit them, using the *dispositifs* of mass industrial society. That is why the problem of “metacinema” does not mean much to him, and why he is at such pains to distinguish the problem of the time-image from a simple opposition between narrative and nonnarrative film, and to insist that the cinema’s signs and images do not form a code or language that would be distinguished from others in some epic effort at differentiation and purification. Bazin had spoken of an “impurity” peculiar to cinema or the ways it turns to literature, or the visual arts, or again to architecture or popular culture, for ideas to create its images. Deleuze extends this idea to include relations with philosophy or theory itself, as well as sciences or techniques, as part of a larger image of thought. In the place of Kant’s “reflexive” idea of critique, Deleuze wanted to substitute a “creative” one, in which the forms of sensibility that are space and time are themselves thrown open to experimentation across many different disciplines at once.²⁸ Deleuze adopted Paul Klee’s Bauhaus principle “to make visible” as a watchword for this process, and he associated with a question in painting that Delaunay formulated when he declared, “Cezanne broke the fruit-dish; too bad the Cubists sewed it up again.”²⁹ It is just in this sense that for the signs and images of cinema—for its logic, its peculiar manner of thinking

with images—there preexists “no determination technical or applied,” not even a culturalist or medialogical one; the signs and images must be precisely invented in a long and often difficult process.³⁰ For in having an idea in cinema, there preexists no fixed sphere of competence, only available means and an inchoate necessity. As in any domain, an idea in cinema is something rare, given through many trials, moving back and forth, with many dead-ends, where one sometimes looks to other arts or disciplines for inspiration. The encounters across the arts, or through ideas in the arts, are not themselves governed by fixed models, analogies, or morphologies, but rather, through the peculiar ways one invents to develop ideas, often through sensory means or in sensory spaces and time. It is not all as if “contents” in each art could just be shuttled around from one “form” or medium to the next. However, in making such invention possible, *dispositifs*, like the cinematic, are distinguished as something more than “media,” or technical supports, or means of transmitting and receiving information; they are, rather, ways of disposing our senses in such a way as to enable thinking or to make ideas possible. The cinematic *dispositif* Deleuze isolates in postwar cinema made possible the invention of new ways, beyond informing (through documentation) or narrating (through traditional characters and stories), to get at the those events we cannot make present through merely informing or narrating, or which require the invention of new kinds of “image” that undo the classical division between the two. That is why it is so misleading to imagine that new kinds of *dispositif* simply take over or replace those of older ones. While it used new audiovisual technical means, the new cinema was not an attempt to supplant the book or the Gutenberg galaxy, as a hasty reading of McLuan might suggest. It was a way of taking up the problems in the “new novel” to create a “new cinema,” a way of linking creative ideas in books with those in darkened rooms. It was a way of breaking through the “*sensus communis*” supposed by our cliché-governed habits of thought, not only for the characters, but also for filmmakers and spectators. For this is something “dissensual” in the Ideas that force us to think. That is why the new cinema led to the emergence of a new public, the virtual audience that Serge Daney thought involved the critical “supplement” of a sort that Deleuze thought critical thought should continue in relation to new conditions of informational control.³¹ One is thus at some distance from the kind of communicational model of the public and public space, which Kluge and Negri would challenge in Habermas in their search for another kind of “public sphere.” In the place of a communicational

sociability, Deleuze was interested in the ways filmmakers exploited the disjunctions of sound and image to expose another idea, developed philosophically by Simmel or Bakhtin. Indeed, we find this notion already in Deleuze's analysis of "wordly signs" in Proust, to which he returns in the passages in *What Is Philosophy?* where he is concerned more generally with contrasting thinking and communication.³² We might imagine extending this analysis of "sociability" in cinema or literature to the way it helps create a new sociability in the ways we think and think together—one for which the principle might be developed from Deleuze's notion of a "people-yet-to-come" as a presupposition of philosophy and art, and so their relations with one another.

How, then, does the cinematic change our idea of art? In looking at Deleuze's answer to this question from a number of different angles, we may start to better see the ways his conception of the cinematic fits with a larger series of transformations in the arts, and of the idea of art, still with us today. These transformations suggest new zones for pursuing cinema's possibilities, and perhaps, as well, for playing in new ways the singular game of art and thinking for which Deleuze offered a larger aesthetic frame for pursuing his investigations and developing his ideas twenty years ago.

Notes

- 1 Such are the words that struck Gilles Deleuze in his "Correspondence with Dionys Mascolo," in *Two Regimes of Madness* (New York: Semiotext(e), 2006), 327. They are also suggestive for his larger encounter with Blanchot and Duras.
- 2 Deleuze explicates this principle of the cinematographic image introduced in Gilles Deleuze, *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 105–16, and in Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 290–91.
- 3 Gilles Deleuze, *Différence et répétition* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1968), 216; my translation. Page references are to the French edition, followed by the corresponding page numbers in italics from the English translation, *Difference and Repetition*, trans. Paul Patton (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 166. At the end of his discussion of "the image of thought," Deleuze captures with these words, "time into thought," the argument he elaborates throughout his study of cinema and the larger idea of "aesthetics" it involves. Kant plays a key role in this turn; see n. 7.

- 4 Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 291. Deleuze's view of the way television tends to "presentify" everything is not simply a question of its broadcast medium; indeed, one of Deleuze's first writings on cinema is his discussion of Godard's television work. The link between "present" and "live" is nevertheless important, as found today, e.g., in so-called reality TV.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 In this chapter, I retain the French term *dispositif* for the manner in which cinematic space is put together. The sense of the term is part of the larger question of the "regimes" of speaking and seeing Deleuze extracts from Foucault in Gilles Deleuze, "What Is a *Dispositif*?, " in *Two Regimes of Madness*, 338–48. In cinema theory, it might be said to belong to a series of notions of the "cinematic apparatus" that descend from Marx, who stressed the ways in which automated production involves not simply forces, but also relations of production (or what Deleuze would call a technical-social machine). One variant is to be found in the Brechtian idea of *Umfunktionierung* that Walter Benjamin developed, through which an author, more than a genius-fabricator of useless or autonomous works, becomes a "producer," whose work alters the larger apparatus of production and distribution in which it finds itself, posing the problem of the link between "collectivization" of the means of production and the control of the party. (See n. 12.) Another is the notion of "apparatus" that Baudry took over from Althusser's analysis of ideologies, where it is connected to an organization of gazes in the reproduction of social roles. Deleuze starts, instead, from a notion of "machine," in which desire functions not as prothesis or projection of an inner state, but as itself a kind of program at work in larger sociotechnical arrangements, the function of which is to undo the usual controllable connections, for which he cites many artistic examples, notably Kurt Schwitters's *Merzbau*; see Félix Guattari, "Balance Sheet-Program for Desiring Machines," in *Chaosophy* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1995), 123–50. With this example, one is close to the problem of cinema as a kind of "installation," as in the debates about how cinema went into the light of the gallery out of its darkened-room *dispositif*. In this case, the cinema hall or gallery is "architecture," just when architecture itself is seen in terms of a given *dispositif*—the darkened room itself deriving from a theatrical *dispositif* transformed by opera, the first modern mass form. Thus, e.g., when Roland Barthes stresses that "cinema" refers to a place as well as what is shown in it, he opposes the eroticism of that place to the awful familial setting of the television set; Roland Barthes, "On Leaving the Cinema," in *The Rustle of Language* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1986), 345–349. And when, in *Les Mots*, Sartre stresses the "democratic" appeal of the cinema hall to the hierarchical organization of the bourgeois theater, it is to explain the source of his enthusiasm for it. To see such spaces as *dispositifs* is to see them as arrangements of sensibilia, which in turn can be analyzed in terms of their

- relation to what forces us to think. By that criterion, many darkened-room experiences are more intense than their equivalents in galleries.
- 7 See Gilles Deleuze, "On Four Poetic Formulas," in *Essays Critical and Clinical*, trans. Daniel W. Smith and Michael A. Greco (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 28–29. For Deleuze, Kant introduces the distinction between time and movement developed in and through the cinema volumes. The distinction is first introduced in Deleuze, *Difference and Repetition*, 118, 86, in passages devoted to the problem of introducing "time into thought," and later, Deleuze, *ibid.*, 130, 98, already develops the consequences for the notion of "aesthetics" he puts into practice in his analysis of cinema. Prior to Bergson, Kant remains the central philosophical figure for Deleuze's film aesthetic, to the point where he declares that Bergson himself was much closer to Kant than he allowed. "On Four Poetic Formulas" itself resumes the new lecture course Deleuze gave on Kant in 1978, which runs through his larger aesthetic enterprise in the 1980s and which directly concerns the "paradox of inner sense" Kant himself elaborates in *Opus Posthumum* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).
 - 8 In an essay on "La chambre," which takes off from Deleuze's analysis of the room in Samuel Beckett's *Film*, Raymond Bellour suggests one way of linking the problem of the "room" in cinema to the room in which it is shown in "the other cinema" of film and video installation. Raymond Bellour, "La chambre," in *L'Entre-images 2: Mots, Images* (Paris: POL, 1999), 281–316.
 - 9 Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 252.
 - 10 *Ibid.*, 292.
 - 11 Deleuze, *Time-Image*, 257; translation modified. Deleuze draws here on Youssef Ishaghpour's detailed analysis of Duras in *D'une image à l'autre* (Paris: Editions Denoël/Gonthier, 1982), 225–98.
 - 12 Walter Benjamin, "The Author as Producer," in *Reflections*, trans. Edmund Jephcott (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978), 220–38. See also Sergei Tret'iakov's own essay "Our Cinema," *October* 118 (2006), 27; originally published 1928. There is something in the *Umfunktionierung* characteristic of author as producer that is akin to Foucault's analysis of the individualizing function of authorship and his own attempts to get out of it. An important difference, however, concerns the way the problem of power in Foucault is purposefully posed in a way irreducible to any party control. Deleuze relates this problem in Vertov to a new "materialism of the eye." See François Zourabichvili, "The Eye of Montage: Dziga Vertov and Bergsonian Materialism," in *The Brain Is the Screen*, ed. Gregory Flaxman (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), 141–49.
 - 13 In an analysis influenced by Deleuze, Jonathan Crary, *Suspensions of Perception* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2001), 347, discusses Vertov and Cezanne in relation to the neuroscientific question of "attention."

- 14 Deleuze develops this view as an original approach to questions of biology and technology in the appendix to his book *Foucault*, trans. Séan Hand (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1988), 124–32. Daniel Birnbaum returns to this idea in his attempt to see Doug Aitken as part of an unwritten “Cinema 3” in contemporary art. See Daniel Birnbaum, *Chronology* (New York: Lucas and Sternberg, 2005), 49–55.
- 15 Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 253.
- 16 Ibid., 386. The notion of an “impersonal yet singular life” figures in Bellour’s conception of “the room.” (See n. 8.)
- 17 *Cinéma 1: L’image-mouvement* (Paris: Éditions de Minuit, 1983) 122; published in English as *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989), 84–85. Deleuze amusingly suggests one sense in which the “expansion” in structural as well as expanded cinema was related to the “expansion of consciousness” in drugs, as part of the larger “community,” rather unlike the Soviet case, with which these American experiments were linked.
- 18 Phillippe-Alain Michaud, *Aby Warburg and the Image in Motion* (New York: Zone Books, 2005), 278–91; Phillippe-Alain Michaud, *The Movement of Images* (New York: Zone Books, 2006).
- 19 Wu Hung, “The Painted Screen,” *Critical Inquiry* 23, no. 1 (1996), 37–79. The idea is developed further in Wu Hung, *The Double Screen: Medium and Representation in Chinese Painting* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997).
- 20 Raymond Bellour, “Of an Other Cinema,” in *Black Box Illuminated*, ed. Sara Arrhenius, Magdalena Malm, and Cristina Ricupero (Stockholm: Nordic Institute for Contemporary Art, 2004), 39–58. Giuliana Bruno extends an analysis begun in her *Atlas of Emotion* (New York: Verso, 2002) in *Public Intimacy: Architecture and the Visual Arts* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2007).
- 21 Deleuze draws on Roland Barthes’s, *Image, Music, Text* (New York: Hall and Wang, 1977) analysis of Eisenstein and the Brechtian “gest” in developing his analysis of “bodily attitudes” in cinema, as seen, e.g., in Cassavetes’s *Faces*, while he sees Carmelo Bene as closer to Artaud. Ceremonial or everyday “bodily attitudes” are time-images because the body shows through them the workings of time irreducible to plot or subject matter. See Deleuze, *Time-Image*, 189–203.
- 22 Gilles Deleuze, *Proust and Signs*, trans. Richard Howard (New York: George Braziller, 1972), 5–7. Deleuze introduces in this study the question of the implications of “showing time” for what he calls, for the first time, “the image of thought.”
- 23 Deleuze discusses the problem of information in relation to Syberberg in “What Is a Creative Act?,” in *Two Regimes of Madness*, 322. Here Deleuze presents in terms of cinema the question of “control” that he would later

- set out more generally in his essay "Postscript on Control Societies," in *Negotiations*, trans. Martin Joughin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1995), 177–82.
- 24 Paul Virilio, *War and Cinema: The Logistics of Perception*, trans. P. Camiller (New York: Verso, 1989). In a larger discussion of these same themes, Virilio says that the paradox of the documentary treatment of war starting with Rossellini's *Rome, Open City* is one that has "haunted me since I was born.... In 1959, *Hiroshima Mon Amour* provoked an upheaval comparable to the one caused by Seurat or Cezanne in the Impressionist period," he declares. Paul Virilio, *Politics of the Very Worst* (New York: Semiotext(e), 1999), 29. The film is exemplary of the way artists use technologies to "diverge" from the larger functions of propaganda or advertising.
 - 25 Gilles Deleuze, "The Brain Is the Screen," in *Two Regimes of Madness*, 284; translation modified.
 - 26 Deleuze, *Time-Image*, 280.
 - 27 "Intercesseurs" is translated as "Mediators" in the essay by that title in *Negotiations*, 121–34.
 - 28 "The limit common to all of these series of interventions . . . is space-time. All of these disciplines communicate at the level of something that never emerges for its own sake, but is engaged in every creative discipline: the formation of space-times." Deleuze, *Two Regimes of Madness*, 315.
 - 29 Deleuze, *Foucault*, 52–53.
 - 30 Deleuze, *Time-Image*, 280.
 - 31 See "Letter to Serge Daney: Optimism, Pessimism, and Voyage," *Negotiations* 72. Here the function of "a little bit of art and thinking" is contrasted with the public as social consensus and the way it figures in the larger issue of information and control.
 - 32 See *What is Philosophy?*, trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Graham Burchell (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) 87–88. Here the problem of a "sociability" in thought in opposition to Imperial power is seen as the start of a problem of "philia" in philosophy, taken up later through notions of "fraternity," or "solidarity" in relation to capitalism, and hence to Blanchot's attempt to rethink notions of "community" and "communism" after the disaster of the War.