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## **Logic and Argumentation in**

### ***The Book of Concord***

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# Logic and Argumentation in

## *The Book of Concord*

by

Jayson Scott Galler, B.S.; M.Div.

**Dissertation**

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*Dedicatus in memoriam*

+ Kurt Eric Marquart +

1934-2006

A “doctor” of the Church in the truest sense

*Hamlet to his Wittenberg classmate—*

*There are more things in heaven and earth, Horatio,  
Than are dreamt of in your philosophy.*

—Hamlet *Act i. Sc. 5.*

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# Logic and Argumentation in *The Book of Concord*

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The sixteenth-century Reformation in Germany is often viewed as having made a radical change by breaking with the thinking of the past and starting something new. One example given is the Reformation's perceived rejection of philosophy (that is, philosophy's method, subject matter, and purpose), although the regard for philosophy has often been assessed only on the basis of second-order data. Past research has looked at various individuals' keeping or breaking with the preceding era and at the question of continuity between individuals within the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century. This interdisciplinary study examines the regard for philosophy and both the keeping and breaking of the whole movement, by considering how philosophy is used in *The Book of Concord*, which contains Reformation documents from the earlier and later sixteenth-century that were widely accepted and given authoritative status. The specific *Book of Concord* uses of philosophy considered are second-order statements about philosophy and its cognates and about logic, as well as first-order uses of organization by τόποι ("topics") or *loci* ("places") and of argumentation by both induction (namely, example and analogy) and deduction. The study's taking philosophical uses as indicators of regard for philosophy has been called for in previous research and is relatively unique. Another significant contribution of this study is a detailed treatment of syllogisms used in arguing, for example, for the Reformers' position that justification, or righteousness

before God, is only on account of faith in Jesus Christ. The study also considers the Reformers' formal distinction between justification and sanctification, or holy living, as a case study for philosophy in service to theology as its handmaiden in a ministerial role. More than finding an inexplicable, eclectic use, the dissertation concludes that *The Book of Concord* where necessary rejects philosophy and logic but nevertheless at the same time makes use of them, except where the use of such methods contradicts or goes beyond the Reformers' understanding of God's revelation in the Bible. Such rejection but simultaneous use both keeps and breaks with the preceding medieval period and continuous within the Reformation movement of the sixteenth century.



## Table of Contents

List of Tables .....	xii
List of Abbreviations .....	xiii
Chapter I: Introduction.....	1
Overview philosophy and theology relationship .....	4
Philosophy and theology in the era of the Reformation .....	18
Existing scholarship .....	37
Repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use.....	38
Continuity of late-medieval period with Reformation period.....	44
Continuity between Reformers and the next generation.....	50
Exploration and hypothesis development .....	53
Scope and Limitations.....	57
Methodology .....	58
<i>The Book of Concord</i> .....	60
Documents included.....	61
Second-order regard for philosophy .....	79
Dissertation Organization .....	88
Chapter I Summary .....	89
Chapter II: Metalogical Opinions and Practices.....	91
Regard for logic .....	91
Apology IV (Justification) .....	92
Apology XII (Penitence).....	93
Apology XX (Good Works).....	95
Apology I (Original Sin).....	97
Formula I (Original Sin) .....	100
Summary of regard for “logic” .....	104
τόποι as the philosophical method of organization .....	106
<i>Book of Concord</i> use of <i>locus, loci</i> .....	106
τόποι organizational structure used by <i>The Book of Concord</i> .....	128
τόποι method’s philosophical background .....	129
Summary of τόποι/ <i>loci</i> method.....	139
Chapter II summary .....	140

Chapter III: Use of Inductive Argumentation.....	141
Philosophical background of example and analogy.....	141
Example .....	146
For Reformers' positions .....	147
Against opponents' positions.....	152
Expressed principles regarding examples.....	163
Summary of "example" use .....	168
Analogy.....	169
For Reformers' positions .....	171
Against opponents' positions.....	179
Summary of "analogy" use .....	190
Chapter III summary .....	191
Chapter IV: Use of Deductive Argumentation .....	193
Philosophical background of syllogisms .....	193
Melancthon's method regarding "sophistries".....	204
Expressions, formulae, and propositions .....	214
Arguing passages and observations .....	220
Full syllogisms, as in Apology IV:67-68.....	226
Proving forgiveness is by faith, as in Apology IV:75-121 .....	231
Replying to opponents' arguments, as in Ap IV:182.....	259
The Apology's German: simplifying and sharpening.....	262
Arguing over particles, as in Apology IV:281-284 .....	269
Finding arguments in Scripture, as in Apology IV:285.....	274
Fundamental principles in a proof, as in Apology IV:291-300 .....	275
"Necessity" of Baptism, as in Apology IX:2 and LC IV:30-31 .....	283
Opponents bad arguments identified, as in Apology XXIII .....	288
No "proof" without Scripture, as in Ap XXI:10-13 and XXIV:92.....	294
Logical moves, as in LC I:63-64.....	298
Illustrating bad syllogisms, as in LC IV:58-59.....	300
Need to conclude about God's will, as in SD XI:35-41 .....	305
Limit to reason, as in SD XI:52-55 .....	313
Chapter IV Summary .....	315
Chapter V: The Justification/Sanctification Distinction.....	318
<i>Prius</i> and other indications of necessity .....	319
General uses of <i>prius</i> .....	319
<i>Prius</i> with some sense of necessity.....	321
Faith and works passages with <i>prius</i> .....	322
Summary of <i>prius</i> uses and other indications of necessity .....	335
Sanctification as a logical distinction .....	336
Early <i>Book of Concord</i> references to sanctification .....	336
Later <i>Book of Concord</i> references to sanctification.....	342
Sanctification distinction as alleged discontinuity.....	356

Justification and sanctification as “formally” distinct? .....	372
The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus.....	373
Scotus’s distinction through Ockham .....	379
The Reformers’ regard for Scotus and the formal distinction .....	381
Summary of justification-sanctification as a “formal distinction” .....	398
Chapter V summary .....	402
Chapter VI: Consideration of Findings and Conclusion .....	403
Summary of evidence regarding uses .....	404
Findings for questions.....	407
Repudiation but simultaneous use .....	407
Continuity between the medieval and Reformation eras .....	409
Continuity within the Reformation era .....	411
Implications of this research .....	413
Reflections for future questions .....	414
Conclusion .....	416
Appendix: <i>The Book of Concord</i> by Structure and Content.....	418
Works Cited .....	422
Vita.....	440

## List of Tables

Table 1: <i>The Book of Concord</i> Reformation-era contents .....	62
Table 2: Four “figures” of syllogisms.....	197
Table 3: Four “kinds” of propositions .....	198
Table 4: Valid moods of syllogisms .....	198
Table 5: Senses of “justification” and “sanctification” .....	342
Table 6: Terminology according to SD III:17-21 .....	348

## List of Abbreviations

AC	Augsburg Confession (chief confession of the Lutheran Church, 1530)
Ap	Apology of the Augsburg Confession (the defense of the AC, 1531)
<i>APo.</i>	Aristotle's <i>Posterior Analytics</i>
<i>APr.</i>	Aristotle's <i>Prior Analytics</i>
AE	American Edition of Luther's Works (largest English edition of his works)
BAGD	<i>A Greek English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature</i> , the combined work of Walter Bauer, William F. Arndt, F. Wilbur Gingrich, and Frederick W. Danker
BOC	<i>Book of Concord</i> (1580 collection of the Lutheran Church confessions)
BHS	<i>Biblia Hebraica Stuttgartensia</i> (standard critical edition of the Old Testament)
<i>BKS</i>	<i>Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche</i> (the critical edition of <i>The Book of Concord</i> )
<i>Cat</i>	Aristotle's <i>Categories</i>
CR	<i>Corpus Reformatorum</i> (a critical edition of Reformation-era writings)
<i>CSEL</i>	<i>Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum</i> , 91+ volumes.
<i>EN</i>	Aristotle's <i>Nicomachean Ethics</i>
Ep	Epitome of the Formula of Concord (the summary of the SD, 1577)
FC (or FoC)	Formula of Concord (a collective term for one of the confessional writings, which writing consists of the Ep and SD)
<i>In Metaph.</i>	<i>Quaestiones subtilissime super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis</i> , an Aristotelian commentary of Scotus
K-N	Kolb-Nestigen (a collection of translated source and contextual documents for <i>The Book of Concord</i> )
K-W	Kolb-Wengert (the latest scholarly English version of <i>The Book of Concord</i> )
KJV	King James Version of the Bible
LC	Large Catechism (one of the Lutheran confessional writings, 1529)

<i>Lect.</i>	<i>Lectura</i> , one form of Scotus's commentary on the <i>Sentences</i>
LXX	Septuagint (the Greek translation of the Old Testament current at the time of the New Testament)
<i>Metaph.</i>	Aristotle's <i>Metaphysics</i>
MSL	<i>Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina</i> , edited by J. P. Migne, 221 volumes.
NA26	the 26 <sup>th</sup> edition of the Nestle-Aland text (a standard critical edition of the New Testament in Greek)
NPNF	<i>A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church</i> , edited by Philip Schaaf, 28 volumes in two series.
OED	<i>The Oxford English Dictionary</i>
<i>Ord.</i>	<i>Ordinatio</i> , one form of Scotus's commentary on the <i>Sentences</i>
<i>Pol.</i>	Aristotle's <i>Politics</i>
<i>Ph.</i>	Aristotle's <i>Physics</i>
<i>Quod.</i>	<i>Quaestiones Quodlibetales</i> , one of Scotus's most important theological works
<i>Rh.</i>	Aristotle's <i>Rhetoric</i>
SA	Smalcald Articles (one of the Lutheran confessional writings, 1537)
SC	Small Catechism (one of the Lutheran confessional writings, 1529)
SD	Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord (the main text of the Formula, 1577)
TDNT	<i>Theological Dictionary of the New Testament</i> (the English translation of <i>Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament</i> edited by Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, a standard reference for koine Greek words used in the New Testament)
<i>Top.</i>	Aristotle's <i>Topics</i>
Tr	Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope (an appendix to the AC, 1537)
R&N	Rule and Norm (a section of prolegomena before both the Ep and SD)
WA	Weimar Edition of Luther's Works (the standard critical edition), which includes subsets of letters ("Br" for <i>Briefwechsel</i> ) and tabletalk ("Tr" for <i>Tischreden</i> )

## Chapter I: Introduction

*Let the intelligent reader just consider this. If this is Christian righteousness, what difference is there between philosophy and the teaching of Christ? If we merit the forgiveness of sins by these elicited acts of ours, of what use is Christ? If we can be justified by reason and its works, what need is there of Christ or of regeneration?*

—*Apology IV:12*

Around the turn of the third century, a north-African priest from Carthage named Tertullian, known as the Father of Latin theology, asked the following questions, referring both to Athens, the city of the famous academies of ancient Philosophy, and to Jerusalem, the city where central events of Christianity took place: “What has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What concord is there between the Academy and the Church?” (*Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? Quid academiae et ecclesiae?*) Tertullian continued: “Away with all attempts to produce a blended Christianity of Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition!” (*Viderint qui Stoicum et Platonium et dialecticum christianismum protulerunt*).<sup>1</sup> Tertullian’s polemic against both philosophy, which Tertullian saw as fostering heresy, and against the philosopher Aristotle centered only on using philosophy as a source of truth, however; his polemic did not stop Tertullian from using philosophy as a tool.<sup>2</sup> Some thirteen centuries later, a Saxon monk in Wittenberg named Martin Luther, known as the founder of the German Reformation, proposed as a thesis for debate: “Briefly, the whole Aristotle is to theology as darkness is to light”

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<sup>1</sup> Tertullian, *Prescriptions Against the Heretics*, 7, translated by Peter Holmes, in Forrest E. Baird and Walter Kaufmann, *Medieval Philosophy*, Philosophic Classics (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2003), 38; Tertullian, *Quinti Septimi Florentis Tertulliani Opera*, Corpus Christianorum: Series Latina, 2 vols. (Turnholt: Brepols, 1954), 193. Acts 17 tells of Paul’s stop in Athens, where he preached to Epicureans and Stoics.

Baird and Kaufmann note that some early Christian writers, using the Bible as evidence, claimed that philosophy could supplement revelation, while others, using different passages, claimed that revelation superseded philosophy (Baird and Kaufmann, *Medieval Philosophy*, 30).

<sup>2</sup> For background on Tertullian, see, for example, *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, eds. F. L. Cross and E. A. Livingstone, 3 ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), 1591-1592; Étienne Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, Second Printing (New York: Random House, 1955), 44-45, 574-757 n.45.

(*Breviter, Totus Aristoteles ad theologiam est tenebrae ad lucem*).<sup>3</sup> As with Tertullian, however, Luther's polemic also did not stop him from using Aristotle and philosophy.<sup>4</sup> Yet another half-century or so later, the church that bore Luther's name confessed in *The Book of Concord*, regarding a question related to the topic of original sin: "No philosopher, no papist, no sophist, indeed, no human reason, be it ever so keen, can give the right answer" (*kein Philosophus, kein Papist, kein Sophist, ja kein menschliche Vernunft, wie scharf auch dieselbige immermehr sein mag, > die recht < Erklärung geben kann; declarationem veram nullus philosophus, nullus Papista, nullus sophista, imo nulla humana ratio [quae etiam acutissimi sit iudicii] proferre potest*).<sup>5</sup> This statement,

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<sup>3</sup> Martin Luther, Thesis #50, translated by Harold J. Grimm, as *Disputation Against Scholastic Theology*, in Martin Luther, *Luther's Works*, American Edition, eds. Jaroslav Pelikan and Helmut T. Lehmann, 55 vols. (St. Louis & Philadelphia: Concordia Publishing House & Fortress Press, 1955-1986), 31:12; *Disputatio contra scholasticam theologiam* (1517), in Martin Luther, *D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe*, 68 vols. (Weimar: Hermann Böhlhaus Nachfolger, 1883-1921), 1:226; #263 in Kurt Aland, *Hilfsbuch zum Lutherstudium*, 4 ed. (Bielefeld: Luther-Verl., 1996). The editors of AE 31 temper this thesis by limiting Luther's condemnation to the logical and metaphysical writings incorporated into scholasticism (AE 31:12 n.7).

Hereafter all references to the Weimar edition of Luther's works will be indicated with "WA", all references to the American Edition of Luther's works will be indicated with "AE", and the cross-reference numbers in Aland will simply be given as "Aland #".

<sup>4</sup> Martin Grabmann's significant study of the history of the scholastic method rightly notes that, despite his opposition to scholasticism, Luther and his followers in many ways kept the method (Martin Grabmann, *Die Geschichte der scholastischen Methode: Nach den gedruckten und ungedruckten Quellen*, 2 vols. [Graz: Akademische Druck-und Verlagsanstalt, 1957], II:49).

<sup>5</sup> Formula of Concord Solid Declaration, I:60, *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, trans. Theodore G. Tappert, Jaroslav Pelikan, Robert H. Fischer and Arthur C. Piepkorn, ed. Theodore G. Tappert (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1959), 519; *Die Bekenntnisschriften der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche*, 12th ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 864. (Confer *The Book of Concord: The Confessions of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, eds. Robert Kolb and Timothy J. Wengert [Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress Press, 2000], 542.)

Hereafter all references to the Tappert edition will be indicated "Tappert", those to *Die Bekenntnisschriften* "BKS", and those to the Kolb-Wengert edition "K-W". Other editions also referenced are *The Book of Concord: Or, the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, ed. Henry E. Jacobs, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: The General Council Press, 1908) (hereafter "Jacobs"); and *Concordia Triglotta: Die symbolischen Bücher der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, deutsch-lateinisch-englisch*, eds. F. Bente and W. H. T. Dau (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921) (hereafter "Triglotta").

Standard abbreviations for the works contained in *The Book of Concord* are given on pp.xiii-xiv.

"Sophists", based on the Greek word for "wisdom", were originally wise people in general, but the ancient philosopher Plato applied the term negatively to teachers he rejected, although at least some of Plato's characterizations may not be born out by the facts. Later, the word and cognates continued to be used negatively, including by the Reformers, as obvious from the passage cited. (Ralf Heinrich Arning, "Sophistik; sophistisch; Sophist," *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie: unter Mitwirkung von mehr als 700 Fachgelehrten in Verbindung mit Gunther Bien* eds. Joachim Ritter and Karlfried Gründer [Basel: Schwabe, 1971], 9:1082-1086; "Sophists," *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Simon Blackburn



however, did not stop that very same confession from immediately explaining original sin by using a philosophical term (namely, “accident”, or the Latin *accidens, accidentis* in both the German and Latin). These similar statements critical of philosophy from Tertullian, Luther, and *The Book of Concord* introduce the context for the work of this dissertation: a close reading that explores the logic and argumentation of *The Book of Concord*, considering opposition to philosophy, the use of philosophy despite that opposition, and the continuity of that use with the preceding medieval period and within the Reformation era.

The question is rightly asked what is meant by “philosophy” as it has been mentioned and discussed so far, and the answer can widely differ depending on when and where the term is used, how and why it is being used, and who is using it. Some philosophers even argue that a key philosophical question is just what philosophy is.<sup>6</sup> From its root words, the Greek φιλο+σοφός, philosophy is love of wisdom, but the etymology does not help that much in this context. “As an intellectual activity”, “philosophy” can be defined in three different ways: according to its *method* as rational inquiry, according to its *subject matter* either as rational inquiry into any number of different subjects or as the study of first principles and concepts used in various disciplines, and according to its *purpose* of obtaining “wisdom, virtue or happiness”.<sup>7</sup> In this dissertation, “philosophy” is used with overtones of all three of these senses. Perhaps most frequently, although again depending on the author, “philosophy” herein refers to the tool of logic that is used to argue, ultimately with a view towards persuasion, and, as will be seen, the use of such logic and argumentation is a central focus of this dissertation. Worth noting is that in some divisions of the sciences, such as is claimed of

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[New York: Oxford University Press, 1994], 356; Harry A. Ide, “Sophists,” The Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ed. Robert Audi [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999], 862-864.)

<sup>6</sup> Norman L. Geisler and Paul D. Feinberg, Introduction to Philosophy: A Christian Perspective (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1980), 13.

<sup>7</sup> “Philosophy”, The Penguin Dictionary of Philosophy ed. Thomas Mautner, Revised ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 422-423.

Aristotle's, primary philosophy is equated both with metaphysics and with theology (that is, "the science of divine things").<sup>8</sup>

This initial chapter of the dissertation gives the background both for the findings presented in the four following chapters and for the discussion in Chapter VI that concludes the dissertation. There are several different areas of background that this initial chapter covers. The first subsection surveys the relationship between philosophy and theology through the centuries before the so-called Lutheran Reformation, and the second subsection surveys philosophy and theology in the era of that Reformation. The third subsection highlights previous scholarship regarding three areas of inquiry and this author's own previous exploration of *The Book of Concord* for relevant evidence to answer those three questions: (a) the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, (b) continuity or discontinuity between the late-medieval period and the Reformation period, and (c) continuity or discontinuity between the initial "Reformers" and the next generation. The fourth subsection presents the scope and limitations of this research, and the fifth subsection of this introductory chapter presents the "close reading" methodology used for the dissertation. The sixth subsection gives necessary background on *The Book of Concord*, including the various works contained in it and the authors of those works, as well as discussing those authors' regard for philosophy as evidenced in *The Book of Concord*. The seventh and final subsection of this introductory chapter briefly overviews the organization and content of the five chapters that follow.

## **Overview philosophy and theology relationship**

This first subsection, then, surveys the relationship between philosophy and theology through the centuries before the so-called Lutheran Reformation. One could almost say "millennia" before the Reformation, since there are what at least some regard as records of history going back to the beginning of time, and those records give some evidence of what might be regarded as philosophical thought. In the Old Testament's references, "philosophy" may well go under the name of "wisdom". The third part of the

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<sup>8</sup> Jonathan Barnes, *Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 39-45.

Old Testament canon according to Hebrew tradition contained the—implicitly “holy” or “sacred”—“Writings” (סְפָרִים, *Kethubim*), included in which miscellaneous category are four writings considered to have the character of “wisdom” (חֵכְמָה, *chokmah*): Proverbs, Job, Song of Solomon, and Ecclesiastes. Especially the Old Testament book of Proverbs is said to reflect “mainstream wisdom activity”, and at least some parts of the book are thought to have been written by Solomon (tenth century B.C.E.), even as others may date back even earlier.<sup>9</sup> The book of Job may have been written by a wisdom teacher, although some traditions hold that Moses wrote it; regardless, the date of the events the book tells and the date of its being penned are likely different, with the events possibly occurring at the time of the patriarchs (roughly 2250 B.C.E.) and the book being written as early as Solomon’s time or as late as Israel’s exile (970-586 B.C.E.).<sup>10</sup> Song of Solomon, sometimes thought to have less of the “wisdom” character, is nevertheless generally associated with Solomon and dated at his time.<sup>11</sup> Likewise, Ecclesiastes, with its stronger character as wisdom, is associated with Solomon and dated at his time.<sup>12</sup> In short, the four major Old Testament works of a wisdom or more-overtly philosophical character likely date before the fifth century B.C.E. Moreover, even Malachi, the last-written of the Old Testament books (or at least the book ostensibly covering the latest period of time), was written before the inter-testamental period of canonical silence (432-5 B.C.E.) that begins around the same time as the lives of the most well-known of the ancient Greek philosophers: Socrates (c.470-399 B.C.E.), Plato (428/427-348/347 B.C.E.), and Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E.).<sup>13</sup>

Although there is much debate over the meaning of “wisdom” in the context of the Old Testament, “wisdom”, depending on the more specific context, can be regarded

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<sup>9</sup> For example, see Horace D. Hummel, *The Word Becoming Flesh: An Introduction to the Origin, Purpose, and Meaning of the Old Testament* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1979), 448-450.

<sup>10</sup> For example, see Hummel, *Word Becoming Flesh*, 457-461.

<sup>11</sup> For example, see Hummel, *Word Becoming Flesh*, 491-496.

<sup>12</sup> For example, see Hummel, *Word Becoming Flesh*, 525-530.

<sup>13</sup> The inter-testamental apocryphal writing known as 4 Maccabees shows evidence of trying to reconcile Judaism with Hellenistic philosophies (Otto Michel, “φιλοσοφία, φιλοσοφός,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. Gerhard Friedrich [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1974], 9:179-180).

subjectively as “natural law” and objectively as awareness of such “eternal norms” and the resulting “ability to cope”. Such “wisdom” can be viewed on three levels: the anthropological; that of “interpersonal relationships, of society, politics, and history”; and the cosmic.<sup>14</sup> As a result, Horace Hummel writes the following:

Thus, if said with due caution, one may say that wisdom was the “science” of antiquity; at very least, it did proceed somewhat inductively or on the basis of observation, and it developed lists and classification of various sorts. Also, if said again with proper reserve, it was the “philosophy” of the ancient Near East (both in comparison and contrast with “theology”), and from the Hellenistic age on it became one of the major avenues of merger of Occident and Orient ...<sup>15</sup>

In the Old Testament, the wise people and associated schools are sometimes presented as a fourth class of Israelite intellectual (with prophet, priest, and king), and sometimes the wise people and their knowledge are said to be a part of any one of the three spheres of activity: popular (“family or clan wisdom”), political (“court wisdom”), or theological (“scribal wisdom”). Yet, the Old Testament records clashes between those who might be called theologians and those who might be called philosophers, thus indicating that revealed theology and human philosophy were not always compatible from the beginning.<sup>16</sup> In fact, while revealed knowledge and human knowledge often grappled with the same topics and could be presented in the same format, the two are quite distinct.

Louis Goldberg explains as follows:

Reflected in OT wisdom is the teaching of a personal God who is holy and just and who expects those who know him to exhibit his character in the many practical affairs of life. This perfect blend of the revealed will of a holy God with the practical human experiences of life is also distinct from the speculative wisdom of the Greeks. The ethical dynamic of Greek philosophy lay in the intellect; if a person had perfect knowledge he could live the good life (Plato). Knowledge was virtue. The emphasis of OT wisdom was that the human will, in the realm of practical matters, was to

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<sup>14</sup> Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 387-389.

<sup>15</sup> Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh 389. Hummel notes how the apocryphal book “The Wisdom of Solomon” was kept out of the canon due in part to its “strong admixture of Greek, semi-pagan thought” (Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 401). Michel notes that the Septuagint, the Greek translation of the Hebrew Old Testament, of Daniel 1:20 renders **הַחֲרָטְמִים הָאֲשָׁפִים** (“magicians and astrologers”, KJV) with the words σοφισταί καί φιλόσοφοι (Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 179-180).

<sup>16</sup> Hummel, Word Becoming Flesh, 390, 391.

be subject to divine causes. Therefore, Hebrew wisdom was not theoretical and speculative. It was practical, based on revealed principles of right and wrong, to be lived out in daily life.<sup>17</sup>

So, the Old Testament can be taken as showing evidence of a philosophy that at times was in service of the belief in and worship of the Old Testament God but at other times in conflict with His revelation.

The words “philosophy” and “philosopher” originate, as mentioned above, as the Greek words φιλοσοφία and φιλόσοφος. Otto Michel has traced out the earliest uses of these words beginning in the fifth century B.C.E. forwards, taking in many different ancient philosophers and such groups as the “Sophists” before Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle. Especially in Aristotle, Michel observes, the related verb φιλοσοφέω (“to philosophize”) relates to “methodical attempts to understand the world around man”, “the reduction of phenomena to basic principles”, “the knowledge of eternal and unmoved or general being”, as well as, significantly, “systematizing arrangement within the totality of knowledge”. (Each of these aspects of philosophy is important to the work of this dissertation.) Later, various “schools” of philosophy with their unique ideas battled for ideological dominance in the Hellenistic period: Academicians, Peripatetics, Epicureans, and Stoics. Eastern ideas about wisdom and religion also were known and blended into philosophy at the time of Alexander (356-323 B.C.E.), in some cases linking a human being’s salvation with knowledge, such as that revealed by God. Increasingly in the final centuries B.C.E., Jewish thinking and Hellenistic philosophy shared ideas and influenced each other.<sup>18</sup>

In the New Testament, there are essentially two specific references to philosophers and philosophy.<sup>19</sup> First, Acts 17:18 tells how on St. Paul’s so-called second missionary journey (ca. 46-48 C.E.) some Epicurean and Stoic philosophers disputed

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<sup>17</sup> Louis Goldberg, “חָכְמָה,” Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament, eds. R. Laird Harris, Gleason L. Archer, Jr. and Bruce K. Waltke (Chicago: Moody Press, 1980), 1:283.

<sup>18</sup> Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 172-185.

<sup>19</sup> Although at least one contemporary English translation (namely, the New International Version) uses the English “philosopher” in 1 Corinthians 1:20, the Greek word being rendered there is συζητητής, which in the New Testament is used only there. Compare the translations “disputer” in the KJV and American Standard Version (ASV) and “debater” in the New American Standard Bible (NASB).

with him while he was in Athens, as he “disputed” (διελέγετο) with the Jews and God-fearing Greeks.<sup>20</sup>

NA26: τινες δὲ καὶ τῶν Ἐπικουρείων καὶ Στοϊκῶν φιλοσόφων συνέβαλλον αὐτῷ, καὶ τινες ἔλεγον· τί ἂν θέλοι ὁ σπερμολόγος οὗτος λέγειν; οἱ δέ· ξένων δαιμονίων δοκεῖ καταγγελεὺς εἶναι, ὅτι τὸν Ἰησοῦν καὶ τὴν ἀνάστασιν εὐηγγελίζετο.<sup>21</sup>

Vulgate: quidam autem epicurei et stoici philosophi disserebant cum eo et quidam dicebant quid vult seminiverbius hic dicere alii vero novorum daemoniorum videtur adnuntiator esse quia Iesum et resurrectionem adnuntiabat eis<sup>22</sup>

Luther Bibel: Etliche aber der Epikurer und Stoiker Philosophen stritten mit ihm. Und etliche sprachen: Was will dieser Lotterbube sagen? Etliche aber: Es sieht, als wolle er neue Götter verkündigen. (Das machte, er hatte das Evangelium von Jesu und von der Auferstehung ihnen verkündigt.)<sup>23</sup>

KJV: Then certain philosophers of the Epicureans, and of the Stoicks, encountered him. And some said, What will this babblers say? other some, He seemeth to be a setter forth of strange gods: because he preached unto them Jesus, and the resurrection.<sup>24</sup>

Michel writes how the first, disparaging reaction given seems to be that of the Epicureans; how the second, somewhat interested reaction given seems to be that of the Stoics; and how both seem to fit the Epicureans and Stoics. Significantly also, the term σπερμολόγος, which the KJV translates “babbler”, is said to denote a “pseudo-philosopher”. Of this whole event in Athens, Michel writes, “There is no debate with Greek philosophy but rather a criticism of pagan worship which in part uses arguments

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<sup>20</sup> When the words used in the various languages of the Biblical text being quoted are significant, the original language and relevant subsequent language translations (such as the Greek Septuagint, the Latin Vulgate, Luther’s German translation, and an English translation, usually the KJV) will be given as below.

<sup>21</sup> All Nestle-Aland 26<sup>th</sup> edition text is from “Libronix Digital Library System,” 2.1c (Bellingham, WA: Logos Research Systems, Inc., 2000-2004).

<sup>22</sup> All Vulgate text is from John Walker, Index Librorum Liberorum, Available: <http://www.fourmilab.ch/etexts/www/Vulgate/Vulgate.html2007>.

<sup>23</sup> All Luther Bibel text is from Gospel Communications International, BibleGateway.com, 1995-2007, Available: <http://www.biblegateway.com/>, 2007.

<sup>24</sup> All King James Version text is from “Libronix Digital Library System”.

forged by philosophy itself.”<sup>25</sup> And, that statement is not even to mention the philosophical terminology used to describe the debate.<sup>26</sup>

The New Testament’s second of two specific references to philosophers and philosophy is in Colossians, one of the so-called “captivity letters” of Paul (ca. 59-61 C.E.). There, in Colossians 2:8, the apostle warns the believers in Collosae not to be deceived by worldly teaching.

NA26: Βλέπετε μή τις ὑμᾶς ἔσται ὁ συλαγωγῶν διὰ τῆς φιλοσοφίας καὶ κενῆς ἀπάτης κατὰ τὴν παράδοσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, κατὰ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου καὶ οὐ κατὰ Χριστόν·

Vulgate: videte ne quis vos decipiat per philosophiam et inanem fallaciam secundum traditionem hominum secundum elementa mundi et non secundum Christum

Luther Bibel: Sehet zu, daß euch niemand beraube durch die Philosophie und lose Verführung nach der Menschen Lehre und nach der Welt Satzungen, und nicht nach Christo.

KJV: Beware lest any man spoil you through philosophy and vain deceit, after the tradition of men, after the rudiments of the world, and not after Christ.

Michel writes that Paul is referring to what is being said by false teachers, not to Greek philosophy in general or a to classical school in particular, although Michel also says “the error has features of a religious fellowship to which late Hellenism and Hellenistic Judaism could accord the predicate φιλοσοφία.” Michel goes on to say that Paul does not introduce the label “philosophy” disparagingly but uses the designation likely used by his opponents and then “sets it aside” with the polemical parallel expression (that is, “vain deceit”).<sup>27</sup> Significant also is Paul’s use of the word στοιχεῖον, which the KJV translates “rudiments”, as it also has a rich philosophical background.<sup>28</sup>

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<sup>25</sup> Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 187-188.

<sup>26</sup> The verb used in verse 17, διαλέγομαι, is used by Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle for “the art of persuasion and demonstration”, although one commentator says of this passage, “There is here no reference to ‘disputation,’ but to the ‘delivering of religious lectures or sermons’” (Gottlob Schrenk, “διαλέγομαι, διαλογίζομαι, διαλογισμος,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel [Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964], 2:93-95).

<sup>27</sup> Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 185-187. Perhaps with this understanding, this verse was taken, in the late Reformation at least, as condemning only *false* philosophy, “a construct of human imagination” (Sachiko

Not only does the New Testament use the words “philosopher” and “philosophy”, but, as has been seen, there is also evidence of philosophy on a more subtle level. In the New Testament one can also find terms and ideas that arguably have a philosophical background, although, as Michel rightly points out, one does not know how much of the philosophical significance the authors of the New Testament works either knew of or intended to use. After giving various New Testament passages as examples,<sup>29</sup> Michel makes the following important observation.

Yet adoption of philosophical terms does not mean unqualified acceptance of their content. Primitive Christianity uses the thought-forms and expressions of philosophy only to the degree that they can contribute to the presentation, elucidation, and establishment of the Gospel. The central theme of the NT message, the declaration of God’s eschatological action which brings the history of Israel and the nations of the world to its divinely determined goal, is neither related to philosophy nor dependent on it. On the contrary, it radically calls in question philosophy’s own goal of helping to master being with the tools of human thought and contradicts fundamental philosophical ideas by Semitic thought-forms which to a certain extent are an irrevocable part of the message.<sup>30</sup>

Note well that the New Testament writers can be taken to be using philosophical terms and concepts that serve the writers’ purposes without *per se* depending on philosophy but in fact possibly directly refuting philosophy. Moreover, as the Semitic thought-forms were an irrevocable part of the message the New Testament writers extended, so philosophical thought-forms, to a somewhat similar extent, became an irrevocable part of the message the New Testament writers passed on to succeeding generations.

The Scriptures themselves thus can be taken to lay the groundwork for some sort of relationship between theology and philosophy, and one of Scripture’s “wisdom”

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Kusukawa, The Transformation of Natural Philosophy: The case of Philip Melanchthon, Ideas in context, ed. Quentin Skinner [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 206-207).

<sup>28</sup> Gerhard Delling, “στοιχειον,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1971), 7:670-687. On the use of commentary on Colossians 2:8 as a litmus test, see below, n.152, p.51.

<sup>29</sup> Michel’s list follows: in teaching about God, creation, and creation’s related Christology, John 1:1-3; Colossians 1:15-17; Hebrews 1:3; in teaching about human beings and ethics, Romans 1:20, 28; 2:15; and in exhortation, 1 Corinthians 9:24; 11:13-15; James 3:3-5; 2 Peter 1:5-7 (Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 185).

<sup>30</sup> Michel, “φιλοσοφία,” 185.



writings may well provide the basis for a figure of speech used widely to express that relationship. Some ancient figure said *philosophia ancilla theologiae* (“philosophy is the handmaiden of theology”), perhaps alluding to, among other, such passages as Proverbs 9:3 and thereby casting theology in the role of “wisdom”.<sup>31</sup>

BHS: [חַכְמוֹת] שְׁלֹחָהּ בָּעֵר תִּיהֶּ תִּקְרָא עַל־גַּפִּי מִי קִרְתָּ:

LXX: [Ἡ σοφία] ἀπέστειλε τοὺς ἐαυτῆς δούλους, συγκαλοῦσα μετὰ ὑψηλοῦ κηρύγματος ἐπὶ κρατῆρα, λέγουσα<sup>32</sup>

Vulgate: [sapientia] misit ancillas suas ut vocarent ad arcem et ad moenia civitatis

Luther Bibel: [Die Weisheit] sandte ihre Dirnen aus, zu rufen oben auf den Höhen der Stadt:

KJV: [Wisdom] hath sent forth her maidens: she crieth upon the highest places of the city,

Considering the wide uses of this figure of speech of theology as the mistress of the house<sup>33</sup> and philosophy as her handmaid provides a vehicle for surveying the relationship between the two. Malcolm de Mowbray, in a well-documented article, draws on a number of other earlier studies to trace especially well the meanings of the idea from the first century to the seventeenth, although for the purposes here interest stops at the

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<sup>31</sup> The statement is variously ascribed. According to “Adventures in Philosophy” (Adventures in Philosophy, 1998-2007, Center for Applied Philosophy, Available: <http://radicalacademy.com/adiphiljewish1.htm>, March 17 2003), philosophy as the handmaid of theology was one of the main ideas of Philo Judaeus (c. 25 B.C.E.-c. 50 A.D), who is also known as Philo of Alexandria. According to William Turner (William Turner, History of Philosophy [Boston: Ginn, 1957]), St. John of Damascus at the end of the seventh century reportedly authored the statement, though Turner thinks it probably originated later. According to Jewish Encyclopedia (Jewish Encyclopedia, 2002, The Kopelman Foundation, Available: [www.jewishencyclopedia.com](http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com), March 17 2003), Isaac Arama “deduced” philosophy as the handmaid of theology around the time of Moses Maimonides (1135-1204). Thomas Aquinas also is given credit for the quote, perhaps stemming from his comments in the *Summa*, I, 1, 5, where he refers to wisdom sending out her maidens in Proverbs 9:3. De Mowbray, whose study is discussed in the text below, says, if any attribution is given, the statement is often attributed, perhaps wrongly, to Peter Damian (1007-1072) (Malcolm de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid of Theology: Biblical Exegesis in the Service of Scholarship,” Traditio 59 [2004]: 1-2).

<sup>32</sup> All Septuagint (LXX) text is from Lancelot C. L. Brenton, ed., The Septuagint with Apocrypha: Greek and English (London: Samuel Bagster & Sons, Ltd., 1851).

<sup>33</sup> “Mistress” here likely has the *Oxford English Dictionary*’s sense of a “woman having control or authority” or the now-obsolete sense of “a thing personified as female considered to be chief, first, or unequalled among a specified group” and most decidedly not “a woman other than his wife with whom a man has a long-lasting sexual relationship”, although that adulterous sense does enter into consideration, albeit by way of another term (The Oxford English Dictionary, eds. J. A. Simpson and E. S. C. Weiner [New York: Oxford University Press, 1989], IX:900-902).

sixteenth. (This dissertation will refer to this figure of speech with the shorthand “handmaid metaphor”.)

De Mowbray writes that “the original and principal meaning of the concept of philosophy as a servant of theology was that philosophy had a part to play in the development of rational Christianity and that [the handmaid metaphor] was mainly used to combat those who wished to reject all secular knowledge.”<sup>34</sup> He identifies three attitudes toward “rational philosophy”: (1) contempt for human reason with no role for philosophy; (2) philosophy as leading to the same goal as theology; and (3) the Bible as the source of all human knowledge with no role for philosophy since it came out of theology. A hybrid attitude of the second and third, de Mowbray says, “saw human knowledge as compatible with revelation and thus recognized a role for philosophy in understanding the Bible, who sought to define its place in religious thought.” That “fourth” attitude is said to result in “the description of philosophy as a servant of theology”, although de Mowbray says, the idea’s “precise meaning varied according to the circumstances in which it was used.”<sup>35</sup>

De Mowbray examines several early Christian writers who describe philosophy as a servant of theology, or revealed knowledge. First is Philo of Alexandria (ca. 15 B.C.E.-ca. C.E. 50), a Jew who used philosophy to explain away parts of the Pentateuch and said Moses invented philosophy and transmitted it to the Egyptians, who transmitted it to the Greeks. De Mowbray details how Philo allegorized the Genesis 16:1-6 story of Abraham, Sarah, and her handmaid Hagar to represent, respectively mind, philosophy, and the liberal arts.<sup>36</sup> Second for de Mowbray is Clement of Alexandria (d. ca. 220), who in the same locale brought Philo’s ideas into Christianity, including that of Sarah and Hagar, as he argued against those who denied secular learning any role in interpreting scripture and

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<sup>34</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 2.

<sup>35</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 3.

<sup>36</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 3-5. De Mowbray refers to a fragment possibly from Ariston of Chios (ca. 250 B.C.E.) as a potential source for Philo’s interpretation (de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 5 n.12). In Galatians 4:21-31 Paul develops quite a different allegory about Hagar and Sarah.

acquiring faith.<sup>37</sup> Third is Origen (185-253), who succeeded Clement in Alexandria and made other arguments for the use of worldly learning, including some based on other Bible passages. But, Origen's great use of philosophy eventually forced him to leave Alexandria, although others there and elsewhere continued the use of philosophy and the figure of speech of it as a servant.<sup>38</sup> Notably, Amphilochius Iconiensis (d. ca. 403) said worldly learning should serve the mistress of divine wisdom "without becoming arrogant", and John of Damascus (d. 749) likewise said that as servants could minister to a queen, so anything could be used to serve the truth. In all of these, de Mowbray says, against those completely rejecting secular knowledge, philosophy is viewed favorably as serving theology, with theology placed higher than philosophy but with no hostility towards philosophy.<sup>39</sup>

De Mowbray details how philosophy came into the Latin western tradition later and how the image of philosophy as a handmaid to theology may have come through reading of Philo. Ambrose (339-397) makes use of Philo and the allegory of Hagar and Sarah, although Ambrose is said to have more or less rejected philosophy.<sup>40</sup> Jerome (347-420) also knew Philo but drew on Origen's allegorical use of Deuteronomy 21 to describe Christianity taking captive secular wisdom and producing servants of the Lord.<sup>41</sup> Augustine (354-430) made wide use of philosophy but appropriated a different allegorical interpretation of Origen's for its defense.<sup>42</sup> After Augustine and the decline of philosophy, de Mowbray details only Alcuin of York (735-804), who, in justifying his curriculum, allegorizes wisdom's seven pillars in Proverbs 9:1 to be the seven liberal arts. De Mowbray suggests Alcuin's use of Proverbs 9:1 may have contributed to the later use of Proverbs 9:3.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>37</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 5-6.

<sup>38</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 6-7.

<sup>39</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 7-8.

<sup>40</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 9.

<sup>41</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 9-10.

<sup>42</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 9, 10-11.

<sup>43</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 11.

When philosophy and the associated figure of speech resurface in the 11<sup>th</sup> century, there has been a subtle shift, according to de Mowbray. In arguing for God's omnipotence against those said to be "excessively inclined towards dialectic", Peter Damian (1007-1072) with some hostility argues against philosophy's arrogance in claiming dominion over the mistress in the context of religious belief. Yet, de Mowbray notes, Damian could also call for those with secular knowledge to apply that knowledge in service of theology. Damian's use of the handmaid metaphor, however, seems to be an extension of Gregory the Great's (ca. 540-604) allegory on Genesis 29-30, involving Jacob, Rachel and Leah, and their respective handmaids, Bilhah and Zilpah.<sup>44</sup> The next significant figure for de Mowbray in that time period is Peter Abelard (1079-1142), who equates the philosopher's study of ethics with the Christian's study of divinity and says all other disciplines serve ethics/divinity as servants serve their mistress. But, Abelard's opponents said he distorted theology with philosophy, and Abelard held that some revealed truths were accessible by reason.<sup>45</sup>

De Mowbray proceeds to the late-12<sup>th</sup> and early-13<sup>th</sup> centuries, when philosophy's influence was increasing, due in part to Aristotle and his commentators being translated into Latin, and when universities were being established and setting up philosophy as a separate, preparatory subject for theology. Pope Gregory IX's 1228 letter titled *Ab Aegyptis (From Egypt)* to Paris theologians used the handmaid metaphor and the Exodus and Deuteronomy passages to discourage too much of a theological reliance on secular learning. Despite that warning and bans in 1210, 1215, and 1231 on some Aristotelian teaching, philosophy advanced.<sup>46</sup> De Mowbray highlights four authors of the period who used both philosophy in their theology and the handmaid metaphor in its defense. Bonaventure (ca. 1217-1274) put human knowledge—its examples and terminology—in service of revelation but kept philosophical knowledge somewhat separate and held

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<sup>44</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 11-14. De Mowbray notes how Immanuel Kant, drawing on Peter Damian, wrote that philosophy could not be banished or gagged if she is to perform her duties as maidservant, whether those be to lead the way carrying the torch or follow behind carrying the train (de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 1).

<sup>45</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 15-17.

<sup>46</sup> de Mowbray, "Philosophy as Handmaid," 17-18.

theological knowledge to go higher.<sup>47</sup> Roger Bacon (ca. 1210-ca. 1294), in at least one place, held theology to be the mistress of all other sciences but elsewhere held experimental sciences to be the queen, perhaps each in their own realms. Bacon also said theology could not “achieve its purpose” without the rest and held that philosophy could acquire knowledge of the Divine, as well as prove articles of faith and demonstrate theological principles.<sup>48</sup> Albertus Magnus (ca. 1200-1280, in English often “Albert the Great”) incorporated into his arguments those of Aristotle’s *Metaphysics*, making all other sciences serve theology.<sup>49</sup> According to de Mowbray, Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) strongly argued that philosophy could serve theology, using as authorities some of the examples discussed above, including passages from Deuteronomy and Exodus. Aquinas said anything in philosophy that contradicted matters of faith was an improperly reasoned abuse of philosophy. Thus, Aquinas put philosophy to use demonstrating the *praeambula fidei* (“introduction to the faith”), revealing theological things by analogy, and resisting positions opposed to the faith. Thomas regarded all the other sciences to be servants to theology and held that theology could use the other sciences’ principles and tools.<sup>50</sup> De Mowbray considers that the Latin West did not have a (different) formula like the handmaid metaphor or only one use of it, since authors alternately used it both to limit secular learning’s role in theology and to justify the same. And, de Mowbray correlates the metaphor’s cycle of emergence and disappearance with the reemergence of philosophy itself or new challenges presented by “different philosophical principles”.<sup>51</sup> (De Mowbray does not discuss in systematic detail the use of the handmaid metaphor in the two centuries before or at the time of the Lutheran Reformation.<sup>52</sup>)

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<sup>47</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 18-20.

<sup>48</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 20-24.

<sup>49</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 24-25.

<sup>50</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 26-28.

<sup>51</sup> de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 28-29.

<sup>52</sup> De Mowbray in one place mentions that in Protestant lands “ever since Martin Luther it had been argued that the Scholastics had corrupted theology through an excessive reliance on Aristotle” and elsewhere mentions that the handmaid metaphor “was used by Protestants to argue that Aristotelianism had become hopelessly enslaved to theology and that the only way forward was its replacement” (de Mowbray, “Philosophy as Handmaid,” 32, 35).

While de Mowbray's survey of the handmaid metaphor has served its useful purpose of surveying the period from the New Testament to the time of the Reformation, it is useful to note that in general the role of philosophy in Christianity is often portrayed as a struggle between Aristotelianism and Platonism. Aristotle studied with Plato at the Academy in Athens but later founded a rival school. Aristotle's lecture notes more or less survived in famous texts on such things as ethics, metaphysics, and logic and became hugely significant in the thought of the following centuries. Though early in the Christian Church Plato was held in greater regard, Aristotle rose to ascendancy, in part due to a philosophical and theological synthesis built by the Dominican philosopher Thomas Aquinas. Aquinas' synthesis subsequently was supported or attacked by those who came after him, including such significant figures as the Franciscan Duns Scotus at the turn of the fourteenth century, the Franciscan William of Ockham in the fourteenth century, and Gabriel Biel in the late fifteenth century. The interplay of philosophy and theology also passed through men such as Jodocus Trutvetter and Bartholomäus Arnoldi von Usingen, teachers of Martin Luther's at Erfurt, and it continued through Martin Luther and his colleagues at Wittenberg to their students after them.<sup>53</sup> Where continuities and discontinuities arise between the medieval and Reformation eras and within the time period of the Reformation are questions the dissertation considers, and there is more background information for those questions below.

At this point, however, two other names are worthy of mention: John Wycliffe (d.1384) and John Hus (d.1415). Both the earlier English "reformer" and the later Bohemian one were significant figures in the efforts to effect reforms at a more-local level in doctrine and practice. In both their teaching and how they lived out that teaching

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<sup>53</sup> For example, Oberman reviews Bengt Häggglund's work regarding the idea that Luther depends on Ockham for a separation of revelation and reason, and Oberman discusses evidence in Luther's teacher Usingen that grace uses reason. Ultimately, Oberman, for his part, rejects the idea that the relationship between reason and revelation in Luther depends on Nominalism, for Oberman finds too much evidence that the earliest Luther was already too independent of the nominalist tradition. (Heiko A. Oberman, "*Facientibus quod in se est deus non denegat gratiam*: Robert Holcot O.P. and the Beginnings of Luther's Theology," The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992], 95-103.) For a closer look at Ockham's regard for reason, one might see David W. Clark, "William of Ockham on Right Reason," Speculum, 48.1 (1973).

they were precursors of the later sixteenth-century Reformation. Positions of both were condemned by the Roman Catholic church, and both were eventually burned. A student and instructor at Oxford, Wycliffe, like Luther later, was heavily influenced by Augustine and Neoplatonism, and he therefore was opposed to medieval nominalism. Wycliffe held that reason and revelation could not contradict, and he put revelation and the Bible's authority over reason and the authority of traditions or church leaders, although he did not deny some church interpretation of Scripture. Wycliffe attacked the Roman Catholic teaching of transubstantiation, the authority of the pope, and the practice of indulgences, just as Luther later did. Perhaps as a result of a dynastic marriage, Wycliffe's ideas spread to and later emerged from Bohemia, where John Hus became associated with versions of them, said to be influenced by a Czech understanding of religious reform. Hus studied and taught at the University of Prague, holding anti-nominalist positions similar to those of Wycliffe. Although Hus was more moderate and drew from Wycliffe selectively (for example not denying transubstantiation but also challenging the authority of the pope and the practice of indulgences), Hus ultimately was condemned, with debated involvement of figures significant to Luther, such as Pierre d'Ailly and Jean Gerson. Wycliffe and Hus both also had controversial writings about the church and the validity of sacramental acts performed by "wicked" priests. A copy of Hus's *On the Church* prompted Luther to say he had held all of Hus's teachings, and that his teacher Staupitz and even Paul and Augustine were "Hussites". Still, there were obvious differences between these earlier Reformers and the later ones, such as the understanding of the antichrist.<sup>54</sup> To the later Reformers and their understanding of philosophy and theology attention now turns.

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<sup>54</sup> On the two, see Heiko A. Oberman, Forerunners of the Reformation: The Shape of Late Medieval Thought, trans. Paul L. Nyhus (Cambridge: James Clarke & Co., 1967), 207-217; Williston Walker, Richard A. Norris, David W. Lotz and Robert T. Handy, A History of the Christian Church, 4th ed. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1985), 377-385; Justo L. González, A History of Christian Thought, rev. ed., 3 vols. (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1987), 327-333; and Heiko A. Oberman, "Hus and Luther," The Contentious Triangle: Church, State, and University: A Festschrift in Honor of Professor George Huntston Williams, eds. Rodney L. Petersen and Calvin Augustine Pater, Sixteenth Century Essays & Studies LI (Kirkville, MO: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1999).

Especially with its apparent nod to Oberman's work, Walker's concluding paragraph on the pair is worth quoting in full: "Wyclif and Hus have often been styled forerunners of the Reformation. The

## Philosophy and theology in the era of the Reformation

Next, however, this introductory chapter's second subsection surveys philosophy and theology in the era of so-called Lutheran Reformation in Germany. That universities were the arena in which theology met philosophy has been mentioned, and, in the case of the Lutheran Reformation, the University of Wittenberg is especially significant. The University of Wittenberg was not only where Martin Luther received part of his theological training but also where he lived out his career, including reforming the very curriculum through which he matriculated. For the most part setting aside for a moment Luther's own education, this subsection briefly discusses the University of Wittenberg's origin and its curricular changes, as well as evidence of a twist that Luther appears to have given the handmaid metaphor, which has been seen to serve as a signpost for an author's position on the relationship between theology and philosophy.

The University of Wittenberg was founded in 1502 with representation from the usual two schools of thought of the *via antiqua* and their differing approaches to the interplay of theology and philosophy.<sup>55</sup> Those schools are Franciscan Scotism, which kept natural philosophy sublimated to theology, and Dominican Thomism, which gave

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designation is appropriate if regard is given to their protest against ecclesiastical abuses, their exaltation of the Bible, and their contribution to the sum total of agitation that ultimately resulted in church reform. The fundamental doctrines of the Protestant reformers, however, owed little of their substance to the doctrines of Wyclif and Hus, and they were far more radical in their break with traditional teaching. Nevertheless, insofar as Wyclif and Hus and a great number of 'orthodox' thinkers of the late Middle Ages were already confronting the same central issues that the Protestant reformers were to confront, they may be justly called 'forerunners' of the Reformation. There remained a basic continuity of 'questions,' albeit not of 'answers.'" (Walker, Norris, Lotz and Handy, *A History of the Christian Church*, 385.)

For his part, Oberman delineates "three levels of inquiry" for Luther's relationship to Hus: "the significance of Luther's alliance with Hus in terms of its political repercussions, the discovery of the 'last days,' and the function of the outlawed Hus in Luther's self-understanding as a reformer." (Oberman, "Hus and Luther," 148-161.)

<sup>55</sup> Maria Grossman, *Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517* (Nieuwkoop: B. De Graf, 1975), 68. Confer pp.64-65, where Grossman cites the 1507 *Rotulus* listing of Wittenberg's faculty of philosophy divided into Scotists (Nikolaus von Amsdorf [1483-1565] and Symon Steyn [no dates available]) and Thomists (Andreas Bodenstein of Carlstadt [1480-1541] and Chilian Reuter [1480-1516]). See also the list given by Ernest G. Schwiebert, *Luther and his times: The Reformation from a new perspective* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), 294.

Some modern scholars now dismiss the framework of competing schools of thought or intellectual outlooks; a recent indicative example is William J. Courtenay, "Fruits of the *Harvest*," *The Work of Heiko A. Oberman: Papers from the Symposium on His Seventieth Birthday*, eds. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Katherine G. Brady, Susan Karant-Nunn, and James D. Tracy (Boston: Brill, 2003), 135-145.



philosophy a pseudo-scientific standing of its own.<sup>56</sup> Shortly after the University's founding, however, it acknowledged the "third way", the so-called *via moderna*,<sup>57</sup> of which one representative, Gabriel Biel, took for granted the presence of Aristotle's philosophy in theology.<sup>58</sup> Later, tension between proponents of the "ways" opened the door for Martin Luther to return to Wittenberg in 1512 and represent the *via moderna*. Luther, who had previously taught Aristotelian philosophy in Wittenberg from 1508 to 1510, was educated in Erfurt. In the Erfurt monastery, evidence suggests, there existed a spirit at odds with the established relationship between philosophy and theology.<sup>59</sup> That spirit may have influenced Luther or been the result of his influence. Either way, it was soon manifest in Wittenberg in the form of what some regard as a radical break with the role medieval philosophy played in theology.<sup>60</sup>

Changes in the curriculum at Wittenberg were underway there soon after the University's institution in 1502, and they continued both during Luther's first stint on the

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<sup>56</sup> Edith Dudley Sylla, "Autonomous and Handmaiden Science: St. Thomas Aquinas and William of Ockham on the Physics of the Eucharist," The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of the first International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages--September 1973, eds. John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla, Boston studies in the philosophy of science ; v. 26 (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1975), 353. In n.23 on p.380, Sylla cites Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy, 331ff., 366.

<sup>57</sup> Grossman, Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517, 68.

<sup>58</sup> Lawrence Murphy, "Martin Luther, the Erfurt Cloister, and Gabriel Biel: The Relation of Philosophy to Theology," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 70 (1979): 17. Murphy is drawing a conclusion from Biel's *Epitome et collectarium ex occamo circa quator sententiarum Libros*, cited in his n.15 on p.12. Biel stood in line with William of Ockham and was himself represented at Wittenberg initially by Jodocus Trutfetter.

<sup>59</sup> Lawrence Murphy, "The Prologue of Martin Luther to the *Sentences* of Peter Lombard (1509): The Clash of Philosophy and Theology," Archiv für Reformationsgeschichte 67 (1976): 55-58, 74; Murphy, "Relation of Philosophy to Theology," 7, 10, 12-13.

<sup>60</sup> Part of the evidence for Luther and Melanchthon's knowledge of and reaction to different schools of thought comes from examining the library at Wittenberg. One scholar in particular has catalogued the library's more than one-thousand volumes, circa 1536, taking note of which volumes Luther and Melanchthon were known to have read and even in some cases annotated. (Sachiko Kusakawa, A Wittenberg University Library Catalogue, Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies [Binghamton, NY: Medieval & Renaissance Texts & Studies, 1995]; confer her own mention of this work Sachiko Kusakawa, "Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought: Melanchthon, Schegk, and Crellius," The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory: 1400-1700, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen, The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 147.

faculty and after he left.<sup>61</sup> When Luther returned in 1512, opposition to scholasticism grew and emphasis shifted from scholastic authors to the Bible and early church fathers.<sup>62</sup> Even as Luther drafted a commentary on Aristotle's *Physics*, he envisioned the use of Aristotle coming to an end.<sup>63</sup> In the years after Luther's "posting" of the Ninety Five Theses, the provision of Hebrew and Greek teachers and new translations of Aristotle contributed to the changing theology at Wittenberg.<sup>64</sup> In order to reform the church, Luther saw the need to do away with the traditional philosophical approach.<sup>65</sup>

While Luther himself was not a philosopher *per se*,<sup>66</sup> he did have *views* about philosophy. For example, just a month before what is today thought of as Reformation Day, Luther had a student defend a thesis that called almost all of Aristotele's *Ethics* "the

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<sup>61</sup> Steven E. Ozment, *The Age of Reform (1250-1550): An Intellectual and Religious History of Late Medieval and Reformation Europe* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 310; Grossman, *Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517*, 53, 55, 73-74; Charles B. Schmitt, "Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Universities: Some Preliminary Comments," *The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning: Proceedings of the first International Colloquium on Philosophy, Science, and Theology in the Middle Ages--September 1973*, eds. John Emery Murdoch and Edith Dudley Sylla, Boston studies in the philosophy of science; v. 26 (Boston: D. Reidel Pub. Co., 1975), 494; Bernd Moeller, "The German Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation," *Imperial Cities and the Reformation: Three Essays*, eds. H. C. Erik Midelfort and Mark U. Edwards, Jr. (Durham, N.C.: Labyrinth Press, 1982), 22. More recent is Jens-Martin Kruse, *Universitäts-theologie und Kirchenreform: Die Anfänge der Reformation in Wittenberg 1516-1522 Veröffentlichungen des Instituts für Europäische Geschichte, Mainz. Abteilung Abendländische Religionsgeschichte* (Mainz: Philipp von Zabern, 2002). Kruse's work was quite favorably reviewed by Susan R. Boettcher, "*Universitäts-theologie und Kirchenreform: die Anfänge der Reformation in Wittenberg 1516-1522*," *Sixteenth Century Journal* XXXVI.3 (2005).

<sup>62</sup> Grossman, *Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517* 74, 76, 80-81, 84; Ernest G. Schwiebert, "The Reformation and Theological Education at Wittenberg," *The Springfielder* 28 (1964): 15-16.

<sup>63</sup> See the introduction to the "Disputation against Scholastic Theology", AE 31:6.

<sup>64</sup> Grossman, *Humanism in Wittenberg, 1485-1517*, 73 ff., 84, 91-92; WA Br 1, no. 74, pp.169-172; Robert Rosin, "The Reformation, Humanism, and Education: The Wittenberg Model for Reform," *Concordia Journal* 16 (1990): 308-310, 314; Lewis W. Spitz and American Council of Learned Societies, *The Religious Renaissance of the German Humanists* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) 246, 249; Kusakawa, *Transformation of Natural Philosophy* 34-35.

<sup>65</sup> WA Br 1 no.74 (to Jodokus Trutfetter from Erfurt on May 9, 1518), pp.169-172 (this letter is not translated in the AE).

<sup>66</sup> Fowler notes that Luther "wrote more as a preacher than as a systematic theologian or philosopher—and he was decidedly more theologian than philosopher. We look in vain in his writings, therefore, for any systematic treatment of philosophical issues." But, he did "have a position that can be clearly identified from his writings on important issues of philosophy. ... a very clear picture of his views on reason and faith emerges from his writings." S Fowler, "Faith and Reason in the Period of the Reformation," *Our Reformational Tradition: A Rich Heritage and Lasting Vocation* (Potchefstroom, Transvaal, Republic of South Africa Potchefstroom University for Christian Higher Education, 1984), 67.

worst enemy of grace” (*pessima gratiae inimica*).<sup>67</sup> However, Luther did not “utterly” reject philosophy, as some suggest.<sup>68</sup> On one occasion, while rejecting some treatises of Aristotle, Luther cited others favorably.<sup>69</sup> Theses drafted by Luther for the Heidelberg Disputation also seem to allow some use of Aristotle,<sup>70</sup> and, later, Luther claimed his opponents misunderstood Aristotle and that the true Aristotle was acceptable.<sup>71</sup> Luther could even cite reason along with Scripture, the Fathers, and canon law against Thomas Aquinas and his followers.<sup>72</sup> For Luther, reason, especially that of a sanctified believer, was appropriate in its sphere.<sup>73</sup> Yet, at other times, Luther’s polemic against reason could be quite sharp, in a way that some modern ears find even offensive.<sup>74</sup>

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<sup>67</sup> Thesis 41, “Disputation against Scholastic Theology” (1517), AE 31:12, translated by Harold J. Grimm; Aland #263; WA 1:226.

Ronald Frost offers the thought-provoking idea that Luther’s Reformation was primarily a reaction to the collision in his mind between Aristotle’s understanding of the human will and the Bible’s and Augustine’s understanding of the human will (Ronald N. Frost, “Aristotle’s Ethics: The Real Reason for Luther’s Reformation?,” *Trinity Journal* 18 (1997)).

<sup>68</sup> Dean Inge, cited by Lewis W. Spitz, “Images of Luther,” *Concordia Journal* 11 (1985): 47.

<sup>69</sup> *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen Standes Besserung* (1520), WA 6:457-459; Aland #7; translated by Charles M. Jacobs and revised by James Atkinson as *To the Christian Nobility*, AE 44:200-202. Confer Ozment, *The Age of Reform* 310-312.

<sup>70</sup> Theses #29-40, WA 1:355; Aland #276; “Heidelberg Disputation” translated by Harold J. Grimm, AE 31:41-42. Confer the introduction, AE 31:37-38.

<sup>71</sup> Ozment, *The Age of Reform*, 310-312; AE 31:317, thesis 3 “The Leipzig Debate” (1519), translated by Harold J. Grimm; Aland #167; WA:160-161. See also J. Heywood Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics in Luther’s Eucharistic Theology,” *Renaissance and Modern Studies* 23 (1979). Thomas finds this assessment of his opponents’ use of Aristotle in other writings of Luther, such as the later *De Babylonica Captivitate*. With Étienne Gilson, Thomas affirms Luther’s assessment of Aquinas’ misunderstanding Aristotle, locating the problem in Avicenna’s filtering (Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics,” 152).

<sup>72</sup> Denis Janz, “Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, and the Origins of the Protestant Reformation,” *Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory of James A. Weisheipl, OP*, ed. R. James Long, Papers in mediaeval studies 12 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1991), 76, 78. Janz cites, for example, WA 1:648, *Ad dialogum Silvestri Prieratis de potestate pape responsio* (1518), Aland #582. Confer Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics,” 150.

<sup>73</sup> Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 31; Ozment, *The Age of Reform* 302; Rosin, “Wittenberg Model for Reform,” 305, 308; and Fowler, “Faith and Reason,” 66-67, where Fowler cites Luther, *Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper* (1528), AE 37:224. Confer Spitz and Societies, *Religious Renaissance*, 146-147, 248. Spitz says that Luther’s 1536 *Disputation Concerning Man* is one of Luther’s clearest statements on reason’s place in the kingdom of nature. That *Disputation* is found in WA 39<sup>1</sup>:175-180; Aland #292; AE 34:137. Confer also Thomas, “Logic and Metaphysics,” 150.

<sup>74</sup> Some are offended by the Luther expression *Teuffel hureren* (“devil’s whore”) discussed below in the text. The German *Hure* is in the line of the origin of the English word “whore”, which the *Oxford English Dictionary* says “is now confined to coarse and abusive speech, except in occasional echoes of

With what might be regarded as his typical earthiness, Martin Luther on occasion referred to reason essentially as *Teuffel hureren* (“the devil’s whore”),<sup>75</sup> possibly a twist on the metaphor of philosophy as theology’s handmaid.<sup>76</sup> What may be the most frequently cited such reference—and thus the *locus classicus* for Luther’s so-called “invective on reason”<sup>77</sup>—comes in Luther’s last sermon preached in Wittenberg before his death.<sup>78</sup> But, there are other times and places where Luther uses the label against

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historical expressions, as *the whore of Babylon*” (*OED*, 20:301-302). Certainly such “whore” and “Babylon” passages as Revelation 17:1 and 5 were in Luther’s mind.

<sup>75</sup> Putting those words on Luther’s lips is apparently so much of a commonplace that some writers make reference to them without any citation at all, while other writers question the quotation’s authenticity due to the lack of a citation. Most remarkably, one website offers as authentic a quotation of the phrase that was spoken by the character of Martin Luther in the 1961 English play by John Osborne titled *Luther*: “This I know: reason is the devil’s whore, born of one stinking goat called Aristotle, which believes that good works make a good man” (John Osborne, *Luther: A Play* [London: Faber and Faber, 1961] 63). While this precise quotation may not be found in extant works of Luther, Osborne does seem to accurately simplify Luther’s major complaint against Aristotle in particular and philosophy in general.

<sup>76</sup> A relationship between Luther’s phrase and the centuries-old handmaid metaphor was suggested by none less than Heiko Oberman: “... for [Luther], philosophy – which for Aquinas was still the willing handmaiden of theology – had become the wily whore, when fashioning and faking a liaison between the human mind and God’s inner being” (Heiko A. Oberman, “*Via Antiqua* and *Via Moderna*: Late Medieval Prolegomena to Early Reformation Thought,” *The Impact of the Reformation* [Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1987] 11). Oberman had earlier written that after the 1958 work of Bernhard Lohse, *Ratio und Fides: Eine Untersuchung über die ratio in der Theologie Luthers*, “it will no longer be possible to be satisfied with the observation that for Luther reason is the whore, *Frau Hulda*, in order to prove that Luther is antirational. Lohse has further [sic] shown that the distinction between the use of reason *coram mundo* or *coram hominibus* – scientia – in contrast with its use *coram deo* – sapientia – is not adequate unless one insists that it is the same reason which operates on the levels of creation and redemption.” (Oberman, “Robert Holcot and Luther’s Theology,” 94-95.) In a posthumously published article, Oberman writes that philosophy as the *ancilla* (“handmaid”) of theology was on the wane “when Luther came on the scene” but would “reassert itself” after the Aristotelian Renaissance (Heiko A. Oberman, “Luther and the Via Moderna: The Philosophical Backdrop of the Reformation Breakthrough,” *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 54.4 (2003): 641-642).

<sup>77</sup> Brian Albert Gerrish, *Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology of Luther* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962) 1.

<sup>78</sup> Roman Catholic historian Jacques Maritain gives a version of the quote (with certain passages omitted and ellipses inserted) that shows up in a number of sites on the internet simply attributed to Luther (Jacques Maritain, *Three Reformers: Luther, Descartes, Rousseau* [London: Sheed & Ward, 1928], 33; compare below at n.98, p.35). Maritain gives two citations for the quote: the Erlangen edition of Luther’s Works 16:142-148 and Denifle-Paquier, III:277-278. According to Vogel, the Erlangen citation corresponds with Aland #648 and the WA and AE citations below (Heinrich J. Vogel, *Vogel’s Cross Reference and Index to the Contents of Luther’s Works: A Cross Reference between the American Edition and the St. Louis, Weimar and Erlangen Editions of Luther’s Works* [Milwaukee: Northwestern Publishing House, 1983], 194-195; confer Aland, *Hilfsbuch zum Lutherstudium*). Maritain comments: “If the practical result aimed at by Luther, above all else, be to exhort his hearers to act according to faith and not according to human reason only, this does not take anything away from *the diseased falsity and absurdity of the formulae* to which he has recourse” (Maritain, *Three Reformers*, 200 n.36., emphasis added). If, as is

reason and false churches that eschew the Word of God.<sup>79</sup> The passages relevant to reason are now discussed in chronological order.

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contended in this dissertation, the devil's whore expression is related to the handmaid metaphor, Maritain certainly missed that connection, as well as the biblical background for Luther's choice of words.

<sup>79</sup> A search of the electronic version of the Weimar edition of Luther's works produced some 28 hits linking *Hure* with *Teuffel* (some hits overlap, so the actual total of different passages treated in this discussion is less than 28). This author here expresses appreciation to Concordia Seminary Library (St. Louis) Reference Services and then-student Rob Korsch, who conducted the electronic search in the spring of 2005 and compiled and sent detailed documentation to this author. (The search results did not include any of the references in the "last sermon", because the precise word combination does not occur in that work, although, as will be seen, the concept is certainly there.) What follows in this note is an extremely brief survey of the uses of the phrase against the false churches. (Two other uses where Luther seems to refer to the world as "the devil's whore" are WA 47:514 and WA 49:792.)

In the 1528 *Ein Bericht an einen guten Freund von beider Gestalt des Sakraments aufs Bischofs zu Meitzen Mandat*, in connection with 2 Thessalonians 2 Luther writes of *teuffels kirche und Satanas braut* and *teuffels hure*, contrasting them to Christ's Church and Bride who hears His word, all in the context of Psalm 26:5, Ephesians 5:22-33, and the creedal statement about the Church (WA 26:568b; Aland #666).

In the 1528 sermon on Matthew 12:46-50 that was apparently published in 1529, Luther similarly contrasts the Christian Church and God's Word with *des Teuffels hure* (WA 28:25; Aland #475).

In the 1531 *Sommerpostille* on 1 Peter 3:8-15, Luther sets *Teuffels Hure* opposite *die rechte Kirche*, which has God's Word and Sacrament (WA 22:59; Aland #Po 261).

In the 1531 *Glosse auf das vermeinte kaiserliche Edikt* that responds to the emperor's November 19, 1530, decree from the Diet of Augsburg, regarding an accusation that Christ's institution of the Sacrament of the Altar has changed, Luther first refers to *hure des teuffels* as a slanderous insult to Christians' mother, the Christian Church and Bride of Christ (WA 30<sup>iii</sup>:340b, Aland #174; AE 34:73), and then Luther identifies the Roman Catholic Church as *des teuffels hure* for blasphemously and arrogantly exerting power over God's Word (WA 30<sup>iii</sup>:341b; AE 34:74).

Likewise, in a 1535 writing known as *Die Zirkulardisputation de concilio Constantiensi, Etliche spruce, wider das Constentzer Concilium gestellet zu Wittemberg durch D. Martinus Luther*, the Turks and Roman Catholics as opponents of Christ's Church are discussed in the context of labels such as *Satans Schule* ("Satan's school"), *Widerchristi* ("Antichrist"), *ketzer* ("heretic"), and *des teuffels wuetige hure* ("the devil's rabid whore"; *furiosam meretricem Diaboli*) (WA 39<sup>i</sup>:16b, Aland #135).

Similarly, in a July 26, 1539 sermon on John 3:29, *Auslegung des dritten und vierten Kapitels Johannis in Predigten 1538-1540, Die zwei und vierzigste Predigt, am Sonnabend nach Maria Magdalena*, Luther writes how in keeping with John the Baptizer's words the Church can only have the one Bridegroom, Christ, and that the church that accepts the pope's claim to be the church's bridegroom, which Luther calls *das redet der Teuffel*, is in fact *des Teuffels Hure* (WA 47:164, Aland #Pr 1791 [confer #318]; AE 22:450).

While continuing to preach on John, in a March 13, 1540, sermon on John 4:4 and verses following, *Auslegung des dritten und vierten Kapitels Johannis in Predigten 1538-1540, Die andere Predigt uber das vierde Capittel Joannis. Gepredigt am Sonnabend nach Judica, den 13. Martij*, Luther denies that the Reformers are schismatics and says that their preaching is dismantling *die rothe hure, des Teuffels Sinagog zu Rom* ("that scarlet whore, the synagog of Satan in Rome") (WA 47:217, Aland #Pr1800 [confer #318]; AE 22:513, translated by Martin H. Bertram, with the editors adding the citation Revelation 2:9).

Around the same time, 1537-1540, while preaching on Matthew 23:37 and verses following, *Predigt D. M. Luthers uber das 23. Capittel Matthei. Gepredigt am 18. Sontag Nach Trinitatis*, Luther likens Rome and its followers to *ein Hurhaus des Teuffels*, and, countering his opponents' claim that they were the church and ought to be heard, he, with reference to Isaiah 1:21, says that because they will not hear the Word of God but put themselves over it they have made Jerusalem *eine Teuffels hure*, later adding,

In 1525, Luther wrote *Wider die himmlischen Propheten, von den Bildern und Sakrament* (Against the Heavenly Prophets in the Matter of Images and Sacraments) against Andreas Karlstadt, a former colleague and opponent of Luther's turned advocate turned opponent again. As the title of the work suggests, Luther's problems with Karlstadt began with the iconoclastic controversy but also regarded the Sacrament of the Altar. In part II of the work, regarding the real, presence of Christ's body and blood in the bread and wine of the Sacrament of the Altar, Luther reacts to Karlstadt's use of reason in order to deny Christ's presence, and Luther also significantly draws in Karlstadt's other arguments, which essentially were based on grammar.<sup>80</sup>

Hynfurder leret er uns, was fraw hulde, die natürlích vernunfft, zu diesen sachen sagt, gerade alls wuesten wyr nicht, das die vernunfft des teuffels hure ist und nichts kan denn lesteren und schenden alles, was Gott redt und thut. Aber ehe wyr der selben ertzihren und teuffels braut antworten, Woellen wyr zuvor unsern glauben beweysen, und nicht grosse buchstaben noch puncten odder Tuto Tato sondern duerre helle sprueche der legen, die der tueffel nicht soll umbstossen.

Furthermore he teaches us what Frau Hulda, natural reason, has to say in the matter, just as if we did not know that reason is the devil's prostitute and can do nothing else but slander and dishonor what God does and says. But before we answer this arch-prostitute and devil's bride, we first want to prove our faith, not by setting forth capitals or periods or *touto tauta* but by clear, sober passages from Scripture which the devil will not overthrow.<sup>81</sup>

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with a reference to John 8:43, that because they hear the devil they are not the Christian Church but are *des Teuffels brauth und Hure* (WA 47:534, 536, Aland #Pr 1845).

Finally, in the 1541 *Vermahnung zum Gebet wider den Türken* (*Appeal for Prayer against the Turk*), Luther refers to the person in charge of the emperor's court as *eine teuffels hure* (WA 51:589a, Aland #733; AE 43:221, translated by Paul H. G. Moessner as "a hellish whore").

<sup>80</sup> The extended quotations in this dissertation generally provide the original language version first, followed by an English translation, for which sources are noted in each case. In the case of Luther's works, English translations are from the American Edition when available and reasonably accurate. For quotations from *The Book of Concord*, see below, n.220, p.80.

<sup>81</sup> WA 18:164 (Aland #588); AE 40:174-175, translated by Conrad Bergendoff (note that Bergendoff switches the order of "saying and doing", probably for more-idiomatic English). The AE editors report that Melancthon complained about Luther's violent style in this work (AE 41:76).

Note well the significance of Luther's equating reason with the capricious Frau Hulda<sup>82</sup> and the devil's whore, arch-prostitute, and devil's bride. (That the devil has a family, including a bride, is not an idea unique to Luther, although he does often use it.<sup>83</sup>) The Bible makes use of rich imagery contrasting bride (*Braut*) and whore (*Hure*).<sup>84</sup>

Some sixteen years later in 1541, Luther wrote *Wider Hans Worst (Against Hanswurst)*, a writing that is replete with references to the devil's whore, most in connection to what Luther saw as the falsity of the Roman Catholic church but some nevertheless relevant to our discussion of reason.<sup>85</sup> The writing was to defend Elector John Frederick from an attack by Henry of Braunschweig/Wolfenbüttel, a staunch opponent of the Reformation who in a writing of his own had virulently attacked Elector John and said that Luther called Elector John "Hanswurst", a clown-like characterization that Luther slapped on Henry as Luther replied in kind.<sup>86</sup> In the work, Luther develops

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<sup>82</sup> The AE notes: "In Germanic mythology, Frau Hulda is the name of the leader of a group of elfin creatures who were looked upon as instigators of good and evil among men. Like them Frau Hulda is of a capricious nature, now friendly, now hostile especially in times when disorder arises among men. She may therefore be regarded as a personification of order and clever reasoning. However, in matters of faith Luther looked upon reason as seductive, hence as 'the devil's prostitute.'" (AE 41:174 n.134.) Reason's "seductive" nature contributes significantly to Luther's objection to reason and thus his use of the "devil's whore" figure of speech.

<sup>83</sup> Jacob Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch, 1984), 21:267.

<sup>84</sup> For the German words, see Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 2:330-332; 10:1958-1960. For example, in Revelation, chapter 17 "describes [the great whore] in her appearance, activity, and following, and indicates her downfall", while chapter 18 "tells of her destruction, recalls memories of what she had been, and records the mourning and lament of her followers", and chapter 19 glorifies God for His judgment over her and transitions to such things as the marriage of the Lamb to His Bride, the Church (21:2, 9 ff.) (Luther Poellot, *Revelation: The Last Book in the Bible* [St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1962], 217, 240).

<sup>85</sup> WA 51:469-256, Aland #777; translated by W. P. Stephens and Eric W. Gritsch in AE 41:179-256. AE 41:181-184 gives background on the controversy and the character of "Hanswurst" who wore a sausage around his neck.

The electronic search of the WA found a total of fifteen references to the "devil's whore" and its associated expressions in this work, the ones not treated in the text follow here and in subsequent notes with additional context and similar uses mentioned: *des teuffels hure vnd schule* (WA 51:487a&b; AE 41:199, "Satan's whore and synagogue [Rev. 2:9]"; confer "arch-whore of the devil and the synagogue of hell (Rev.2:9)" [AE 41:201]); for taking the devil's teaching and passing it along, *eine rechte teuffels hure* (WA 51:497&ba; AE 41:204, "the devil's own whore"; confer *der verlauffenen teuffels huren*, "that apostate devil's whore" [WA 51:497a, AE 41:205]; confer "arch-whore of the devil" [AE 41:205] and the invoking of Revelation 18:4-5 [AE 41:206]). For the "a" and "b" references, see below, n.87, p.27.

<sup>86</sup> The AE editors half apologize for the potentially offensive nature of the work in preparing the reader and explaining the language of Luther's polemic as essentially common at that time (AE 41:183-184).

the thesis that his opponents at one time had been faithful but turned away from the truth, significantly after they had reached the age of reason, and he emphasizes the use of the German vernacular to make sure his pointed statements are understood.

Jungfraw vnd liebe braut war ist eine abtrunnige verlauffene ehehure, eine haushure, eine betthure, eine schlusshure, die ym hause frawe ist, schlüssel, bette, kuchen, keller vnd alles hat ynn yhrem befehl so bese das Da gegen die gemeynen freyen huren, puschhuren, feldhuren, landhuren, Heerhuren, schier heilig sind, Denn diese is die rechte Ertzhure vnd eigentlich eine teuffels hure.

Von solcher huren sagt Hosea, vnd gar viel groblicher vnd schier zu groblich, der prophet Ezechiel capt xxij, das mugt yhr lesen, so yhr wiseen wolt, was fur eine hure ewr kirchen ist, Denn eine solche hure Meine ich, wenn ich euch eine abtrunnige verlauffene hure schelte, die yhr ynn der kindheit rechte Christen getaufft auff den lieben herrn ettliche iar gelebt, wie die alte kirche, darnach wenn yhr gross worden vnd zur vernunft komen (wie ich selbs mit allen andern auch gethan), sehet vnd horet yhr die schone Ceremonien der Bepstlichen kirchen dazu den ge nies ehre vnd gewalt der drinnen gleisset ia die prechtige heiligkeit vnd grossen Gottes dienst vnd für geplaudertes hymelreich vergesset yhr ewrs Christlichen glaubens tauffe vnd sacrament werdet der Lene der Ertzhuren vleissige schulerin vnd iünge hurlin, jr alte Huren, widerumb iungehürin machet, und so fort an des Bapsts ja des Teufels Kirche mehret, und viel von den rechten Jungreqlin Christi, so aus der Tauffe geboren, jmer fort auch zu Ertzhuren machet. Solchs, halt ich sey Deudsch gered, das jr und jederman verstehen kan, was wir meinen. Denn ob jr solch Newerey bey euch fur schertz haltet, die jr keinen Gott habt noch achtet, so ists doch fur Gott schrecklich, grewlich, Abgötterey, Mord, Helle und alles unglück, das Gott nicht leiden kan, das er darumb die Ertzhure ewiglich verdammen wil.

This whore, who before was a pure virgin and dear bride, is now an apostate, erring, married whore, a house-whore, a bed-whore, a key-whore, being the mistress of the house, having the key, the bed, the kitchen, the cellar, and everything at her command. Yet she is so evil that beside her the common unattached whores, the pimp-whores, the whores of the field, the country, and the army are almost holy. For she is the true arch-whore and the true whore of the devil.

Of such a whore Hosea speaks, and Ezekiel indeed does so much more coarsely, in fact almost too coarsely, in chapter 23. You should read that if you want to know what kind of a whore your church is. For this is what I mean when I call you an apostate, erring whore—you who were baptized as children in the dear Lord and even lived some years like the ancient church. But when you grew up and reached the age of reason (as I



and everyone else have done), you saw and heard the lovely ceremonies of the papal church, and also its glittering profit, honor, and power, yes, its magnificent holiness, the mighty worship, and all the yarns about the kingdom of heaven. Then you forgot your Christian faith, baptism, and sacrament, becoming the diligent pupils and young little whores (as the comedies say) the procuresses, the arch-whores, until you old whores once more make young whores. Thus the church of the pope, indeed, the church of the devil, grew, transforming many of Christ's young virgins, who were born in baptism, into arch-whores. This, I hold, should be said in German, so that you and everyone can understand what we mean. For if you hold these innovations of yours to be a joke—you who neither have a God nor honor him—then it is something terrible and abominable before God. It is idolatry, murder, hell, and every calamity, which God cannot bear, so that he will damn the arch-whore for eternity.<sup>87</sup>

Clearly Luther does not think the age of reason itself is bad, but he says that is the age when the temptation to misuse reason hits in force, and such virgins and brides once fallen beget more whores. Significantly, even in this context Luther demonstrates, with the reference to Aristophanes, his own education.<sup>88</sup> In contrast, Luther says that, although the target of Luther's polemic could *teach* his friends things that do not matter, he is beyond *learning* the things that matter and beyond reason itself.

Vnd der grobe filtz Rultz vnd tolpel der Esel aller Esel zu Wolffenbittel  
schreiet daher sein Esel geschreye vrteilt vnd ketzert so er doch nimmer  
mehr lernen kan wenn er hundert iar studirt vnd seine meister ym gantzen  
Bapstum horet, was kirche sey oder ketzer, Was ein Christ oder  
abtrunniger sey, der verstand ist yhnen zu hoch Was aber mordbrenner  
sey, das kundte er seine meister auch den Bapst selbs wol leren

Die heilige Christliche kirche (ich rede itzt mit den unsern. Denn  
bey dem Bapst Esel oder bey den Heintzen klotzen vnd steinen ist kein  
vernunfft, sehen noch horen), ist nicht ein rohr noch zalpfennig Nein sie  
wanckt nicht vnd gibt nicht nach. wie des Teuffels hure die Bepstliche

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<sup>87</sup> WA 51:503b-504b (confer 511b); AE 41:208-209 (the AE translation says it follows the first German edition; the top or "a" text in WA 51 is Luther's handwritten draft, while the "b" text is the printed edition that reflects changes purportedly made by Luther himself). Confer also "the whoredom of the devil" and "devilish whoredom" (AE 41:210).

<sup>88</sup> AE 41:208 n.34. A study of the American Edition of Luther's Works for a handful of authors usually cited in the medieval curriculum found: "Luther quite favorably uses ancient writers of both mid- and late-medieval popularity. Negative references to them come, if at all, when the otherwise secular authors are given any weight in matters theological." (Jayson S. Galler, "Martin Luther and *Auctores Quattuor*: A Study of the Use and Treatment of Four 'Medieval' Authors in the American Edition of Luther's Works," [University of Texas at Austin, 2003] 25pp.). Luther arguably cites Aristotle and other philosophers in the same fashion as the *auctores quattuor*.

kirche, die, wie eine und gibt nicht nach, wide die Tuefels hure, die Bepstliche Kirche, die, wie eine Ehebrecherin, meinet, sie müssen nicht feste halten bey jrem Ehemanne, Sondern müge wol wancken, nachgeben, zulassen, wie es der Hurrenjeger haben wil.

And that vulgar boor, blockhead, and lout from Wolfenbüttel, that ass to cap all asses, screams his heehaws, judges, and calls men heretical. Why, he could never learn if he studied a hundred years, not even if he heard his masters in the whole of the papacy tell what the church is and what a heretic is, what Christ is and what an apostate is. This would take too great a measure of understanding. But he could indeed teach his masters, and even the pope himself, what arson is.

The holy Christian church (I am speaking to our own people now, for with the papal ass and with these Harrys and other blocks and stones there is no reasoning, no perception or listening) is neither a reed nor a counter. No, it does not waver or give way, like the devil's whore—the papal church—who, like an adulteress, thinks she need not remain faithful to her husband, but may waver, yield, and submit to the will of the whoremonger.<sup>89</sup>

Luther has greater confidence in just about everyone else, as is clear later in the same work, just after calling the Roman church the devil's whore.

Denn das kan wol ein kind von sieben iaren, ia wol ein grober narr, an den fingern zelen und rechnen (wie wol der grobe Bapst Esel sampt seine verdampten Heintzen nichts verstehen können, Das die loblichen vorigen keiser; fursten, herrn und frome leute on zweuel nicht gemeinet noch willens gewest sind yhre guter zu geben, damit eitel Teuffels hurn oder abgotterey zu stifften, zu schmucken und zu ehren, Viel weniger, das

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<sup>89</sup> WA 51:510b-511b; AE 41:212-213. The AE editors refer to their own introduction to explain the allegations of arson made against Henry (AE 41:212 n.40). And, elsewhere they explain that *Heintz* is a pun on *Hans* (AE 41:218 n.48).

Shortly after the passage cited, Luther refers to the lying and idolatrous “whore-church of the devil” (AE 41:214). A little further down, having listed the innovations in the papal church without the support of the Word of God, Luther writes: *So müssen sie zugleich bekennen, das sie solche heilige kirche nicht sind noch sein können, weil sie vol solcher grewliger yrthumb lügen vnd abgotterey sind Sondern seyen die richete verläüffeneabtrunnige, schendliche hure des Teüffels, dem sie ynn solchen grewlichen lügen folget vnd dienet*; “But at the same time they must confess that they are not and cannot be such a holy church, since they are full of abominable errors, lies, and idolatry. In fact, they must confess that they are the true, erring, apostate, shameless whore of the devil, whom they follow and serve with such abominable lies.” (WA 51:515a&b; AE 41:214-215.) Confer also where Luther says the Romanists must confess *das sie die rechte Teuffels Hure kirche sind* (WA 51:523b; AE 41:219, “they are the true whore-church of the devil”), where he takes as an antecedent that they are not the church but *des Teuffels hure* (WA 51:523b; AE 41:220, “the devil’s whore”), and where he considers it proved that they are *die rechte mord grube vnd teuffels hure*; “the true den of robbers and devil’s whore” (WA 51:524a&b; AE 41:220).

sie damit seel morder, kirchen reuber, Heintzen und mordbrenner erzihen  
oder unterhalten wolten ...

A seven-year-old child, indeed, a silly fool, can figure it out on his fingers—although that stupid ass, the pope, together with his damned Harrys cannot understand anything—that the worthy emperors, princes, lords, and pious people of former days undoubtedly neither intended nor desired to give their property for the purpose of adorning and honoring nothing but the devil’s whores and idolatry, much less to educate and to support murderers of men’s souls, robbers of churches, Harrys, and arsonists.<sup>90</sup>

Thus, in this work, the devil’s whore expression is used to criticize the falsity of the Roman Catholic church in part by portraying its defenders as essentially misusing reason or being unable to reason and producing others just as ill-suited to reason as themselves,<sup>91</sup> unlike others for whom the truth is obvious.

Considering the latest and most frequently cited work in which Luther uses the devil’s whore expression to describe reason is the most illuminating. Luther’s last Wittenberg sermon for which there is a record was preached on Romans 12:3, the first verse of the Epistle reading for the day, January 17, 1546, the Second Sunday after Epiphany.<sup>92</sup> In a sermon full of various uses of imagery related to marriage and harlotry, Luther attacks both his reformed and Roman Catholic opponents. The sermon basically warns people against regarding too highly their own wisdom and letting the devil “kindle the light of reason” (*das liecht der vernunfft anzünden*) and rob them of their faith, but the sermon also comforts people with the forgiveness of sins by the blood of Jesus, exhorting them to drown reason in baptism and feed their faith in the Sacrament of the

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<sup>90</sup> WA 51:524-525; AE 41:221. Confer the similar reference to the age of discretion or reason in SA III:xii:2.

The final hit for *teuffels Hure* comes in criticism of the Roman Catholics for their prohibition of married clergy; there Luther asks if *eine geringe teuffels Hure* (“a little whore of a devil”) set up the article (WA 51:527a&b; AE 41:222) and goes on to speak of the Roman church “made into a whore by the devil” (AE 41:223).

<sup>91</sup> Perhaps confer Matthew 23:13-15.

<sup>92</sup> Die letzte predigt Doctoris Martini Lutheri heiliger gedechtnis, So her gethan hat zu Wittenberg, am andern Sontag nach Epiphania Domini, den xvii. Januarij. Im M.D.xlvij Jhar, WA 51:123-34, Aland #648; AE 51:369-380, translated by John W. Doberstein as “The Last Sermon in Wittenberg”, 1546.

Altar.<sup>93</sup> Reason's attacks on those sacraments is Luther's first mention of reason in the sermon.

Da mus man nu predigen unnd jderman auff sich achtung haben, das ihn seineigene vernunfft nicht verführe, Denn sihe, was die schwermgeister thun, das word und den glauben haben sie angenommen, so kumpt die klugheit hergelauffen, die noch ist augsgesegt, unnd wil sein in den Geistlichen sachen, wil schrifft und glauben meistern unnd macht Ketzerey, wenn wir gantz rein weren, so bedürfften wir keines zuchtmeisters, sondern würden von uns selbst alles willig thun wie die Engeln im Himmel, Aber weil wir noch stecken im schendtlichem madenfack, den die schlangen mit der zeit sollen freffen, hette wol ergers verdient, das ehr inn der helle brente ewiglich, so ist not, das man immer dem alten menschen an, der do vernewert wird zu der erkenntnis nach dem ebenbilde des, der ihn geschaffen hat. Wucherey, seufferey, ehebruch, mord, todschlag etc., die kan man mercken, und verstehet auch die welt, das sie sünde sein, Aber des Teuffels Braut Ratio, die schöne Metze, feret herein und wil klug sein, und was sie sagt, meinete sie, es sey der heilig Geist, wer wil da helffen? wedder Iurist, Medicus, noch König odder Keyser, Denn es ist die höchste Hure, die der Teuffel hat, Die andern groben sünde sihet man, aber die vornunfft kan niemand richten, die feret daher, richtet schwermerey an mit der Tauff, Abendtmal, meinete, alles, was ihr einfelt, und der Teuffel ins hertz gibt, sol der heilig Geist sein, Darumb spricht Paulus: so war ich ein Apostel bin, unnd Gott mir hat den Geist gegeben, also vermane ich.

So there must be preaching and everyone must also take care that his own reason may not lead him astray. For, behold what the fanatics do. They have accepted the Word and faith, but then, added to baptism, there comes wisdom, which has not yet been purged, and wants to be wise in spiritual things. They want to master both the Scriptures and faith by their own wisdom, and they perpetrate heresy. If we were wholly clean, we should not need everywhere the ministry of the Word. If we were altogether pure, we should have no need to be admonished, but would be like the angels in heaven with no need for a schoolmaster, and do everything willingly of ourselves. But since we are still confined to this miserable carcass—which in time the worms will devour, though it deserves something worse, to burn in hell eternally—it is necessary constantly to resist and put off the old man and his works and put on the new man, which is being renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him [cf. Col. 3:10]. Usury, gluttony, adultery, manslaughter, murder, etc., these can be seen and the world understands that these are sins. But the devil's bride, reason, the

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<sup>93</sup> WA 51:129-131; AE 51:376-377—what could be called the central part of the sermon, with the clearest application to the text.

lovely whore comes in and wants to be wise, and what she says, she thinks, is the Holy Spirit. Who can be of any help then? Neither jurist, physician, nor king, nor emperor; for she is the foremost whore the devil has. The other gross sins can be seen, but nobody can control reason. It walks about, cooks up fanaticism [Schwärmerei] with baptism and the Lord's Supper, and claims that everything that pops into its head and the devil puts into its heart is the Holy Spirit. Therefore Paul says: As I am an apostle and God has given me the Spirit, so I appeal to you [cf. Rom. 12:1; I Cor. 4:16].<sup>94</sup>

Luther then writes how, even in believers, sin remains (such as lusts leading to fornication and lewdness), not losing sight, as he continues, of his target: misused reason.

Und was ich von der brunft, so ein grobe sünde ist, rede, solchs ist auch von der vernunft zuverstehen, denn dieselbige schendet unnd beleidiget Gott in Geistlichen gaben, hat auch viel einfreulicher huren übel denn ein Hure. Ein Abgöttischer leufft hie einem Abgott nach, der einem andern, wie die Propheten reden, unter einem baum, wie ein hurentreiber einem unzüchtigem weib nachleufft, darumb heists die schrifft Abgötterey, hurerey, der vernunft weisheit und heiligkeit. Wie haben sich die Propheten mit der schönen hurerey, Abgötterey zerscholten, die ist einwild, das sich nicht leichtlich sahen lest, unnd ist jhr die torheit angeborn, welche sie für die höchste weissheit und gerechtigkeit helt, und kan doch in GOTtes sachen nicht auff den bergen order in thalen noch unter den bewmen dienen, sondern zu Hierusalem, da sein word und der ort jhm zu dienen verordnet ist. Hie widder sagt die vernunft: Es ist war, ich bin wol beruffen, beschnitten, unnd ist mir auch befohlen, das ich gen Hierusalem gehe, Aber hie ist eine schöne wiesse, ein sein grüner bergk, wenn man hie einen Gottesdienst anstiftetet, das wird Gott unnd allen Engeln im Himel gefallen. Ist denn Gott ein solcher GOTT, der sich allein zu Hierusalem lest anbinden? Solche weisheit der vernunft heissen die Propheten hurerey.

And what I say about the sin of lust, which everybody understands, applies also to reason; for the reason mocks and affronts God in spiritual things and has in it more hideous harlotry than any harlot. Here we have an idolater running after an idol, as the prophets say, under every green tree [cf. Jer. 2:20; I Kings 14:23], as a whorechaser runs after a harlot. That's why the Scriptures call idolatry whoredom, while reason calls it wisdom and holiness. How the prophets inveighed against this lovely whoredom, idolatry! It is a wild thing which is not easily caught and its foolishness is inborn, but it considers itself the height of wisdom and justice, and still it cannot understand the things of God. We must guard against it, as the

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<sup>94</sup> WA 51:125-126; AE 51:373-374; emphasis added.

prophets say: You must not serve God on the mountains or in the valleys or under the trees, but in Jerusalem, which is the place that God appointed for his worship and where his Word is. But here again, reason says: True enough, I have been called, circumcised, and adjured to go to Jerusalem, but here is a beautiful meadow, a fine green mountain; if we worship God here this will please God and all the angels in heaven. After all, is God the kind of God who binds himself only to Jerusalem? Such wisdom of reason the prophets call whoredom.<sup>95</sup>

Luther goes on to equate the Reformers' preaching of faith and worship of God alone with being in Jerusalem's temple, and he contrasts that with reason leading the Roman Catholics to worship the Virgin Mary as the mother of Christ and even invoke the saints.

Daher ist das gemeld, wie Gott zürnet und Christus dem Vatter die Wunden,  
Maria aber Christo ihr Brüste zeigt, Das treibt die hübsche Braut, der  
vernunft Weisheit, Maria ist des Herrn Christi Mutter, vorwar so wird sie  
Christus erhören, Christus ist ein gestrenger Richter, Ich will S. Georgen,  
S. Christoffel anrufen ...

So you have the picture of God as angry and Christ as judge; Mary shows to Christ her breast and Christ shows his wounds to the wrathful Father. That's the kind of thing this comely bride, the wisdom of reason cooks up: Mary is the mother of Christ, surely Christ will listen to her; Christ is a stern judge, therefore I will call upon St. George and St. Christopher.<sup>96</sup>

Recalling the glittery attractions that tempted Henry and his ilk away from the faith after they reached the age of reason,<sup>97</sup> Luther warns against the temptation to put reason over the Scriptures, continuing to bring together various relevant Bible passages and devil's whore expressions from his own years of writing. (The following passage is quoted at greater length in part because the well-known Luther quote regarding reason is somewhat dishonestly excerpted from it.)

Derhalben wie ein junger Gesell muß der bösen Lust wehren, ein Alter dem Geist, Also ist die vernunft von Art und Natur ein schädliche Hure, aber sie soll mir nicht schaden, wenn ich allein ihr widerstrebe. Ja, sie ist aber schöne, sie gleisset über die Massen sein, Da sollen Prediger sein und die Leute wissen auf den Kinder glauben: Ich glaube in Ihesum Christum, nicht in S. Georgen oder S. Christoffel, denn alleine von Christo wird gesagt: 'Siehe das Lamm Gottes, welches die Sünde der Welt hinweg

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<sup>95</sup> WA 51:127-128; AE 51:374-375; emphasis added.

<sup>96</sup> WA 51:128; AE 51:375.

<sup>97</sup> See above at n.87, p.27.

nimpt', nicht von Maria odder Engeln. Der Vatter schreiet vom Himmel herab: 'Diesen höret', nicht vom Gabriel etc. Darumb sol ich bey dem Kinder glauben bleiben, da kan ich mich der vernunfft erwehren, wenn die widderteuffer geisseren: Die Tauff ist wasser, was kans aufsrichten? Oder Geist mus es thun. Hörestu es, du schebichte, auffetzige hure, du heilige vernunfft, das geschriben stehet: 'Diesen höret', der da sagt: 'gehet hin und teuffet alle Heiden', 'wer gleubt und getauft wirt', Es ist nicht schlecht wasser, sondern die Tauffe, so im namen der heiligen dreifaltigkeit gegeben wirt, darumb sihe, das due die vernunfft im zaum haltest unnd folgest nicht jhren schönen gedancken, wirff jhr ein dreck ins angesicht, auff das sie hesslich werde, Gedenckestu nicht daselbst an das geheimnis der Heiligen Dreyfaltigkeit unnd an das blut Jhesu Christi, damit du von deinen sünden gewasschen bist? Item vom abentmal sagen die schwermergeister, die Scramentierer: was sol Brod, Wein? wie kan Gott der Almechtige seinen Leib in Brod geben? ich wolt, das du mütest mit dem hindermaul etc. Sind so klug, das sie niemand zu narren kan machen, wenn sie einer in einem mörser hette unnd mit dem stempel zuschläge, so wieche doch die torheit nicht von jhnen. Die vernunfft is unnd sol in der Tauf erseufft sein, und sol ihr die narrete weisheit nich schaden, allein so sie den Son Gottes höret, der da sagt: 'Nemet hin, das ist mein Leib, der für euch gegeben wirt', diss Brod, das dir dargereicht wirt, sage ich, sey mein Leib, wenn ich solchs hab, trette ich die vernunfft mit jhrer weisheit mit füßen, du verfluchte Hure, wilt du mich verführen, das ich mit dem Teuffel hurerey treiben solte? Also wird die vernunfft durch das Wort des Sons Gottes gereinigt und frey gemacht, Also last uns auch handeln mit den Rotten, wie die Propheten mid den Geistlichen Hurern, den Abgöttischen, mit den klüglingen, die es besser wollen machen, denn es Gott machet, unnd sollen zu jhnen sagen: Ich hab ein Breutgam, en wil ich hören, Deine weisheit ist die gröste torheit etc. Dieser streit wehret biss auff den letzten tag, Das wil S. Paulus, wir sollen nicht allein di andern lüste, sondern auch die vernunfft unnd hohe weisheit dempffen. So dich hurerey ansicht, schlage sie todt unnd thu solchs viel mehr in der geistlichen Hurerey. Es gefelt einem nichts so wol als die philautia, wenn einer sein eigen lust an seiner weissheit hat. Die begirde der geistigen ist nichts dar gegen, wenn einem sein eigen dünckel hertzlich gefelt, unnd bringet denn die schönen gedancken inn die schrift, das ist der Teuffel gantz und gar, Diese sünde ist vergeben, aber wenn sie in der natur, so noch nicht gar gereinigt ist, herschet, da verleurt man bald die rechte lere, da ist Christus auch hinweg, und sie, die lerer, fallen auff dem berge für dem Teuffel nidder unnd beten jhn an. Matth. iiij.

As a young man must resist lust and an old man avarice, so reason is by nature a harmful whore. But she shall not harm me, if only I resist her. Ah, but she is so comely and glittering. That's why there must be preachers

who will point people to the catechism: I believe in Jesus Christ, not in St. George or St. Christopher, for only of Christ is it said, "Behold, the Lamb of God, who takes away the sin of the world" [John 1:29]; not of Mary or the angels. The Father did not speak of Gabriel or any others when he cried from heaven, "Listen to him" [Matt. 17:5].

Therefore I should stick to the catechism; then I can defend myself against reason when the Anabaptists say, "Baptism is water; how can water do such great things? Pigs and cows drink it. The Spirit must do it." Don't you hear, you mangy, leprous whore, you holy reason, what the Scripture says, "Listen to him," who says, "Go and baptize all nations" [Matt. 28:19], and "He who believes and is baptized [will be saved]" [Mark 16:16]. It is not merely water, but baptism given in the name of the holy Trinity.

Therefore, see to it that you hold reason in check and do not follow her beautiful cogitations. Throw dirt in her face and make her ugly. Don't you remember the mystery of the holy Trinity and the blood of Jesus Christ with which you have been washed of your sins? Again, concerning the sacrament, the fanatical antisacramentalists say, "What's the use of bread and wine? How can God the Almighty give his body in bread?" I wish they had to eat their own dirt. They are so smart that nobody can fool them. If you had one in a mortar and crushed him with seven pestles his foolishness still would not depart from him. Reason is and should be drowned in baptism, and this foolish wisdom will not harm you, if you hear the beloved Son of God saying, "Take, eat; this is my body, which is given for you; this bread which is administered to you, I say, is my body." If I hear and accept this, then I trample reason and its wisdom under foot and say, "You cursed whore, shut up! Are you trying to seduce me into committing fornication with the devil?" That's the way reason is purged and made free through the Word of the Son of God.

So let us deal with the fanatics as the prophets dealt with the spiritual harlots, the idolaters, the wiseacres, who want to do things better than God does. We should say to them, "I have a Bridegroom, I will listen to him. Your wisdom is utter foolishness. I destroy your wisdom and trample it under foot." This struggle will go on till the last day. This is what Paul wants; we are to quench not only the low desires but also the high desires, reason and its high wisdom. When whoredom invades you, strike it dead, but do this far more when spiritual whoredom tempts you. Nothing pleases a man so much as self-love, when he has a passion for his own wisdom. The cupidity of a greedy man is as nothing compared with a man's hearty pleasure in his own ideas. He then brings these fine ideas into the Scriptures, and this is devilishness pure and simple. This sin is forgiven, but when it reigns in one's nature, not yet fully purged, then assuredly the true doctrine is soon lost, however willingly one preaches



and willingly one listens. Then Christ is gone. Then they fall down before the devil on the mountain and worship him (Matt. 4 [:8–10]).<sup>98</sup>

The contrast between reason and the Scripture and the Catechism is especially striking, and note how Luther closely connects the devil's use of reason with idolatry that ultimately makes the devil the center of worship. Luther continues to preach on the right relationship between, on the one hand, the Word of God and faith and, on the other hand, reason. Luther likens the use of reason to controlling lusts in a human marriage, and, at the end of a significant passage very near the end of the sermon itself, Luther makes what can be taken as an allusion to the handmaid metaphor.

Wenn du einen Sacramentschwermer hörest, der daher lestert: Im Sacrament des Altars ist nur Brot und Wein, Item: solte Christus auff dein wort vom Himmel steigen in dein maul und bauch? Ey es gefelt mir wol, was du sagest, ey hat der Teuffel so ein gelarte Braut? Aber was sagestu mir hirzu: 'Dis ist mein delibter Son, den höret', und der sagt: 'Dis ist mein leib.' Troll dich mit deinem dunckel auff das heimlich gemach, höre auff, du verfluchte hure, wiltu meisterin sein über den Glauben, welcher sagt, das im Abentmal des Herrn sey der ware Leib und das ware Blut, Item, das die Tauff nicht schlecht wasser ist, sonder wasser Gottess des Vaters, Gottesdes Sons und Gottes des heiligen Geistes? Diesem glauben mus die vernunft unterthan und gehorsam sein, Item die von uns sagen, wir sind stoltz, wir solten weichen, Reden sie von leiblichensachen? Nein, sondern von Glaubens sachen, Nu ist aber also geschrieben, das uns der dünckel so gefallen, so ferne ehr nicht widder den glauben ist, aus welchen du nicht solt einen knecht machen noch Christum vom Himmel herab stürmen.

When you hear a fanatical antisacramentalist say, "There is only bread and wine in the sacrament of the altar," or "Do you think that at your word Christ is going to descend from heaven into your mouth and your belly?" You just say to him, "Ah, I like what you say; what a learned bride the devil has! But what do you say to this: 'This is my beloved Son, listen to him?' And he says, 'This is my body' [Matt. 17:5; 26:26]. Go, trot to the privy with your conceit, your reason! Shut up, you cursed

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<sup>98</sup> WA 51:128-130; AE 51:376-377; emphasis added. Maritain's questionable representation of Luther's sentiments is clear by comparing Luther's statements as quoted in the text and Maritain's version of Luther's thoughts (confer at n.78, p.22; admittedly the text of the edition from which Maritain translates could be different). Maritain quotes as follows: "Reason is the devil's greatest whore; by nature and manner of being she is a noxious whore; she is a prostitute, the devil's appointed whore; whore eaten by scab and leprosy who ought to be trodden under foot and destroyed, she and her wisdom . . . Throw dung in her face to make her ugly. She is, and she ought to be, drowned in baptism . . . She would deserve, the wretch, to be banished to the filthiest place in the house, to the closets." (Maritain, Three Reformers, 33.)

whore, do you think you are master over faith, which declares that the true body and the true blood is in the Lord's Supper, and that Baptism is not merely water, but the water of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit?" Reason must be subject and obedient to this faith.

Likewise, those who say that we are proud and ought to give in; are they talking about material things? No, they are really talking about matters of faith. But it is written here that we are to accept conceit and reason only in so far as it is not contrary to faith; you must not make faith a servant nor cast Christ out of heaven [i.e., rob Christ of his divinity].<sup>99</sup>

Quite simply for Luther redeemed reason and philosophy must serve faith and theology (the so-called "ministerial use" of reason), not the other way around. Who the opponent is—the iconoclast and sacramentarian Karlstadt, the Romanist Henry, or other sacramentarians or Romanists—does not make a difference. When reason, the devil's whore, takes the position of authority over the Word of God (the so-called "magisterial use" of reason<sup>100</sup>), the household is turned upside down, the mistress becomes the maid and the maid becomes the whore. Then, all is lost, as Christ's Bride and Church becomes the devil's whore and church, hearing the devil instead of Christ.<sup>101</sup>

For centuries, the saying *philosophia ancilla theologiae* ("philosophy is the handmaiden of theology") served as a metaphor for the proper relationship between theology and philosophy, faith and reason, the Word of God and human opinions. Those using the handmaid metaphor did not exclude all uses of philosophy or reason in the realm of theology and faith, as other figures did, but the metaphor instead indicated their allowing philosophy and reason a role in the realm of theology and faith, in some cases

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<sup>99</sup> WA 51:133-134; AE 51:379; emphasis added.

<sup>100</sup> Note especially Luther's statement about "mastering Scriptures and faith by their own wisdom" (above at n.94, p.31).

<sup>101</sup> Confer above, as at n.79, where many of the references to the false church as the devil's whore and church are in connection with the displacing of the Word of God as the final authority. In a February 8, 1517, letter to Johann Lang that served as a cover letter of sorts for a letter to Iodocus Trutfetter, Luther complained that people listened to Aristotle instead of "good books" (*bonos libros*), and he also said of Aristotle, "He is the most subtle seducer of gifted people, so that if Aristotle had not been flesh, I would not hesitate to claim that he was really a devil" (*illusorem vaferrimum ingeniorum, ita ut nisi caro fuisset Aristoteles, vere diabolum eum fuisse non puderet asserere*) (AE 48:36-38, translated by Gottfried G. Krodel; WA Br 1:88-89). Confer "I would not hesitate to assert that he was the Devil himself" in Heiko A. Oberman, *Luther: Man Between God and the Devil*, trans. Eileen Walliser-Schwarzbart (New York: Image Books, 1990), 121, 337 n.12. Also see Frost, "Aristotle's Ethics," 231-232, although Frost mistakenly gives the citation as "WA" instead of "WA Br".

the role of helping understand the Word of God. Various passages from the Bible were allegorized to support the truth the handmaid metaphor held forth. And, early on, the danger of reason overstepping its bounds was clear, and for Luther such misuse of reason and its false fruits drew fire with the “devil’s whore” expression.<sup>102</sup> The preceding overview of the relationship between philosophy and theology essentially from the beginning up to and then including the era of the Reformation leads us to highlights of previous scholarship regarding the areas of inquiry, the third subsection of this introductory chapter.

## Existing scholarship

Look up the word “reformation” in a standard dictionary, and one of the definitions is likely to refer to something such as “the religious movement in the 16<sup>th</sup> century that lead to the establishment of the Protestant churches”.<sup>103</sup> Despite etymology that would suggest a now-obsolete sense of “reformation” as “*restoration*”, the usual sense since the 16<sup>th</sup> century has been that of a *new* formation, a *radical change*.<sup>104</sup> *The Oxford Dictionary of the Catholic Church* indeed connects the term “Reformation” with “an involved series of *changes* in Western Christendom” in the 16<sup>th</sup> century, but that same work notes that “most of the Reformation movements demanded not *innovation*, but a *return* to a primitive excellence”.<sup>105</sup> Similarly, Anthony Levi, in his 2002 book, *Renaissance and Reformation: the intellectual genesis*, is somewhat critical of the terms “reformation” and “renaissance” for “marking a fundamental cultural *discontinuity* with what had gone before”. However, when Levi suggests, “Real history knows no

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<sup>102</sup> If the handmaid metaphor indeed comes from Proverbs 9, then the temptations from adulterous reason might be found in Proverbs 9, as well as 5-7. While there is some irony in such a use, for “wisdom” is the protagonist in the opening chapters of Proverbs and “folly” the antagonist, surely the resolution lies in the “wisdom” of Proverbs being found in faith, “the fear of the Lord” (Proverbs 1:7), and not in fallen human reason.

<sup>103</sup> “Reformation”, *The Random House Dictionary*, ed. Jess Stein (New York: Ballantine Books, 1980), 752.

<sup>104</sup> “Reform” *The Concise Oxford Dictionary of English Etymology*, ed. T. F. Hoad (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 394.

<sup>105</sup> “Reformation”, *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 1374.

discontinuities”,<sup>106</sup> one may react to it as an overstatement. Perhaps the question “Reformation: Continuity *or* Discontinuity?” is itself put falsely, because the real operators for many modern scholars appear to be not “either/or” but “both/and”.

Mindful, then, that one might expect both continuity and discontinuity, this section’s focus is on the findings of previous scholarship regarding three different aspects, or sub-questions, of the larger continuity/discontinuity question. The first, a consideration of the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, is not so much itself a question of continuity, however, although it becomes one when examined across different time periods. The second is a consideration of continuity between the late-medieval period and the Reformation period, and the third is a consideration of continuity between the initial Reformers and the next generation. This section treats each of the three questions in turn and then summarizes this author’s own previous work looking for their answers within *The Book of Concord*.

### ***Repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use***

The first question regards the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, and consideration begins with Martin Luther. Already in this introductory chapter the few quotations from Luther’s theses for the *Disputation Against Scholastic Theology* (1517) have made it clear that at least at one time Luther could fairly soundly condemn Aristotle and the philosophy and reasoning that he came to represent. Other quotations have made it clear also that Luther allowed Aristotle, philosophy, and reason a role. If the theses are taken as Luther’s genuine position—a debated assumption given the nature of such propositions for an academic disputation<sup>107</sup>—then what explains Luther’s apparent inconsistency: on the hand repudiating philosophy, while on the other hand simultaneously using it? One of any number of answers is possible, such as the

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<sup>106</sup> Anthony Levi, *Renaissance and Reformation: The Intellectual Genesis* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 1.

<sup>107</sup> For an informed idea of how disputations proceeded, see Graham White, *Luther as Nominalist: A Study of the Logical Methods used in Martin Luther's disputations in the Light of their Medieval Background*, *Schriften der Luther-Agricola-Gesellschaft* 30 (Helsinki: Luther-Agricola-Society, 1994), 20-26.

repudiation not being Luther's position, the repudiation being a polemical overstatement, Luther changing his position, Luther simply being inconsistent, etc. Most studies of Luther and philosophy note the problem and proceed to some sort of explanation.

When appraising someone's treatment of philosophy or reception of Aristotle, some studies examine writings for mentions and citations of Aristotle or his works and assess those mentions and citations as positive or negative.<sup>108</sup> For example, Joseph Freedman examined the work of Clemens Timpler (1563/4-1624), a German Calvinist philosopher and professor at the *Gymnasium illustre Arnoldinum* in Steinfurt/Westphalia from 1595 to 1624.<sup>109</sup> Freedman found that in some cases Timpler cites Aristotle favorably, in others negatively, in others "radically reinterprets him" (perhaps as Aquinas and others before Timpler had done), and in others uses Aristotle as a source of opinions. Freedman summarizes: "Timpler's main concern seems to have been to present and to defend his own positions as well as to integrate those opinions into his own systematic textbooks." Freedman points out that Timpler's Lutheran opponents, Jacob Martini and Christian Matthiae, are similarly eclectic in their use of Aristotle.<sup>110</sup> Such an approach might seem reasonable to apply to works of Luther himself.

The American Edition of Luther's Works (AE), while not a complete collection of his works,<sup>111</sup> might be thought of as at least an appropriate sample to examine. In one

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<sup>108</sup> For example, see Joseph S. Freedman, "Aristotelianism and Humanism in the Late Reformation German Philosophy: The Case of Clemens Timpler," The harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: Essays in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 213, 215, 216.

See also Jayson S. Galler, "Aristotle and Luther: A General Overview and An Investigation of Their Relationship in Class-Related Works," (University of Texas at Austin, 2002), 35pp.; and Jayson S. Galler, "Martin Luther's Reception of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*," (University of Texas at Austin, 2003), 19pp.

<sup>109</sup> Freedman, "Aristotelianism and Humanism," 213.

<sup>110</sup> Freedman, "Aristotelianism and Humanism," 216.

<sup>111</sup> The American Edition, produced from 1955-86 under the joint auspices of Concordia Publishing House and Fortress Press, contains only a fraction of Luther's total work (Timothy Lull, "Luther's Writings," The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther, ed. Donald K. McKim [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003] 39). One estimate puts that fraction at between one-fifth and one-fourth of Luther's extant works (Mark Sell, then senior editor for Concordia Publishing House, personal e-mail to author October 29, 2003). (Another estimate puts the fraction at one-third, if the Bible translation is excluded.) Nevertheless, the collection spans his career (see Vogel, Vogel's Cross Reference). The first thirty volumes include some of Luther's biblical writings ("lectures, commentaries, and expository

study, the American Edition was examined for references to Aristotle's *Categories*, *Generation of Animals*, *History of Animals*, *Metaphysics*, *Parts of Animals*, *Physics*, *Posterior Analytics*, *Prior Analytics*, and *Topics*.<sup>112</sup> The examination found 59 references: 32 positive (54%), 21 negative (36%), and 6 neutral or errant (10%). A closer inspection of the data yielded some significant findings. All 4 of the references to *Prior Analytics*, in which Aristotle develops his theory of the syllogism, were positive. The vast majority of the references were from the "exegetical" writings (40, 68%) and were overwhelmingly positive (30-10, 75-25%). The majority of the references in the "theological" writings (public treatises, private letters, etc.) were overwhelmingly negative (11-2, 85-15%). Since the exegetical writings are about half of AE, this finding may be significant. That *in* the exegetical writings so many references were *positive* may be especially significant—perhaps Luther was trying to make his exposition appeal to the better educated by favorably using Aristotelian distinctions, or it may be that given the nature of the lectures in a university community he could make more-scholarly references. Likewise perhaps significant is that the majority of the non-exegetical references were negative, possibly due to the more polemical nature of these writings, the greater candor Luther could or did express in letters (even open ones), or perhaps to their somewhat earlier dates. As to the dating, 24 (40%) of the references are from Luther's Genesis lectures, given between 1535 and 1545, and thought to be his most mature work. Of these, 16 (67%) are positive, compared to 7 (29%) negative. When sorted by date, there is a cluster of negative references in 1517-20 (including letters to Lang and Spalatin, Galatians, the *Babylonian Captivity*, and *Christian Nobility*), and there is a cluster of positive references in the Genesis lectures, especially after chapter 11.<sup>113</sup>

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sermons"), and the second twenty-four contain "Reformation documents" (including correspondence and table talk), with the final volume being an index to the Edition (Lull, "Luther's Writings," 40, although Lull's breakdown of the volumes is corrected in the text of this note). Concordia Publishing House is, at this writing, in the early stages of producing additional volumes of the American Edition.

<sup>112</sup> Galler, "Aristotle and Luther."

<sup>113</sup> The lectures were given as follows: chapters 1-14 between 1535-1536, chapters 15-20 between 1538-1539, chapters 21-25 between 1539-1540, chapters 26-30 between 1541-1542, chapters 31-37 between 1542-1544, chapters 38-44 in 1544, and chapters 45-50 in 1545.

In general based on that examination, Luther across the board could make both positive and negative references to and use of those selected works of Aristotle. The specific work of Aristotle, work of Luther, and date of reference did not seem to control whether the reference was positive or negative. What seemed to be the controlling factor was that Luther favorably referred to and used Aristotle when it supported his point, and Luther negatively referred to Aristotle when Aristotle supported a point Luther needed to defeat.<sup>114</sup> Relevant issues included the righteousness of the soul, creation and eternity of the world and man, justification, free will, and God's involvement in the world. The discovery of such a controlling principle is completely in keeping with the ministerial use of reason and philosophy in the spiritual sphere. When human reason and philosophy arrogantly tried to take over the house of faith supported by God's revelation in Holy Scripture, Luther criticized reason and philosophy. When reason and philosophy stayed as the dutiful handmaiden, Luther for the most part was happy. (For example, when Luther refers specifically to Aristotelian causes or categories, the references are predominantly positive: 10-5, 67-33%.)<sup>115</sup>

An examination of the American Edition regarding references to Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* with a similar but refined methodology produced consistent findings.<sup>116</sup> In this case, the type and content of the reference was also observed. Types of

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<sup>114</sup> While such a principle might seem obvious, one that any person would use in debate, it offers more explanatory force than simply saying Luther's use was eclectic. Moreover, with Luther the principle is not so arbitrary, as he at least believes that the position he is taking is firmly based on the Bible.

<sup>115</sup> This approach for analyzing the American Edition has its own drawbacks. First, while the American Edition has translated many of Luther's significant works, not all of them are translated, and, while the AE does translate works from a number of different categories of Luther's works, saying whether the AE is any type of representative sample of the whole is not possible (it is certainly not a random sample). Second, various translators, editors, and undoubtedly indexers worked on AE and there are inconsistencies in how references to Aristotle and his works are treated. Third, taking index references and editors' connections at face value is somewhat superficial, treating equally statements possibly influenced by Aristotle, possible references to Aristotle, or actual citations of Aristotle. Fourth and finally, not every reference is easily classified as positive or negative. Moreover, each publishing company had at least one general editor, so from the outset one expects differences between the volumes produced by each company. Those differences multiply exponentially when one considers different editors for each volume and different translators and revisers for each work. Finally, during the 31 years that the Edition was being published, other scholarship and resources were developed, so that one finds works cited in later volumes that were not available to cite in earlier ones.

<sup>116</sup> Galler, "Luther's Reception of the *Nicomachean Ethics*." The consistency of the findings when considering the different types of Aristotle's works may well go to the findings' reliability.

references included simple references, paraphrases, uses, allusions, quotations, and imitations. The content of the references included such things as statements, maxims, definitions, arguments, and distinctions.<sup>117</sup> Of the 40 references that could be classified as positive or negative, 25 were positive (63%), and 15 were negative (37%). Of the positive references, one was made in what is thought to have been Luther's first sermon in 1510, and another one was made in his last sermon in 1546, thereby setting the limits for the 1510-1546 range of both the positive references and the data as a whole. Just inside that range, the 15 negative references were made in years ranging from 1515 to 1540. While there were no positive references to the whole of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, three of the 15 negative references (20%) were to the *Nicomachean Ethics* in general, and the twelve others were as follows: to Book I, 4, 8, 12, 13; Book II, 1-7, 1, 4, 4&5, Book V (twice), and Book X, 8 (twice). The greatest frequency of positive references regarded ἐπιείκεια ("clemency"). Mentions to Aristotle's comments regarding works drew praise and fire, although in one case Luther significantly uses Aristotle to support his distinction between righteousness before God and righteousness before other people.<sup>118</sup> Luther especially condemned Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* for being wrong on matters related to original sin, and "reason" gets dragged into the fray, too.

One of the latest and in some ways more sophisticated studies of Luther's reception of Aristotle is Theodor Dieter's 2001 combined publication of his dissertation and *habilitation*, *Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie* (*The Young Luther and Aristotle: A Historical-Systematic Inquiry into the Relation of Theology and Philosophy*).<sup>119</sup> Dieter, of course, surveys the major preceding inquiries (for example, Gerhard Ebeling's, Brian Gerrish's, Leif Grane's, Wilhelm Link's, Heiko Oberman's,

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<sup>117</sup> These categories are not mutually exclusive, and a reference's categorization was subjective and in many cases debatable.

<sup>118</sup> AE 25:152, the 1515-1516 commentary on Romans (confer 410-411). The reference is to *EN* III.7.

<sup>119</sup> Theodor Dieter, *Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: Eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie*, Theologische Bibliothek Töpelmann, Band 105, eds. O. Bayer, W. Härle and H.-P. Müller (New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001).



Graham White's, etc.), builds on them where he can, and, as one might expect, he criticizes the methodology of many and proceeds to justify his own. Part of Dieter's methodology is to reconstruct disputations and treat the topic as if Luther were debating not just with the scholastic theologians but with Aristotle himself. Dieter rightly points out some of the problems with trying to read Luther and determine what he thought about philosophy, such as determining how philosophy itself is to be determined (for example, should it be what Luther knew it to be, what someone like Thomas Aquinas actually said about Aristotle, or what we now know Aristotle himself said, etc.). And, Dieter is certainly right that Luther's use of philosophy is eclectic, but that conclusion does not mean there is not method to Luther's madness.

Dieter's work generally has received praise,<sup>120</sup> but that Dieter escapes the very problems he describes with the earlier research is not entirely clear, and Dieter's work has problems of its own. Dieter's methodology of anachronistic reconstruction is somewhat far-fetched, especially when he writes about how Aristotle responds to a particular statement of Luther (or about Aristotle saying the same thing as the Apostle James, or about Thomas Aquinas making a distinction almost like Luther does)—many might like to see such a disputation or debate, but such an event never actually took place and reading something that is written as if it did can be disconcerting to the reader. For some reason, Dieter cites Aristotle in German, instead of the more authoritative Greek or Latin, and when Dieter cites Luther, as he naturally does often, he seldom satisfactorily identifies the work and its date. Moreover, Dieter's limiting his focus to Luther's early years (up to 1518) is also not without its problems. The year 1517 may indeed have been the highpoint of Luther's attacks on Aristotle, but Luther continued to refer to Aristotle, to use philosophy, and to debate the philosophers throughout his life. Furthermore, Luther did not himself, nor did those who followed him, regard all of his writings as

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<sup>120</sup> Markus Mühling-Schlapkohl, "Theodor Dieter, Der junge Luther und Aristoteles," International Journal of Systematic Theology 5.1 (2003); Ulrich Kühn, "Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie," Theologische Literaturzeitung 128.5 (2003); Richard Penaskovic, "Der junge Luther und Aristoteles," Heythrop Journal 45.3 (2004); Hellmut Zschoch, "Der junge Luther und Aristoteles: eine historisch-systematische Untersuchung zum Verhältnis von Theologie und Philosophie," Journal of Theological Studies 55.2 (2004).

equally valuable or indicative of his thought, although Dieter does at times quote from those writings of Luther's, such as the Large Catechism, given confessional standing in *The Book of Concord*.

Across his career and its various writings, Luther thus generally repudiated but simultaneously used philosophy in some form, likely rejecting the philosophy that worked against his position taken on the basis of the Bible and using that which supported it. Is Luther the only practitioner in his tradition to approach philosophy and theology this way? There is evidence of such a repudiating-using approach in at least one strain of more-modern Lutheranism,<sup>121</sup> but what of others at the time of the Reformation? How does one begin to select works that are more-reliable indicators of the approach of those other than the works' author, to the extent even those are reliable indicators? And, can one move beyond the somewhat superficial evidence, namely mentions and citations of a philosopher and his works, for philosophy is part of theology at a much deeper level and one more difficult to detect.<sup>122</sup> That this dissertation has a methodology to address these issues will be seen in due time, but next attention is given to the second aspect of the main research question.

### ***Continuity of late-medieval period with Reformation period***

The second question regards the continuity between the late-medieval period and the Reformation period. Much of modern scholarship's acceptance of the notion of at least *some* continuity between at least *some* period *before* the Reformation and the period *after* the Reformation can be attributed to the late Heiko Oberman's lifetime of work. Oberman's insightful and scholarly publications extend from his seminal 1963 work, *The*

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<sup>121</sup> Francis Pieper's standard seminary textbook, Francis Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 4 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1924-1928), translated as Francis Pieper, *Christian Dogmatics*, trans. Theodore et al. Engelder, 4 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950-1953), can both condemn philosophy as leading to a religion "diametrically opposed" (*diametralen Gegensatz*) to the Christian religion (I:17; German 18) and praise philosophy in its place (I:199-200; German 240-241).

<sup>122</sup> Diogenes Allen goes so far as to suggest that theology, *as a discipline*, is inherently philosophical due to its Hellenic influence [Diogenes Allen, *Philosophy for Understanding Theology* (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1985), 5-6].

*Harvest of Medieval Theology*,<sup>123</sup> to its 1977 sequel, translated into English as *The Masters of The Reformation*,<sup>124</sup> to what might be regarded as the third volume in the series, his 1989 biography of Martin Luther, translated into English as *Luther: Man Between God and the Devil*,<sup>125</sup> and to dozens of other articles, essays, chapters and other books.<sup>126</sup> Oberman both confirmed Luther's *continuity* with his medieval predecessors and declared the *discontinuity* that set Luther apart.<sup>127</sup> As much as Oberman argues for *continuity*, he, too, might have *disagreed* with Levi's statement regarding *no* historical *discontinuities*.<sup>128</sup> Scott Hendrix refers to Oberman's Luther as "re-forming" the preceding tradition and in the process *making something new*.<sup>129</sup>

Tracing continuity or discontinuity of thought was not something new with Oberman, although Oberman is up-front about his own "break" with some preceding scholarship, such as that of Étienne Gilson.<sup>130</sup> Gilson's 1931-1932 Gifford Lectures at the University of Aberdeen, for example, which were published and translated into English as *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy*, traced Christian philosophical thought from its roots in the Greek tradition forward, primarily to the time of Thomas Aquinas in the 13<sup>th</sup>

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<sup>123</sup> Heiko A. Oberman, *The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963).

<sup>124</sup> Heiko A. Oberman, *Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe*, trans. Dennis Martin (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

<sup>125</sup> Oberman, *Luther*. Peter Blickle reportedly said that Oberman's *Luther* was one of the 20<sup>th</sup> century's most original contributions to understanding the Reformer (G. H. M. Posthumus Meyjes, "The Life of Heiko Augustinus Oberman," *The Work of Heiko A. Oberman: Papers from the Symposium on His Seventieth Birthday*, eds. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Katherine G. Brady, Susan Karant-Nunn and James D. Tracy [Boston: Brill, 2003], 200).

<sup>126</sup> See Oberman's bibliography in Robert J. Bast and Andrew C. Gow, eds., *Continuity and Change: The Harvest of Late Medieval and Reformation History: Essays Presented to Heiko A. Oberman on his 70th Birthday* (Boston: Brill, 2000), 431-446.

<sup>127</sup> A characterization shared by Scott Hendrix, "'More than a Prophet': Martin Luther in the Work of Heiko Oberman," *The Work of Heiko A. Oberman: Papers from the Symposium on His Seventieth Birthday*, eds. Thomas A. Brady, Jr., Katherine G. Brady, Susan Karant-Nunn and James D. Tracy (Boston: Brill, 2003), 12.

<sup>128</sup> See above at n.106, p.38.

<sup>129</sup> Hendrix, "More than a Prophet," 13-14.

<sup>130</sup> See, for example, Oberman's "Preface to the Third Edition" of *Harvest* (Oberman, *Harvest of Medieval Theology*, vii ).

century.<sup>131</sup> Where *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* was topical, *History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages*,<sup>132</sup> another significant Gilson work, was more historical and chronological in approach, treating writers and thinkers of Christianity, Islam, and Judaism, beginning with the second century after Christ and continuing up through Nicholas of Cues (1401-1464). Gilson sees what he calls Christian philosophy<sup>133</sup> to have blossomed with Aquinas but declined thereafter. Oberman to some extent took issue with the view of Gilson and others that medieval philosophy culminated in the High Middle Ages, and Oberman essentially worked from that time period forward. Yet, they both picked *loci*, or specific topics, on which to consider the continuity or discontinuity. For example, Gilson's *Spirit* traced thoughts on such topics as being, providence, and free-will. Oberman's *Harvest* traced thoughts on such topics as humanity, predestination, and Christ and the Eucharist. Nevertheless, neither saw himself as doing "theological" studies; rather their investigations were primarily philosophical and historical, respectively.<sup>134</sup>

Neither Oberman's nor Gilson's works are without their critics. For example, Oberman's *Harvest* was first published in 1962; twelve years later Denis Janz in his Master's thesis discussed critical reaction to Oberman's work.<sup>135</sup> Although a truly tertiary

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<sup>131</sup> Étienne Gilson, *The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy* (Gifford Lectures 1931-1932), trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1940).

<sup>132</sup> Gilson, *History of Christian Philosophy*.

<sup>133</sup> James Keating alludes to the debate over whether such a thing as "Christian philosophy" exists, but Keating is more concerned about Gilson's "more radical" thesis of there being "the Christian God of philosophy as well as of revealed theology". Keating refers more to Étienne Gilson, *Elements of Christian Philosophy* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, Catholic Textbook Division, 1960) and Étienne Gilson, *God and Philosophy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1941), and Keating uses Gilson's own evidence to ultimately reject Gilson's notion of such a god. (John W. Keating, "The Christian God of Philosophy," *The Harvard Theological Review* 58.4 [1965].)

<sup>134</sup> At least not *explicitly* theological—Oberman passed examinations for and was ordained by his father into the ministry of the Dutch Reformed church (see, for example, Posthumus Meyjes, "The Life of Heiko Augustinus Oberman," 196-197). In a review of a collection of Oberman's essays published posthumously, Mattox writes of one particular essay, "Here, too, one perceives most clearly the interconnections between Oberman's legendary passion for history and his perhaps less well known commitments to his faith tradition" (Mickey L. Mattox, "The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World," *Sixteenth Century Journal* XXXVI.1 [2006]).

<sup>135</sup> Denis Janz, "Semipelagianism and the Catholicity of Nominalism: A Critical Reaction to Heiko Oberman's 'Harvest of Medieval Theology'," University of St. Michael's College, 1975.

work and now woefully out of date, still today Janz's introduction helpfully sets the stage before and immediately after Oberman's seminal work, especially pertaining to the semi-pelagianism of the central figure of *Harvest*'s analysis, that is, Gabriel Biel.<sup>136</sup> (Strictly speaking, semi-pelagianism refers to the position between the diametrically opposed teachings of Augustine and Pelagius regarding the role of the human will in salvation, although the term came to be used to refer to positions taken in the 16<sup>th</sup> century that some modern scholars are careful to distinguish from the earlier semi-pelagian teachings.<sup>137</sup>) With an eye to how modern ecumenism and one's view of the Reformation might condition one's interpretation of the late medieval period, Janz describes how Oberman concludes Biel was semi-pelagian but nevertheless also concludes that Biel and much of the nominalism that precedes him are "basically Catholic". Janz's research found scholars reacting to Oberman in one of three ways: some agreed both that Biel was semi-pelagian and that he was Catholic, others agreed that Biel was semi-pelagian but disagreed that he could then be Catholic, and still others disagreed that Biel was semi-pelagian and agreed that he was Catholic.<sup>138</sup> In treating the positions of other scholars, Janz highlights critical weaknesses in Oberman's work, such as Oberman's lack of commonly accepted definitions of both semi-pelagianism and Catholicity.<sup>139</sup> For his part, Janz concludes that since Biel was not catholic on justification, the very *locus* at which the Reformation centered, "to say that Biel was 'basically Catholic' is beside the point. Though Oberman's judgement on this may be technically correct, we must conclude that it is, nevertheless, historically irrelevant."<sup>140</sup> Janz nevertheless recognizes the significance of

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<sup>136</sup> Janz, "Critical Reaction," 1-4.

<sup>137</sup> "Semipelagianism", *Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*, 1481.

<sup>138</sup> When putting Hermann Sasse in the category of those who agree with Oberman, Janz, perhaps due to the journal publishing Sasse's review, curiously describes the Lutheran as a scholar "from the reformed tradition" (Janz, "Critical Reaction," 25).

<sup>139</sup> See, for example, where Janz deals with the work of his own thesis director, Henry McSorley (Janz, "Critical Reaction," 49-53) and the related subsections in Janz's final chapter (Janz, "Critical Reaction," 71-83).

<sup>140</sup> Janz, "Critical Reaction," 82. Janz indicates that he is following McSorley in this regard.

Oberman's work and that in some regards, at least at the point in time at which Janz was writing, the verdict was still out.<sup>141</sup>

Oberman continued to assess the claims he made in *Harvest*,<sup>142</sup> and to some extent he moved beyond Biel to Luther and the Reformation, although the studies were not unrelated. Like others among his contemporaries, Oberman found that the usual picture of the medieval period grossly simplified the way the evidence indicates things actually were. For example, in a 1974 essay titled "Headwaters of the Reformation", Oberman distinguished between the *initia Lutheri* ("Luther's beginnings") and the *initia reformationis* ("beginning of the Reformation"), and Oberman intentionally avoided speaking of causes of the Reformation and instead wrote of cross currents and converging tributaries. He referred to nominalism, humanism, and Augustinianism "as currents within the history of the Reformation," but was careful to clarify each in terms of what earlier scholarship had said about them. And, Oberman did not stop with those three, but took note of other factors such as the *devotio moderna* ("modern devotion"), late medieval mysticism, and the reemergence of apocalypics.<sup>143</sup> There's little surprise that a 1975 essay, "Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile", took up those factors as well as three other aspects of the medieval context, which factors Oberman called "The Myth of the Thomist Phalanx", "The Augustinian Renaissance", and "The

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<sup>141</sup> If Biel is semi-pelagian, he may not necessarily be the one who initially contaminates the pure line of doctrinal transmission. One might say that there was a "creeping pelagianism" and that someone like Scotus was "three-quarters" Pelagian.

<sup>142</sup> For a listing of just some of Oberman's reassessments, see Courtenay, "Fruits of the *Harvest*," 135 n.3; Courtenay points out there that many of the essays were reprinted in Heiko A. Oberman, The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992). In a review of Heiko A. Oberman, The Two Reformations: The Journey from the Last Days to the New World [ed. Donald Weinstein (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003)], Mattox comments, "Oberman not only restates and defends some of his most controversial claims (e.g., the *via Gregorii*), but also buttresses them with new and noteworthy supporting argumentation. Any who may have been hoping for retractions will be sadly disappointed." (Mattox, "*The Two Reformations*," 316.)

<sup>143</sup> Heiko A. Oberman, "Headwaters of the Reformation: *Initia Lutheri - Initia Reformationis*," The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992).

Franciscan Hegemony”.<sup>144</sup> Oberman concluded that essay with statements such as the following.

The historian must respect this plurality of phenomena and trends and withstand the temptation to present a coherent pattern. It is clear, however, that fourteenth-century thought can no longer be described only in terms of philosophy and academic theology, as we have been inclined to do. Lay thought and lay piety now begin to occupy the center of the stage.<sup>145</sup>

By the end of Oberman’s career, in what is arguably his last essay (one published posthumously), philosophy was reduced to one of four scenes on a distant “backdrop” for the Reformation “breakthrough”. In that essay one can say Oberman seems to have settled on “four basic co-ordinates” for “Luther’s platform”: Scripture as an authoritative communication from God, the *pactum* (or “covenant”) as God’s promise founding salvation through the sacraments, Luther’s perspective that the end was near as an imminent eschatology, and the *via moderna* (or “modern way”) of his intellectual upbringing, even if that *via moderna* was not as monolithic as it once was thought to be.<sup>146</sup>

The foregoing is merely a summary, and that of only a few of Oberman’s works, and of his works only as a chief representative of modern scholarship familiar with that which has gone before. Nevertheless, the work of Oberman and others like him faces some of the same drawbacks that were discussed above in terms of the first question, the question of the repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy. In looking for the use of philosophy in any of Luther’s writings, researchers limit themselves to only one—albeit the leading—reformer and make no distinction among his writings, as he himself or others after him made. Such limitations are also seen regarding the research pertaining to the third and final question, that of continuity between the earlier and later Reformers.

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<sup>144</sup> Heiko A. Oberman, “Fourteenth-Century Religious Thought: A Premature Profile,” The Dawn of the Reformation: Essays in Late Medieval and Early Reformation Thought (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1992). The paper was originally given at the Fiftieth Anniversary Meeting of the Medieval Academy of America on April 18, 1975, in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

<sup>145</sup> Oberman, “Premature Profile,” 16.

<sup>146</sup> Oberman, “Philosophical Backdrop.”

## ***Continuity between Reformers and the next generation***

The third question, then, is a consideration of continuity between the initial Reformers and the next generation. Luther was not the only proponent of the theology of the Reformation—there were converts to the Lutheran cause among the humanists and clergy, and there were others educated in the Lutheran mold all along. Wittenberg University especially had a significant impact on the pastors entering the field in the early days of the Reformation, equipping them with skills for properly interpreting Scripture and communicating its message.<sup>147</sup> Smaller parishes and villages would temporarily put up with a *Notprediger* (or “emergency pastor”) while waiting for a highly-trained pastor, and the university did not rush pastors into the field with some lesser, alternate training. The highly educated clergy was important and desired.<sup>148</sup> (Of course, research done by scholars such as Bruce Tolley considers the problems of highly-educated clergy dealing with lesser-educated laity.<sup>149</sup>)

In the later sixteenth century, Aristotle—although a fundamentally different Aristotle—continued to be taught, with some ongoing struggle between theology and philosophy.<sup>150</sup> It is said that the Lutheran blend of humanism and scholasticism “confessionalized” Aristotle, or put another way, “integrated [him] into the larger task of formulating the new ... doctrine and communicating it to the faithful.”<sup>151</sup> Still, philosophy needed to be kept—and was kept, in most cases—to a ministerial role in

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<sup>147</sup> Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 10, 20, 32. While Schwiebert says the Reformation-trained pastors “knew Biblical teaching on the basis of their own private investigations” (Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 32.), this should *not* be understood in some subjective way as if the interpretation was private or unique to themselves and not normed by the *regula fide*.

<sup>148</sup> Schwiebert, “Reformation and Theological Education,” 32; Rosin, “Wittenberg Model for Reform,” 311, 313.

<sup>149</sup> Bruce Tolley, Pastors & Parishioners in Württemberg During the Late Reformation, 1581-1621 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 41-42, for example.

<sup>150</sup> Freedman, “Aristotelianism and Humanism,” 217-218, 219, 220-221; James M. Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties of Lutheran Universities during the Late Reformation,” The harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: Essays in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 151-153; Schmitt, “Philosophy and Science,” 510.

<sup>151</sup> Ozment, The Age of Reform, 316. Confer Rosin, “Wittenberg Model for Reform,” 301; Schmitt, “Philosophy and Science,” 513. Paul’s use of the poets when dealing with philosophers in Acts 17 is similar.



theology.<sup>152</sup> Philosophy served as a “necessary part of understanding and expounding the Scriptures and refuting heretics.”<sup>153</sup> Especially Aristotle’s categories were used in the theology of the later sixteenth century, though neither on every *locus* nor by every user.<sup>154</sup> The doctrine of God is a good and relevant example of a *locus* where the categories were used and arguably used appropriately. Speaking of the one Being (essence or substance) of God preserves the unity of the Trinity, but speaking of three distinct Persons preserves its tripartite nature. Such terminology was used already about 380, and, without understanding Aristotle’s terminology, one can think such terminology is—at best—unclear (if not heretical).<sup>155</sup> It is hard to imagine what theology would be like without the availability and use of philosophical terminology and distinctions. Another example illustrates the importance of Aristotle further. In his *Categories*, Aristotle distinguishes between individual primary substances, say “that piece (of bread)”, and its accidental qualities, say “beige”. Asking: “What is it?” and answering “bread”, identifies its substance. Asking: “What is it?” and answering “beige”, however, identifies one of its accidents (attributes such as quantity, quality, place, and the like). In general, one can predicate substances with or without specific accidents, but one cannot predicate accidents without the substances to which they belong: accidents by nature are *in* something.<sup>156</sup> The third and final research question, then, is to what extent philosophical

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<sup>152</sup> A litmus test of sorts would be one’s commentary on Colossians 2:8, which gave occasion for criticism of “philosophy.” Most Lutherans of the era would not just criticize but also give “a defense of the proper role of learning and the study of the disciplines” (Robert Kolb, “Philipp’s Foes, but Followers Nonetheless: Late Humanism among the Gnesio-Lutherans,” The harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: Essays in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer [St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992], 160). Confer the discussion of Colossians 2:8 above, beginning on p.9.

<sup>153</sup> Kolb, “Philipp’s Foes,” 161.

<sup>154</sup> Kolb, “Philipp’s Foes,” 162-163, 168; Robert Kolb, “Dynamics of Party Conflict in the Saxon Late Reformation: Gnesio-Lutherans vs. Philippists,” The Journal of Modern History 49 (1977): D1296, D1303-D1304; Kusukawa, Transformation of Natural Philosophy, 204-205; Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 143-144; Manfred P. Fleischer, “Humanism and Reformation in Silesia: Imprints of Italy—Celtis, Erasmus, Luther, and Melanchthon,” The harvest of Humanism in Central Europe: Essays in Honor of Lewis W. Spitz, ed. Manfred P. Fleischer (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 71-72.

<sup>155</sup> Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology, 96ff.

<sup>156</sup> *Categories* 4-5, 1<sup>b</sup>25-2<sup>a</sup>33, Terence Irwin and Gail Fine, Aristotle: Selections (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 3-5. Confer 606-607, 616-617. Confer also Jonathan Barnes, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 55-57, 79-81; Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction 64-67; Allen, Philosophy for Understanding Theology 93-96;

terminology and concepts are prevalent in the later sixteenth century and whether the later Reformers' use of philosophy and Aristotle in that way is consistent with the use of the Reformers earlier in the sixteenth century.

What may be one of the most recent comparisons of earlier and later Reformers is Robert Kolb's 2005 essay "Melanchthon's Doctrinal Last Will and Testament: The *Responsiones ad articulos Bavaricae inquisitionis* as His Final Confession of Faith".<sup>157</sup> Kolb draws on Bernhard Lohse to identify four areas in which some of Melanchthon's—and no doubt in some cases also Luther's—former students later criticized Melanchthon, their former *praeceptor* ("teacher")<sup>158</sup>: allowing some adiaphora ("matters of indifference") that others felt compromised the Gospel, emphasizing good works in such a way as to at best obscure the teaching of grace and at worst teach works righteousness, teaching about the human will so that some understood Melanchthon to give human action partial credit for salvation, and expressing his teaching on the Lord's Supper so that some thought he no longer confessed the real, physical presence of Christ in the Sacrament.<sup>159</sup> Kolb examined Melanchthon's last theological testament on these matters and essentially concluded that, especially pertaining to justification by faith in Christ and the comfort of consciences, "the underlying structure and the dynamic core of his doctrine remained much the same as they had been at Augsburg when he composed the

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Thomas, "Logic and Metaphysics," 150. Thomas discusses at length the application of these categories to the Eucharist (Thomas, "Logic and Metaphysics," 150-152).

Hereafter this dissertation generally refers to Aristotle's works with the conventional abbreviations of the Liddell-Jones-Scott Lexicon, as found in G. E. R. Lloyd, *Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of His Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968) xiii. (Confer and compare the lists in Barnes, ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle* xxiii-xxv.) The abbreviations for works of Aristotle referenced in this dissertation are included in the List of Abbreviations on pp.xiii-xiv. Usually following the abbreviations one will find a book number in Roman numerals, a chapter number in Arabic numerals, and a specified page number, column letter, and line number from Immanuel Bekker's standard edition of the Greek text, which numbering scheme is generally used by all subsequent standard editions.

<sup>157</sup> Robert Kolb, "Melanchthon's Doctrinal Last Will and Testament: The *Responsiones ad articulos Bavaricae inquisitionis* as His Final Confession of Faith," *Sixteenth Century Journal* XXXVI.1 (2005).

<sup>158</sup> On the title, Kolb refers to the announcement of Melanchthon's death on April 19, 1560, in CR, 9:1100 (Bernhard Lohse, "Innerprotestantische Lehrstreitigkeiten," *Handbuch der Dogmen- und Theologiegeschichte*, vol. 3 [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988] 99 n.6).

<sup>159</sup> Kolb, "Melanchthon's Doctrinal Last Will and Testament," 97 n.1. Kolb refers to Lohse, "Innerprotestantische Lehrstreitigkeiten," 2:102-138.

Augsburg Confession”.<sup>160</sup> Yet, especially pertaining to human involvement in salvation and the presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper, Kolb recognized that Melanchthon’s students in the Formula of Concord interpreted the Augsburg Confession differently than did Melanchthon himself in his *Responsiones*.<sup>161</sup>

These four controversies Kolb addressed are among those that precipitated the Formula of Concord, and, while none are explicitly philosophical in nature, at least several arguably touch on philosophy at some level, whether sub-sentential, sentential, or supra-sentential. In that most recent work, Kolb did not consider the use of philosophy and whether such might be behind the different teacher’s and students’ differing interpretations of the Augsburg Confession. Moreover, Kolb himself recognizes that the *Responsiones*’ limited “influence and significance”. To be sure, Melanchthon’s own statements regarding his and his students’ positions are bound to be biased, and even an relatively objective assessment of the *Responsiones* in comparison to Melanchthon’s earlier writings are indeed limited in what they can tell about the positions of others, even relative to this work of lesser significance. There would seem to be a need for a better way of answering the third and final research question, as well as the preceding two.<sup>162</sup>

## Exploration and hypothesis development

Having considered the three sub-questions or aspects of the larger question regarding both continuity and discontinuity, this subsection now summarizes this author’s own work, prior to this dissertation, looking for answers to the questions within *The Book of Concord*, especially as that work pertains to the development of a hypothesis for this

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<sup>160</sup> Kolb, “Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Last Will and Testament,” 103.

<sup>161</sup> Kolb, “Melanchthon’s Doctrinal Last Will and Testament,” 114.

<sup>162</sup> For more on philosophy and theology after the immediate events of the Reformation see Fowler, “Faith and Reason,” 61-85.

Kusukawa, in her more recent essay on Jacob Schegk, a professor of philosophy in Tübingen who worked alongside Andreä and Brenz, describes how Schegk saw dialectics as a way of distinguishing false and true arguments, how he distinguished between *dianoia* and the Mind, and how that distinction resulted in him holding to a difference between hypothetical and non-hypothetical principles as to their respective degrees of certainty. In this way, Schegk kept philosophy from establishing theological principles, but he also saw a necessary role for dialectics in preventing theological heresies. (Kusukawa, “Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought,” 148-152.)

dissertation's research. (The particular justification for using *The Book of Concord* as source material will be detailed below, and further introduction to the writings contained in *The Book of Concord* is also found below.<sup>163</sup>)

In terms of the first research question, that of the repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy, a casual reading indicates some second-order repudiation of philosophy in the works of both the earlier and later Reformers. (The detailed evidence regarding second-order "philosophy" is included later in this chapter.<sup>164</sup>) A casual reading also indicates some second-order use of philosophy, but more telling is the close reading for the first order use that was undertaken with more of a view to the second and third research questions.

In terms of second research question, that of continuity or discontinuity between the period before and the period after the Reformation, preliminary results, in keeping with earlier scholarship, suggested evidence of both. On the side of continuity are two specific *loci*: the Trinity and the real, physical presence of Jesus Christ in the bread and wine of the Lord's Supper. In these cases, the confessors use the same philosophical content and terminology that the church had used for centuries.<sup>165</sup> Also on the side of continuity, although perhaps with somewhat of a caveat, is *The Book of Concord*'s use of the concept of four-causes drawn from Aristotle's *Physics* and *Metaphysics*, which terminology and distinctions are used when discussing the causes of sin, election, and conversion.<sup>166</sup> On the side of discontinuity, is the *locus* of justification (how people stand righteous before God). In this case, philosophical terminology is not so much in use, and

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<sup>163</sup> The justification for the source material is found beginning on p.59, and the background on the writings contained in *The Book of Concord* begins on p.60.

<sup>164</sup> See below, beginning on p.79.

<sup>165</sup> See Jayson S. Galler, "The University of Wittenberg: Where German Studies Meets History, Philosophy, and Theology," The 5th Annual German Studies Graduate Student Conference (University of Wisconsin-Madison: 2003), 16pp.; Jayson S. Galler, "The Lutheran Confessions: A Break with Medieval Philosophy?" (University of Texas at Austin, 2003), 30pp.

<sup>166</sup> See Jayson S. Galler, "Aristotle's Causes and Their Theological Use," (University of Texas at Austin, 2004), 10pp. Not considered for that analysis was Lowell C. Green's suggestion that, at least in the case of conversion, the terminology is not used in the same way as the previous tradition (Lowell C. Green, "The Three Causes of Conversion in Philipp Melanchthon, Martin Chemnitz, David Chytraeus, and the 'Formula of Concord'," Lutherjahrbuch 47 [1980]).

the Lutherans specifically reject philosophical content—the notions of human ability to be righteous before God or even to please God in any way apart from faith.<sup>167</sup> Arguably what discontinuity was found with the immediately preceding medieval tradition may not have been discontinuous with an earlier philosophical tradition.<sup>168</sup>

In terms of the third research question, that of continuity between the original Reformers and those of the next generation, the initial investigation into the use of philosophy related to the Trinity, the Lord's Supper, and causes yielded no significant observable differences between the writings of the earlier and later Reformers.

The initial investigation led to the some preliminary conclusions. Despite some second-order repudiation, there is both second and first-order use of philosophy in *The Book of Concord*, and the use appears to be continuous between the Reformers and their successors. Where there is discontinuity with the immediately preceding tradition, the possibility remains that such usage is continuous with an earlier tradition. As for the reason for the break with the immediately preceding tradition (to the extent there was a break), a preliminary hypothesis was as follows:

Philosophical terminology and concepts are not a problem for either the authors of the earlier documents or the authors of the later ones contained in *The Book of Concord*; rather, the problem with philosophy and philosophers seems to arise where the content of their teaching directly contradicts how the authors understood God's revelation in the Bible.

More research was needed to fully consider whether the preliminary hypothesis would hold true.

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<sup>167</sup> See Galler, "Break with Medieval Philosophy?" See also "The Vocabulary of Justification" in Martin Chemnitz, *Justification: The Chief Article of Christian Doctrine as Expounded in *Loci Theologici**, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1985), 61-77.

<sup>168</sup> In other words, the philosophical element being rejected might well be a later accretion. Under this view, earlier theologians incorporating philosophical content into their theology would be the ones making something new, not the Reformers who break with that preceding tradition to return to an earlier one—returning "to a primitive excellence" in the words of *The Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church*'s definition of "reformation" (see above at n.105, p.37).

Although an examination of *The Book of Concord* could be conducted *locus* by *locus* as the preliminary investigation was,<sup>169</sup> a complete examination of the use of philosophy in *The Book of Concord* would in the end consider three different levels of first-order philosophical use: sub-sentential, sentential, and supra-sentential.<sup>170</sup> Terminology and concepts are used on what can be called a sub-sentential level. Philosophical terminology includes terms such as “substance” or “accident”, and concepts include such things as the four different causes (that is, material, formal, efficient, and final). Content and theses are used on what can be termed a sentential level and include, for example, the principle that a human being is oriented towards the highest good. Method of argumentation and organization can be regarded as a supra-sentential level and includes, for example, deductive argumentation and the *loci* method of organization.

As there had been no initial investigation into the supra-sentential use of philosophy in *The Book of Concord*, research for this dissertation began there, and to some extent it ended there. Once that phase of the work reached a point nearing completion, its magnitude and unexpected discoveries were deemed sufficient for the dissertation. Although the decision to narrow the scope primarily to the supra-sentential use of philosophy to some extent left the dissertation unable to fully consider the preliminary hypothesis, the dissertation’s findings shed light on the preliminary hypothesis, especially as revised into a working hypothesis that concentrates on the supra-sentential aspects of philosophy’s use and the research questions.

Despite a second-order repudiation of philosophy, logic and philosophical argumentation are not a problem for either the authors of the earlier documents or the authors of the later documents contained in *The Book of Concord*; rather, consistent with the preceding medieval tradition, the problem with philosophy and philosophers seems to arise where the use of

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<sup>169</sup> For examples, the *locus* of the two natures personally united in Christ includes philosophical terminology and concepts, and *loci* such as original sin, free will, and predestination include philosophical content.

<sup>170</sup> These three levels follow the usual divisions of Aristotle’s logical treatises (known collectively as the *Organon*, “tool” or “instrument” of thought): *Categoriae* as sub-sentential, *de Interpretatione* as sentential, and *Analytica Priora* and *Analytica Posteriora* as supra-sentential.

such methods directly contradicts how the authors understood God's revelation in the Bible.

The future will undoubtedly hold plenty of opportunities to consider fully the original preliminary hypothesis' merits as it pertained to the sub-sentential and sentential uses of philosophy.

## Scope and Limitations

Having considered the relevant research questions, the work that led to the development of a hypothesis, and considerations that resulted in the dissertation's more limited focus on the supra-sentential use of philosophy, this fourth subsection of the introductory chapter more clearly specifies the scope and limitations of this dissertation's research.

The dissertation considers the supra-sentential use of philosophy in the works contained in *The Book of Concord* and what answers whatever use is found might suggest to the three different aspects of the primary research question discussed above: repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy, continuity between the medieval and Reformation periods, and continuity between the earlier and later Reformers. In this context, the supra-sentential use of philosophy means logic and argumentation, and specific aspects considered are metalogical opinions and practices (such as the first-order regard for logic and the use of τόποι ["places"] as an organizational tool), inductive argumentation, deductive argumentation, and what amounts to a case study in the use of such logic and argumentation, namely the theological distinction between justification and sanctification that is thoroughly philosophical in nature but nevertheless a product of philosophy in the ministerial or handmaiden role.

While essentially limited to the supra-sentential use of philosophy in the forms of logic and argumentation, the dissertation nevertheless touches on the sub-sentential and sentential uses of philosophy. For example, the nature of the close-reading methodology outlined below produces a focus on words and terms as indicators of an application of philosophy bigger than the words themselves.

There are a number of things that this dissertation does not encompass. As indicated, a full survey of the sub-sentential and sentential uses of philosophy in *The Book of Concord* is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Furthermore, the dissertation is not a theological inquiry, nor is the dissertation specifically an investigation as would occur in the philosophy of religion school of thought (that is, into the theory of religious belief). Moreover, somewhat unlike the work of Gilson, Oberman, and other scholars, the dissertation does not aim to find theological precedents for the positions taken in the writings of *The Book of Concord*, nor does it find each and every philosophical precedent. Instead, the methodology is sufficient to consider the supra-sentential uses of philosophy and with that information consider potential answers to the three sub-questions.

## Methodology

For its consideration of the three sub-questions in light of the supra-sentential use of philosophy, this dissertation uses a close reading *The Book of Concord*. This fifth subsection of the introductory chapter thus provides additional details on this methodology and discusses the justification of the methodology and the source material as they relate to advantages over the approaches of previous research.

First, then, are the additional details on this close-reading methodology. Although the text of *The Book of Concord* is not examined in isolation and although other specific analytical techniques outlined by practioners such as Ivor Armstrong Richards in his 1929 *Practical Criticism: A Study of Literary Judgment* are also not strictly followed, the text is given a requisite “detailed, balanced and rigorous critical examination”.<sup>171</sup> The work as a whole is certainly considered, but appropriate emphasis is often placed on particular passages and words. This dissertation’s methodology is not the imposition of higher forms of literary criticism on the text but rather a recognition that such literary criticism has its roots in both ancient Biblical exegesis and in the classical and renaissance rhetoric that were part of the milieu in which *The Book of Concord*

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<sup>171</sup> John A. Cuddon, “close reading,” The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory, Fourth ed. (New York: Penguin Books, 1998), 142.



documents themselves were born. Searches for specific words in the Latin or German versions of *The Book of Concord*'s works were conducted with the aid of the search engine in the Libronix Digital Library System as applied to the German and Latin text of the *Concordia Triglotta*.<sup>172</sup> Results include data of the second order (where “philosophy”, “philosophers”, etc. are discussed) and of the first order (where “philosophy” itself is not mentioned but its logic and argumentation are clearly in play). *The Book of Concord* and its supra-sentential use of philosophy thereby serve as source material for considering the repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy, the continuity between the medieval and Reformation traditions, and the continuity of the original Reformers and the next generation.

Second is the justification of the methodology and the source material as they relate to advantages over the approaches of previous research. As noted above, previous studies that examine an author's works for mentions of a philosopher or his works result in a superficial analysis of the use of philosophy.<sup>173</sup> In comparison to previous studies, the close reading conducted for this dissertation was much more sensitive to contextual and verbal indicators that philosophical logical and argumentation were in use in *The Book of Concord*. And, the interdisciplinary approach can interpret the data in a broader context than a strictly philosophical or strictly theological approach could alone. Where previous studies of authors such as Luther either considered only an arbitrarily selected handful of the author's works (or an indiscriminately larger number), authors such as Luther did not always regard their works equally,<sup>174</sup> and even then the works considered arguably represent only the author's position. Luther was but one figure—albeit a significant figure—in the Reformation that usually bears his name. To see the continuity or discontinuity between the periods before the Lutheran Reformation and the period

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<sup>172</sup> “Libronix Digital Library System.” Confer the Triglotta.

<sup>173</sup> Even White concludes his significant work on Luther by noting that few have looked at the logical methods Luther used in order to find out his attitude to logic (White, *Luther as Nominalist*, 346).

<sup>174</sup> In Luther's 1545 Preface to a published collection of his Latin works, Luther not only wrote how he wished his books were “buried in perpetual oblivion” (*adductus cupiebam omnes libros meos perpetua oblivione sepultos*), but he also suggested to the readers that in his earlier writings he took positions he might not have taken later in life (AE 34:327-328, translated by Lewis W. Spitz, Sr.; Aland #753; WA 54:179-180).

after for more than just Luther, one looks elsewhere than to just the corpus of Luther's writings, such as to a collection of writings, including some of Luther's, that were not only widely accepted but also given authority and thus arguably are representative of the whole movement. To examine a collection of works such as those found in *The Book of Concord* is to examine a limited number of carefully selected works that represent more than the authors' positions. *The Book of Concord* is at least intended as non-contradictory commentary on the Augsburg Confession<sup>175</sup>—presented in 1530 at the emperor's request by the electors, princes, and estates and regarded as the preeminent of the Lutheran confessions—and received widespread acceptance and authority.<sup>176</sup> Moreover, where a vast survey encounters the variability of many different topics being addressed, closer readings comparing the same, specific topics are more beneficial. Furthermore, the authors in question produced works of various natures under different circumstances and for different purposes. Examining treatments of the topics contained in *The Book of Concord* is worthwhile because those works were recognized to have similar natures, as evidenced by their broader acceptance and confessional status (that is, normative force) among Lutherans. The additional background on *The Book of Concord*, to which attention is given in the next subsection, illuminates the foregoing matters.

## The Book of Concord

This sixth subsection gives necessary background on *The Book of Concord*, including information about the various works it contains and their authors, as well as discussing those authors' regard for philosophy and reason as evidenced in *The Book of Concord*.

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<sup>175</sup> See, for example, the Preface to *The Book of Concord*, Tappert, 5, 8; *BKS*, 5, 9-10.

<sup>176</sup> For example, the Augsburg Confession had been signed by eight princes and representatives of two free cities. The Smalcald Articles were subscribed to by theologians and adopted by Lutheran princes and estates. The Formula of Concord was signed by "the electors of Saxony, of Brandenburg, and of the Palatinate; furthermore by 20 dukes and princes, 24 counts, 4 barons, 35 imperial cities, and about 8,000 pastors and teachers, embracing about two-thirds of the Lutheran territories in Germany." (F. Bente, "Historical Introductions to the Book of Concord," *Concordia Triglotta* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1921), 22, 58, 247.

*The Book of Concord*, sometimes also called “The Concordia”, like nearly all the individual writings or documents it collects into one work, arose out of a particular historical context. In the case of *The Book of Concord*, its historical context is inextricably tied to the Formula of Concord (the background of which is discussed below).<sup>177</sup> At this point worth noting is that, although the printing process for the official German edition edited by Jacob Andreae was begun in 1578, the book was not formally presented and promulgated until June 25, 1580, the fiftieth anniversary of the presentation of one of the book’s chief works, the Augsburg Confession. As for the Latin translation of *The Book of Concord*, a little regarded work edited by Nikolaus Selnecker was published in 1580, but a more-widely accepted, revised Latin translation under the added supervision of Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586) was published in 1584.<sup>178</sup> Also worth noting at the outset is that upon *The Book of Concord*’s publication in 1580, the collection served what historians call the *gnesio* (“genuine”) Lutherans as their confession on a number of theological *loci*, as the collection continues to do for genuine Lutherans even today.

## ***Documents included***

Although *The Book of Concord* also contains the three Ecumenical creeds from the earliest centuries of the church, the bulk of its contents are documents written in Latin and German that for the most part span the years 1530-1580. Although they are not in

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<sup>177</sup> The Preface to the *Book* is more properly to the Formula (Henry E. Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” The Book of Concord: Or, the Symbolical Books of the Evangelical Lutheran Church [Philadelphia: The General Council Press, 1908], II:61).

<sup>178</sup> Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §2-3, pp.3-6. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:61-63.

In the case of each document included in *The Book of Concord*, the historical information given in the text is primarily drawn from Bente’s standard work, which, though dated and arguably somewhat biased against Melancthon, remains a valuable source (regarding this assessment of Bente, confer Charles P. Arand, “The Apology as a Polemical Commentary,” Philip Melancthon (1497-1560) and the Commentary, eds. Timothy J. Wengert and M. Patrick Graham [Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1997], 171 n.1). Also somewhat dated but worthwhile is Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes.” Other English translations of *The Book of Concord* have some brief introductory material (for example, Tappert and K-W), often drawn from the *BKS*, which arguably has the essential-up-to-date critical information. Some other relatively recent relevant resources will be mentioned where appropriate in notes.

*The Book of Concord* in strict chronological order, the documents quite easily classify as earlier and later. From the early 16<sup>th</sup> century, the documents are the Philip Melanchthon-authored Augsburg Confession, its Apology, and their appendix-like Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope; and the Martin Luther-authored Large and Small Catechisms and Smalcald Articles. The later 16<sup>th</sup> century documents are Jacob Andreaä's and Martin Chemnitz's Epitome and Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord. The table that follows (Table 1) provides an easy reference for the essential information about the Reformation-era works included in *The Book of Concord*.<sup>179</sup> In the subsections that follow the table, each work is considered briefly in turn in order to provide necessary background for the analysis in the dissertation as a whole.

**Table 1: *The Book of Concord* Reformation-era contents**

<b>Work (abbreviation)</b>	<b>Date</b>	<b>Author</b>	<b>Authoritative Language</b>	<b>“Translator”</b>
Augsburg Confession (AC)	1530	Philip Melanchthon	German & Latin	—
Apology of the Augsburg Confession (Ap)	1531	Philip Melanchthon	Latin	Justus Jonas Philip Melanchthon
Smalcald Articles (SA)	1537	Martin Luther	German	Nikolaus Selnecker
Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope (Tr)	1537	Philip Melanchthon	Latin	Veit Dietrich
Small Catechism (SC)	1529	Martin Luther	German	Johannes Saueremann
Large Catechism (LC)	1529	Martin Luther	German	Vincent Obsopoeus Nikolaus Selnecker
The Epitome of the Formula of Concord (Ep)	1577	Jacob Andreaä	German	Lucas Osiander Jacob Heerbrand Nikolaus Selnecker Martin Chemnitz
The Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord (SD)	1577	Jacob Andreaä Martin Chemnitz David Chytraeus Christopher Körner Andrew Musculus Nikolaus Selnecker	German	Lucas Osiander Jacob Heerbrand Nikolaus Selnecker Martin Chemnitz

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<sup>179</sup> Note that in general the Formula of Concord may be abbreviated “FC” and its “Rule and Norm” section “R&N”.

### Three Ecumenical Creeds

As mentioned, *The Book of Concord* contains the three Ecumenical Creeds from the earliest centuries of the Christian church. In this context, “Ecumenical” means those symbols or confessions of faith that “at least in the past, have been accepted by all Christendom, and are still formally acknowledged by most of the evangelical Churches”.<sup>180</sup> These creeds were included in *The Book of Concord* in order for the Reformers to confess the same faith that had always been confessed and to refute their opponents’ claim that the Reformers taught something new.<sup>181</sup> While originally in Greek or Latin, in *The Book of Concord* those Ecumenical Creeds all appear, depending on the language of the edition, in either German or Latin. The following subsections give brief background on the three Ecumenical Creeds: the Apostolic (or “Apostles”) Creed, the Nicene Creed, and the Athanasian Creed.<sup>182</sup>

#### *Apostolic Creed*

The Apostolic (or “Apostles”) Creed is, at its core, the most ancient of the confessions of faith found in *The Book of Concord*. Connecting, as Jesus did, His teaching with Baptism in the Triune Name, the Apostolic Creed and its “I believe” (πιστεύω; *credo*; *Ich gläube*) amplifies that Name primarily in connection with the individual who is being—or who has been—baptized. Thus, the Creed is not thought to have arisen out of a specifically polemical context. The contents of the person’s faith and the Creed have their origin in the teaching of the apostles, even as the popular tradition that each apostle contributed a phrase in the Creed has no biblical or early church support. Although there were various confessions of faith within the Bible itself and in the years immediately following the time of the New Testament, evidence dates to at least the eighth century C.E. the present form of the Apostolic Creed, although its roots

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<sup>180</sup> Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §1, p.3. “Evangelical” here is used with the more-original sense meaning those churches centered on properly teaching the εὐαγγέλιον (the Gospel), not with the sense of the word referring to the Lutheran-Reformed churches in Germany (synonymous with “Protestant”) or with the sense of the word referring to churches in America under the influence of the 1800s’ revivalism or of the 1900s’ fundamentalism.

<sup>181</sup> Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §8, p.9.

<sup>182</sup> On the Three Ecumenical Creeds, see also *BKS*, 11-15; Tappert, 17-18.

can be traced back at least as early as the third century C.E. Originally in Greek, the Apostolic Creed had been translated into German before Luther's day, and, while he did render καθολικὴν ἐκκλησίαν ("catholic Church") with *christliche Kirche* ("Christian Church"), that change in translation is found before his, and he considered the expressions to be equivalent.<sup>183</sup>

### ***Nicene Creed***

Where the Apostolic Creed is today more connected with Baptism, the Nicene Creed (technically the "Niceno-Constantinopolitan" Creed), with its original Greek πιστεύομεν ("We believe"), is in some sense more connected with the Sacrament of the Altar, although it, too, began as a baptismal creed. The Nicene Creed was adopted by the First Ecumenical Council at Nicea, a council called by the Emperor Constantine the Great in the year C.E. 325 to settle the controversy over the teaching of Arius of Alexandria (d.336), who denied that Jesus Christ was truly divine. The Council modified the confession of Eusebius into a clearly anti-Arian statement of faith and banished Arius and two Egyptian bishops who refused to sign the modified creed. Arianism continued, however, so Emperor Theodosius in C.E. 381 called the Second Ecumenical Council at Constantinople. Generally scholars hold that that Council gave the Creed its present form (affirmed by the councils of Ephesus in 431 and Chalcedon in 451), except for the insertion of the word(s) *Filioque* ("and the Son") regarding the procession of the Holy Spirit, which insertion was made by a council in Toledo, Spain, according to some texts, in C.E. 589.<sup>184</sup>

### ***Athanasian Creed***

With a name like "Athanasian Creed", one would think that the Creed was the work of Athanasius, Greek bishop of Alexandria (d.373) known for his anti-Arianism at

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<sup>183</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §9-13, pp.10-13. For the Latin and German, *BKS*, 21. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:14-19; K-W, 19-20.

<sup>184</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §14-15, p.13. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:20-22; K-W, 20. The addition of *Filioque* became a chief point of contention between the Orthodox Church and the Church of Rome, and its manuscript evidence may be debatable.

the Council of Nicea, which is similarly expressed in this Creed, and for a long time people thought Athanasius indeed was the Creed's author. This Creed, however, was not known except in Latin and until later. The Creed's first Latin word *Quicumque* ("Whoever"), as with other elements of the historic liturgy, gives it another title by which it is known. Opinions regarding the dates and places of the *Quicumque*'s origin differ, but at least one opinion is that it originated in Southern Gaul around the fifth century C.E.<sup>185</sup> Where contemporary orders of Divine Service that use the ancient liturgy might use the Apostolic Creed or the Nicene Creed on any given Sunday, the Athanasian Creed, if used at all, is in the Lutheran tradition usually confessed only on Trinity Sunday, that is, depending on how one measures it, either the first Sunday after the feast of Pentecost or the eighth Sunday after Easter.

### **Augsburg Confession**

The first of the relevant "particular" creeds and Lutheran confessions<sup>186</sup> is the Augsburg Confession of 1530, sometimes called the Augustana. More than twelve years after Luther posted his Ninety-Five Theses in an effort to reform the Roman Catholic Church and arguably began religious turmoil in the Germanic lands, Emperor Charles V, who had previously made Luther an outlaw and banned his reform efforts, on January 21, 1530, ordered an imperial diet (or assembly) to address a resolution of the religious division, apparently in order to better unite the country to deal with the threat of the Turks. (Previous diets had been held but produced ambiguous and mixed results.) The Emperor's call prompted Elector John to commission Martin Luther, Justus Jonas, John Bugenhagen, and Philip Melanchthon to prepare a document that treated the division in terms of articles of doctrine and practice; later the scope was increased to include articles pertaining to heresies the Reformers were falsely accused of holding (demonstrating their

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<sup>185</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §16, pp.13-14. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:22-24.

<sup>186</sup> Bente defines the particular symbols as those "adopted by the various denominations of divided Christendom" but is careful to write that, while they are "particular" in that sense, the Lutheran confessions nevertheless "are in complete agreement with Holy Scripture, and in this respect differ from all other particular symbols, the Lutheran confessions are truly ecumenical and catholic in character" (Bente, "Historical Introductions," §1, p.3).

catholicity and distinguishing them from the Roman Catholics on the one hand and from other, more radical reformers on the other).<sup>187</sup> The bulk of the work was completed by Melanchthon, although there had been earlier articles drawn up by others, including Luther, that served as Melanchthon's "sources".<sup>188</sup> Once completed and signed by seven princes and those representing two free cities, the Confession was presented to the Emperor at Augsburg on June 25, 1530, in both German and Latin, the German being read aloud. The text of the Augsburg Confession, printed in 1531, is thus authoritative in both languages.<sup>189</sup>

As noted, the principal author of Augsburg Confession was Philip Melanchthon, and some background on him is useful, especially as he also authored the Apology of the Augsburg Confession and the Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope. Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) was a grand-nephew of the German humanist Johannes Reuchlin (1455-1522), who perhaps is best known for generally defending Jewish literature in the Pfefferkorn affair that united German humanists. Reuchlin influenced his nephew in a number of different ways, including suggesting Philip change his last name from birth, *Schwartzerd*, German for "black earth" and indicative of his family's heritage as blacksmiths and armorers, to the equivalent in Greek. Melanchthon at the age of 12 entered Heidelberg University and received his bachelor's degree at the age of 14. He then attended Tübingen, where at the age of 17 he earned his master's degree and was part of the faculty for the following four years. At the age of 21, Melanchthon, at the urging of Reuchlin, went to the University of Wittenberg and was installed as professor of Greek in 1518. His inaugural address with its call for improving the educational system caused a stir, as did the theses he delivered the following year in connection with his Bachelor of Theology degree. Melanchthon never received a doctorate nor was he

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<sup>187</sup> The two purposes are somewhat reflected in the two parts of the Confession: "Chief Articles of Faith and Doctrine" (articles I-XXI) and "Articles about Matters in Dispute" (articles XXII-XXVIII). For a listing, see the Appendix, "A Breakdown of *The Book of Concord* by Structure and Content".

<sup>188</sup> Although the sources are not of immediate concern in this dissertation, one can see, in particular, Wilhelm Maurer, *Historical Commentary on the Augsburg Confession*, trans. H. George Anderson (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1986).

<sup>189</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §18-29, pp.51-23. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:24-36; *BKS*, xv-xxi; Tappert, 23-24; K-W, 27-29.



ever ordained, but he nevertheless had a profound influence on those who did receive doctorates and were ordained. A sharp contrast to Luther's personality, Melanchthon worked closely with Luther in the years that followed, although differences between the two appeared as early as 1530 and gradually widened. They did continue to agree on some issues, and Melanchthon in some ways strengthened Luther's teaching. On other issues, they disagreed, and, while Luther never publicly criticized or broke with Melanchthon, students of theirs did. In addition, after Luther's death, Melanchthon was involved in compromises that later even he admitted that he had sinned in supporting. Nearly twenty years after Melanchthon's death in 1560, the Formula of Concord, although not mentioning him by name, nevertheless indirectly criticized positions of Melanchthon and of some of his students. A theologian, classicist, and philosopher, Melanchthon wrote not only the three confessional works receiving attention here, but he also published editions of classical and ancient philosophical authors and theological and other types of textbooks that are discussed later in this dissertation.<sup>190</sup>

## **Apology of the Augsburg Confession**

Melanchthon's Augsburg Confession was eventually "answered" on August 3, 1530, by the Roman Catholic side with what is known as the *Confutatio Pontificia* or simply the Confutation,<sup>191</sup> which then received a response from Melanchthon: the Apology (that is, Defense) of the Augsburg Confession. Although at least initially denied

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<sup>190</sup> Textbooks in general and Melanchthon's in particular are discussed below beginning on p.199.

On Reuchlin, see, for example, Walker, Norris, Lotz and Handy, *A History of the Christian Church*, 394, 408, 421. On Melanchthon, there is a worthwhile brief biography by J. A. O. Preus in Philipp Melanchthon, *Loci Communes 1543*, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1992), 8-14. There is a brief overview of Melanchthon's disputed legacy in Charles P. Arand, "Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument for Sola Fide in the Apology," *Lutheran Quarterly* XIV (2000): 281. What may be the latest significant work on Melanchthon is Nichole Kuropka, *Philipp Melanchthon: Wissenschaft und Gesellschaft; Ein Gelehrter im Dienst der Kirche (1526-1532)* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2002).

<sup>191</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §36-47, pp.28-36. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:36-39. The principal authors of the Confutation were John Eck, John Faber, Conrad Wimpina, and John Cochlaeus. (Confer Arand, "The Apology as a Polemical Commentary," 172.) A critical Latin text is in CR 27:81-184. English translations include Johann Michael Reu, ed., *The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources* (Fort Wayne, IN: Concordia Theological Seminary Press, n.d.), \*348-\*383; Robert Kolb and James A. Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts of The Book of Concord* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2001), 105-139.

a copy of the Confutation, Melanchthon worked from notes, taken down during its reading, regarding its chief points. (Melanchthon did eventually get a copy of the Confutation, although there were allegations it was obtained fraudulently.) A first draft of the Apology was presented to the emperor on September 22, 1530, but the emperor declined it. After in some cases extensive revisions by Melanchthon, the Apology in Latin was published in the spring of 1531 (the *quarto* edition). That fall, a German version of the work was published (more a paraphrase than a translation), the work of Justus Jonas, apparently with some input from Melanchthon, who around the same time published a revised edition of the Latin version, streamlining and focusing the arguments (the *octavo* edition). The Apology endeavored to refute the Confutation and defend and elaborate on the Augsburg Confession. Where Melanchthon, hoping for a possible reunion, used a tone in the Augsburg Confession that is often called “irenic”, in the Apology, perhaps recognizing that reconciliation was no longer a possibility, Melanchthon used a tone that was much sharper. Originally published under Melanchthon’s name, the Apology, together with the Augsburg Confession, was being referred to as a confession of faith already in 1532, a status made official five years later in 1537 at Smalcald, where a different set of articles were slated for approval.<sup>192</sup>

## Smalcald Articles

Anticipating a long-requested and promised general council of the church—as of June 2, 1536, appointed for Mantua in May of 1537 (but not held there or then)—and debating whether or not the adherents to the Augsburg Confession and its Apology could or should attend it,<sup>193</sup> Elector John Frederick of Saxony, likely as early as August 20,

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<sup>192</sup> Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §48-60, pp.37-47. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:39-41; *BKS*, xxii-xxiii; Tappert, 97-98; K-W, 107-109. Notably, K-W translates the Apology from the *octavo* edition, what K-W regards as “the final form”. The *octavo* edition was signed at Smalcald, but the *quarto* edition was used for the Latin *Book of Concord* in 1584 and somewhat set a trend thereafter, thereby raising some questions about the changes from the *quarto* edition to the *octavo* edition.

Two worthwhile recent examinations of the Apology are Arand, “The Apology as a Polemical Commentary,” and Arand, “Melanchthon’s Rhetorical Argument.” The latter mentions the shortening and refocusing of the *octavo* edition (p.283).

<sup>193</sup> Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §61-67, pp.47-52. The council eventually opened in December 1545 in Trent.

1536, requested Luther to lead the preparation of a statement of faith suited for the new context of the council. The request was apparently reiterated on December 11, 1536, and Luther had drafted a set of articles by December 28, 1536, when a group of theologians in Wittenberg reviewed them, suggested changes and additions to them, and ultimately approved them. Having approved the articles himself, the Elector, on February 8, 1537, then took them to a meeting of the Smalcald League. (The Smalcald League consisted of leaders of Lutheran territories and free cities who had formed a political and military alliance in February of 1531, pledging, for example, to help defend all of their lands if the emperor attacked.) At that February 1537 meeting of the Smalcald League, illness kept Luther from the sessions, and Melancthon variously is said to have taken advantage of Luther's absence to keep the League from officially discussing Luther's articles or officially adopting them as a League, although the articles were circulated privately, widely read, and signed by many. (The Augustana and the Apology, however, were officially subscribed, and a special treatise addressing the papacy was requested.<sup>194</sup>) In 1538 Luther published the articles he had authored as written in German, and in subsequent printings they came to be known, somewhat mistakenly, as the Smalcald Articles. In 1541 Peter Generanus published a Latin translation, with a revised edition following in 1542, but, apparently in part due to Generanus's conversion to Romanism, the Latin translation of the Smalcald Articles included in *The Book of Concord* was the work of Nikolaus Selnecker.<sup>195</sup>

As indicated, Martin Luther authored the Smalcald Articles, and he also authored the Small and Large Catechisms discussed below. Thus, some biographical details about Luther are in order. On November 10, 1483, Martin Luther was born in Eisleben, Saxony. This eldest son of Hans and Margaretta Luther's likely ten children was baptized the next day, the festival of St. Martin of Tours, which gave him his name. Of peasant origins, Hans worked as a copper miner, and, a few months after Martin's birth, they moved to

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<sup>194</sup> This treatise, Melancthon's *Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope*, is discussed below in the text, beginning on p.72.

<sup>195</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §68-77, pp.52-60. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:41-44; *BKS*, xxiv-xxvi, xxvii; Tappert, 227-228; K-W, 295-296.

Mansfeld (1490-1497), where Hans won civic respect and considerable prosperity and planned for Luther to be educated for a career in law. Luther attended preparatory schools in Mansfeld, Magdeburg (1497), and Eisenach (1498) before entering the University of Erfurt in 1501, where the classics and ancient philosophy were a usual part of the curriculum (how much influence humanism had at that time in Erfurt is debated).<sup>196</sup> Luther got his bachelor's degree in 1502, his master of arts in January 1505, and entered the law school in May at the age of 21.

After the sudden death of a classmate and a close call with a lightning storm when returning to school from a visit home, Luther vowed to St. Anne that he would become a monk, and he did. He broke off his legal studies and entered the Augustinian monastery in Erfurt on July 17, 1505. That monastery was under the supervision of Johannes von Staupitz, to whom Luther would later give credit for initiating the Reformation. At the monastery, Luther studied St. Augustine, especially through the work of Gregory of Rimini, whom Luther thought to be only scholastic theologian free of Pelagianism. In so doing Luther was profoundly shaped by Augustinianism, although some debate the nature and validity of that form of Augustinianism. Luther was ordained to the priesthood and conducted his first mass in 1507, and the following year he was in Wittenberg, lecturing at the new university there on the topic of the ethics of Aristotle.<sup>197</sup> Luther graduated with his bachelor of theology in 1509, and he went back to Erfurt for additional study there. Over the winter of 1510-1511, he went to Rome on the business of his cloister, returning

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<sup>196</sup> Bartholomaeus de Usingen and Jodocus Trutfetter were two of Luther's logic teachers who influenced him. See Henrik Lagerlund, *Modal Syllogistics in the Middle Ages*, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters (Boston: Brill, 2000), 203. Lagerlund cites Gustav L. Plitt, *Jodokus Trutfetter von Eisenach, der Lehrer Luthers, in seinem Wirken geschildert* (Erlangen: A. Deichert, 1876); Martin Brecht, *Martin Luther: sein Weg zur Reformation, 1483-1521* (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1981).

Worthwhile on Luther's development and also his cold and hot attitude towards Aristotle is Helmar Junghans, "Luther's Development from Biblical Humanist to Reformer," trans. Katharina Gustavs, *Martin Luther in Two Centuries: The Sixteenth and the Twentieth*, eds. Terrance Dinovo and Robert Kolb (St. Paul: Lutheran Brotherhood Foundation Reformation Research and Luther Northwestern Theological Seminary, 1992). Junghans concludes: "Is it true that the Reformation was one of the results of biblical humanism? Luther himself held this view. In 1524, looking back on the past, he found that God himself had initiated the study of languages in order to prepare for the rediscovery of the gospel. Luther research will be well-advised to keep Luther's judgment in mind, when it gives attention to the positive meaning of biblical humanism for Luther's development into a reformer." (Junghans, "Biblical Humanist to Reformer," 14.)

<sup>197</sup> Remember that Aristotle and his ethics were Luther's targets some ten years later in his theses *Against Scholastic Theology* (see above at n.67, p.21).

to Erfurt and then Wittenberg, where he received his doctor of theology in 1512 and succeeded Staupitz as professor of Bible. As professor of Bible, Luther lectured on the Psalms (1513-1518), Romans (1515-1516), Galatians (1516-1517), and Hebrews (1517-1518). Over time and based on his study and spiritual direction, Luther became more and more convinced that salvation is a new relationship with God, not based on human work but on trust in God's promise of forgiveness for Christ's sake. This Reformation or Gospel breakthrough did not necessarily occur in one sudden flash of insight, however. Most likely it began in some form as early as 1513 and neared its full development at the beginning of 1519, at which point it is quite well stated. Luther did not think he discovered anything other theologians had not previously known.<sup>198</sup> Reforms in the curriculum of the University and changes in Luther's thinking each seemed to feed the other.

The usual events of the Reformation may be greater or lesser known to individual readers. The previously mentioned Ninety-Five Theses against indulgences came the end of October of 1517 and within weeks were published and widely disseminated. (An indulgence was commonly understood, if not actually intended, to wipe away all one's former sins and restore one to a state of spiritual innocence.) By the beginning of 1518 Luther was formally charged with heresy, and by the summer Pope Leo X essentially called him a heretic. In 1520, the pope formally condemned Luther and threatened excommunication, and by January of 1521 the pope did excommunicate Luther. Around the same time, Luther was summoned to a meeting of the Reichstag at Worms, where in April of 1521 he said he would stand by what he had written unless convinced of its

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<sup>198</sup> Jaroslav Pelikan seems to have the sentiment right but the citation wrong. Pelikan writes of Luther, "he long professed the conviction that what he had 'discovered' was something that the best theologians of the church must have known all along", and for that statement Pelikan cites WA 8:45 (Jaroslav Pelikan, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700), The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 4 [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984], 127). In that 1521 *Ad Praefacionem Latomi* ("On the Preface of Latomus"), in the context of having submitted his early writings to the pope, Luther writes: *semper arbitratus in Academiis latere theologos, qui si impia haec essent, non silerent* ("I always believed there were theologians hidden in the schools who would not have been silent if these teachings were impious") (WA 8:45; Aland #399; AE 32:141, translated by George Lindbeck). There may not be a single citation from Luther as a "proof text" for what is otherwise an accurate claim based on a general sense from Luther's works.

wrongfulness—and this is significant—“by the testimony of the Scriptures or by clear reason”, reportedly finishing his statements at the Diet with the words “Here I stand. God help me, Amen.” Luther lived secretly under protective custody for about a year, during which time he began to translate the Latin Bible into German, not the first such translation but arguably the best and the one that had the greatest impact. Back in Wittenberg some of Luther’s colleagues, such as Andreas Karlstadt, made changes going faster and further than Luther would have, which in 1522 brought Luther back to the city to restore order and undo some of the changes. In 1524, Luther both faced Erasmus over the freedom or bondage of the will and faced angry mobs of peasants who somewhat wrongly claimed Luther for their cause, similar to the princes who crushed their rebellion with excessive violence. In 1525 Luther married Katherine von Bora, a former nun, with whom he fathered six children. In 1529 the Catechisms were published, a *protestatio* (“protest”) lodged at the diet in Speyer, and Luther in Marburg faced off against those who denied the real, physical presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar. The events of the next few years, at least in terms of the confessional writings, have already been rehearsed, and it would be Luther’s death on February 18, 1546, that would precipitate the need for one more such writing, as will be seen below.<sup>199</sup>

## **Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope**

At the same time that the Smalcald Articles were to be considered, as mentioned, there was a call for a more extended treatment on the authority of the papacy. The call for the church council and the question of whether the Reformers should or would attend

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<sup>199</sup> There are numerous works on the life of Luther covering the basics sketched in the text. A recent concise treatment is Albrecht Beutel, “Luther’s Life,” trans. Katharina Gustavs, The Cambridge Companion to Martin Luther, ed. Donald K. McKim (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). A popular standard biography is Roland H. Bainton, Here I Stand: A Life of Martin Luther (New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1950). Dedicated to Bainton was the previously mentioned Oberman, Luther. A more recent full-length biographical treatment is James M. Kittelson, Luther the Reformer: The Story of the Man and His Career (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1986). Less of a biography and more of a study in Luther reception is Robert Kolb, Martin Luther as Prophet, Teacher, and Hero: Images of the Reformer, 1520-1620, Texts and studies in Reformation and post-Reformation thought (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books, 1999). An even more-recent full-length biographical treatment, although one intended for the Luther “novice”, is Paul R. Waibel, Martin Luther: A Brief Introduction to His Life and Works (Wheeling, IL: Harlan-Davidson, 2005). (Waibel’s book was reviewed favorably by Timothy M. McAlhane, “*Martin Luther: A Brief Introduction to His Life and Works*,” Sixteenth Century Journal XXXVII.2 [2006].)

were the immediate context. Like the Augustana and its Apology subscribed at Smalcald, the resulting Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope of 1537 was authored by Melanchthon in Latin, reportedly drawing on Luther's 1520 German work "On the Papacy",<sup>200</sup> and Melanchthon's Treatise was seemingly immediately translated into German by Veit Dietrich. While still at Smalcald, the theologians approved both the Latin original and its German translation, and the record of the princes' meeting notes the theologians work approvingly. Often published with the Smalcald Articles, the Treatise came to be regarded as an appendix to those articles, even though the Smalcald Articles have their own treatment of the pope;<sup>201</sup> more properly the Treatise is regarded as an appendix to the Augustana and its Apology. There was confusion in the sixteenth century not just over the Treatise's relation to other confessional writings, but there was also confusion over the work's author and its official language, and, even in the editions of *The Book of Concord* that got the authoritative language right, Melanchthon's authorship seems omitted intentionally.<sup>202</sup>

### **Small Catechism**

There is no doubt that Luther authored the bulk of the next work in *The Book of Concord*, namely the Small Catechism. Catechisms and catechetical instruction had a long history before Luther, of course (arguably going back to the Bible itself), and Luther tried to get others to produce one before he took it upon himself to do so. In 1528 and 1529, Luther had "visited" Saxon congregations, in a formal examination sort of way, and found pastors and people needing greater knowledge of such basics as the Ten Commandments, the Apostolic Creed, and the Lord's Prayer—the usual parts of ancient "catechisms". Luther describes such findings in the Preface to the Small Catechism. (The additional three parts Luther adds to his catechisms address Baptism, Confession and

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<sup>200</sup> *Von dem Bapstum zu Rome: wider den hochberumpten Romanisten zu Leipstzck*, WA 6:285-324; Aland #548; AE 39:49-104, translated as "On the Papacy in Rome Against the Most Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig" by Eric W. Gritsch and Ruth C. Gritsch.

<sup>201</sup> SA II:iv.

<sup>202</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §78-80, pp.60-62. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:44-45; *BKS*, xxvi-xxvii; Tappert, 319; K-W, 329-330.

Absolution, and the Lord's Supper.) He thought of the Catechism as a lay person's Bible, although never as a substitute for the Bible itself. Luther had preached and published on individual parts of the Catechism previously, but the Catechisms themselves are the first works where all the parts are treated together. The "tables" that are the Small Catechism came out of Luther's work on the "larger" Catechism discussed below. The Small Catechism was particularly aimed at children, with the head of the household being responsible for teaching them (and for putting the text itself in the children's hands), although Luther also had pastors and schoolteachers in view. The chart form of the Small Catechism was published in German, perhaps in stages, in January and March of 1529, and the book form came out in May. (Additional text and various appendices were added over time.) While there were several Latin translations, that of Johannes Saueremann of Bamberg seems to have had Luther's approval and was essentially used in the 1584 Latin edition of *The Book of Concord*. By the time of *The Book of Concord* both the Small and Large Catechisms had in various ways been given confessional authority.<sup>203</sup>

## **Large Catechism**

Although the Large Catechism was likely begun before the smaller Catechism and itself provided the milieu out of which the smaller came, the Large Catechism was apparently published later: in April of 1529 and also in German. As with the smaller, the Large Catechism had children in view, even as the primary target for the Large Catechism were pastors, teachers, and parents. Luther revised the text in different ways for later editions. There was an almost-immediate Latin translation by John Lonicer in May of 1529, and there was another in 1529 by Vincentius Obsopoeus. When Selnecker put together the Latin *Book of Concord* he himself revised and then used Obsopoeus's translation.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> On both the Small and Large Catechisms, see Bente, "Historical Introductions," §81-118, pp.62-93. See also Jacobs, "Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes," II:45-51; *BKS*, xxviii-xxxi; Tappert, 337-338, 357-358; K-W, 345-347, 377-379.

<sup>204</sup> For relevant citations see above, n.203, p.74.



## Formula of Concord (Epitome & Solid Declaration)

The various confessional writings did not prevent all disputes from arising amongst the Lutherans and eventually brought about the Formula of Concord. Especially after the death of Luther in 1546 controversies arose that necessitated not so much a new confession but elaboration on some points of the earlier Augustana and its Apology. A war and “compromise” documents, such as the Augsburg and Leipzig Interims, contributed to the difficulties that necessitated the Formula. The specific details about each controversy do not need elaboration here, other than to note that in some cases they had aspects touching on philosophy (for example, terminology, or sub-sentential philosophy was involved). The discussion below presents together the basics of both the Formula of Concord’s Epitome, the shorter “version”, and its Solid (or Thoroughgoing) Declaration.<sup>205</sup>

Those contending for the faith that had been handed down to them in many cases desired peace and were working to bring it about, a process that culminated decades later in *The Book of Concord*. For example, Matthias Flacius Illyricus (1520-1575), who was on the “right” side in some controversies but the “wrong” side in others, made some of the first appeals for a resolution to the differences, although his appeals ultimately failed.<sup>206</sup> More effective approaches were eventually applied by Jacob Andreä and Martin Chemnitz. Over the course of 1572 and 1573, Andreä preached and published a number of sermons, directed to the pastors and laity, treating of controverted topics.<sup>207</sup> At the suggestion of Chemnitz, David Chytraeus (1531-1600), and others, Andreä reduced those sermons to theses and antitheses, which work when completed was known as the

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<sup>205</sup> For the historical background of the Formula and its controversies, see Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §119-266, pp.93-235; Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:51-56; Robert Kolb, *Andreae and the Formula of Concord: Six Sermons on the Way to Lutheran Unity* (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1977), 19-39. A more recent treatment is Irene Dingel, *Concordia Controversa: Die Öffentlichen Diskussionen um das Lutherische Konkordienwerk am Ende des 16. Jahrhunderts*, Quellen und Forschungen zur Reformationgeschichte, vol. 63 (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus, 1996).

<sup>206</sup> Specifically on Flacius, see Wilhelm Preger, *Matthias Flacius Illyricus und seine Zeit*, 2 vols. (Erlangen: T. Bläsing, 1859-1861). More recent is Oliver K. Olson, *Matthias Flacius and the Survival of Luther's Reform* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2002).

<sup>207</sup> The sermons are available in English translation: Kolb, *Andreae and the Formula*.

*Swabian Concordia*, or the Tübingen Book, and amounted to a first draft of the Formula. After conferences in 1574, Chemnitz in 1575 revised the document into what is known as the *Swabian-Saxon Concordia*. Later in 1575, at the direction of Elector August of Saxony, Lucas Osiander, Balthasar Bidembach and others produced a document known as the *Maulbronn Formula*, and, in 1576, the Elector had Andreä, Chemnitz, and Nicholas Selnecker meet with others, including Chytraeus, Andrew Musculus (1514-1581), and Christopher Körner (1518-1594). They revised the *Swabian-Saxon Concordia* with a view to the strengths of the *Maulbronn Formula* and produced what is known as the *Torgau Book*. Acting on feedback that the *Torgau Book* was too long, Andreä prepared a summary, or “Epitome”, of its contents. In March of 1577, meeting at Cloister Bergen near Magdeburg, Andreä, Chemnitz, and Selnecker made revisions, and later in 1577 Chytraeus, Körner, and Musculus joined the process of revisions that resulted in the *Bergic Book*, or Formula of Concord, as it is known today. Another name given to it, *Book of Concord* later was limited in use to the 1580 collection of all the Lutheran Confessions. Electors, dukes, princes, counts, barons, representatives of free cities, and pastors and teachers subscribed to the Formula over the course of approximately two years before it was published. A translation of the Formula from German to Latin was soon completed, the work of Lucas Osiander and Jacob Heerbrand (1521-1600, a former student of Luther and Melancthon’s in Wittenberg and colleague of Andreä in Tübingen<sup>208</sup>); the official Latin translation of the Formula is their work as revised by Selnecker and Chemnitz.<sup>209</sup>

From the foregoing narration of the Formula’s development, one likely can tell that naming the authors of the Formula of Concord’s Epitome and Solid Declaration is to

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<sup>208</sup> Theodore R. Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula of Concord: Four Architects of Lutheran Unity (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1977), 29. Although there are perhaps some questionable interpretations in Jungkuntz’s work, the facts seem to be accurate.

<sup>209</sup> On the peace process and development of the Formula of Concord itself, see Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §3, 267-293, pp.5-6, 235-256. See also Jacobs, “Historical Introduction, Notes, Appendixes and Indexes,” II:56-61; *BKS*, xxxii-xliv; Tappert, 463-464; K-W, 481-485. The K-W edition makes some indication of which of the relevant preceding works may be behind the various paragraphs of the Formula. There is also an accessible but brief discussion of the peace process in Kolb, Andreae and the Formula 39-57.

make a somewhat subjective judgment as to who contributed what. Although in various stages almost countless people were involved, Table 1<sup>210</sup> listed only six authors, as the Torgau book listed six signatures of those “chiefly responsible for its form and contents”.<sup>211</sup> J. A. O. Preus says Chytraeus “became disillusioned with the entire process of producing the Formula of Concord and in many ways simply backed out of it.”<sup>212</sup> Theodore Jungkuntz says that Koerner and Musculus were present at the Formula’s “final stages of writing and editing” for political reasons and played only “a minor role”.<sup>213</sup> Friedrich Bente says Selnecker “contributed little to the contents of the *Formula*”, although Bente credits Selnecker for cooperating “in its preparation, revision, and adoption”.<sup>214</sup> Those “disqualifications” leave us with Andreä and Chemnitz as the Formula’s principal authors to discuss in the paragraphs that follow.<sup>215</sup>

Born into a poor smith family, Jacob Andreä (1528-1590) went to school at Stuttgart and Tübingen thanks chiefly to the support of his duke. In 1546 at the age of 18, and after only one year of theological studies, Andreä returned to Stuttgart as a pastor. Andreä stayed at his post during the 1547 Smalcald War but was deposed in 1548 for refusing to submit to the Interim. The next year, 1549, he became pastor in Tübingen, where he resumed his doctoral studies and later, after some time in Göppingen, was superintendent, university professor, and university chancellor. Though Andreä did not attend Wittenberg’s university, that school and its theologians influenced him through John Brenz, who had been active in the duchy of Württemberg where Andreä was born and raised and who later became a 20-year personal acquaintance and colleague of Andreä, shaping his thought and practice. By making philosophical distinctions, such as

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<sup>210</sup> See above, p.62.

<sup>211</sup> Bente, “Historical Introductions,” 246.

<sup>212</sup> Jacob A. O. Preus, The Second Martin: The Life and Theology of Martin Chemnitz (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1994), 170.

<sup>213</sup> Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula, 11-12.

<sup>214</sup> Bente, “Historical Introductions,” 246.

<sup>215</sup> For his part, Jungkuntz does discuss Chytraeus (pp.69-88) and Selnecker (pp.89-109) along with Andreä and Chemnitz, and Jungkuntz writes that each brought something to the table that was needed for the Concord produced (Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula, 114). Preus also seems to intimate such sentiments (Preus, The Second Martin, *passim*).

those between causes, Andreä also rose to the defense of Brenz and Osiander, harmonizing what otherwise might have been taken as contradictory statements. A lecturer on Melanchthon's *Loci* and good at disputations, Andreä was nevertheless "deceived" by Victorin Strigel when adjudicating his case, which experience along with others is said to have cost Andreä the confidence of the Gnesio-Lutherans later when he was trying to make peace between the disputing parties. Andreä's involvement in the peace process introduced him to Martin Chemnitz when the two were conducting "visits" for Duke Julius of Brunswick. The Andreä-authored summary of the Torgau book that later became the Formula of Concord's Epitome is said to be "the only part of the Formula written by Andreae",<sup>216</sup> and some further minimize Andreä's role by pointing to that part's only being a summary of the rest. Nevertheless, Andreä is typically regarded as one of the leading authors of the Formula.<sup>217</sup>

The other leading author of the Formula is Martin Chemnitz (1522-1586). Chemnitz shares a namesake with "the other Martin" of the Reformation, but that was not his only point of contact with Luther. In 1536 Chemnitz briefly studied at Wittenberg as a 14-year-old, but family finances put an end to that and made his other schooling somewhat intermittent. Chemnitz also attended school in Magdeburg, where he learned Latin, Greek, dialectics, rhetoric, and, Chemnitz's favorite, astronomy. Later he continued his studies at Frankfurt an der Oder before eventually returning to Wittenberg in 1545, at which time Melanchthon "directed his studies". Chemnitz was gone from Wittenberg again from 1548 until 1553, at which time Chemnitz boarded with and even taught for Melanchthon. Chemnitz was ordained in November of 1554 and left Wittenberg for Brunswick, where he served the rest of his life. From there, Chemnitz, like Andreä, had occasion to be involved in the case of a pastor accused of false teaching, and Chemnitz exposed faulty reasoning and deceitful wording. Chemnitz's own writing was clear and significant, including such things as a treatise on the Lord's Supper and his

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<sup>216</sup> Preus, *The Second Martin*, 188.

<sup>217</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §275, pp.242-243; Jungkuntz, *Formulators of the Formula*, 19-45. See also the accessible biographical discussion of Andreä in Kolb, *Andreae and the Formula*, 9-18. There are brief biographical details about Andreä in Preus, *The Second Martin*, 171-172.

examination of the Council of Trent, even before he was involved in authoring the Formula of Concord.<sup>218</sup>

Thus, each of the documents contained in *The Book of Concord* arose from a specific context, even as their authors were shaped by their own educational background, including training in philosophy, and the circumstances in which they found themselves.

### ***Second-order regard for philosophy***

The opening of this introductory chapter made reference to *The Book of Concord*'s repudiation of philosophy and reason; now, with some details provided regarding the works contained in *The Book of Concord* and the four main authors of those works, attention turns to a more detailed examination of the works' regard for those two things. Such second-order data is especially enlightening before moving into the following chapters that contain primarily first-order data indicating whether the Reformers used philosophy and reason, and, if so, how they did so. Thus, this subsection summarizes all and closely examines two of the references made by the documents in *The Book of Concord* to "philosophers" and "philosophy", as well as the book's use of "philosophical" and "philosophize". The examination of these cognates gives both an idea of what "philosophy" is for the documents' authors and an idea of how they regard "philosophy".<sup>219</sup>

### **"Philosophers"**

When it comes to "philosophers", there are three references that may be regarded as neutral. What may be one neutral reference comes in the Apology's treatment of

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<sup>218</sup> Bente, "Historical Introductions," §275, pp.242-243; Jungkuntz, Formulators of the Formula 46-68. With Chapter 7 detailing his involvement in the Formula of Concord, a book length treatment of Chemnitz's life is Preus, The Second Martin.

<sup>219</sup> "Reason" is often indicted in the some of the same statements critical of philosophy. To be sure, a close examination of the references to "reason" and its English cognates and the references to equivalent cognates in Latin and German could be conducted, although a cursory examination of the English gives reason to believe the results would be similar to those for "philosophy" and its cognates as follow in the text.

A perhaps more interesting inquiry would look at all the "philosophers" who are named and all of the contexts in which they are named for assessment of the relevant topics and whether the references are positive or negative.

original sin, where Melanchthon explains that what the philosophers said about the need for something to be voluntary in order to be regarded as blameworthy in the civil courts was used in theology by the scholastics.<sup>220</sup>

Sed in scholis transtulerunt huc ex philosophia prorsus alienas sententias, quod propter passiones nec boni nec mali simus, nec laudemur nec vituperemur. Item nihil esse peccatum nisi voluntarium. Hae sententiae apud philosophos de civili iudicio dictae sunt, non de iudicio Dei. Nihilo prudentius assunt et alias sententias, naturam non esse malam. Id in loco dictum, non reprehendimus; sed non recte detorquetur ad extenuandum peccatum originis. Et tamen hae sententiae leguntur apud scholasticos, qui intempestive commiscent philosophicam seu civilem doctrinam de moribus cum evangelio. Neque haec in scholis tantum disputabantur, sed ex scholis, ut fit, efferebantur ad populum. Et hae persuasiones regnabant et alebant fiducium humanarum virium et opprimebant cognitionem gratiae Christi.

Here the scholastics have taken over from philosophy the totally foreign idea that because of our emotions we are neither good nor bad, neither to be praised nor condemned. Or they say that nothing is sin unless it is voluntary. The philosophers said this about the civil courts, not about the judgment of God. It is no wiser to say that nature is not evil. In its place we do not object to this statement, but it is not right to twist it in order to minimize original sin. Yet these ideas appear in the scholastics, who improperly mingle philosophical and civil ethics with the Gospel. As often happens, these ideas did not remain purely academic, but moved out among the people. These notions prevailed, feeding a trust in human powers and obscuring the knowledge of the grace of Christ.

Aber die Sophisten in Schulen haben zu dieser Sache wider die klare, öffentliche Schrift geredet und aus der Philosophie ihr eigen Träume und Sprüche erdichtet, sagen, daß wir um der bösen Lüste willen weder böse noch gut, noch zu schelten noch zu loben sind. Item, daß Lüste und Gedanken inwendig nicht Sünde sind, wenn ich nicht ganz drein verwillige. Dieselben Rede und Worte in der Philosophen Büchern sind zu verstehen von äusserlicher Ehrbarkeit für der Welt und auch äußerlicher Strafe für der Welt. Denn da ists wahr, wie die Juristen sagen: *L. cogitationis*, Gedanken sind zollfrei und straffrei. Aber Gott erforschet die Herzen; mit Gottes Gericht und Urteil ists anders. Also flicken sie auch an

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<sup>220</sup> Generally in keeping with the procedure noted above (n.80, p.24), quotations from *The Book of Concord* in this dissertation will be presented in the authoritative original language first, followed by the alternate language's translation, an English translation of the authoritative language, and, if needed, an English translation of the alternate language's translation if it is significantly different. Although the English translations are generally those of the Tappert edition, sources of all translations are noted.

diese Sache andere ungereimte Sprüche, nämlich: Gottes Geschöpf und die Natur könne an ihr selbst nicht böse sein. Das fecht ich nicht an, wenn es irgend geredt wird, da es statt hat; aber dazu soll dieser Spruch nicht angezogen werden die Erbsünde gering zu machen. Und dieselbigen Sprüche der Sophisten haben viel unsäglichen Schaden getan, durch welche sie die Philosophie und die Lehre, welche äusserlich Leben für der Welt belangend, vermischen mit dem Evangelio, und haben doch solchs nicht allein in der Schule gelehret, sondern auch öffentlich unverschämt für dem Volk gepredigt. Und die selbigen ungöttlichen, irrigen, fährliche und schädliche Lehren hatten in aller Welt überhand genommen, da ward nichts gepredigt denn unser Verdienst in aller Welt, dadurch ward das Erkenntnis Christi und das Evangelium ganz untergedrückt.

But the sophists in the schools have spoken on this matter against the clear, public Scripture and imagined from philosophy their own dreams and expressions, saying that on account of evil desires, we are neither evil nor good, we are neither to scold nor to praise. Again, that desires and thoughts are not sins, if I do not altogether consent thereto. These same statements and words in the philosopher's books are to be understood of external worthiness before the world and also of external punishment before the world. For there it is true, as the jurists say, *L.* [presumably *Lex cogitationis*, thoughts are toll-free and punishment-free. But God searches the hearts; with God's court and judgment it is a different matter. So they botch also in this matter other nonsensical expressions, namely: God's creature and nature cannot in itself be evil. That I do not contest, if someone speaks it where it has a place; but for that reason these expressions should not be stretched to trivialize original sin. And, these same expressions of the sophists have done much unspeakable damage, through which they have mixed philosophy and the teaching, which concerns the external life before the world, with the Gospel, and they have even taught such not only in the school but also unashamedly publicly preached it to the people. And the same ungodly, erroneous, dangerous, and harmful teachings have gotten out of hand in the whole world, where nothing was preached other than our merit in the world, whereby the knowledge of Christ and the Gospel have become completely suppressed.<sup>221</sup>

(This example includes several other negative uses of cognates to which attention is given later.) A second possibly neutral reference to “philosophers” comes in the Apology’s treatment of justification, how sinners stand righteous before God, and occurs

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<sup>221</sup> Ap II:43-44, *BKS*, 155-156; Tappert, 106. The English translation of the German is this author’s adaptation of the Triglotta, 117. The *BKS* editors note that the Latin expression in the German is after Ulpian and Cicero. Confer the discussion of this passage below at n.61, p. 217.

as Melanchthon identifies what the apostles describe as “the duty of love” (*de hoc officio dilectionis toties praecipunt apostolic; die apostel vermahnen nicht ohn Ursache zu solcher Liebe*) with what the philosophers call “leniency” (*philosophi vocant ἐπιείκεια; welches die Philosophi Epiikian genennet haben*).<sup>222</sup> The third arguably neutral reference comes in the Apology’s treatment of monastic vows, where Melanchthon says the philosophers praise Aristippus for throwing his gold into the sea, though Melanchthon says, “Such examples have nothing to do with Christian perfection” (*Talia exempla nihil pertinent ad christianam perfectionem*).<sup>223</sup>

The vast majority of the *Book of Concord* references to “philosophers” are negative. Several of these negative references come in connection with misunderstandings of righteousness: the scholastics are said to “have followed the philosophers” (*Hic scholastici secuti philosophos; Hie haben die Scholastici den Philosophis gefolget*) in teaching “only a righteousness of reason—that is, civil works” (*tantum docent iustitiam rationis, videlicet civilian opera; lehren sie allein ein Gerechtigkeit und Frommkeit, da ein Mensch äußerlich für der Welt ein ehrbar Leben führet und gute Werk tut*) that gives too much ability to unconverted reason (*quod ratio sine spiritu sancto poscit diligere Deum supra omnia; daß die menschliche Vernunft ohne den heiligen Geist vermüge Gott über alles zu lieben*),<sup>224</sup> which civil righteousness the philosophers themselves are elsewhere also said not to have achieved.<sup>225</sup> Because the

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<sup>222</sup> Ap IV:243, Tappert, 141; *BKS*, 207. The translation of ἐπιείκεια may be debated. The Triglotta, 189, anticipates Tappert’s “leniency”, but K-W, 157, renders “fairness”. The word is classically defined as “reasonableness”, “equity”, and “clemency” (Henry George Liddell and Robert Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon* [New York: Harper, 1968], 632).

In canon law, ἐπιείκεια is equity, which explains or corrects a positive human law, and can be defined as follows: “The benign application of the law according to what is good and equitable, which decides that the lawgiver does not intend that, because of exceptional circumstances, some particular case be included under his general law.” (Amleto Giovanni Cicognani, *Canon Law*, 2nd rev. ed. [Philadelphia: Dolphin Press, 1935], 15.) The Reformers’ uses, of course, are not necessarily going to follow canon law.

<sup>223</sup> Ap XXVII:46, Tappert, 277; *BKS*, 391. (This particular statement is not found in the German version of the Apology. Confer below at n.226, p.83; n.233, p.84; n.237, p.85; n.239, p.85; n.240, p.86; n.241, p.86; n.243, p.86; and n.244, p.86. Compare below at n.235, p.85. Omissions from the Latin to the German may have some significance, perhaps lessening the anti-philosophy polemic given the confessions’ own use of philosophical terminology and concepts.) The concept of “perfection” is a sentential use of philosophy outside the scope of the dissertation.

<sup>224</sup> Ap IV:9, Tappert, 108; *BKS*, 160.

<sup>225</sup> AC<sub>G&L</sub> XX:33; Ap XVIII:5.



philosophers look for the wrong righteousness (in contrast to the righteousness revealed by the foolishness of the Gospel), the philosophers are said to be deceived by human wisdom, along with the scholastics, Pharisees, and Mohammedans.<sup>226</sup> *The Book of Concord* criticizes the philosophers not only on the topic of righteousness but on other related and unrelated topics. Along with the papists, sophists, and human reason, the philosophers are said to be unable to indicate what kind of accident original sin is; only Holy Scripture can correctly define it.<sup>227</sup> Following the philosophers, the scholastics are said to teach “error and stupidity” (*Irrtum und Blindheit; errores et caligines*) when saying that after the fall a human’s natural powers are “whole and uncorrupted” (*ganz und unverderbt; integras et incorruptas*) and that a human “by nature possesses a right understanding and a good will” (*von Natur eine rechte Vernunft und guten Willen; rationem rectam et bonam voluntatem*).<sup>228</sup> Where philosophers understand only one mode of being, God is said to have more,<sup>229</sup> and what is called the “dream” (*Schwarm; delirum*) of Stoic philosophers regarding compulsion, like that of the heretical Manicheans, is condemned.<sup>230</sup>

## “Philosophy”

When it comes to “philosophy”, the authors of *The Book of Concord* in four references have only negative things to say. The first of those references, where, in the Apology’s treatment of original sin, “philosophy” is given as the scholastics’ source of the “foreign idea” that people’s emotions make them “neither good nor bad”, has already

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<sup>226</sup> Ap IV:229. Although working with limited knowledge but wanting an honest presentation about those who today we would call Muslims, Luther for one often polemicized against Islam, primarily for spiritual reasons, although he saw the religion as a threat to all three estates. He emphasized how Christians should repent in the face of Turkish attacks. Luther could not only group his Roman Catholic opponents, Jews, and Muslims together since he held that all taught works righteousness, but he could substitute one for the other in his polemic and accuse one of trying to keep information about the other secret so people would not know how alike they were. (Sarah Henrich and James L. Boyce, “Martin Luther—Translations of Two Prefaces on Islam,” *Word & World* XVI.2 [1996].) Naumann also helpfully reviews not only Luther’s but *The Book of Concord*’s views of Islam (Jonathan C. Naumann, “Luther, Lutherans, and Islam,” *Concordia Journal* 28.1 [2002]).

<sup>227</sup> SD I:60.

<sup>228</sup> SA III:i:3-4, Tappert, 302; *BKS*, 434.

<sup>229</sup> Ep VII:14; SD VII:97. A discussion of Christ’s three modes follows there.

<sup>230</sup> Ep II:8, Tappert, 470-471; *BKS*, 778.

been seen.<sup>231</sup> The second negative reference to “philosophy” comes in the Apology’s treatment of justification, where Melanchthon in discussing the righteousness of reason and civil works begins a string of rhetorical questions by asking, “If this is Christian righteousness, what difference is there between philosophy and the teaching of Christ?” (*Si haec est iustitia christiana, quid interest inter philosophiam et Christi doctrinam?*; ... *was doch vor Unterscheid fein wollt zwischen der Philosophen und Christi Lehre ...*).<sup>232</sup> (This particular paragraph goes on to mention some philosophers, including Aristotle, by name, and ends with one of *The Book of Concord*’s references to “philosophical” that is mentioned again below.) The third negative reference to “philosophy” comes later in the same article from the Apology dealing with justification, as Melanchthon writes that, “the theologians have mingled more than enough philosophy with Christian doctrine” (*Theologos constat plura ex philosophia admiscuisse doctrinae christianae, quam satis erat*).<sup>233</sup> *The Book of Concord*’s fourth and final negative reference to “philosophy” comes in the Formula of Concord’s Solid Declaration, where the authors treat of free will and deny philosophy and reason a role as the ultimate source of truth.

Diese Erklärung und Häuptantwort auf die im Eingang dieses Artikels gesetzte Häuptfrage und *statum controversiae* bestätigen und bekräftigen folgende Gründe des göttlichen Worts, welche, ob sie wohl der hoffärtigen Vernunft und Philosophie zuwider sind, so wissen wir doch, daß „dieser verkehrten Welt Weisheit nur Torheit für Gott“ ist, und daß von den Artikeln des Glaubens alleine aus Gottes Wort soll geurteilt werden.

Hanc piam declarationem et generalem (ad statum causae, in exordio huius tractationis propositum) responsionem e verbo Dei desumpta argumenta, quae recitabimus, confirmant. Licet autem ea supercilio humanae rationis et philosophiae displiceant, tamen novimus mundi huius perversissimi sapientiam coram Deo esse stultitiam et quod de capitibus religionis nostrae tantummodo ex Verbo Dei sit iudicandum.

The following reasons from the Word of God support and confirm the foregoing explanation of and summary reply to the questions and issues stated at the beginning of this article. It is true that they are contrary to

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<sup>231</sup> Ap II:43, see above, at n.221, p.81.

<sup>232</sup> Ap IV:12, Tappert, 109; *BKS*, 161. (This statement was part of the epigram at the beginning of this chapter.)

<sup>233</sup> Ap IV:390, Tappert, 166; *BKS*, 232. (This particular statement is not found in the German version of the Apology.)

proud reason and philosophy, but we also know that ‘the wisdom of this perverse world is folly with God’ and that it is only from the Word of God that judgments on articles of faith are to be pronounced.<sup>234</sup>

This statement is especially significant since the statement directly attacks philosophy as an ultimate method for obtaining the truth.

### “Philosophical”

When it comes to the adjective “philosophical”, *The Book of Concord* uses the word to make negative comments about a number of things. That the most frequently attacked item is specifically “philosophical righteousness” (*philosophicam iustitiam*) by this point is hardly a surprise; those four attacks come in the Latin version of Augsburg Confession’s treatment of good works and in the Apology’s treatments of original sin and justification (the latter two of which attacks come in a paragraph to which reference was made earlier).<sup>235</sup> In the same context as these attacks on “philosophical righteousness” come attacks: on “philosophical views about the perfection of nature” (*philosophiam de perfectione naturae*; *viel Philosophie gemengt und viel von dem Licht der Vernunft*) that the scholastics are said to have mingled with Christian doctrine instead of employing more the Word of God,<sup>236</sup> on “philosophical questions” (*dialecticis quaestionibus*; *quaestiones philosophicas*; *philosophische Quästion und Frage*) that the preachers who want to appear to be or are “more learned” (*doctiores*; *gelehrtesten*) are said to take up but not understand,<sup>237</sup> on “philosophical ethics” the scholastics mingled with the Gospel,<sup>238</sup> on “vain ... philosophical speculations” (*vanitatem illarum speculationem philosophicarum*),<sup>239</sup> on “philosophical or judicial investigation” (*in philosophia aut in*

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<sup>234</sup> SD II:8, *BKS*, 874; Tappert, 521. The quoted phrase is from 1 Corinthians 3:19.

<sup>235</sup> AC<sub>L</sub> XX:18; Ap II:12; Ap IV:13,16.

<sup>236</sup> Ap II:12-13, Tappert, 102; *BKS*, 149-150. The German equally indicts “much from the light of reason”.

<sup>237</sup> Ap II:15, Tappert, 102; *BKS*, 150. Ap XXIV:43, Tappert, 258; *BKS*, 362.

<sup>238</sup> Ap II:43. See above at n.221, p.81.

<sup>239</sup> Ap IV:37, Tappert, 112; *BKS*, 167. (This particular statement regarding the “philosophical speculations” is not found in the German version of the Apology.)

*foro quaerimus*) of one's own righteousness,<sup>240</sup> on "a philosophical or a Jewish manner" (*seu philosophico seu iudaico more*) of interpreting Holy Scripture,<sup>241</sup> on "philosophical teaching" about human righteousness different from "the teaching of the Holy Spirit" regarding spiritual righteousness (*inter iustitiam humanam et spiritualem, inter philosophicam et doctrinam spiritus sancti*; ),<sup>242</sup> on "philosophical disputes" (*rixarum philosophicarum*) that come from scholastic doctrine,<sup>243</sup> and on "philosophical discussions" (*philosophicis disputationibus*) that obscure Christ.<sup>244</sup>

### **"Philosophize"**

When it comes to the verb "philosophize", *The Book of Concord* makes only one use, which use also carries a negative connotation. In the Apology's treatment of original sin, while discussing the definition of original sin and concupiscence, Melancthon writes how "so many philosophize about it irreligiously" (*de ea nonnulli parum religiose philosophantur*), to which reference the German adds a comment about their failing to use God's Word, or Holy Scripture.<sup>245</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> Ap IV:306, Tappert, 154; *BKS*, 219. (This particular statement is not found in the German version of the Apology.) Note this reference is grouped with references to the English adjective "philosophical", though in the Latin the noun form of the word is used.

<sup>241</sup> Ap IV:376, Tappert, 164; *BKS*, 230. (This particular statement is not found in the German version of the Apology.)

<sup>242</sup> Ap XVIII:9, Tappert, 226; *BKS*, 312. Note this reference is grouped with references to the English adjective "philosophical", though in the Latin the noun form of the word is used.

The German is different: *Also bleibt weltliche, äußerliche Zucht; denn Gott will ungeschicktes, wildes, freches Wesen und Leben nicht haben, und wird doch ein rechter Unterscheid gemacht unter äußerlichem Weltleben und Frömmigkeit, und der Frömmigkeit, die für Gott gilt, die nicht philosophisch äußerlich ist, sondern inwendig im Herzen.* ("What remains is a worldly, external discipline; because God will not have clumsy, wild, insolent behavior and life, and yet a proper distinction is made between external worldly life and goodness, and the goodness, which is relevant for God, which is not philosophically external but internal in the heart.") (The English translation of the German is this author's adaptation of the Triglotta, 337.)

<sup>243</sup> Ap XXI:41, Tappert, 235; *BKS*, 326. (This particular statement is not found in the German version of the Apology.)

<sup>244</sup> Ap XXVII:54, Tappert, 278; *BKS*, 393. (This particular statement is not found in the German version of the Apology.)

<sup>245</sup> Ap II:4, Tappert, 101; *BKS*, 147.

The German reads: *Darumb so ich habe wollen sagen, was Erbsunde sei, ist das nicht zu übergehen gewest, sonderlich dieser Zeit, da etliche von derselbigen angeborenen bösen Lust mehr heidnisch aus der Philosophie, denn nach dem göttlichen Wort oder nach der heiligen Schrift reden.* "Therefore I have wished to say what original sin is, so that it is not passed over, especially at this time,

## Second-order “philosophy” summary

The foregoing examination of *The Book of Concord*’s second-order use of philosophy—that is, the use of “philosophers”, “philosophy”, “philosophical”, and “philosophize”—has shown an overwhelmingly negative regard, arguably for the method, subject matter, and purpose of the intellectual activity that is “philosophy”. This negative regard has emerged primarily in discussions of justification, but the negative regard has also been evident in other places where the issue of righteousness has come up, such as in faith and good works, original sin, free will, invocation of the saints, the mass, monastic vows, and the Lord’s Supper. Although the vast majority of the references were in early documents written by Melanchthon, there was no apparent difference (other than frequency) between those references and the others in early documents written by Luther or in later documents written by Andreä and Chemnitz.

Striking also in this examination has been how *The Book of Concord* refers to philosophy and things philosophical being mingled or mixed with the Gospel or Christian doctrine, objecting to such an adulteration of Christian doctrine, and how, directly or indirectly calling opponents “philosophers”, *The Book of Concord* groups them with scholastics, Pharisees, Mohammedans, papists, sophists, and the like. Furthermore, it has been striking how philosophy and its cognates were often set opposite God’s Word and Holy Scripture<sup>246</sup> and how the polemic against philosophy was often sharper in the Latin.<sup>247</sup>

Yet, despite the repudiation of second-order philosophy just detailed (and an interesting second-order regard for logic detailed in the next chapter), the authors of the works contained in *The Book of Concord*, as the following chapters show, nevertheless simultaneously make supra-sentential use of philosophy in the form of logic and

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when many speak of this inborn, wicked desire more in a heathenish way from philosophy than according to God’s Word, or according to Holy Scripture.” (The English translation of the German is this author’s, based in part on the Triglotta, 105.)

<sup>246</sup> See examples above at n.227, p.83; n.236, p.85; and n.245, p.86.

<sup>247</sup> See the listing of examples above in n.223, p.82. In addition to the example of a difference in the German to the Latin noted above (n.235, p.85), the German of Apology IV:235 in the context of perfection makes reference to books specifically of “philosophers” where the Latin simply refers to “sages” (see *BKS*, 205; Tappert, 140). (See also the reference to “perfection” at n.223, p.82.)

argumentation. Further consideration is needed to see the continuity of such uses with the medieval tradition and within the Reformation tradition itself. The rest of the dissertation in part considers those very questions.

## Dissertation Organization

The following four chapters of this dissertation present the evidence to consider and begin that consideration, while the last chapter of the dissertation draws the conclusions from that consideration. This seventh and final subsection of this introductory chapter thus briefly overviews the organization and content of the following five chapters.

Chapter II addresses meta-logical opinions and practices in *The Book of Concord*. First in Chapter II is a survey of the second-order data regarding “logic”, principally from the Apology, although there is some data from the *locus* on Original Sin in both the Apology and the Formula of Concord, which allows for a very direct comparison. The rest of Chapter II looks at how the works within *The Book of Concord* are organized by τόποι or *loci* (“places” or “topics”). That examination includes other major uses of the relevant words and a survey of the philosophical background for the method of organization, from Aristotle forward.

Chapter III deals with *The Book of Concord*’s use of inductive argumentation. The two types of inductive argumentation explored are example and analogy. The philosophical background of these inductive methods is first presented to serve as a basis for comparison after the way *The Book of Concord* uses the two methods has also been presented. That the Reformers use the two methods both for their own positions and against their opponents’ positions will be seen.

Chapter IV explores the use of deductive argumentation in *The Book of Concord*. After presenting the philosophical background of syllogisms, the chapter moves on to survey Melancthon’s method regarding “sophistries”, terminology used in connection with the arguments, and then arguing passages themselves, making general observations along the way.

Chapter V in some ways is a case study of how the logic and argumentation of *The Book of Concord* is used. First, Chapter V shows how the word *prius* (“before”) is used in *The Book of Concord*, eventually indicating some sense of necessity for works to follow faith. With a cause and effect relationship between faith and works established, the chapter goes on to examine how the Reformers treated justification by faith as inseparable but distinct from the resulting good works of sanctification, arguably using a somewhat controversial philosophical concept known as a formal distinction, which, if true, makes the justification-sanctification distinction less discontinuous than often alleged.

As noted above, the final chapter, Chapter VI, draws on the evidence and discussion of the preceding chapters pertaining to the supra-sentential use of philosophy by *The Book of Concord* to reach conclusions about its repudiation but simultaneous use, its continuity with the preceding medieval tradition, and its continuity within the Reformation tradition, contrasting the uses by the authors of the earlier documents with the uses of the authors of the later documents.

## **Chapter I Summary**

In the beginning, through the time of Tertullian, and up through the time of the Reformation, the relationship between theology and philosophy occasionally was contentious. Nevertheless, theologians well-trained in philosophy have allowed philosophy and reason to serve theology in a ministerial role, as handmaid to the mistress of the house, a metaphor with a basis in such Bible passages as Proverbs 9; Genesis 16, 29-30. Although Martin Luther and some of his Reformation successors could give blanket condemnations of philosophy and reason (such as Luther’s famous quotation that “reason is the devil’s whore”), initial investigations indicated they still used “baptized” forms of philosophy and reason. A close reading of *The Book of Concord* is uniquely suited to explore the Reformers’ repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy and that use of philosophy’s continuity and discontinuity between the late-medieval and Reformation periods and within the Reformation era itself. The close reading is more sensitive than somewhat-superficial previous studies, and *The Book of Concord* provides

works of a similar type from several earlier and later authors that were widely accepted and thus represent more than the positions of the individual authors, thereby allowing a more-meaningful comparison. After introducing the relevant works and their philosophically trained authors, this chapter provided evidence that those same authors could speak quite sharply against philosophy and set limits to what it and its practitioners could do in relationship to Scripture. What they said about logic and the philosophical way they organized their works is taken up next, in Chapter II.



## Chapter II: Metalogical Opinions and Practices

*In the same way, prior to this controversy, the theologians in our schools and churches, following the rules of logic, used the same terminology freely and without incurring suspicion, and for that reason without ever being corrected either by Dr. Luther or by any other dependable teacher of our pure Evangelical churches.*

—Solid Declaration I:56

In the Formula of Concord, the confessors claim that “following the rules of logic” (*nach der Dialectica; iuxta regulas dialecticae*) Lutheran theologians had not run into problems prior to the controversy over terminology related to original sin.<sup>1</sup> Indeed, Lutheran theologians frequently made uncontroversial supra-sentential use of philosophy, such as logic and organization, and in more than just the article on Original Sin. This chapter traces out the Reformers’ second-order regard for logic and the confessors’ organizational approach according to τόποι or *loci* (“topics” or “places”).

### Regard for logic

Perhaps the most obvious next place to proceed with the examination of the supra-sentential use of philosophy in *The Book of Concord* is with the specific uses the authors in the work make of the words for “logic” and their cognates.<sup>2</sup> This examination yields what might be called a second-order regard for logic. The uses of “logic” and its cognates follow below, roughly in the order that they appear in *The Book of Concord*, which, in this case, is also essentially chronological order.

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<sup>1</sup> SD I:56, Tappert, 518; BKS, 863.

<sup>2</sup> The words in the Latin writings are *dialecticum*, *dialectici* and *dialectica*, *dialecticae*; the words in the German writings are both the German *Dialektika* and the Latin *dialectica*, *dialecticae*. Both the Latin *dialecticum*, *dialectici* and *dialectica*, *dialecticae* are said to mean “dialectics (pl.), logic; art of logic/reasoning; logic questions” (Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short, *A Latin Dictionary* [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975]).

The English word “logic” derives through the French from medieval Latin *logica*, which translates the Greek λογική, an elliptical expression for ἡ λογικὴ τέχνη or *ars logica* (“logical art”). Although often used synonymously with “dialectic(s)”, more strictly speaking “logic” was a broader category that included “dialectic(s)”, which itself was used in various ways by different authors. (*OED*, 4:599-600; 8:1107-1108.)

## ***Apology IV (Justification)***

Melanchthon is the principal author of the document that contains six of the seven uses of “logic” and its cognates. The first use considered here comes in Apology IV, Justification, where Melanchthon says his opponents “do violence not only to Scripture but also to the very usage of language” (*non solum contra Scripturam, sed etiam contra sermonis consuetudinem; nicht allein wider die Schrift, sondern auch wider gemeinen Gebrauch zu reden*) and use a completely new logic as they reason, on the basis of the word “reward” (μισθός, *merces*) in Luke 6:23, that works merit eternal life apart from faith.<sup>3</sup>

Plane nova est haec dialectica: vocabulum audimus mercedis, igitur nihil opus est mediatore Christo aut fide habente accessum ad Deum propter Christum, non propter opera nostra. Quis non videt haec esse ἀνακόλουθα?

Das ist gar einen neue Dialectica, da finden wir das enzele Wort Lohn, darum tun unsere Werk vollkömmlich genug dem Gesetze, darum sind wir durch unsere Werke Gott angenehm, dürfen keiner Gnade noch keines Mittlers Christi. Unsere gute Werke sind der Schatz, dadurch das ewige Leben erkauf und erlanget wird.

Such logic is completely new. We hear the term “reward”: therefore we need neither Christ the mediator nor the faith that has access to God for Christ’s sake, not for our works’ sake. Who cannot see that this is a fallacious conclusion?<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Ap IV:357, Tappert, 161-162; *BKS*, 227-228. (Confer Ap IV:362.) There may be an intended sense of “common usage”, although with Tappert confer Triglotta, 217,219; K-W, 170.

The label *nova dialectica* is probably not to be taken a reference to the *logica nova*, the “new logic”, of Aristotle’s more recently discovered works (see in the text below, p.198). In general, calling something “new” is a negative reference, describing it as an innovation or otherwise heretical. In this context, Melanchthon seems to be suggesting his opponents’ “new” logic is no logic at all.

<sup>4</sup> Ap IV:358, *BKS*, 228; Tappert, 162. The Triglotta’s English translation renders the rhetorical question: “Who does not see that these are anacoluthons?” K-W does not seem to translate the question. The lack of the specific Greek term in the German version is likely due to the simplifying tendencies of the German version for its different audience.

According to the *OED*, the etymology of the Greek word, which means “wanting sequence” is the privative prefix ἀν + ἀκόλουθος “following”. Thus, an “anacoluthon” is an instance of a grammatical problem where a change is made to a second constructions without completing the first (*OED*, 1:427). Put another way, the term refers to “Beginning a sentence in one way and continuing or ending it in another” (John A. Cuddon, “anacoluthon,” *The Penguin Dictionary of Literary Terms and Literary Theory*, Fourth ed. [New York: Penguin Books, 1998], 33). The literary figure of speech may be used by design to clarify

Significantly, Melanchthon here connects the misuse of Scripture with the misuses of language and logic.<sup>5</sup> Furthermore, he not only accuses his opponents of bad logic, but he also intimates that their error in logic is clear to all, which by implication means the error in logic is especially clear to the theologians of the Augsburg Confession who can use logic soundly.

## ***Apology XII (Penitence)***

Sound logic was taught in the medieval schools, and how one made use of logic could depend on how one was taught. So, the fact that Melanchthon's polemic against his

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or emphasize something or simply be more elegant.

In the third edition of Melanchthon's logic (1547), however, the term, which he attributes to Plato, is used for making a connection where one does not exist. (Confer "inconsequence" in Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon 109.) Melanchthon says the error means the consequence, or conclusion, must be denied. He gives the following example:

In omnibus sanctis in hac vita manet peccatum, (In all the saints in whom there is life [P] sin remains [M].)

Adulterium est peccatum. (Adultery [S] is a sin [M].)

Ergo in sanctis manet adulterium. (Therefore adultery [S] remains in the saints [P].)

Melanchthon goes on to explain that the AAA form of the syllogism is not valid in the second figure and that nothing can follow from pure affirmatives in this form. (CR, 13:716-717; confer BKS, 228 n.1; this author's translation. Confer and compare the edition of his logic text current at the time Melanchthon wrote the Apology, Philipp Melanchthon, De dialectica libri quatuor, 2nd [1528] ed. [Wittenberg: Josephum Klug, 1536], 207-208. [Neither the pages of the book as photographed nor the images of the folios on the fiche are numbered, so for reference purposes the pages beginning with the title page were given cardinal numbers the way pages of a book would be numbered today.]) The example of the bad argument is significant; all Melanchthon's examples are said to be ethical and scriptural (Lisa Jardine, "Humanism and the teaching of logic," The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 803 n.37; confer Sachiko Kusukawa, "Vinculum Concordiae: Lutheran Method by Philip Melanchthon," Method and Order in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, eds. Daniel A. Di Liscia, Eckhard Kessler and Charlotte Methuen [Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1997] 346). Background on syllogisms and their forms is provided below, beginning on p.193.

A search for any declension of the Greek term ἀνακόλουθα in the Latin and for the English term "anacoluthon" in the English failed to produce any other uses in *The Book of Concord*. The Tappert edition, however, which in this case of Ap IV:358 translated ἀνακόλουθα as "fallacy", in Ap IV:222 uses "It would be a fallacy to reason" to translate *Neque vero recte ratiocinabitur* (the German does not have a direct equivalent) (Tappert, 137; BKS, 202) and in Ap IV 246 "It is therefore fallacious for our opponents to argue" to translate *Quare errant adversarii, cum hinc ratiocinantur* (*Darum irren die Widersacher weit*) (Tappert, 142; BKS, 208). For more on the uses of *ratiocinor*, see n.72 below, p.221.

<sup>5</sup> In the *octavo* edition of Ap IV (see the explanation above n.192), however, Melanchthon says, "We are not engaging in a mere war over words" (K-W, 170). Confer SD I:3, where nearly an identical statement is made regarding the dispute over original sin: "This controversy concerning original sin is not a useless contention about words" (Tappert, 507; BKS, 648: *Nun ist dieser Streit von der Erbsünde nicht ein unnötiges Gezänk; Haec disceptatio de peccato originis non est certamen quoddam non necessarium, sed maximi moment*).

opponents includes raising questions about their logic teachers is not surprising. We find a case in point in the Apology at the *locus* of penitence.<sup>6</sup>

Deus perdat istos impios sophistas, tam scelestes detorquentes verbum Dei ad sua somnia vanissima. Quis bonus vir non commoveatur indignitate tanta? Christus inquit: Agite poenitentiam, apostoli praedicant poenitentiam: igitur poenae aeternae compensantur poenis purgatorii, igitur claves habent mandatum remittendi partem poenarum purgatorii, igitur satisfactiones redimunt poenas purgatorii. Quis docuit istos asinos hanc dialecticam? Sed haec neque dialectica neque sophistica est, sed est sycophantica. Ideo allegant hanc vocem, Agite poenitentiam, ut cum tale dictum contra nos citatum imperiti audiunt, concipiant opinionem nos totam poenitentiam tollere. His artibus alienare animos et inflammare odia conantur, ut con clament contra nos imperiti, tollendos esse e medio tam pestilentes haereticos, qui improbent poenitentiam.

Gott wolle schänden und strafen solche verzweifelte Sophisten, die so verräterlich und bösllich das heilige Evangelium auf ihre Träume deuten. Welchem from men, ehrbarn Mann sollt nicht solch groß, öffentlich Mißbrauch göttliches Worts im Herzen wehe tun? Christus spricht: Tut Buß. Die Aposteln predigen auch: Tut Buße. Darum ist durch die Sprüche beweiset, daß Gott Sünde nicht vergebe ohne um der erdichteten Satisfaction willen? Wer hat die groben unverschämten Esel solche Dialektiken gelehret? Es ist aber nicht Dialektika noch Sophistika, sondern es sind Bubenstück, mit Gottes Word also zu spielen und so verdrießlichen Mutwillen zu treiben. Darum ziehen sie den Spruch als dunkel und verdeckt an aus dem Evangelio: Tut Buße usw., daß, wenn die Unerfahrenen hören, daß dies Wort aus dem Evangelio wird wider uns angezogen, denken sollen, wir sein solche Leute, die gar nichts von der Buße halten. Mit solchen Böswichtstücken gehen sie mit uns um. Wiewohl sie wissen, daß wir recht von der Buße lehren, so wollen sie doch die Leute abschrecken und gern viele Leute wider uns erbittern, daß die Unerfahrenen schreien sollen: Kreuzige, kreuzige solche schädliche Ketzer, welche von der Buß nicht halten; und werden also öffentlich als die Lügner hier überwunden.

May God destroy these wicked sophists who so sinfully twist the Word of God to suit their vain dreams! What good man would not be moved by such dishonesty? Christ says, “Be penitent”; the apostles preach penitence. Therefore the punishments of purgatory compensate for eternal punishments; therefore the keys have the command to remit part of the

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<sup>6</sup> Melancthon’s logic textbook was mentioned above in n.4, p.92, and is further discussed below beginning on p.199. See also, for example, Bente, “Historical Introductions,” §169.

punishments of purgatory; therefore satisfactions buy off the punishments of purgatory. Who ever taught these asses such logic? This is not logic or even sophistry, but sheer dishonesty. They quote the word, “Be penitent,” against us so that when the uninitiated hear this they will conclude that we deny all penitence. With such tricks they try to alienate men’s minds and fan their hatred, so that the uninitiated may demand that such terrible heretics, who reject penitence, should be removed from their midst.<sup>7</sup>

Again, Melanchthon connects twisting the Word of God to bad logic (and vice versa). In the case of penitence, he regards his opponents’ bad arguments as worse than sophistry—the bad arguments are dishonest tricks.

### ***Apology XX (Good Works)***

At the Apology’s *locus* on Good Works, Melanchthon again impugns his opponents by stating that they learned tricks in their logic courses that enable them to draw out of Scripture whatever conclusions they want. Melanchthon even gives expression to their bad arguments.

Adversarii etiam addunt testimonia suae condemnationi. Et operae pretium est unum atque alterum recitare. Allegant ex Petro: Studete firmam facere vocationem vestram etc. Iam vides, lector, adversarios nostros non perdidisse operam in discenda dialectica, sed habere artificium ratiocinandi ex Scripturis prorsus, quidquid libet. Facite firmam vocationem vestram per bona opera. Igitur opera merentur remissionem peccatorum. Sane concinna erit argumentatio, si quis sic ratiocinetur de reo capitalis poenae, cui poena remissa est: Magistratus praecipit, ut in posterum abstineas ab alieno. Igitur per hoc meritis es condonationem poenae, quod nunc ab alieno abstines. Sic argumentari est ex non causa causam facere. Nam Petrus loquitur de operibus sequentibus remissionem peccatorum et docet, quare sint facienda, scilicet, ut sit firma vocatio, hoc est, ne vocatione sua excidant, si iterum peccent. Facite bona opera, ut perseveretis in vocatione, ne amittatis dona vocationis, quae prius contigerunt, non propter sequentia opera, sed iam retinentur fide, et fides non manet in his, qui amittunt spiritum sanctum, qui abiiciunt poenitentiam, sicut supra diximus, fidem exsistere in poenitentia.

Die Widersacher führen auch etliche Sprüche der Schrift ein, warum sie diesen Artikel verdammen. Nämlich bringen sie den Spruch Petri herfür: „Fleißet euch, euren Beruf fest zu machen durch gute Werk

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<sup>7</sup> Ap XII:123, BKS, 277-278; Tappert, 200-201.

usw.” Da siehet jedermann, daß unsere Widersacher ihr Geld nicht übel angelegt, da sie *Dialecticam* studiert haben. Denn sie mügen die Sprüche der Schrift gereimt, ungereimt, schließlich, unschließlich, wie sie wollen, und wie es ihnen gefällt, einführen. Denn also schließen sie: Petrus sagt: „Fleißet euch durch gute Werke, euren Beruf fest zu machen”, darum verdienen wir durch Werke Vergebung der Sunde. Es ist wahrlich ein feine Argumentation, als wenn einer spräche von einem Beklagten im Halsgericht, welchem das Leben gefristet wäre: Der Richter hat geboten, daß der forthin sich solcher Übeltat soll enthalten; darum so hat er verdienet mit solchem Enthalten, daß ihm das Leben gefristet ist. Also argumentieren, das heißt, *ex non causa causam* machen. Denn Petrus redet von guten Werken und Früchten, die da folgen dem Glauben, und lehret, warum man sie tun solle, nämlich, daß wir unsern Beruf fest machen, das ist, daß wir nicht wiederum vom Evangelio fallen, wenn wir wiederum sundigeten. Will sagen: Tut gute Werke, daß ihr bei dem Evangelio, bei eurem himmlischen Beruf bleibet, daß ihr nicht wiederum abfallet, kalt werdet, verlieret Geist und Gaben, die euch aus Gnaden durch Christum widerfahren sind, nicht um der folgenden Werke willen. Denn in dem Beruf bleibet man fest durch den Glauben, und der Glaube und heilige Geist bleibet in denjenigen nicht, die sündlich Leben führen.

Our opponents quote many Scripture passages to show why they have condemned our article, and it is worthwhile to examine some of these. From Peter they quote (II Pet. 1:10), “Be zealous to confirm your call.” Now you see, dear reader, that our opponents have indeed got the most out of their logic courses, for they have learned the trick of deducing from Scripture whatever suits them. “Confirm your call by good works”; therefore works merit the forgiveness of sins! By the same argument we could say to a man who was sentenced to die and then pardoned, “The magistrate commands that from now on you steal no more, and therefore you are pardoned.” Such argumentation is to make the effect the cause. For Peter is talking about the works that follow the forgiveness of sins; he is giving instruction that they should be done in order to confirm their call, that is, lest they fall from their call by sinning again. Do good works to persevere in your call and not to lose its gifts, which were given to you before your works and not because of them and which now are kept by faith. Faith does not remain in those who lose the Holy Spirit and reject penitence; as we have said before, faith has its existence in penitence.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Ap XX:12-13, *BKS*, 315-316; Tappert, 228-229. Note that in this case the German translator uses the Latin words in the German text (confer n.77 below, p.354, where the German philosophical and theological vocabulary is said to still be in development).

The specific error Melanchthon accuses his opponents of committing is making a non-cause a cause,<sup>9</sup> yet, as with the foregoing uses, the bad logic in question is notably being applied to Holy Scripture. The Reformers' own proper use of cause and effect will be seen later in Chapter V.

### ***Apology I (Original Sin)***

Coming earlier in the Apology but treated later here is the use of “logic” at the locus of original sin. The Roman Catholic opponents in their *Confutation* attacked the definition of original sin given in the Augsburg Confession. Thus, at issue in the Apology's treatment of original sin is whether lacking fear of God and faith is actual or original guilt and whether original sin can be said to include the concupiscence that remains after Baptism.<sup>10</sup> Melanchthon calls these questions “sophistry” (*cavillatio*, *Deutungen*) or “quibbles” (*argutias*; *cavillatio*) that “have obviously come from the schools” (*satis apparet in scholis natas esse; von Theologen ... herkommen*).<sup>11</sup> Nevertheless, Melanchthon refers back to the Augsburg Confession<sup>12</sup> and explains that original sin entails the lack “of actual fear and trust in God” and the lack “of the possibility and gift to produce” the fear and trust in God and, according to the definition given in the Latin version of the Augsburg Confession, concupiscence.<sup>13</sup> Melanchthon defends including concupiscence in the definition of original sin, saying even his opponents regard concupiscence as “the so-called ‘material element’ of original sin” (*Adversarii in scholis fatentur: materiale, ut vocant, peccati originalis esse concupiscentiam; Die Widersacher selbst reden also davon in ihren Schulen und bekennen, daß die Materien oder Materiale der Erbsünde, wie sie es nennen, sei böse*

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<sup>9</sup> For more on this passage and the specific logical error identified, see below, at n.33, p.335.

<sup>10</sup> Ap II:1.

<sup>11</sup> Ap II:2, Tappert, 100; BKS, 146.

<sup>12</sup> AC II:1.

<sup>13</sup> Ap II:3, Tappert, 101. That the definition is not in the German may again reflect its tendency to simplify content and omit more technical terminology.

*Lust*).<sup>14</sup> Melanchthon's reference to his opponents' philosophical terminology is significant, but we must note that he does not endorse the distinction *per se*. Quite the contrary, Melanchthon goes on to criticize the scholastics for misunderstanding the Church Fathers, as a result minimizing original sin, and thereby erring on the matter of righteousness. In the matter of righteousness, too, Melanchthon says his opponents' misuse logic.<sup>15</sup>

Neque novi quidquam diximus. Vetus definitio recte intellecta prorsus idem dicit, cum ait: peccatum originis carentiam esse iustitiae originalis. Quid est autem iustitia? Scholastici hic rixantur de dialecticis quaestionibus, non explicant, quid sit iustitia originalis.

Und wir haben da nichts Neues gesagt. Die alten Scholastici, so man sie recht verstehet, haben gleich dasselbige gesagt; denn sie sagen, die Erbsünde sei ein Mangel der ersten Reinigkeit und Gerechtigkeit im Paradies.

We said nothing new. Properly understood, the old definition says exactly the same thing, "Original sin is the lack of original righteousness." But what is righteousness? Here the scholastics quibble about philosophical questions and do not explain what original righteousness is.<sup>16</sup>

Melanchthon goes on to explain righteousness and original sin as described by the Scriptures and Fathers, and he contrasts the correct teaching to that of his opponents.<sup>17</sup> Melanchthon basically says there is a tradeoff: one has righteousness or concupiscence; concupiscence (the "vicious disposition") comes with the lack of righteousness (the defect or deficiency).<sup>18</sup> After Melanchthon has adduced Scriptural and patristic support for his position, he says: "No quibbling can overthrow these proofs" (*Haec testimonia nulla cavillatione everti possunt. Dieses sind Pauli helle, gewisse Worte und klare Sprüche; da vermag keine Gloß, kein listiges Fündlein nichts wider; diese Sprüche*

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<sup>14</sup> Ap II:4, Tappert, 101; BKS, 147. The BKS editors and Tappert make reference at this point to Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae*, II, 1, q.82, a.3.c (BKS, 147 n.1; Tappert, 101 n.4). On the opponents' identification of concupiscence with the material element of original sin, confer Ap II:35.

<sup>15</sup> Ap II:5-14, Tappert, 101-102.

<sup>16</sup> Ap II:15, BKS, 150; Tappert, 102.

<sup>17</sup> Ap II:16-50.

<sup>18</sup> Ap II:24. Confer SD I:54 and its reference to the substance-accident dichotomy without a middle term.



*werden alle Teufel, alle Menschen nicht mögen umstossen*).<sup>19</sup> And, Melanchthon is confident the emperor will be able to see through the bad logic (or at least trust Melanchthon's conclusion regarding the matter).

Haec arbitramur satisfactura esse Caesareae Maiestati de puerilibus et frigidis cavillationibus, quibus adversarii articulum nostrum calumniati sunt. Scimus enim nos recte et cum catholica ecclesia Christi sentire. Sed si renovabunt hanc controversiam adversarii, non defuturi sunt apud nos, qui respondeant et veritati patrocinentur. Nam adversarii in hac causa magna ex parte, quid loquantur, non intelligunt. Saepe dicunt pugnancia, nec formale peccati originis nec defectus, quos vocant, recte ac dialectice expediunt. Sed nos hoc loco noluimus istorum rixas nimis subtiliter excutere. Tantum sententiam sanctorum patrum, quam et nos sequimur, communibus et notis verbis duximus esse recitandam.

Dieses achten wir, solle die kaiserliche Majestät ihr billig lassen gnug sein wider das lose; kindische, ungegründt Fürbringen der Widersacher, durch welches sie der Unsern Artikel ohne Ursache ganz unbillig anfechten. Denn sie singen, sagen, wie viel, was und wie lange sie wollen, so wissen wir eigentlich das und sinds fürwahr gewis, daß wir christlich und recht lehren und mit der gemeinen christlichen Kirche gleich stimmen und halten. Werden sie darüber weiter mutwilligen Zank einführen, so sollen sie sehen, es sollen hie, will Gott, Leute nicht feilen, die ihnen antworten und die Wahrheit dennoch erhalten. Denn die Widersacher wissen das mehrer Teil nicht, was sie reden. Denn wie ofte reden und schreiben sie ihnen selbst Widerwärtigs? Verstehen auch ihre eigen Dialektica nicht vom Formal der Erbsünde, das ist, was eigentlich an ihrem Wesen die Erbsünde sei oder nicht sei, was auch der Mangel der ersten Gerechtigkeit sei. An diesem Orte aber haben wir nicht wollen von ihrer zänkischen Disputation subtiler oder weiter reden, sondern allein die Sprüche und Meinung der heiligen Väter, welchen wir auch gleichförmig lehren, mit klaren, gemeinen verständlichen Worten erzählen wollen.

This, we believe, will satisfy His Imperial Majesty about the childish and trivial quibbling with which our opponents have slandered our article. We know that our doctrine is correct and in agreement with Christ's church catholic. If our opponents reopen the controversy, we shall not lack men to reply in defense of the truth, for in this case our opponents frequently do not know what they are talking about. They often contradict themselves and fail to explain logically and correctly either the formal

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<sup>19</sup> Ap II:40, Tappert, 105; BKS, 155. Note the intensification of the statement in the German: "These are Paul's certain words and clear expressions, which no gloss, no smart little discovery is able to refute; all devils, all people will not be able to reverse these expressions" (this author's translation).

element of original sin or the so-called deficiency. For our part, we have been reluctant to enter upon their arguments at great length. We have thought it worthwhile rather to list, in the usual familiar phrases, the opinions of the holy Fathers, which we also follow.<sup>20</sup>

For Melanchthon and the other Lutherans, Scripture and the simple statements of the Church Fathers are preferred over philosophy-influenced distinctions or conclusions reached by bad logic. In the case of the Apology on Original Sin, the dispute centered not on a use of philosophy where none should be used, however, but over bad theology reached by bad philosophy. The limits of logic from the Lutheran perspective, somewhat notable on this *locus* of original sin in the Apology, become even more explicit in the final use of “logic” and its cognates, that from the Formula of Concord on the same *locus*.<sup>21</sup>

### ***Formula I (Original Sin)***

Nearly 30 years after Melanchthon authored the Apology, a controversy arose among the Lutherans themselves regarding Original Sin.<sup>22</sup> The Formula of Concord addressed that controversy in its first article, citing the Apology and continuing to approve the use of logic.<sup>23</sup> Put simply, the controversy centered on whether original sin is to be identified with or distinguished from a human being’s “substance, nature, essence, body, and soul” (*Substanz, Natur, Wesen, Leib, Seele; substantiam, naturam, essentiam, corpus et animam*), and the authors of and subscribers to the Formula confessed that such

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<sup>20</sup> Ap II:51, *BKS*, 157; Tappert, 106-107. The Triglotta’s English adds into its translation from the Latin after “formal element” a bit from the German: “*i.e.*, that which is or is not properly of the essence of”. The K-W translation is essentially the same as Tappert’s.

<sup>21</sup> In the years between the Apology and Formula, Luther in SA III:I condemned the scholastics on original sin and held the same position as Melanchthon, but he did so without invoking logic or philosophy by name (Tappert, 302-303). Confer at n.34 below, p.104, where the SD’s reference back to SA III:I is discussed. Later it will be seen further how throughout *The Book of Concord* the second-order data match the first-order data.

<sup>22</sup> In 1560, Victorine Strigel and Matthias Flacius disputed over original sin, but Flacius went too far and was himself opposed by men such as Chemnitz and Andreaä, principal authors of the Formula. Strigel’s and Flacius’ positions are condemned by the Formula (see, for example, Tappert, 468 n.7 and 9, 508 n.5 and 6).

<sup>23</sup> For its references to the Apology, see SD I:3, 8, 10.

a distinction existed both before and after the fall into sin.<sup>24</sup> (As is seen below, the distinction between the corruption of original sin and human nature relates directly to the article of justification.<sup>25</sup>) The confessors held to a distinction between original sin and human nature, but they also made it clear only God could separate the two, and that that separation would come only at the resurrection.<sup>26</sup> Formula I condemns a number of different positions, most theological aberrations,<sup>27</sup> and the article also clearly sets a limit to the use of logic, though it does not rule out any and every use of logic.

Und dieweil unter andern dieses auch dieses ein ungezweifelter, unwidersprechlicher Grundspruch in der Theologia ist, daß eine jede *substantia* oder selbständiges Wesen, sofern es eine *Substanz* ist, entweder Gott selber oder ein Werk und Geschöpf Gottes sei: so hat Augustinus in vielen Schriften wider die Manichäer mit allen wahrhaftigen Lehrern wohlbedacht und mit Ernst die Rede: *Peccatum originis est substantia vel natura*, das ist: Die Erbsünde ist des Menschen Natur oder Wesen, verdammet und verworfen, nach welchem auch alle Gelehrte und Vorständige allzeit gehalten, daß dasjenige, so nicht für sich selbst bestehet noch ein Teil ist eins andern selbständigen Wesens, sondern in einem andern Dinge wandelbarlich ist, nicht ein *substantia*, das ist, etwas Selbständiges, sondern ein *accidens*, das ist, etwas Zufälliges, seie. Also pflegt Augustinus beständiglich auf diese Weise zu reden: Die Erbsünde sei nicht die Natur selbst, sondern ein *accidens vitium in natura*, das ist, ein zufälliger Mangel und Schaden in der Natur. Wie man denn auf solche Weise auch in unsern Schulen und Kirchen nach der Dialektika für diesem Zank frei und unvordächtig geredet hat, und deswegen weder von D. Luthern, noch einichem rechtschaffenen Lehrer unserer reinen evangelischen Kirchen jemals gestraft worden.

Et cum sit indubitatum certissimumque axioma in re theologica, quod omnis substantia (quatenus est substantia) aut sit Deus ipse aut opus et creatura Dei: Augustinus in multis suis scriptis contra Manichaeos (quemadmodum et reliqui sinceri ecclesiae doctores) rem diligentissime expendit et propositionem hanc (peccatum originis est substantia vel natura) magno zelo reiecit atque damnavit. Et post eum etiam omnes eruditi et intelligentes semper senserunt, quidquid non per se subsistit, nec

<sup>24</sup> Ep I:1-2, Tappert, 466; BKS, 770. Confer SD I:1-2.

<sup>25</sup> See the discussion of justification and sanctification in regards to Formula I that begins on p.342. Original sin distinct from human nature also relates directly to the teaching about Christ (AC II:1).

<sup>26</sup> Ep I:10, Tappert, 467.

<sup>27</sup> The Epitome has one list of antitheses in I:2-19; the Sola Declaration essentially has two lists in I:16-23, one pertaining to Pelagian errors and the other to Manichaean errors.

est pars alterius per se subsistentis essentiae, sed in alio est mutabiliter, id substantiam non esse, id est, quiddam per se subsistens, sed accidens, quod aliunde accidit. Et Augustinus constanter in hanc sententiam loqui solet: *Peccatum originale non est ipsa natura, sed accidens vitium in natura. Et hoc ipso modo etiam nostro saeculo in scholis et ecclesiis nostris (iuxta regulas dialecticae) ante motam hanc controversiam libere et sine ulla haereseos suspicione locuti sunt viri docti, neque eam ob causam vel a D. Luthero vel ab ullo alio sincero doctore Evangelicarum ecclesiarum unquam sunt reprehensi.*

It is one of the unquestioned and irrefutable axioms in theology that every substance or self-subsisting essence, in as far as it is a substance, is either God Himself or a product and creature of God. Thus in many of his writings against the Manicheans, Augustine, in accord with all dependable teachers, deliberately and seriously condemned and rejected the statement, “Original sin is the nature or essence of man.” On this basis all scholars and intelligent people have always held that whatever does not subsist by itself and is not a part of another self-subsisting essence, but is present in another thing mutably, is not a substance (that is, something self-subsistent) but an accident (that is, something accidental). Augustine therefore constantly speaks in this fashion: Original sin is not man’s nature itself, but an accidental defect and damage in the nature. In the same way, prior to this controversy, the theologians in our schools and churches, following the rules of logic, used the same terminology freely and without incurring suspicion, and for that reason without ever being corrected either by Dr. Luther or by any other dependable teacher of our pure, Evangelical churches.<sup>28</sup>

While logic helps make the distinction between the accident of original sin and the substance of the human nature, the Formula also says those Latin terms are not to be used with the “common, unlearned people” (*gemeinen unvorständigen Volk*), the “simple folk” (*einfältigen Volks*).<sup>29</sup>

Relative to the distinction between the corruption of original sin and the human nature, there is an important limitation to observe: human beings’ corrupted reason

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<sup>28</sup> SD I:55-56, *BKS*, 862-863; Tappert, 518. (The epigram for this chapter comes from this same.)

<sup>29</sup> Ep I:23, Tappert, 469; *BKS*, 775. The Latin reads: *abstinendum est ab illis in publicis sacris concionibus, ubi indocta plebs docetur, et hoc in re simplicium et rudiorum merito habenda est ratio* (“they ought to be abstained from in public sermons, where the unlearned commoners are taught; and for this there is a correct rationale in the affairs of the simple country folk”) (this author’s translation). Confer SD I:54.

The use of these terms belongs to the sub-sentential use of philosophy, and further consideration of their use is, strictly speaking, outside the scope of this dissertation.

cannot understand the corruption but can only come to believe in it from Scripture. Flacius reportedly had held, “that no distinction should be made, even in the mind, between man’s nature itself after the Fall and original sin, and that the two cannot be differentiated in the mind” (*kein Unterschied zwischen der Natur nach dem Fall an ihr selbst und der Erbsünde sollte auch nicht gedacht, noch mit Gedanken voneinander unterscheiden werden könnten; inter naturam corruptam post lapsum per se ipsam consideratam, et inter peccatum originis nulla prorsus sit differentia neque ulla distinctio cogitari, aut saltem peccatum illud a natura cogitatione discerni possit*).<sup>30</sup> While the Epitome condemns that position, it makes clear that “This damage is so unspeakable that it may not be recognized by a rational process, but only from God’s Word” (*Welcher Schade unaussprechlich, nicht mit der Vernunft, sondern allein aus Gottes Wort erkannt werden mag; Hoc quantum sit malum, verbis revera est inexplicabile, neque humanae rationis acumine indagari, sed duntaxat per Verbum Dei revelatum agnosci potest*).<sup>31</sup> The Solid Declaration reiterates the need for God’s Word to reveal the characteristics of original sin by quoting from Luther’s Smalcald Articles,<sup>32</sup> and it further cites other Luther writings in support of this same point.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>30</sup> Ep I:19, Tappert, 468; *BKS*, 774. Flacius in this passage might be understood as ruling out the kind of distinction Scotus called a “formal distinction”, one this dissertation argues the Reformers essentially made in the case of justification and sanctification (see below, beginning on p.372). The condemnation of Flacius’s position that itself rejected the formal distinction, then, is not without additional significance.

<sup>31</sup> Ep I:9, Tappert, 467; *BKS*, 772.

<sup>32</sup> SD I:8, citing SA III:i:3 (see *BKS*, 847 with n.5 and 434). Confer n.21 above, p.100.

<sup>33</sup> SD I:33 (*BKS*, 854 n.1; Tappert, 514 n.5; K-W, 537 n.38). The works cited are as follows: a sermon on 1 Corinthians 15:54f. preached on April 14, 1532 (WA 36:682<sub>19</sub>; Aland #Pr1386); 1535 lecture on Genesis 3:7 (WA 42:125<sub>21-32</sub>; Aland #517; AE 1:167); 1544 lecture on Genesis 42:6-7 (WA 44:472<sub>30-37</sub>; Aland #517; AE 7:233-234); 1544 lecture on Genesis 42:18-20 (WA 44:489<sub>1-3, 19</sub>; Aland #517; AE 7:256); 1544 lecture on Genesis 42:29-34 (WA 44:506<sub>10-16</sub>; Aland #517; AE 7:278-279); etc. None of the references given, however, seems to directly speak to corrupted reason not being able to discern the characteristics of the corruption.

SD I:61-62 also cites the following works of Luther in support of the use of the word “accident” (*BKS*, 865 n.1-2; Tappert, 519 n.7-9; K-W, 542 n.50-51): the 1535 lecture on Genesis 3 (WA 42:120<sub>25</sub>-131-<sub>20</sub>; Aland #517; AE 1:160-182) and the 1534-1535 exposition of Psalm 90:12 (WA 40<sup>III</sup>:571<sub>18-20</sub>; Aland #612; AE 13:127-128).

The editors of *BKS* note that both sides in the dispute the Formula is addressing had gathered evidence from Luther in support of their respective positions (*BKS*, 854 n.; confer Tappert, 517 n.3).

Wiewohl aber die Erbsünde die ganze menschliche Natur wie ein geistlich Gift und Aussatz (wie Lutherus redet) vergiftet und verderbt hat, daß man in unserer verderbten Natur augenscheinlich nicht zeigen und weisen kann die Natur besonders für sich und die Erbsünde auch besonders für sich ... so in der Natur wohnt die beiden müssen und können auch unterschiedlich nach der Heiligen Schrift betrachtet, gelehrt und geglaubt werden.

Etsi vero peccatum originale totam hominis naturam ut spirituale quoddam venenum et horribilis lepra (quemadmodum D. Lutherus loquitur) infecit et corrupit, ita quidem, ut iam in nostra natura corrupta ad oculum non monstrari possint distincte haec duo, ipsa natura sola et originale peccatum solum ... Haec enim duo secundum Sacrae Scripturae regulam distincte considerari, doceri et credi debent et possunt.

Although, in Luther's words, original sin, like a spiritual poison and leprosy, has so poisoned and corrupted man's whole nature that within the corrupted nature we are not able to point out and expose the nature by itself and original sin by itself as two manifestly separate things ... According to the Holy Scriptures we must and can consider, discuss, and believe these two as distinct from each other.<sup>34</sup>

The important sequence to note is God's Word enlightening corrupted reason that can then make use of philosophical words and the rules of logic to further elucidate the Bible's teaching.

### ***Summary of regard for "logic"***

From the foregoing uses of "logic" and its cognates, we see that the Lutherans wrote in the Apology of their opponents' bad logic and in the Formula of Concord of their own good logic. Implicit in the condemnation of the opponents' bad logic and explicit in the reference to their own good logic is that logic has its place in theology. Despite the facts of the negative context of the references to logic in the earlier writing and the positive context to the reference to logic in the later, there is no essential difference between the earlier and later writings. The subscribers to *The Book of Concord* present themselves as knowing logic's place in theology and keeping it there. For them, applying logic to Holy Scripture is not out of place in and of itself, but using bad

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<sup>34</sup> SD I:33, *BKS*, 854-855; Tappert, 514. (The portion omitted by this author further denies the identification of the corrupt nature with original sin and extends the leprosy illustration.)

arguments or logical sleight-of-hands to deduce desired positions is condemned. Doing violence to the Word of God, abusing language, and bad logic are all related, they say, and they hold that logic is only able to help after one's corrupt reason has been illuminated by the Scriptures.

The *locus* of original sin provides the only opportunity to compare the explicit references to logic between the earlier and later confessors. Neither the earlier nor the later confessors see themselves as innovating in terms of the teaching of original sin. In fact, they claim continuity by explicitly mentioning their predecessors by name or by referring favorably to their teaching: Thomas Aquinas, Anselm of Canterbury, Irenaeus, Ambrose, Peter Lombard, Augustine, Bonaventure, Hugo of St. Victor, Cyril, and Basil.<sup>35</sup> (In similar ways they also disfavorably refer to authorities such as the “scholastics”, Gabriel Biel, Duns Scotus, “modern theologians”, Thomas Aquinas, Albert Pighius, the Council of Trent, Ulrich Zwingli.<sup>36</sup>) Such references occur in both the earlier and later writings contained in *The Book of Concord*. When it comes to the expression of the teaching regarding original sin, the philosophical concept of a “material element” is used early to help identify concupiscence as a part of original sin, and the distinction between a substance and its accidents is used to help separate human nature from original sin (put another way, original sin is not allowed to be a material element of human nature).

Despite a greater focus on original sin, all the *loci* where these second-order uses of “logic” and its cognates arise are notable: original sin, justification, penitence, and good works—all relate most closely to the central teaching of *The Book of Concord*. Where the Lutherans accuse their opponents of bad logic on these *loci*, the Lutherans themselves make a logical distinction in the nexus of these same issues that raises questions of a different sort, as will be seen in Chapter V.

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<sup>35</sup> Ap II:4, 15, 19-22, 24, 27, 28, 29, 36, 41; SD I:30, 54, 55, 56.

<sup>36</sup> Ap II:7, 8, 10, 32, 43, 46; SA III:1:3; Ep I:11, 12, 17, 18.

## τόποι as the philosophical method of organization

This chapter now moves from the confessors' second-order regard for logic to their organizational approach according to τόποι or *loci* ("topics" or "places"), a first-order supra-sentential use of philosophy.<sup>37</sup> First, this section considers the confessors' use of the word *loci* especially as it pertains to the method of treating theological topics. Next, this section overviews the τόποι organizational structure used by *The Book of Concord*, and finally it gives evidence for the use of this method being philosophical in nature and discusses what implications the use of the *loci* method might or might not have had.

### Book of Concord *use of locus, loci*

There are some 270 occurrences in *The Book of Concord*'s Latin of the masculine noun *locus, loci*; the neuter noun *locum, loci* that has essentially the same meaning; and the adverb *loco*.<sup>38</sup> These Latin words both are translated by and themselves translate a number of different German words, chiefly, in alphabetical order, *Artikel, hier, Ort, and Spruch*.<sup>39</sup> The Latin and the German are translated into English chiefly with the roughly

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<sup>37</sup> The Greek τόπος in the singular and τόποι in the plural are respectively transliterated as *topos* and *topoi* and translated into Latin as *locus* and *loci*. Confer Ong, who gives the German vernacular forms as *Ort* or *Gemeinplatz* (Walter J. Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue: From the Art of Discourse to the Art of Reason* [Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 1958], 112).

<sup>38</sup> More specifically, the Libronix search of the Triglotta's Latin found 42 occurrences of *locus* (nominative singular masculine), 47 occurrences of *locum* (accusative singular masculine and nominative, vocative, and accusative singular neuter), 7 occurrences of *loci* (genitive and locative singular masculine or neuter and nominative and vocative plural masculine), 112 occurrences of *loco* (dative and ablative singular masculine or neuter, in addition to being the adverb), 13 occurrences of *locos* (accusative plural masculine), 7 occurrences of *loca* (nominative, vocative, and accusative plural neuter), 4 occurrences of *locorum* (genitive plural masculine and neuter), and 39 occurrences of *locis* (locative, dative, and ablative plural masculine or neuter). Not all of the occurrences found were, strictly speaking, in the text of *The Book of Concord*, so the total number of occurrences, 271, is not exact. No other forms of the words were used.

<sup>39</sup> The longer list, based principally on Libronix's German edition of the Triglotta, follows in alphabetical order. *andern* Ep VIII:8; SD VIII:10. *anstatt* SD I:11; VII:119. *Artikel* AC XXVIII:52; Ap Preface:17; IV:2, 3; XII:10; XV:49; XVI:2, 13; XXVII:52; SD III:29 (twice), VIII:86. *da* Ap IV:207; XXIV:46; LC I:195; III:58, 120; SD VIII:84; LC II:63. *daselbst/derselben* Ap IV:238; SA Preface 19; LC Preface 3; I:278; SD II:44. *diesem/dieses* Ap II:3; XXIV:52; LC III:73. *erste* LC III:5, V:53. *dritten* Tr 38. *für* LC I:23, 54; III:75. *Gründe* Ap XXVIII:6. *hier* Ap I:35; XII:90; XX:5; XXIV:14; XXVII:20; Tr 22; LC I:56, 180, 200, 206, 261 (*hiermit*); II:26; III:55, 72; IV:12, 47 (*Hierbei*), V:28; SD I:15 (*allhier*), 39; III:67 (*hiermit*); VI:15; VII:66, 111 (*hiermit*), 128 (*allhier*); VIII:38 (*hieher*), 39 (*hie*). *mehr ... denn* Ap XXIII:23. *solches* Ap XXIII:68; LC I:53; III:118. *Ort* AC XXII:5; Ap Preface 14; I:4, 43, 51; IV:154, 208; XX:11; XXI:40 (twice), 42; XXIV:9, 31, 53; SA II:iv:8; Tr 26; LC I:167, 275; V:48; Ep VII:25, 32, 34; VIII:8, 29,



corresponding “topic”, “here”, “place”, and “passage”.<sup>40</sup> The various German and English words used in translation give a sense of the relevant meanings and uses of the

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30, 33; SD I:49; IV:26; V:7; VII:75, 97, 103, 119, 122, 126; VIII:10, 28, 82, 84 (twice), 92; X:9, 30; XI:2; XII:8. *Raum* LC I:203, 328; II:48; SD VII:99 (twice, one *oder Stätte*), 100 (four times); VIII:83; XII:7 (*Platz noch R.*). *Spruch* Ap II:31; IV:83, 107, 218, 219, 231, 235, 244, 245, 259, 281, 282, 371; VII/VIII:19; XXII:7 (twice); XXIII:32; XXIV:31, 34, 53, 66; XXVII:11, 18, 40, 45 (twice), 65, 66; XXVIII:8, 21; SD II:27, 81. *Stätte* Ap XXI:28; Ap XXVII:53; VII/VIII:28; SC Preface:21; LC I:82, 94, 182, 306, 313; LC I:108, 115, 181; II:30. *Stelle* SD XII:29. *Stück* Ap Preface:18; IV:5, 87; XV:43; XXI:1; XXII:98; XXIV:46. *Stücklein* LC III:113. *Summa* Ap Preface:6. *Teil* Ap XXIV:54. *Titel* Ap XIII:16. *vor* LC I:46. *Wege* Ap XX:4. *wo* SD III:29.

Even though the authoritative language of the various documents differs, the foregoing German list is based only on the use of the Latin words given; searches were not made going from the German to the Latin. One should note further, however, that even where a German word is originally used, the authors nevertheless may well be intending the Latin equivalent.

Moreover, there are a number of places where the specific work in *The Book of Concord* in which the words occur is quoting another source, as in the following examples: Ap XXIV:31 (Bible); Tr 62 (Jerome); SD III:29 (twice, Luther WA 40<sup>1</sup>:240); VII:97, 99, 100 (four times), 103 (all seven in ¶97-103 from Luther, WA 26:335ff); VIII:39 (Luther, WA 26:319); 82, 83, 84 (twice) (all four in ¶82-84 from Luther, WA 26:332, 333).

<sup>40</sup> The longer list, with some variations between the Tappert (Tap) and Triglotta (Trig) translations noted, follows in alphabetical order. *argument* Ap XXIV:52 Tap. *article* AC XXVI:4; XXVIII:52; Ap Preface:17 Tap; Tr 38 Tap; SD III:29 (twice), 86. *as* LC I:54. *(this) commandment* LC I:180 Tap. *connection* Ap IV:369. *corner* Ap XIII:13 Tap. *declaration* Ap XXVII:11 Trig, 12 Trig. *doctrine* Ap IV:2 Tap, 3 Tap, 5 Tap, 310 Tap; XII:3 Tap, 10 Tap, 90 Tap, 98 Tap; XXIV:46 Tap. *estate* Ap XV:19. *here* Ap I:4 Tap, 35 Tap; IV:154 Tap, 378 Tap; XX:5; XXVII:20 Tap; Tr 22 Tap; SA Preface 19 Trig; LC I:56, 180 Trig, 195, 200, 206, 261; II:26, 64 (Tap adds “in the Creed”); III:55, 72; IV:12, 47; V:28; SD I:15 Trig, 31 Trig, 49 Tap; VI:15; VII:66, 111 Trig, 128 Trig; VIII:38, 39. *hereby* SD VII:113 Trig. *herewith* SD III:67. *instead* Ap XXIII:23; LC I:181 Trig; LC III:75; SD I:11 Trig; VII:119 Trig. *matter* Ap XVI:13 Tap; LC III:53 Trig, 118. *nowhere* Ap XXI:40. *one* Ap XXIV:53 Tap. *occasion* LC I:203 Tap. *opportunity*: LC I:203 Trig, 328. *passage* Ap II:3, 31; IV:83 Tap, 107, 154 Trig, 155, 171 Trig, 207, 220 Trig, 221 Trig (twice), 222 Trig, 224 (thrice) Trig, 226, 235 Trig, 238 Trig, 244, 245 Trig, 259, 264 Trig, 266, 272, 273 Trig, 274, 280 (twice), 282, 284 (twice), 286 (five times), 305, 306, 310 Trig, 343, 371, 372, 376 (twice), 388; VIII/VIII:19; XII:36, 59; XX:4 Trig; XXI:40 Trig; XXII:7 (twice); XXIII:32, 68 Trig; XXIV:31, 34 (twice), 52 Trig & K-W but Tap seems better, 53, 53 Trig, 66; XXVII:3, 12, 19, 40, 45 (twice), 65, 66; XXVIII:8, 21; LC I:167 Tap, 278 Tap; Ep VII:25; SD II:27, 81 Trig; V:7. *petition* LC III:113 (could be “passage”, but the German *Stücklein* suggests petition is better), 118 Tap. *place*: AC XII:5; Ap Preface:14 Tap; I:4 Trig, 43, 51 Trig; IV:., 208, 273 Tap, 342; XII:51 Trig; XIII:13 Trig, 16 Trig; XXIV:31; XXVII:20 Trig; XXVIII:17; SA II:iv:8; Tr 26, 38 Trig, 62 Tap; SC Preface:18, 21; LC I:82, 94, 167 Trig, 278 Trig, 313; II:48; V:37, 48; Ep VII:32, 34; VIII:8, 8 Tap, 29, 30, 33; SD I:49 Trig; II:29 Tap; IV:26; VII:75, 97, 99 (“space or p.”), 103, 119 Trig, 122, 126; VIII:10, 28, 82, 84 (twice), 92; X:9, 30; XI:2, 96; XII:8 (twice; second Trig “p. or room”, Tap “room nor scope”). *point* Ap Preface:6, 14 Trig, 18 Tap; I:35 Trig; XXI:40 Tap, 42 Tap; LC V:53; SD I:31 Tap; VII:128 Tap. *position* Ap XIII:16 Tap; SD XII:29 Trig. *private parts* LC I:275. *question* Ap XVI:2 Tap. *rank* SD XII:29 Tap. *relation/thing/sphere* LC III:73. *replace/place of* Ap XXI:28; XXVII:53; LC I:23, 46, 181 Trig, 182; LC II:30. *representative* LC I:108 Tap. *room* Ap XII:51 Tap; SD VIII:28 Trig. *space* SD VII:99, 100 (four times), 119 Tap; SD VIII:83. *statements* Ap IV:238 Tap; XX:4 Tap; XXIII:68 Trig; XXVII:11 Tap, 12 Tap. *station* Tr 62 Trig. *stead* Ap VII/VIII:28 (*vice et loco*, Tap “place and stead”, Trig “stead and place”); LC I:108 Trig, 115 Trig. *subject*: Ap IV:87 Tap, 171 Tap; XV:49 Tap; XXVIII:6 Tap. *theme* Ap XXIV:54. *thing* LC III:53 Trig. *this* LC I:53. *topic* Ap Preface:17 Trig, 18 Trig; IV:2 Trig, 3 Trig, 5 Trig, 83 Trig & K-W, 87 Trig, 378 Trig; XII:., 3 Trig, 10 Trig, 90 Trig, 98 Trig; XV:43, 49 Trig; XVI:2 Trig, 13 Trig; XX:11 Trig; XXI:1 Trig, 40 Trig, 42 Trig; XXIV:9

Latin in *The Book of Concord*, to which the focus now turns. (Note that not all Latin uses are necessarily reflected in the German or English, especially depending on which English translation is consulted.)

All the words in question can be said to have various senses related to “place”, the most basic meaning of the Greek τόπος, ου, ὁ. Latin dictionaries indicate the following meanings for *locus, loci*: “place, territory/locality/neighborhood/region; position/point; aim point; site; seat, rank, position; soldier’s post; quarters; category; book passage, topic; part of the body; female genitals (pl.); grounds of proof”. As noted earlier, meanings given for *locum, loci* are similar: “place, territory/locality/neighborhood/region; position/point; aim point; site; seat, rank, position; soldier’s post; quarters; category; book passage, topic; region, places (pl.); places connected with each other”. Finally, the adverb *loco* can mean “for, in the place of, instead of”.<sup>41</sup> To greater and lesser extents, many of these are found in *The Book of Concord*. The following subsections deal with these uses.

### “In place of”

What may be the least found use of these three words in *The Book of Concord* is “in place of”, “instead of”, or “behalf of”, although even this use is found frequently enough to span across earlier and later documents and those written in Latin and translated from German to Latin.<sup>42</sup>

### “Place”

A far more common use of the words in *The Book of Concord* is to refer to a “place” of one form or another.<sup>43</sup> These “places” can be “when or where” something

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Trig, 14 Trig, 46 Trig, 54 Trig; XXVII:52; XXVIII:6 Trig; SC Preface 20 Trig. *text* Ap IV:218, 219 Tap, 221 and 221 Tap (twice), 224 (thrice) Tap, 220 Tap, 235 Tap, 245 Tap, 264 Tap. *there* SD II:44 Trig. *where* SD III:29 Trig. *wherever* SD VIII:84. *words* SD II:81 Tap. *(these) writings* SD II:44 Tap.

<sup>41</sup> “loco” from William Whitaker, *Words by William Whitaker*, 1993-2007. Available: <http://lisy2.archives.nd.edu/cgi-bin/words.exe>. Accessed 2006 July 11.

<sup>42</sup> *in place of* Ap XXI:28; XXVII:53; LC I:23, 46, 54, 182; II:30; SD III:42. *instead* Ap XXIII:23; LC I:149, 151; III:75; SD I:11; VII:119. *behalf of* Ap VII/VIII:28; LC I:108, 115.

<sup>43</sup> Ap Preface 14 & 18 (arguably dogmatic); IV:208; XII:51; XIII:13, 16; XV:19; XXIV:31; XXVIII:17 (proper place); SA II:iv:8; Tr 26, 62; SC Preface:18, 21; LC I:82, 94, 116, 155, 219, 224, 227, 240, 258, 284, 300, 306, 313; II:48; III:25, 56, 58, 68, 70, 73 (arguably two kingdoms), 120; V:37, 48; Ep R&N:2 (arguably a passage of writing); VII:32, 34; VIII:8 (twice), 29, 30, 33; SD I:57; II:21; VII:2, 75, 97,

might take place, they can be physical space, and they can be “places” of a more figurative type.<sup>44</sup> As with determining uses of the word throughout this treatment, in some cases the precise use is somewhat debatable. Again note that these uses are found in earlier and later documents and in those written both in Latin and translated to Latin.

## “Passage”

A slightly more frequent use of the words is to refer to a passage or passages of writings. A handful of these uses refer to writings of those the confessors’ claim for their side,<sup>45</sup> while another handful of these uses refer to passages or *loci* of the writings of the confessors’ opponents.<sup>46</sup> However, the vast majority of such references are to Holy Scripture. In some of these uses the context makes it clear that it is to a “place” of Scripture that reference is being made,<sup>47</sup> although in other places the modifier “of Scripture” makes the reference specific.<sup>48</sup> As with the other uses, these “passage” uses are found in both earlier and later documents and in both those written both in Latin and translated to Latin.<sup>49</sup>

Of the uses that refer to passages, several specify that the passage being referred to “testifies” to something in the context of a larger argument. First, consider the following passage from the Apology’s Original Sin *locus*.

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99 (twice), 100 (four times), 103, 119, 122, 126; VIII:10 (twice), 23, 28, 82, 83, 84 (thrice), 92; X:9, 30; XI:96 (arguably dogmatic space); XII:8 (twice), 29.

<sup>44</sup> Even this use of the words can be philosophically influenced, as in SD VII:97. See also SD I:57, where the word is used in the definition of “substance”.

<sup>45</sup> *Cyprian* AC XXII:5. *The Augsburg Confession* Ap II:3. *Luther* SD II:44; IV:26; SD VII:91.

<sup>46</sup> Ap Preface:14 (Confutation *loci*); XX:4 (Confutation passage); XXIV:9; XXIII:68; XXVII:19 (Confutation passage); SD VIII:39 (Zwingli arguably *locus*).

<sup>47</sup> Ap II:31 (explicit in the German original); IV:83 (though Trig & K-W render “topic”), 107, 154, 155, 207, 218, 219, 220, 221 (thrice), 222, 224 (thrice), 226, 231, 235, 238, 244, 245, 259, 264, 266, 272, 273, 274, 280 (twice), 281, 282, 284 (twice), 286 (five times), 305, 306, 343, 371, 372, 376 (twice), 388; VII/VIII:19; XII:36; XXII:7 (twice); XXIII:32; XXIV:31, 34 (twice), 53 (twice), 66; XXVII:3, 11, 12, 18, 45 (twice), 65, 66; XXVIII:8, 21; LC I:278, 279; SD II:27, 81; XI:2 (where Scripture is the subject of the verb), 67.

<sup>48</sup> *Scripturae* Ap XXIV:66; XXVII:40; LC I:167; Ep VII:25 (explicit only in the Latin translation); SD IV:17 (explicit only in the Latin translation). *Sacrae Scripturae* SD V:7.

<sup>49</sup> In discussing Ramus and the time after the invention of the printing press, Ong discusses how books became receptacles for content, the places of which could be indexed (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 313-314 ).

Has argutias satis apparet in scholis natas esse, non in consilio Caesaris. Quamquam autem haec cavillatio facillime refelli possit: tamen ut omnes boni viri intelligant, nos nihil absurdi de hac causa docere, primum petimus, ut inspiciatur germanica confessio; haec absolvet nos suspicione novitatis. Sic enim ibi scriptum est: *Weiter wird gelehret, daß nach dem Fall Adae alle Menschen, so natürlich geboren werden, in Sunden empfangen und geborn werden, das ist, daß sie alle von Mutterleib an voll böser Lüst und Neigung sind, keine wahre Gottesforcht, kein wahren Glauben an Gott von Natur haben können.* Hic locus testatur nos non solum actus, sed potentiam seu dona efficiendi timorem et fiduciam erga Deum adimere propagatis secundum carnalem naturam. Dicimus enim, ita natos habere concupiscentiam, nec posse efficere verum timorem et fiduciam erga Deum.

Es ist leichtlich zu merken und abzunehmen, daß solche *cavillatio* von Theologen, nicht von des Kaisers Rat herkommet. Wiewohl wir nu solche neidische, gefährliche, muthwillige Deutungen wohl wissen zu verlegen, doch, daß alle redlichen und ehrbare Leute verstehen mügen, daß wir in dieser Sache nichts Ungeschicktes lehren, so bitten wir, sie wollen unsere vorige deutsche Konfession, so zu Augsburg überantwortet, ansehen; die wird gnug anzeigen, wie wir nichts Neues oder Ungehörtes lehren. Denn in derselbigen ist also geschrieben: „Weiter wird gelehret, daß nach dem Fall Adä alle Menschen, so natürlich geboren werden, in Sunden empfangen und geboren werden, das ist, daß sie alle von Mutter Leibe an voll böser Lust und Neigung sind, keine wahre Gottesfurcht, keinen wahren Glauben an Gott von Natur haben können.“ In diesem erscheint genug, daß wir von allen, so aus Fleisch geboren sind, sagen, daß sie untüchtig sind zu allen Gottes Sachen, Gott nicht herzlich fürchten, ihme nicht glauben, noch vertrauen können.

These quibbles have obviously come from the schools, and not from the emperor's council. This sophistry is easy to refute. But to show all good men that our teaching on this point is not absurd, we ask them first to look at the German text of the Confession. This will exonerate us of the charge of innovation, for it says: "It is also taught that since the fall of Adam all men who are born according to the course of nature are conceived and born in sin. That is, all men are full of evil lusts and inclinations from their mothers' wombs and are unable by nature to have true fear of God or true faith in God." This passage testifies [*Hic locus testatur*] that in those who are born according to the flesh we deny the existence not only of actual fear and trust in God but also of the possibility

and gifts to produce it. We say that anyone born in this way has concupiscence and cannot produce true fear and trust in God.<sup>50</sup>

Later the Apology's treatment of Original Sin continues the argument on the basis of Holy Scripture.

Nam Paulus interdum expresse nominat defectum, ut 1 Cor. 2: Animalis, homo non percipit ea, quae Spiritus Dei sunt. Alibi concupiscentiam nominat efficacem in membris et parientem malos fructus. Plures locos citare de utraque parte possemus; sed in re manifesta nihil opus est testimoniis. Et facile iudicare poterit prudens lector, has non tantum culpas actuales esse, sine metu Dei et sine fide esse. Sunt enim durabiles defectus in natura non renovata.

Denn Paulus nennet die Erbsünde unter Zeiten mit klaren Worten einen Mangel göttlichen Lichts usw. 1. Korinth. 2.: „Der natürliche Mensch aber vernimmt nichts vom Geiste Gottes.“ Und an andern Orten nennet er es böse Lust, als zu den Römern am 7., da er sagt: „Ich sehe ein ander Gesetz in meinen Gliedern usw.“ Welche Lust allerlei böse Früchte gebietet. Ich könnte hie wohl viel mehr Sprüche der Schrift vorbringen von beiden diesen Stücken; aber in dieser öffentlichen Wahrheit ist es nicht noth. Ein jeder Verständiger wird leichtlich sehen und merken, daß also ohne Gottesfurcht, ohne Vertrauen im Herzen sein sind nicht allein *actus* oder wirklich Sünde, sondern ein angeboren Mangel des göttlichen Lichtes und alles Guten, welcher da bleibt, so lange wir nicht durch den Heiligen Geist neu geboren und durch den erleuchtet werden.

For Paul sometimes mentions the deficiency, as in I Cor. 2:14, “The unspiritual man does not receive the gifts of the Spirit of God.” Elsewhere (Rom. 7:5) he mentions lust at work in our members and bringing forth evil fruit. We could quote many passages [Plures locos citare ... possemus] on both parts of our definition, but on so clear an issue there is no need of evidence [testimoniis]. The wise reader will easily be able to see that when the fear of God and faith are lacking, this is not merely actual guilt but an abiding deficiency in an unrenewed human nature.<sup>51</sup>

The confessors clearly give passages as testimonies even while claiming that the matter is clear enough not to need the evidence (evidence of this practice will continue to be seen below). The Apology's article on Justification has a similar passage.

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<sup>50</sup> Ap II:2-3, *BKS*, 146; Tappert, 100-101. (Emphasis added.)

<sup>51</sup> Ap II:30-31, *BKS*, 153; Tappert, 104. (Emphasis added.)

Itaque doctrina poenitentiae, quia non solum nova opera praecipit, sed etiam promittit remissionem peccatorum, necessario requirit fidem. Non enim accipitur remissio peccatorum nisi fide. Semper igitur in his locis de poenitentia intelligere oportet, quod non solum opera, sed etiam fides requiratur, ut hic Matth. 6.: Si dimiseritis hominibus peccata eorum, dimittet et vobis Pater vester coelestis delicta vestra. Hic requiritur opus et additur promissio remissionis peccatorum, quae non contingit propter opus, sed propter Christum per fidem. Sicut alibi multis locis testatur Scriptura. Actuum 10: Huic omnes prophetae testimonium perhibent, remissionem peccatorum accipere per nomen eius omnes, qui credunt in eum. Et 1 Ioh. 2.: Remittuntur vobis peccata propter nomen eius. Eph. 1.: In quo habemus redemptionem per sanguinem eius in remissionem peccatorum. Quamquam quid opus est recitare testimonia? Haec est ipsa vox evangelii propria, quod propter Christum, non propter nostra opera, fide consequamur remissionem peccatorum. Hanc evangelii vocem adversarii nostri obruere conantur male detortis locis, qui continent doctrinam legis aut operum. Verum est enim, quod in doctrina poenitentiae requiruntur opera, quia certe nova vita requiritur. Sed hic male assuunt adversarii, quod talibus operibus mereamur remissionem peccatorum aut iustificationem.

Because the doctrine of penitence not only demands new works but also promises the forgiveness of sins, it necessarily requires faith. Only faith accepts the forgiveness of sins. In passages about penitence we should understand that faith is required, not merely works, as in Matt. 6:14, “If you forgive men their trespasses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you.” Here a work is required and a promise of the forgiveness of sins is added, depending not on the work but on Christ through faith. So the Scriptures testify in many other places. Acts 10:43, “To him all the prophets bear witness that every one who believes in him shall receive forgiveness of sins through his name.” I John 2:12, “Your sins are forgiven for his sake.” Eph. 1:7, “In him we have redemption through His blood, the forgiveness of our trespasses.” Why recite passages? This is the essential proclamation of the Gospel, that we obtain forgiveness of sins by faith because of Christ and not because of our works. Our opponents try to silence this proclamation of the Gospel by twisting those passages which teach about the law or of works. It is true that in teaching penitence works are required, since a new life is certainly required; but here our opponents maliciously maintain that by such works we merit the forgiveness of sins or justification.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> Ap IV:272-274, *BKS*, 214; Tappert, 148. The German “paraphrase” of the Apology does not include this particular passage. (Emphasis added.)

The discussion of the interpretation of the “passage” evidence continues later in Apology IV, with a hint of distaste for philosophy even as its method of reasoning from given evidence is used.

... Fit autem regeneratio fide in poenitentia.

Nemo sanus iudicare aliter potest, nec nos aliquam otiosam subtilitatem hic affectamus, ut divellamus fructus a iustitia cordis, si tantum adversarii concesserint, quod fructus propter fidem et mediatorem Christum placeant, non sint per sese digni gratia et vita aeterna. Hoc enim reprehendimus in adversariorum doctrina, quod talibus locis scripturae seu philosophico seu iudaico more intellectis abolent iustitiam fidei et excludunt mediatorem Christum. Ex his locis ratiocinantur, quod haec opera mereantur gratiam, alias de congruo, alias de condigno, quum videlicet accedit dilectio, id est, quod iustificent et, quia sint iustitia, digna sint vita aeterna. Hic error manifeste abolet iustitiam fidei, quae sentit, quod accessum ad Deum habeamus propter Christum, non propter opera nostra, quae sentit nos per pontificem et mediatorem Christum adduci ad patrem et habere placatum patrem, ut supra satis dictum est. Et haec doctrina de iustitia fidei non est in ecclesia Christi negligenda, quia sine ea non potest officium Christi conspici, et reliqua doctrina iustificationis tantum est doctrina legis. Atqui nos oportet retinere evangelium et doctrinam de promissione propter Christum donata.

Non igitur litigamus in hoc loco de parva re cum adversariis. ...

... Such a new birth comes by faith amid penitence.

No sane man can judge otherwise. We are not trying to be overly subtle here in distinguishing the righteousness of the heart from its fruits, if only our opponents would grant that the fruits please God because of faith and the mediator Christ but in themselves are not worthy of grace and eternal life. This is what we condemn in our opponents' position, that by interpreting such passages of the Scriptures in either a philosophical or a Jewish manner they eliminate from them the righteousness of faith and Christ, the Mediator. From these passages they reason that works merit grace by the merit of congruity or, if love is added, by the merit of condignity; that is, that they justify, and because they are righteousness that they are worthy of eternal life. This error obviously destroys the righteousness of faith, which believes that we have access to God not because of our works but because of Christ, and that through his priestly mediation we are led to the Father and have a reconciled Father, as we have said often enough. This teaching about the righteousness of faith dare not be neglected in the church of Christ; without it the work of Christ cannot be understood, and what is left of the doctrine of justification is nothing more than the teaching of the law. We are therefore obliged to

hold fast to the Gospel and the teaching of the promise given for Christ's sake.

It is no minor matter about which we are arguing here with our opponents. ...<sup>53</sup>

In the case of the Mass, the Reformers in Apology XXIV:53 also attack their opponents for twisting passages (*locos*; *Sprüche*) from Hebrews, from where the Reformers themselves draw their “main proofs” (*praecipua testimonia*; *Sache sonderlich*).<sup>54</sup> Thus, passages of Holy Scripture referred to as *loci* are in some ways regarded as evidence used in arguments. And, as the last extended quotation from Apology IV demonstrated, the gathering together of such related evidence and arguments in one place is the essence of the *loci* method.<sup>55</sup> The focus thus now turns from *loci* as “passages” to those uses in *The Book of Concord* of the Latin words being considered where “articles” or their components seem to be in view.<sup>56</sup>

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<sup>53</sup> Ap IV:375-377, *BKS*, 230-231; Tappert, 164-165. (The closing sentence of ¶374 and the opening sentence of ¶378 are also included.) (Emphasis added.) For the German equivalent and further discussion of this passage relative to Scotus's “formal distinction”, see below, beginning on p.392.

<sup>54</sup> Ap XXIV:53, Tappert, 259; *BKS*, 365. (The Triglotta translates, “chief testimonies”.) Notably, the paragraph immediately following refers to the “theme” (*loco*, *Teil*) of the Epistle to the Hebrews of the Old Testament priesthood and sacrifices not meriting forgiveness but symbolizing Christ's meritorious sacrifice (Ap XXIV:54, Tappert, 259; *BKS*, 365). On a larger scale, Ap IV:5 says, “All Scripture should be divided into these two chief doctrines, the law and the promises” (*Universa scriptura in hos duos locos praecipuos distribui debet: in legem et promissiones*; *Die ganze Schrift beide altes und neues Testaments wird in die zwei Stück geteilt und lehret diese zwei Stück, nämlich Gesetz und göttliche Verheißungen*) (Tappert, 108; *BKS*, 159). The distinction between law and Gospel is not a *locus* in the Apology, although it is in the Formula.

<sup>55</sup> Significantly reflecting the *loci* method, the *locus* of Good Works (Ap XX:4-5) is another example of a place for assembling testimonies, such as passages from Scripture and the Fathers (see below at n.80, p.125). Confer also Ap IV:171; SD VIII:86.

<sup>56</sup> The nearly equal dual uses of the word may reflect Melanchthon's own somewhat schizophrenic uses. Citing Siegfried Wiedenhofer (*Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer Theologie bei Philipp Melanchthon*, 2 vols. [Frankfort: Peter Lang, 1976]), Wengert observes how Melanchthon can use *loci* “as storehouses for arguments to be used in oratory, as general meanings or topics of a speech or text, or as the basic principles of content which stand behind a speech or text.” Wengert also notes that in Melanchthon's 1519 *De rhetorica* and 1521 *Loci communes* the word *loci* is defined as “underlying themes or principles of a work” but that in Melanchthon's 1523 *Annotationes in Johannem* the word *locus* is a synonym for “verse” or “text” containing “a single theological idea”. (Timothy J. Wengert, *Philip Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem in Relation to its Predecessors and Contemporaries*, *Travaux d'humanisme et Renaissance* no. 220 [Geneve: Librairie Droz S. A., 1987], 183, 189.) Melanchthon's contributions to *The Book of Concord*, again, are dated as follows: 1530 Augsburg Confession, 1531 Apology of the Augsburg Confession, and 1537 Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope.



## “Article” or its parts

The uses of the Latin *locus*, *loci* and *locum*, *loci* to refer to an article or its components are about as frequent as both the uses to refer to other sorts of places and the uses to refer to passages.<sup>57</sup> Of the uses to refer to an article or its components, however, there are only a handful of occurrences where the words refer to an article’s components. What may be the clearest example regarding an article’s components comes in the Apology’s treatment of Ecclesiastical Power, where Melancthon writes the following, referring back to the corresponding article in the Augsburg Confession and to the Confutation’s response.

Cum autem nos in confessione, in hoc articulo, varios locos complexi simus, adversarii nihil respondent, nisi episcopos habere potestatem regiminis et coercitivae correctionis, ad dirigendum subditos in finem beatitudinis aeternae, et ad potestatem regiminis requiri potestatem iudicandi, definiendi, discernendi et statuendi ea, quae ad praefatum finem expediunt aut conducunt. Haec sunt verba confutationis, in quibus docent nos adversarii, quod episcopi habeant auctoritatem condendi leges utiles ad consequendam vitam aeternam. De hoc articulo controversia est.

Auch antwortet die Confutatio nicht auf unsere Gründe, sondern stellt sich recht päbstlich, sagt von großer Gewalt der Bischöfe und beweiset sie nicht, spricht also, daß die Bischöfe Gewalt haben zu herrschen, zu richten, zu strafen, zu zwingen, Gesetz zu machen, dienlich zum ewigen Leben. Also rühmet die Confutatio der Bischöfe Gewalt und beweiset sie doch nicht. Von diesem Artikel ist nun der Streit: ob die Bischöfe Macht haben Gesetze zu machen außer dem Evangelio, und zu gebieten dieselbigen zu halten als Gottesdienst, dadurch ewiges Leben zu verdienen.

In this article of the Confession we included various subjects. But our opponents’ only reply is that the bishops have the power to rule and to correct by force in order to guide their subjects toward the goal of eternal

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<sup>57</sup> Although apparently done only by way of an English translation, Gerald Wittmaier previously examined the uses of the terms “article” and “article of faith” in the Lutheran Confessions. (Wittmaier refers to the Latin *articulus* and *artus*, but seemingly only as “terms that give significance to the English equivalent” [p.2].) Wittmaier found an intimate connection between articles as individual members of one body of doctrine, and he also highlighted an emphasis on an article’s revelation by God in His Word, reference to human salvation, connection to other articles, and necessity of faith for understanding it. Wittmaier further discussed the importance of justification as the chief article that binds others together. (Gerald Wittmaier, “How are the terms ‘Article’ and ‘Article of Faith’ used in the Augsburg Confession and Apology,” Concordia Theological Seminary, 1971.)

bliss, and that the power to rule requires the power to judge, define, distinguish, and establish what is helpful or conducive to the aforementioned goal. These are the words of the Confutation, by which our opponents inform us that bishops have the authority to create laws which are useful for attaining eternal life. That is the issue in controversy.<sup>58</sup>

Not only are the various subtopics of the “article” on Ecclesiastical Power called *loci*, but the two parts of penitence, contrition and faith, can also be so referred in the article on Penitence.

Boni viri facile iudicare possunt plurimum referre, ut de superioribus partibus, videlicet contritione et fide conservetur vera doctrina. Itaque in his locis illustrandis semper plus versati sumus, de confessione et satisfactionibus non admodum rixati sumus.

Gottesfürchtige, ehrbare, fromme, christliche Leute können hie wohl merken, daß viel daran gelegen ist, daß man de poenitentia, von der Reue und dem Glauben, ein rechte, gewisse Lehre in der Kirchen habe und erhalte. Denn der große, unsaglich, ungehört Betrug vom Ablass usw., item die ungeschickte Lehre der Sophisten hat uns genug gewitzigt, was großen Unrats und Fährlichkeit daraus entsteht, wenn man hie feihl schlächt. Wie hat manch fromm Gewissen unterm Pabsttum hie so in großer Arbeit den rechten Weg gesucht und unter solchem Finsternis nicht funden. Darum haben wir allzeit großen Fleiß gehabt von diesem Stück klar, gewiß richtig zu lehren. Von der Beicht und Genugtuung haben wir nicht sonders gezankt.

Good men can easily judge the great importance of preserving the true teaching about contrition and faith, the two parts of penitence we have discussed above. [For the great fraud of indulgences, etc., and the preposterous doctrines of the sophists have sufficiently taught us what great vexation and danger arise therefrom if a foul stroke is here made. How many a godly conscience under the Papacy sought with great labor the true way, and in the midst, of such darkness did not find it!] We have therefore concentrated on the explanation of these doctrines and thus far have written nothing about confession and satisfaction.<sup>59</sup>

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<sup>58</sup> Ap XXVIII:6, *BKS*, 398; Tappert, 282. (Emphasis added.)

<sup>59</sup> Ap XII:98, *BKS*, 272; Tappert, 197. (Emphasis added.) (The English translation of the German addition is provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 281.) Another possible interpretation of this paragraph could have “contrition and faith” be one topic under the treatment of Penitence and “confession and satisfaction” another subject under the same article.

There are also other uses of *locus*, *loci* and *locum*, *loci* to refer to what may be subjects underneath a larger topic.<sup>60</sup>

There are some uses of the Latin words to refer to subjects that are larger topics of their own right but that do not appear as *loci* in specific writings of *The Book of Concord*. One, the training of the young, is a larger topic that is not of itself explicitly theological but is nevertheless referred to as a *locus*.<sup>61</sup> Another, that is theological, is the highest worship of the Gospel being the desire to receive forgiveness of sins, a *locus* that is said to provide a great deal of comfort.<sup>62</sup> Still another is the so-called two-kingdoms doctrine, which comes up in the article on Political Order but may be somehow distinct from it.<sup>63</sup> A final example is the possible division of the Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope into three topics as presented at its outset.<sup>64</sup>

The vast majority of the uses of *locus*, *loci* and *locum*, *loci* to refer to larger topics, however, refer to larger topics that do appear as *loci* in the writings of *The Book of Concord* or their precipitating documents. For example, articles of the Confutation, which essentially followed the organizational scheme of the Augsburg Confession, are referred to as *loci* in some cases by the Apology, which responded to the arguments of the Confutation. The Apology's article on the Invocation of the Saints provides one example.

Ita insidiose scripta est confutatio non tantum in hoc loco, sed fere  
ubique. Nullus est locus, in quo a dogmatibus suis discernant manifestos

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Significantly, earlier in the same article on Penitence, contrition and faith are called “chief parts of penitence” (*praecipua membra, Stücke*) (Ap XII:52, Tappert, 189; BKS, 261).

<sup>60</sup> In LC III:5, the duty to pray is “the first thing to know” (*soll nämlich das erste sein, daß man wisse; hoc quidem primo loco recensendum est*) (Tappert, 420; BKS, 663). In LC V:53, Christ's command to “Do this” is “the first point” (*Das soll nu das erste sein; Hoc primo quidem loco dictum est*) in exhorting people to receive the Sacrament (Tappert, 453; BKS, 718).

Furthermore, if the six main parts of the Catechisms are regarded as *loci*, then that the individual commandments, articles of the Creed, and petitions of the Lord's Prayer are also referred to as *loci* provides other examples of *loci* as subpoints of a larger *locus*. See also the discussion in the text below, p.129.

<sup>61</sup> SC Preface 19, 20. Confer/compare Ap XV:43.

<sup>62</sup> Ap IV:310.

<sup>63</sup> Ap XVI:2; compare ¶13. Certainly AC XVI makes no explicit mention of the two kingdoms, as Ap XVI does. Ap XV:43 may also be informative on this matter.

<sup>64</sup> Although the Treatise usually has other headings—“Testimony of Scriptures”, “Testimony from History”, “Arguments of Opponents Refuted”, “The Marks of the Antichrist”, and “The Power and Jurisdiction of Bishops” (although compare K-W)—Melancthon initially presents “three articles” of false teaching (Tr 1-4) to which he later refers almost as if they could be intended divisions (Tr 38; cf. 22).

abusus. Et tamen apud ipsos si qui sunt saniores, fatentur multas falsus persuasiones haerere in doctrina scholasticorum et canonistarum, multos praeterea abusus in tanta inscitia et negligentia pastorum irrepsisse in ecclesiam.

Also voll Hinterlist und gefährlichs Betrugs ist ihr ganze Confutatio, nicht allein an diesem Ort, sondern allenthalben. Sie stellen sich, als sein sie gar goldrein, als haben sie nie kein Wasser betrübt. Denn an keinem Ort unterscheiden sie von ihren dogmatibus oder Lehre die öffentlichen Mißbräuche. Und doch, viel unter ihnen sind so ehrbar und redlich, bekennen selbst, daß viel Irrtum sind in der scholasticorum und Canonisten Bücher, daß auch viele Mißbräuche durch ungelehrte Prediger und durch so großen schändlichen Unfleiß der Bischöfe eingerissen sein in der Kirchen.

At this point, and almost everywhere else, the Confutation is a deceitful document. [They pretend that they are as pure as gold, that they have never muddled the water.] Nowhere do they distinguish between their teaching and obvious abuses. Yet anyone in their party with a little sense would admit that the teachings of the scholastics and canonists contain many false opinions and that the ignorance and negligence of the pastors permitted many abuses to creep into the church.<sup>65</sup>

The foregoing quotation is significant first for its close uses of *locus* with *dogmatibus*, which latter word derives from the same original Greek word, δόγμα, ατος, τό, as ultimately does the English word “dogmatics”.<sup>66</sup> (In this place, the Triglotta translates

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<sup>65</sup> Ap XXI:40, BKS, 326; Tappert, 235. (Emphasis added.) (The English translation of the German addition is provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 355.)

There are a number of other occurrences of the words in *The Book of Concord* that refer to the *loci* of the opponents’ Confutation. Especially significant is Melancthon’s Preface to the Apology where he refers to “the main points” (*capita locorum*; *Summa der Argument*) of the Confutation’s argumentation (Ap Preface:6, BKS, 142; Tappert, 98). Confer Ap Preface:14; XXIV:9; and possibly also XX:4 and XXVII:19, where *locum* and *loco*, respectively, both could be taken narrowly to refer to specific statements or broadly to refer to the whole article.

<sup>66</sup> OED, 4:929. The Greek word δόγμα, ατος, τό can be used in early Christian writings to refer to the teaching of philosophers and false prophets whose doctrines lead to destruction in hell, although it is said not to be used in that sense in the New Testament (“δόγμα, ατος, τό,” Walter Bauer, William F. Arndt, F. Wilbur Gingrich and Frederick W. Danker, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, Second ed. [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1979], 201; hereafter, BAGD). The word originally was used for philosophical opinions and principles, came to mean official decrees, and was used of Old Testament and New Testament religious teaching as divine philosophy (Gerhard Kittel, “δόγμα,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964], 230-232).

Another passage where *locus*, *loci* is combined with *dogma*, *dogmatis* is in the Formula, where the

and somewhat transliterates, rendering “dogmas”.) The second significance of the foregoing quotation is its statement that broadens from the *locus* of the Invocation of the Saints to all the *loci* of the Confutation. The Latin *Nullus est locus* that Tappert translates “Nowhere” significantly could be translated “At no *locus*” or “At no topic”.<sup>67</sup> The Reformers’ opponents in the Confutation do not admit their errors, which forces Melanchthon essentially to follow its organization and to refute the opponents’ errors *locus* for *locus*.

In fact, in prefacing his Apology, Melanchthon indicates the doctrine is organized by *loci*.

Neque enim negari potest, quin multi loci doctrinae christianae, quos maxime prodest exstare in ecclesia, a nostris patefacti et illustrati sint; qui qualibus et quam periculosus opinionibus obruti olim iacuerint apud monachos, canonistas et theologos sophistas, non libet hic recitare.

Habemus publica testimonia multorum bonorum virorum, qui Deo gratias agunt pro hoc summo beneficio, quod de multis necessariis locis docuerit meliora, quam passim leguntur apud adversarios nostros.

Denn es können die Widersacher selbs nicht verneinen noch läugnen, daß viele und die höchsten, nötigsten Artikel der christlichen Lehre, ohne welche die christliche Kirch samt der ganzen christlichen Lehre und Namen würden vergessen und untergehen, durch die Unsern wieder an Tag bracht sein. Denn mit was zänkischen, vergeblichen, unnützen, kindischen Lehren viel nötige Stücke vor wenig Jahren bei Mönchen, Theologen, Canonisten und Sophisten untergedrückt gewesen, will ich hie diesmal nicht erzählen; es soll noch wohl kommen.

Wir haben (Gott Lob) Zeugnis von vielen hohen, ehrlichen, redlichen, gottfürchtigen Leuten, welche Gott von Herzen danken vor die unaussprechlichen Gaben und Gnaden, daß sie in den allernötigsten Stücken der ganzen Schrift von uns viel klärer, gewisser, eigentlicher, richtiger Lehre und Trost der Gewissen haben, denn in allen Büchern der Widersacher immer funden ist.

For we have undoubtedly brought into view many articles of Christian doctrine that the Church sorely needs. We need not describe here

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confessors write of desiring concord “that will not give place to the smallest error” (*dem wenigsten Irrtumb nichts eingeräumt; nulli etiam falso dogmati locus concedatur*) (SD XI:96, Tappert, 632; BKS, 1091).

<sup>67</sup> Where the Latin uses essentially the same word, *loco* and *locus*, the German uses in both places *Ort*, but English translations change words: point-nowhere (Tappert), topic-passage (Triglotta, 355; K-W, 243).

how they lay hidden under all sorts of dangerous opinions in the writings of the monks, canonists, and scholastic theologians.

Many good men have testified publicly and thanked God for this great blessing, that on many points our Confession's teaching is better than that which appears everywhere in our opponents' writings.<sup>68</sup>

Not only does the Apology use *loci* in this way but also the Augsburg Confession, the Treatise, The Small and Large Catechism, and the Formula of Concord. Thus, again, earlier and later documents have such occurrences, representing the principal authors of the documents in *The Book of Concord*. And, in these documents their authors refer to a wide variety of topics as *loci*.<sup>69</sup>

The chief locus is Justification, a designation made already in the Augsburg Confession and continued through the Apology and the Formula. The Augsburg Confession's article on the Authority of Bishops or Ecclesiastical Power says the following.

Dann es muß je der furnehme Artikel des Evangeliums erhalten werden, daß wir die Gnad Gottes durch den Glauben an Christum ohn unser Verdienst erlangen und nicht durch Gottesdienst, von Menschen eingesetzt, verdienen.

For the chief article of the Gospel be maintained, namely, that we obtain the grace of God through faith in Christ without our merits; we do not merit it by services of God instituted by men.

Necesse est retineri praecipuum evangelii locum, quod gratiam per fidem in Christum gratis consequamur, non per certas observationes aut per cultus ab hominibus institutos.

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<sup>68</sup> Ap Preface:17-18, *BKS*, 144; Tappert, 99. (Emphasis added.)

<sup>69</sup> Aside from those mentioned in the text's ensuing discussion the list follows. *Original Sin* Ap I:4, 35, 51; IV:171 (confer *Adamsunde*); SD I:11, 39, 49. *Human Traditions* Ap XV:49. *Invocation of Saints* Ap XXI:1 (note the philosophical context), 40, 42. *The Mass* Ap XXIV:14. *Distinction of Foods* AC XXVI:4. *Monastic Vows* Ap XXVII:20, 52. *Second Commandment* LC I:53, 56. *Fourth Commandment* LC I:166. *Fifth Commandment* LC I:180, 195. *Sixth Commandment* LC I:200, 206. *Apostolic Creed* LC II:63. *Second Article* LC II:26. *Second Petition* LC III:55. *Fourth Petition* LC III:72. *Seventh (Last) Petition* LC III:113, 118. *Baptism* LC IV:12. *Infant Baptism* LC IV:47. *Lord's Supper* LC V:28; SD VII:66, 111, 113, 128. *Third use of the Law* SD VI:15. *Person of Christ* SD VIII:38, 86 (in contrast to the *locus* on the Lord's Supper).

It is necessary to preserve the chief article of the Gospel, namely, that we obtain grace through faith in Christ and not through certain observances or acts of worship instituted by men.<sup>70</sup>

The Apology's article on Justification similarly calls it "the main doctrine of Christianity" (*praecipuus locus; dem höchsten fürnehmsten Artikel*) and says the Reformers' opponents "confuse this doctrine miserably" (*misere contaminant hunc locum; haben sie diesen edlen hochnötigen, fürnehmsten Artikel ... jämmerlich befudelt*).<sup>71</sup> Articles other than those on justification also refer to justification as the "chief doctrine of the Gospel" (*praecipuum evangelii locum; dieser großen, hohesten, allerwichtigen Sachen*).<sup>72</sup> And, there are other places where the topic of justification is referred to as a *locus*.<sup>73</sup>

The chief or main *locus* of Justification is closely related to the *locus* of Penitence, as the Apology's article on Penitence states.

Sed quia adversarii nominatim hoc damnant, quod dicimus homines fide consequi remissionem peccatorum, addemus paucas quasdam probationes, ex quibus intelligi poterit remissionem peccatorum contingere non ex opere operato propter contritionem, sed fide illa speciali, qua unusquisque credit sibi remitti peccata. Nam hic articulus praecipuus est, de quo digladiamur cum adversariis, et cuius cognitionem ducimus maxime necessariam esse Christianis omnibus. Cum autem supra de iustificatione de eadem re satis dictum videatur, hic breviores erimus. Sunt enim loci maxime cognati, doctrina poenitentiae et doctrina iustificationis.

Die weil aber die die Widersacher diesen klaren, gewissen, trefflichsten Artikel ohne alle Scheu und Scham namhaftig verdammen, da wir sagen, daß die Menschen Vergebung der Sünden erlangen durch den Glauben an Christum, so wollen wir des etliche Gründe und Beweisung setzen, aus welchen zu verstehen sei, daß wir Vergebung der Sünden nicht erlangen *ex opere operato* oder durch das getane Werk, durch Reü oder

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<sup>70</sup> AC XXVIII:52, *BKS*, 129; Tappert, 89. (Emphasis added.)

<sup>71</sup> Ap IV:2, 3, Tappert, 107; *BKS*, 159. SD III:6 favorably cites Ap IV:2-3 but uses a slightly different wording: *fürnehmste der ganzen christlichen Lehr; His ... articulus ... praecipuus est*; "the chief article of the entire Christian doctrine" (*BKS*, 916; Tappert, 540).

<sup>72</sup> Ap XII:3, Tappert, 182; *BKS*, 252-253. Confer Ap XII:10: *praecipuo evangelii loco; Hauptartikel der christlichen Lehre*; "chief doctrine of the Gospel" (*BKS*, 254; Tappert, 184).

<sup>73</sup> Ap IV:378 ; SD III:67. SD III:29 is also a significant passage referring to the *locus* of Justification; it is dealt with in the text below at n.83, p.127.

Leid usw., sondern allein durch den Glauben, da ein jeder für sich selbst glaubet, daß ihm Sünde vergeben sein. Denn dieser Artikel ist der fürnehmste und nötigste, darum wir mit den Widersachern streiten, welcher auch der nötigst ist allen Christen zu wissen. So wir aber hieroben im Artikel *de iustificatione* von demselben genugsam gesagt, so wollen wir desto kürzer hier dasselbe handeln.

Our opponents expressly condemn our statement that men obtain the forgiveness of sins by faith. We shall therefore add a few proofs to show that the forgiveness of sins does not come *ex opere operato* because of contrition, but by that personal faith by which each individual believes that his sins are forgiven. For this is the chief issue on which we clash with our opponents and which we believe all Christians must understand. Since it is evident that we have said enough about this earlier, we shall be briefer at this point. For the doctrine of penitence and the doctrine of justification are very closely related.<sup>74</sup>

The two *loci* are so closely related that, in the Apology's treatment of the Mass, Melancthon appears to refer to *Penitence* as the chief *locus* of the faith.

Adversarii in Confutatione miras tragoedias agunt de desolatione templorum, quod videlicet stent inornatae arae sine candelis, sine statuīs. Has nugas iudicant esse ornatum ecclesiarum. Longe aliam desolationem significat Daniel, videlicet ignorationem evangelii. Nam populus obrutus multitudine et varietate traditionum atque opinionum nullo modo potuit complecti summam doctrinae christianae. Quis enim unquam de populo intellexit doctrinam de poenitentia, quam adversarii tradiderunt? Et hic praecipuus locus est doctrinae Christianae.

Die Widersacher ziehen den Daniel an, der da sagt: „Es werden Greuel und Verwüstung in der Kirchen stehen“, und deuten dieses auf unsere Kirchen, derhalben daß die Altar nicht bedeckt sein, nicht Licher darin brennen und dergleichen. Wiewohl es nicht wahr ist, daß wir solche äußerliche Ornament alle weg tun, dennoch, so es schon also wäre, redet Daniel nicht von solchen Dingen, die gar äußerlich sind und zur christlichen Kirchen nicht gehören, sondern meint viel ein andere, greulichere Verwüstung, welche im Pabsttum stark gehet, nämlich von Verwüstung des nötigsten, größten Gottesdiensts, des Predigtamts und Unterdrückung des Evangelii. Denn bei den Widersachern predigt man das mehrer Teil von Menschensatzungen, dadurch die Gewissen von Christo auf eigene Werk und Vertrauen geführt werden; so ists gewiß, daß

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<sup>74</sup> Ap XII:59, BKS, 263; Tappert, 190. (Emphasis added.) Penitence is also referred to as a *locus* in Ap XII:90; XV:43.



unterm Pabsttum die Predigt von der Buß oder *de poenitentia*, wie die Widersacher davon gelehret, niemand verstanden hat, und das ist doch das nötigste Stück der ganzen christlichen Lehre.

In the Confutation our opponents wring their hands over “the desolation of the temples” and the altars standing unadorned, without candles or statues. They call these trifles the ornament of the churches. [Although it is not true that we abolish all such outward ornaments; yet, even if it were so, Daniel is not speaking of such things as are altogether external and do not belong to the Christian Church.] Daniel describes a vastly different desolation, ignorance of the Gospel. The people were swamped by the many different traditions and ideas and could not grasp the sum of Christian doctrine. [For the adversaries preach mostly of human ordinances, whereby consciences are led from Christ to confidence in their own works.] Who among the people has ever understood our opponents’ doctrine of penitence? Yet this is the principal doctrine of the Christian faith.<sup>75</sup>

The key to understanding these apparently contradictory statements may be suggested by the passage from the Apology’s article on Penitence cited above, where contrition and faith are referred to both as parts of Penitence and yet as *loci* themselves.<sup>76</sup> The faith that is part of penitence (or repentance) subjectively appropriates as its content that which is included in the *locus* of Justification as objective righteousness: “that for his sake our sin is forgiven and righteousness and eternal life are given to us” (*daß uns umb seinen willen die Sunde vergeben, Gerechtigkeit und ewiges Leben geschenkt wird*).<sup>77</sup> In much the same way, the *locus* of Justification entails that subjective appropriation of repentant faith as the way by which “we receive forgiveness of sin and become righteous before God by grace, for Christ’s sake, through faith” (*wir Vergebung der Sunde bekommen und vor Gott gerecht werden aus Gnaden, umb Christus willen, durch den Glauben*).<sup>78</sup>

While Justification is so closely joined with Penitence as to carry the “chief locus” designation, Justification is to be distinguished from the *locus* of Good Works,

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<sup>75</sup> Ap XXIV:44-46, *BKS*, 363; Tappert, 258. (Emphasis added.) (The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 399, 401.)

<sup>76</sup> Apology XII:98. See at n.59.

<sup>77</sup> AC<sub>G</sub> IV:2, Tappert, 30; *BKS*, 56.

<sup>78</sup> AC<sub>G</sub> IV:1, Tappert, 30; *BKS*, 56.

even though there is an ontological relationship between the two *loci*.<sup>79</sup> The Apology's article on Good Works twice refers to itself as a *locus*. In one case Melanchthon writes the following.

Non ferenda est igitur blasphemia tribuere honorem Christi nostris operibus. Nihil pudet iam istos theologos, si talem sententiam in ecclesia audent ferre. Neque dubitamus, quin optimus Imperator ac plerique Principum hunc locum nullo modo fuerint in confutatione relicturi, si essent admoniti. Infinita hoc loco testimonia ex scriptura, ex patribus citare possemus. Verum et supra satis multa de hac re diximus. Et nihil opus est pluribus testimoniis illi, qui scit, quare Christus nobis donatus sit, qui scit Christum esse propitiationem pro peccatis nostris. Esaias inquit: Posuit Dominus in eo iniquitates omnium nostrum.

Darum ist es eine greulich Gotteslästerung, die Ehre Christi also unsern Menschenwerken zu geben. Und wir vertrösten und versehen uns zu Kaiserl. Majestät und auch andern Fürsten dieser kaiserlichen, fürstlichen Tugend, daß sie so öffentliche Unwahrheit und Ungrund, dadurch für aller Welt Gott und das Evangelium gelästert wird, in keinem Weg würden in der Konfutation, wenn sie verwarnet wären, gelassen haben. Denn daß dieser Artikel gewißlich göttlich und wahr ist, und das dies die heilige göttliche Wahrheit sei, künnten wir hie gar nahe unzählige Sprüche der Schrift fürbringen, auch aus den Vätern. Und ist gar nahe keine Syllabe, kein Blatt in der Bible, in den fürnehmsten Büchern der Heiligen Schrift, da das nicht klar gemeldet wäre. Wir haben oben auch viel von diesen Stücken gesagt, und gottfürchtige, fromme Herzen, die da wohl wissen, warum Christus geben ist, die da nicht für aller Welt Güter und Königreiche entbehren wollten, daß Christus nicht unser einiger Schatz, unser einiger Mittler und Versöhner wäre, die müssen sich hie entsetzen und erschrecken, daß Gottes heilig Wort und Wahrheit so öffentlich von armen Menschen verachtet und verdammt wird. Esaias der Prophet sagt: „Der Herre hat auf ihnen gelegt unser aller Sünde.“

Therefore the blasphemy of attributing the honor of Christ to our works is intolerable. These theologians have lost all sense of shame if they dare to smuggle such a notion into the church. We are sure that His Most Excellent Imperial Majesty and many of the princes would have refused to let this statement of the Confutation stand if their attention had been called to it. Here we could quote endless passages from Scripture and from the Fathers, [that this article is certainly divine and true, and this is the sacred and divine truth. For there is hardly a syllable, hardly a leaf in the Bible, in the principal books of the Holy Scriptures, where this is not clearly stated.]

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<sup>79</sup> The relationship is well-detailed in Chapter V.

but we have already said enough on this subject. There is no need for proofs to anyone who knows that Christ was given to us to be a propitiation for our sins. [Godfearing, pious hearts that know well why Christ has been given, who for all the possessions and kingdoms of the world would not be without Christ as our only Treasure, our only Mediator and Redeemer, must here be shocked and terrified that God's holy Word and Truth should be so openly despised and condemned by poor men.] Isaiah says (53:6), "The Lord hath laid on Him the iniquities of us all."<sup>80</sup>

The other place where the Apology's article on Good Works refers to itself as a *locus* comes a few paragraphs later.

Sed supra de tota re diximus. Inde lector sumat testimonia. Nam hanc non disputationem, sed querelam indignitas rei nobis expressit, quod hoc loco diserte posuerunt se improbare hunc nostrum articulum, quod remissionem peccatorum consequamur non propter opera nostra, sed fide et gratis propter Christum.

Wir haben hie oben davon genug gesagt; da mag ein jeder Sprüche der Schrift, so diese Lehre gründen, suchen. Denn an diesem Ort hat mich bewegt so heftig zu klagen die greuliche, unverschämte, übermachte, färgefasste Bosheit der Widersacher, da sie mit klaren Worten setzen, daß sie diesen Artikel verwerfen, daß wir Vergebung der Sunde erlangen nicht durch unser Werk, sondern ohn Verdienst, durch den Glauben an Christum.

But we spoke about all these matters above. The reader can find the references there. For the shameful treatment of this topic has compelled us to register a complaint rather than compose a point-by-point refutation. For they clearly have gone on record as rejecting our teaching that we receive the forgiveness of sins not on account of our works but by faith and freely on account of Christ.<sup>81</sup>

Both of these passages from this article of the Apology that refer to the article on Good Works as a *locus* are thus also significant for what they show of the purpose and use of *loci*.

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<sup>80</sup> Ap XX:4-5, *BKS*, 314; Tappert, 227. (Emphasis added.) (The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 339.) On *loci* as places for assembling testimonies, confer above at n.55, p.114.

<sup>81</sup> Ap XX:11, *BKS*, 315; K-W, 236 (confer Triglotta, 341). (Emphasis added.) In this case, Tappert (228) did not translate the relevant phrase and less-felicitously translated the concluding phrase.

The more significant reference to the *locus* of Good Works, however, comes in the Solid Declaration's treatment of Justification. This key passage is itself an extended quotation from Luther's 1535 commentary on Galatians.<sup>82</sup>

Wir gebens wohl zu, das man von der Liebe und guten Werken auch lehren solle, doch also, das es geschehe, wenn und wo es vonnöten ist, als nämlich, wenn man außerhalb dieser Sachen von der Rechtfertigung von Werken sunst zu ton hat. Hie aber ist dieses die Hauptsächlich, darmit man zu ton hat, daß man frage, nicht, ob man auch gute Werke ton und lieben solle, sunder wodurch man doch gerecht für Gott und selig werden möge? Und da antworten wir mit S. Paulo also: daß wir „allein durch den Glauben“ an Christum gerecht werden, und nicht durch des Gesetzes Werk oder durch die Liebe, nicht also, das wir hiemit die Werk und Liebe gar verwerfen, wie die Widersacher uns mit Unwahrheit lästern und schuld geben, sondern auf daß wir uns allein von der Hauptsachen, darmit man hie zu ton hat, nicht auf einen andern, frembden Handel, der in diese Sachen gar nichts gehöret, abführen lassen, wie es der Satan gerne haben wollt. Derhalben, alldieweil und solange wir in diesem Artikel von der Rechtfertigung zu tun haben, verwerfen und verdammen wir die Werk, sintemal es umb diesen Artikel also geton ist, das er keinerlei Disputation oder Handlung von den Werken nicht leiden kann. Darumb schneiden wir in dieser Sache alle Gesetz und Gesetzeswerk kurz ab.

Concedimus, de caritate et bonis operibus etiam docendum esse, sed suo tempore et loco, quando scilicet quaestio est de bonis operibus extra hunc articulum de iustificatione. Hic autem status causae et caput est, de quo agitur, ut scilicet quaeratur, non, an bona opera sint facienda et caritas exercenda sit, sed qua re iustificemur et vitam aeternam consequamur. Hic respondemus cum Paulo: sola fide in Christum nos pronuntiari iustos, non operibus legis aut caritate. Non quod opera aut caritatem reiiciamus, ut adversarii nos falso accusant, sed quod a statu causae in alienum negotium, quod ad hanc quaestionem prorsus non pertinet, abstrahi nos et implicari nolumus; id quod tamen Satanas maximopere molitur et quaerit. Itaque cum iam versemur in loco communi et articulo de iustificatione, reiicimus et damnamus opera. Is enim locus nequaquam patitur aut admittit disputationem de bonis operibus. Abscindimus igitur hoc proposito simpliciter omnes leges et omnia opera legis.

We certainly grant that we must teach about love and good works too. But it must be done at the time and place where it is necessary, namely, when we deal with good works apart from this matter of justification. At this point the main question with which we have to do is not whether a person

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<sup>82</sup> WA 40<sup>1</sup>:40-688, Aland #229; AE 26:1-461, translated by Jaroslav Pelikan.

should also do good works and love, but how a person may be justified before God and be saved. And then we answer with St. Paul that we are justified alone through faith in Christ, and not through the works of the law or through love—not in such a way as if we thereby utterly rejected works or love (as the adversaries falsely slander and accuse us) but so that we may not be diverted (as Satan would very much like) from the main issue with which we here have to do into another extraneous matter which does not belong in this article at all. Therefore, while and as long as we have to do with this article of justification, we reject and condemn works, since the very nature of this article cannot admit any treatment or discussion of works. For this reason we summarily cut off every reference to the law and the works of the law in this conjunction.<sup>83</sup>

Not only are the specific Latin expression *loco communi* (“commonplace”) and the references to the nature of the article and to “disputation” significant here,<sup>84</sup> but more significant is the distinction made between the “place” for teaching about justification and the “place” for teaching about good works. Although there are elsewhere in *The Book of Concord* a number of other references to the appropriateness of places for certain arguments,<sup>85</sup> this distinction between justification and good works (sanctification) is by far the most important. While the logical distinction the Reformers make between justification and sanctification is discussed further elsewhere,<sup>86</sup> here it is important to

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<sup>83</sup> SD III:29, *BKS*, 923-924; Tappert, 544. (Emphasis added.) The wording is not exactly the same, but see WA 40<sup>1</sup>:240<sup>17-26</sup>; confer AE 26:137. As indicated below (n.216, p.398), this Luther passage is cited by Martin Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus, 2 vols. (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1989), II:619. Furthermore, the passage is a crucial one for the justification-sanctification distinction, as discussed in Chapter V.

<sup>84</sup> By the time this passage was written, of course, Melancthon had published several works using the *loci* method and titled them so. Chemnitz, one of the principal authors of the Formula, lectured on Melancthon’s *loci* and had a similar work of his own posthumously published (see further the discussion below, beginning on p.396).

<sup>85</sup> Ap I:43; IV:342, 369; SD VIII:30. Note well the philosophical expressions in the surrounding context of Ap I:43 and IV:342.

<sup>86</sup> See Chapter V.

Scholars debate whether humanism led the Reformers to emphasize sanctification more than justification or spiritualize the presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar. Kittelson (“Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 154 n.48) cites Gerhard Ritter, “Die geschichtliche Bedeutung des deutschen Humanismus,” *Historische Zeitschrift* 127 (1923): 450-451; the original German of Moeller, “The German Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation,” 59-60 (about p.37 in the English); and Spitz and Societies, *Religious Renaissance* 292. Kittelson disagrees with Ritter, Moeller, and Spitz. The Kittelson citation of Ritter does not appear to be accurate. Moeller, whom Kittelson says “depends” on Ritter (Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 139 n.2.), does briefly discuss the two topics but does not cite Ritter. Spitz, at the page cited from his Conclusion, simply asserts the claim in passing without any

note the role that the *loci* method plays in the distinction and, as with the use of the *loci* method in general, to observe that what will shortly be seen to be a philosophical tool is put in use of the Gospel.<sup>87</sup> To be sure, that the earlier and later authors of the writings contained in *The Book of Concord* considered their works to be organized according to the *loci* method is clear from how they referred to the different parts of the works, and from the overall organization of the works, which is the next topic here.

### ***τόποι organizational structure used by The Book of Concord***

While *The Book of Concord* itself is organized according to the different documents of which it consists, even without the foregoing examination there really can be little doubt that those documents contained in *The Book of Concord* are themselves organized topically. That the τόποι or *loci* method is used is demonstrable by even a casual examination of the writings contained in *The Book of Concord*.<sup>88</sup> The Apostolic and Nicene Creeds, the first two of the three Ecumenical Creeds that predate the Reformation, have articles corresponding to the three Persons of the Trinity: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. (Even that division Luther can perceive as relating to creation, redemption, and sanctification.<sup>89</sup>) The third Ecumenical Creed, the Athanasian, deals both with the nature of the Trinity—the distinctions between the Persons and the unity of the substance—and the nature and works of the Incarnation. Of the Reformation writings, the Augsburg Confession is organized into 28 topical articles, 21 treating matters of faith and doctrine and 7 treating matters in dispute. The Apology of the Augsburg Confession’s 23 articles generally correspond to the Augsburg Confession’s articles. Covering some of the same points as the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, Martin Luther’s Smalcald Articles has some 21 articles. An appendix to the Augsburg Confession, the Treatise on

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support, although he does cite both Moeller and Ritter for other reasons in another place (for example, p.354 n.15).

<sup>87</sup> Another example of *loci* in service of the Gospel is found in Ap XV:43, where sermons are said to deal with “topics” (*locis*; *Stücke*) such as penitence, faith, and the like (Tappert, 221; *BKS*, 305). Confer the discussion below about *locis* being homiletical for Melanchthon (see at n.101).

<sup>88</sup> A complete listing of the usual headings for the various documents is included in the Appendix, “*The Book of Concord by Structure and Content*”.

<sup>89</sup> See the discussion below, beginning on p.337.

the Power and Primacy of the Pope treats its major topic according to the testimony of Scripture, the testimony of history, refutations of the opponents' arguments, and two related subtopics, the marks of the Antichrist and the power and jurisdiction of bishops.<sup>90</sup> The Small and Large Catechisms are organized according to the six chief parts of Christian Doctrine, to the first three of which—the Ten Commandments, the Apostolic Creed, and the Lord's Prayer—Luther added parts on Holy Baptism, the Office of the Keys and Confession, and the Sacrament of the Altar.<sup>91</sup> (Within especially the first three parts, each subpart—commandment, article, and petition—essentially become *loci* of their own.<sup>92</sup>) The later Formula of Concord has 12 topical articles also covering some of the same points as the earlier confessional writings.<sup>93</sup>

Thus, considering both how the authors of the writings contained in *The Book of Concord* refer to their divisions and how the writings themselves are organized, the topical organization of the works contained in *The Book of Concord* is clear.

### ***τόποι method's philosophical background***

Such topical organization is said to be inherently philosophical in nature. The works contained in *The Book of Concord* were not the only Reformation-era works to be organized by topic or commonplace. Philip Melanchthon, the author of the 1530 Augsburg Confession, organized his earlier major theological work, *Loci Communes*, by the same method.<sup>94</sup> Melanchthon's *Loci* and others like it provide the primary basis for the work of both Quirinus Breen, who demonstrates that the τόποι method comes from

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<sup>90</sup> Those divisions given in the text are the usual divisions, but an examination of the work itself suggests there are three central questions being addressed (see Tr 1-4 and subsequent references to such divisions, such as Tr 22 and 38). Confer n.64 above, p.117.

<sup>91</sup> See, for example, Bente, §84-85, pp.64-65. The extent to which Luther added the part on the Keys and Confession is somewhat debated, as in Bente, §112-113, pp.87-88.

<sup>92</sup> See also the discussion in n.60 above, p.117.

<sup>93</sup> The use of the *loci* method can be theologically problematic. There is somewhat of a contemporary controversy over whether the confessional writings are completely authoritative in all their teaching or only on those matters given a specific *locus* or article. In addition, the division of the Bible's one teaching, or doctrine, into many *loci* can be said to contribute to a false notion that there are many doctrines.

<sup>94</sup> There are some details on the editions of Melanchthon's *Loci* below, beginning on p.252.

philosophy, and James M. Kittelson, who locates the method within humanism and suggests possible implications of its use.

## The work of Quirinus Breen

Quirinus Breen traced Melanchthon's *loci* method in at least some senses back to Aristotle's *Topics*.<sup>95</sup> Breen regarded both as innovative works, writing that Aristotle's *Topics* was intended to systematize dialectics (logic) in an original way and that Philip Melanchthon's 1521 *Loci communes*, highly praised by Luther, was a first for what Breen calls "Protestant" theology. Although Breen regarded both as innovative and in some senses related, Breen also found some discontinuities. Breen wrote that Aristotle's *Topics* was to apply only to probable statements and thus provide only probable conclusions, as opposed to Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics* that was intended to deal with certain knowledge. In part due to what Breen called ignorance of Aristotle's *Analytics*, Breen wrote that Greek and Roman schools lost the distinction between probable and certain knowledge, and Breen illustrated this point with the example of Cicero, who held that only probable knowledge was possible and thus made greater use of the *loci* in attempting to discover what he regarded as the only kind of knowledge.<sup>96</sup> While Breen claims that during the Middle Ages some of the distinction between probable and certain knowledge was recovered and that those regarded as orthodox kept the dialectics of probable propositions out of matters of faith, renaissance authors Rudolph Agricola and Erasmus, according to Breen, both approached knowledge more in Cicero's manner than in Aristotle's manner and influenced Melanchthon in this regard.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>95</sup> Quirinus Breen, "The Terms 'Loci Communes' and 'Loci' in Melanchthon," *Church History* 16.4 (1947). On many of Breen's statements about the *loci* method's background, confer Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*. (Some specific page references to Ong's work are made in the notes that follow.)

<sup>96</sup> Ong wrote that Aristotle and Cicero thought of *loci communes* as "common to all subjects, providing arguments for anything at all" (citing Aristotle *Rhetoric* i.2[1358a], ii.18[1391b] and Cicero *De inventione* ii.14. sec. 47ff.), but Ong noted that by the time of the Reformation the distinction between "private" and "common" places "generally amounted to little in theory or practice", making "place" and "commonplace" interchangeable (Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 116).

<sup>97</sup> With Breen, confer the discussion of Peter of Spain's *Summulae logicales* and its importance to Ramus and Agricola in Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 60-61. Ong similarly places Peter of Spain's *De locis* on a line stretching from Aristotle through Themistius and Boethius to Agricola



Agricola sought by the *loci* to reconstitute all knowledge; Erasmus (in addition to that) sought more particularly to reinterpret Christianity by *loci* belonging to ethics. . . . In a sense Melanchthon is their most illustrious pupil. As a worker in the topical tradition the pupil has outshone his masters.<sup>98</sup>

To further understand Melanchthon's "illustrious" use of the *loci* method, the relationship between dialectic and rhetoric must be briefly explored.

The relationship between dialectic and rhetoric depended on who used them. Breen wrote that Aristotle knew dialectics and rhetoric were related but kept them separate and did not think rhetoric itself could attain knowledge.<sup>99</sup> Orators, Breen wrote, used the dialectical method of *topica* to dig out and arrange their subject matter, which subject matter was polished by rhetoric. Thus, at least for some, Breen wrote, the dialectical *topos* or *locus*, called *inventio*, was to be distinguished from rhetorical *inventio*. Dialectic was separate from rhetoric for Aristotle and others in the Middle Ages, but not necessarily for Melanchthon.<sup>100</sup>

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and Ramus (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 63). On Ramus' criticism of Aristotle's *Topics*, however, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 174.

<sup>98</sup> Breen, "'Loci Communes' and 'Loci,'" 202. For more on Agricola's use of the *loci* and the relationship between rhetoric and dialectic, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 102-104. For Melanchthon following Agricola, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 158-160. Hill says, "topical methods of writing became known to the occidental theologians through the writings of John of Damascus" (Charles Leander Hill, "Prolegomena," The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521] [Boston: Meador, 1944], 55). Melanchthon's dedicatory letter at the beginning of the 1521 *loci* is said to show Agricola's influence in being both critical of John of Damascus for too much philosophy and of Peter Lombard for not enough Scripture; see Philipp Melanchthon, The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521], trans. Charles Leander Hill (Boston: Meador, 1944), 66-67.

<sup>99</sup> Aristotle is said to have seen rhetoric more or less as tailoring a message to an audience, knowing which dialectical arguments a particular audience will find persuasive. Rhetorical arguments for Aristotle were said to be "just arguments in another type of dress". (See further the discussion of inductive and deductive methods that follow in Chapters III and IV, respectively.) As for rhetorical *loci*, Aristotle's list of *topoi* in *Rhetoric* II.23 is said to be "mostly traceable" to Aristotle's *Topics*. (Robin Smith, "Logic," The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 63-64. Confer Jonathan Barnes, "Rhetoric and poetics," The Cambridge Companion to Aristotle, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995], 269-272.)

<sup>100</sup> Ong notes how Peter of Spain's *loci* provides maxims that somewhat correspond with Aristotle's axioms and that function "in the dialectical or even literary or rhetorical sense" (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 63-65). And, Ong notes the significant connection between *ratio* ("reason") and the *loci*: "Here in the thirteenth century, when the goddess of reason makes her most definitive appearance in scholastic philosophy in the most distinctive and influential of all scholastic manuals, she is supported not on the pillars of science, but on the topics or arguments of a merely probably dialectic or rhetoric" (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 65).

Based on the changing titles of Melanchthon's work, its content, and Melanchthon's treatises on the *loci* method, Breen understood Melanchthon at least initially to intend his *loci communes* as a rhetorical work, although Breen saw Melanchthon and his *loci* become more dialectical over time. However, even as Melanchthon's use of *loci* moved towards dialectics, Breen concluded that for Melanchthon, as for Cicero, dialectic always served rhetoric, or, in Melanchthon's case, homiletics.<sup>101</sup> Moreover, Breen wrote that Melanchthon distinguished between dialectics as judging on the basis of logic and dialectics as providing an index of things to investigate (as a physician investigates what may cause a rapid pulse under the *locus* "on effects") or to select (as done with religious doctrine that has already been searched out "and needs only to be selected, arranged, defined, and so on"). Thus, Breen wrote that Melanchthon kept both dialectics as logic and dialectics as *loci* on the same level, which was contrary to how Aristotle understood the fit of *loci* and more in keeping with Cicero, even if, unlike Cicero, Melanchthon could grant that some knowledge was certain. So, Breen ultimately concluded that despite the term *loci* and the method itself going back to Aristotle, Melanchthon's specific use and understanding of *loci* did not.<sup>102</sup> Nevertheless, Melanchthon's use of the *loci* method is still at its core inherently philosophical. The philosophical τόποι or *loci* method itself was given rebirth by the humanists of the Renaissance, as further documented by James M. Kittelson.

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<sup>101</sup> On the claim of the relationship between rhetoric and dialectics for Melanchthon, compare Kusakawa, "Lutheran Method," 338. On dialectics serving rhetoric in the Apology, see Arand, "Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument," 284-287.

<sup>102</sup> Petersen traces Melanchthon's *loci* through Cicero to Aristotle's τόποι (Peter Petersen, "Aristotelisches in der Theologie Melanchthons," *Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik* 164 [1927]: 149), but, Breen seems to dismiss Petersen's claim by saying Melanchthon uses Cicero's *loci*, without really considering the implication that even Cicero's *loci* are in one way or another traced back to Aristotle (as Breen himself traces them) (Breen, "'Loci Communes' and 'Loci,'" 205).

In the end, Breen noted that Melanchthon preserved Aristotle for theological and other curriculum primarily because of Aristotle's dialectics and rhetoric, and Breen then also interestingly noted the following: "Once in theology, Aristotle may give forth, to a generation that knows him better, things that may alter the Melanchthonian concept of theology. It may have its uses that Melanchthon had not too carefully examined his Trojan horse." (Breen, 209.)

## The work of James M. Kittelson

Generally in keeping with Breen's conclusion, James M. Kittelson found the *loci* method inherently humanistic.<sup>103</sup> Kittelson, as to some extent Breen, saw that the Reformers used a *loci* method that was based more on rhetoric than on dialectic.<sup>104</sup> Regarding the Reformers' use, Kittelson described the *loci* method in the following way.

This method drew primarily upon classical rhetoric for proper procedure in both the acquisition and impartation of the wisdom (*sapientia*) that governs life. As such, it assumed that useful oration or essay both addressed the whole person and covered all the *loci*, *topoi*, or issues that were central to the question at stake. Naturally enough, one or another of the aspects of the good life—whether love, the onset of old age, civic duty, or even evangelical theology—were this method's proper subjects. Hence, the core of religious faith could be broken down into *topoi* that could be learned at least in the sense of being memorized.<sup>105</sup>

Although recognizing they were intended for different audiences and purposes, Kittelson pointed to Melanchthon's *Loci communes* and Luther's Catechisms as examples of

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<sup>103</sup> Five Kittelson essays from 1984-1999 are cited in the following. There is a good degree of overlap and repetition among them, but each essay is not cited in every place it could be. Generally the essays with the more detailed discussion and additional details are cited.

In discussing Melanchthon, Ong suggests the humanist rejection of scholasticism by name and the humanist emphasis on pedagogy is in keeping with the substance of scholasticism, if only amplified by a greater consideration for the needs of their pupils (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 158, 159).

<sup>104</sup> James M. Kittelson, "Luther's Impact on the Universities—and the Reverse," Concordia Theological Quarterly 48 (1984): 159. Confer James M. Kittelson, "Luther the Educational Reformer," Luther and Learning: The Wittenberg University Luther Symposium, ed. Marilyn J. Harran (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1985), 108-109. Wengert, however, sees *loci communes* as a "bridge for Melanchthon between rhetoric and dialectics", functioning in dialectics as a major proposition of a syllogism and thus relating to dialectics' *status* and thus rhetorics' *scopus*, what Melanchthon sometimes calls the *summa* (Wengert, Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem, 171, 174 ). In places such as p.183, Wengert draws on Wiedenhofer, Formalstrukturen humanistischer und reformatorischer Theologie bei Philipp Melanchthon, I:373-379.

<sup>105</sup> Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 154-155. Confer James M. Kittelson, "The significance of humanist educational methods for Reformation theology," Lutherjahrbuch 66 (1999): 227. Ong discusses the various definitions of *loci* in the period immediately leading up to the time of Agricola and Ramus (Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 116-121). Freedman traces lines from Ramus through Melanchthon and into the schools beyond, noting their curricula and the confessional lines that influenced them, discussing along the way figures significant to the "second generation" of Reformers (Joseph S. Freedman, "The Diffusion of the Writings of Petrus Ramus in Central Europe, c. 1570-c.1630," Renaissance Quarterly 46.1 [1993]).

Reformation works organized on the basis of τόποι or *loci*.<sup>106</sup> Kittelson cited the *loci* method used by theologians as an example of how humanism and its methods triumphed in form and sometimes also content in Lutheran universities of the late Reformation period.<sup>107</sup>

Kittelson perceived a shift at the time of the Reformation from using the Bible as the place to find Christ to using the Bible as a place to find doctrine, and he saw a similar shift from teaching Bible commentary to teaching the Bible according to the *loci* method. Kittelson illustrated this observation with the case of Johann Marbach, a Wittenberg doctoral student in the 1540s, who went on to teach at Strasbourg. Kittelson determined that Melancthon's lectures on John were a basis for Marbach's own lectures on John according to the *loci* method, and Kittelson connected the doctrine of election taught by Marbach in connection with John 12:40 to the Formula of Concord some thirty years later.<sup>108</sup> Kittelson's conclusion regarding the impact of the *loci* method differed from the impact other authors identified:

A movement [presumably humanist pedagogy] and a method [presumably the *loci* method] that was at its base anti-dogmatic and whose practitioners were certainly no friends of professional theologians provided the means by which biblical commentaries could speak to theological issues as the occasion required. Thus, the method *itself* did not lead directly to "theologizing" the biblical text, nor did the use of *loci* as such "turn the texts into a theological textbook", as Wengert and others maintain.

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<sup>106</sup> Kittelson, "Educational Reformer," 109. Confer Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 155. Wengert also writes of the *Loci Communes* as giving "the proper theological framework from which to approach the Scripture" (Wengert, *Melancthon's Annotationes in Johannem*, 168). As mentioned above (in the discussion of the background of the Small Catechism that begins on p.73), Luther's Catechisms had some long-standing medieval precedents and were hardly Luther's innovation prompted by humanism.

<sup>107</sup> Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 148.

<sup>108</sup> Kittelson, "Luther's Impact," 29-31. Confer Kittelson, "Educational Reformer," 109-110; James M. Kittelson, "Learning and Education: Phase Two of the Reformation," *Die dänische Reformation: vor ihrem internationalen Hintergrund*, eds. Leif Grane and Kai Hørby (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990), 159; Kittelson, "Significance of Humanist Educational Methods," 229-236.

A colleague of Marbach's, Johannes Pappus was also examined by Kittelson, who found Pappus to evoke the humanistic core of the late Reformation, in terms of formal education, career pursuit, and proficiency. Marbach and Pappus each had their respective battles with Johannes Sturm (1507-1589), the rector of Strasbourg's *Gymnasium* (Latin school, or secondary school), keeping their theological faculty relatively independent from the greater institution and a greater form of humanism. (Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties.")

Instead, humanist pedagogy provided the means for testing new doctrinal statements against the Biblical texts and led, in this instance [that of Marbach], to the rejection of the Reformed conception of the eternal decree. The loci method thus made clear that the Scriptures had both utility and teeth.<sup>109</sup>

Luther's 1520 *Address to the Christian Nobility* did call for the Bible to replace the usual theological textbook, Lombard's *Sentences*,<sup>110</sup> but Luther did not reduce the role of the content of the Bible to something that only mattered to academics, as will be discussed below.

While Kittelson's documenting the use of the *loci* method from Melanchthon forward is helpful, a problem with this aspect of Kittelson's analysis, however, is that he does not address the inextricable connection between the content of the Bible and its presentation according to *loci*.<sup>111</sup> The Bible presents a teaching about Jesus Christ with various aspects that can truly be approached either exegetically, as one encounters it in the text itself, or systematically, as centered on its various topics.<sup>112</sup> Moreover, the content of the Bible is knowable and expressible and to be the object of a believer's faith

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<sup>109</sup> Kittelson, "Significance of Humanist Educational Methods," 235-236. (Emphasis original.) Kittelson cites Wengert, *Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem*, 191. Wengert, however, did not actually maintain that the *loci* method turned the text "into a theologocal textbook"; Wengert wrote that Melanchthon's desire to find unifying principles in John's Gospel and the opposing desire to denote theological themes within its various sections "threaten between them to turn the Gospel into a theological textbook", although Wengert admits "the seeds for the 'theologization' of the biblical text by Protestant interpreters have been planted by Melanchthon's use of a loci method of exegesis." (Wengert, *Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem*, 190-191.)

<sup>110</sup> WA 6:461-462; Aland #7; AE 44:204-207. Confer Kittelson, "Luther's Impact," 25. Ong discusses how the *loci* works replaced Lombard's *Sentences*, and he traces a similar development in medicine (Ong, *Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue*, 315 ).

<sup>111</sup> Kittelson does suggest a logical syllogism showing why the *loci* method was used for teaching the Scriptures (Kittelson, "Educational Reformer," 109). Wengert, however, in the case of the *Annotationes in Johannem*, discusses Melanchthon's view that, both the Gospel writer and Jesus were using rhetorical and dialectical techniques and that the *loci* present are not "invented" but "discovered" in the text (Wengert, *Melanchthon's Annotationes in Johannem*, 169, 170-173, 177-182).

<sup>112</sup> Kittelson writes that the *loci* method turned exegesis into a type of systematics as if exegesis ceased to exist on its own (Kittelson, "Luther's Impact," 29). Compare Grane's statement: "The *loci* method invited the inclusion of portions of Lutheran doctrine in exegesis" (Leif Grane, "Teaching the People—the Education of the Clergy and the Instruction of the People in the Danish Reformation Church," *Die dänische Reformation: vor ihrem internationalen Hintergrund*, eds. Leif Grane and Kai Horby [Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990], 174).

and confession. Kittelson's failure to address this matter leads to another criticism of his treatment of the *loci* method.

Kittelson further argued that the *loci*-method contributed to "concern for true doctrine" that became equated with "right belief". Kittelson argued that a related tendency was to regard faith less as *fiducia* ("trust") and more as *assensus* ("agreement"),<sup>113</sup> to produce "a religion that was at least as much a matter of the head as of the heart".<sup>114</sup> Kittelson wrote that *loci*-based works became statements of doctrine somewhat independent of the whole of theology, and thus Kittelson found some truth in Nicolai Grundtvig's statement that the Small Catechism helped separate doctrine and life.<sup>115</sup> Kittelson went so far as to write, "In a curious—but true—irony, humanism itself gave Luther's heirs the methods with which to become highly contentious and to make of Lutheranism a very doctrinal and therefore cerebral version of Christianity."<sup>116</sup> He continued, "the humanistic method so eagerly employed by the Reformers to teach 'life-giving' doctrine undercut its very life-giving character."<sup>117</sup> Finally, Kittelson favorably quoted Leif Grane's remark regarding the era of Melancthon as a time of an attack on Christianity.<sup>118</sup>

As for Grundtvig's assessment of the Small Catechism, his comments are described by at least one modern writer as a part of Romanticism's criticism of

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<sup>113</sup> Kittelson, "Luther's Impact," 32-33.

<sup>114</sup> Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 156; confer Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 163. Earlier Kittelson had commented, "True religion had become as much a matter of the mind (or the memory) as of the heart" (Kittelson, "Luther's Impact," 32). Later Kittelson wrote that at the hands of these humanists "true religion became a matter of learning in the sense that the head led the heart" (Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 157). As will be seen in Chapter IV, the Reformers view the mind and the heart as working in tandem.

<sup>115</sup> Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 155, 156. Kittelson does not give a citation for the Grundtvig statement, and this author was unable to locate a statement resembling Kittelson's paraphrase, although at least one passage was located where Grundtvig referred to an imagined antithesis between soul and body and the notion that mastering the Small Catechism and assigned Scripture passages would assure one of eternal life (Nicolai Frederick Severin Grundtvig, "The School for Life," trans. Ernest D. Nielsen, *N. F. S. Grundtvig: Selected Writings*, ed. Johannes Knudsen [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976], 152).

<sup>116</sup> Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 154.

<sup>117</sup> Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 155.

<sup>118</sup> Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 155. Kittelson cited Grane, "Teaching the People," 168 (p.184 in the edition consulted for this dissertation).

memorization as an educational approach.<sup>119</sup> That same modern writer, however, while claiming Luther was opposed to *mimesis*, overlooked Luther's support of *imitatio* in the case of the text of the Small Catechism.<sup>120</sup> Memorization and imitation, moreover, were themselves humanistic devices traceable back to Aristotle and his critique of Plato.<sup>121</sup> Although Kittelson connects memorization with the *loci* method,<sup>122</sup> the two do not necessarily go hand in hand.<sup>123</sup>

Likewise, where Kittelson claimed that an educated clergy and its indoctrinating people were the goals of the Reformation,<sup>124</sup> he seems to have overlooked the inextricable connection between doctrine and the saving faith in He Whom that doctrine proclaims. Kittelson rightly connected the events of Luther's parish visitation and the production of the Small Catechism for teaching, giving as proof two quotations from Luther's preface to that work.<sup>125</sup> However, Kittelson did not quote or even acknowledge the key link between the conditions he found upon visiting and the exhortation he gives

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<sup>119</sup> Peter Kemp, "Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics," Educational Philosophy and Theory 38.2 (2006): 181.

<sup>120</sup> Kemp, "Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics," 181. SC Preface, 8-13.

<sup>121</sup> Kemp, "Mimesis in Educational Hermeneutics," 175-176, 177, 179-180. Confer Kittelson, who questions Gerald Strauss' cause and effect relationship between the Reformation's poor regard for fallen humanity and the choice of memorization as a method (Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 157-158). Kittelson cites as an example Gerald Strauss, Luther's House of Learning: Indoctrination of the Young in the German Reformation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978), 176-177.

<sup>122</sup> Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 159-160.

<sup>123</sup> On Ramus and memory, for example, see Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Dialogue, 280.

<sup>124</sup> On the matter of the educated clergy, see, for example, Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 154-156. On the matter of indoctrination, although Kittelson disagreed with at least Strauss's approach, Kittelson agreed with Strauss that "The Reformation quickly became a process of education or (to use [Strauss's] term) 'indoctrination' first and foremost." (Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 150).

A slightly more recent study of the first and second generations of Lutheran pastors is that of Susan Karant-Nunn, who considered the Ernestine lands. Karant-Nunn takes issue with some aspects of usual Reformation histories, and she argues that, in the time period she studied, the faculty in Wittenberg had little influence on clergy outside of large city parishes. Her evidence did not suggest to her that rural parishioners were even attracted by or essentially knew Lutheran doctrine. She admits some people may have had heartfelt faith, however. (Susan Karant-Nunn, Luther's Pastors: The Reformation in the Ernestine Countryside, Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, vol. 69, part 8 [Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society, 1979].)

<sup>125</sup> Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 152. Kittelson cites SC Preface:1-2, 6 (see *BKS*, 501-502; Tappert, 338).

for teaching the Catechism: the people should have belief they can confess and live according to.

... sollen doch alle Christen heißen, getauft sein und der heiligen Sakrament geniessen, können wider Vaterunser noch den Glauben oder zehn Gebot, leben dahin wie das liebe Viehe und unvernünftige Säue und, nu das Evangelium kommen ist, dennoch fein gelehrt haben, aller Freiheit meisterlich zu missebrauchen.

Et tamen omnes sancto illo Christi nomine appellantur et nobiscum communibus utuntur sacramentis, cum orationem Dominicam, symbolum apostolicum et decalogum non modo non intelligant, sed ne verba quidem referre possint. Quid multis moror? nihil omnino a bestiis differunt. Jam autem cum evangelium passim doceatur, illi vel maxime Christianorum libertate fruuntur.

Although the people are supposed to be Christian, are baptized, and receive the holy sacrament, they do not know the Lord's Prayer, the Creed, or the Ten Commandments, they live as if they were pigs and irrational beasts, and now that the Gospel has been restored they have mastered the fine art of abusing liberty.<sup>126</sup>

For Luther education is a means to an end, whereas Kittelson seems to have seen it as an end unto itself.<sup>127</sup> Something that is believed in the heart is to find expression on the lips in the form of a confession of faith, which obviously then must be known in the mind.<sup>128</sup> And, even Kittelson, referring to his own work on Strasbourg, Scott Hendrix's work on Oldenbourg, and Bruce Tolley's work on Württemberg, admits that evidence suggests people did believe the doctrine they were taught.<sup>129</sup>

Finally, the argument regarding the separation of head-knowledge and heart-faith must be further addressed. Kittelson seems to have overlooked the fact that systematic theological works such as Thomas' *Summa* had been around for some time. Moreover,

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<sup>126</sup> SC Preface:3, Tappert, 338; BKS, 502.

<sup>127</sup> For example, "The Reformation therefore became an educational process very quickly and it did so at its very core." (Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 153.)

<sup>128</sup> See, for example, Romans 10:9-10. Kittelson admits that Lutheranism "was put forth as a knowable religion even for ordinary people" (Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 161, 163). Further, he at least admits Luther thought that the Holy Spirit was active in the reading and meditation on the Catechism and that the mind might even lead the heart (Kittelson, "Luther's Impact," 35, and Kittelson, "Humanism in the Theological Faculties," 156, citing SC Longer Preface:9).

<sup>129</sup> Kittelson, "Phase Two of the Reformation," 161.



Luther intended at least his smaller Catechism to be not only a textbook but also a devotional tool, a fact Kittelson admits in at least one of his essays.<sup>130</sup> To be sure, not everyone had the depth of personal experiences Luther had, however.<sup>131</sup> Kittelson distinguished between formal theological essays and works of a more pastoral character, but he noted that while they did not appear together “the doctrinal work informed the pastoral.”<sup>132</sup> Indeed, theological study is necessary for pastoral work such as preaching and applying law and Gospel one-on-one at bedsides and the like. *The Book of Concord* follows Luther in expecting that a faithful pastor is going to be able to both feed (pasture) his sheep and protect them from wolves by a more formally theological ἀπολογία (apology, defense) of the faith.<sup>133</sup> For the confessors, the τόποι or *loci* method traceable back to Aristotle served that end of feeding and protecting the flock and thus provides another example of philosophy in its ministerial role.<sup>134</sup>

### ***Summary of τόποι/loci method***

The writings contained in *The Book of Concord* are organized by the theological commonplaces, a method of organization that is traced back to Aristotle and his *Topics* and that thus is at its core philosophical. Although Aristotle may have intended for his *Topics* to systematize logic and pertain only to probable statements and conclusions, in time the *Topics* were applied to the task of investigating and sequencing all types of knowledge for rhetoric. The Reformers’ use of the *loci* method seems to have followed

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<sup>130</sup> Kittelson, “Educational Reformer,” 111. Kittelson does acknowledge that the result was unintentional (Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 156). On the Catechism as a devotional tool, see LC Longer Preface 3, 9, 11, 19.

<sup>131</sup> This is briefly discussed by Moeller, “The German Humanists and the Beginnings of the Reformation,” 37.

<sup>132</sup> Kittelson, “Humanism in the Theological Faculties,” 155. Confer Breen’s observation that Melancthon’s *loci* were intended to serve pastoral work (Breen, “‘Loci Communes’ and ‘Loci,’” 204).

<sup>133</sup> See Luther’s 1522 comment to this effect while preaching on 1 Peter 5:2 (WA 12:389; Aland #Pr. 369; AE 30:135, translated by Martin H. Bertram), cited by the Formula’s Solid Declaration, R&N:14.

<sup>134</sup> There is some irony in the Reformers being charged of emphasizing the head and not the heart. For example, in Ap IV:38 the Reformers accuse the scholastics of treating faith merely as knowledge. The Reformers, on the other hand, in some places, for example in the German of Ap IV:141, make a very careful effort to join the heart’s faith that accepts God’s promises for the sake of Christ with the individual consciences’s logical conclusion that God has surely forgiven him or her. (See further below, n.240, p.301, where faith in the heart is both conjoined and distinguished from the mind drawing conclusions.)

the later trend and stayed in service of rhetoric by indexing and arranging the Bible's teaching. The use of this philosophical *loci* method and some applications of memorization fit with humanism and took a prominent role in education at many different levels, and it was used in service of the Reformation to teach people what they were to believe and thereby be saved.

## Chapter II summary

Chapter II has presented the evidence for both the Reformers' second-order regard for "logic" and their use of the *τόποι* or *loci* method for organizing their works contained in *The Book of Concord*. In the case of the second-order regard for "logic", where the earlier Reformers wrote of their opponents' bad logic, the later Reformers wrote of their good logic, even within the theological realm. Such uses of second-order references to logic are consistent within the Reformation era, even as they are consistent with those in the preceding period, such as Augustine and Ockham, who held that logic had a role to play in theology, albeit a limited one. For the Reformers, logic's place was definitely behind Holy Scripture and could only be used rightly by redeemed reason.

Since the second-order data regarding logic was not completely negative, there may be little surprise that the earlier and later Reformers almost without question organized their writings by *τόποι* or *loci*, a first-order use of philosophy. The division of their writings into "topics" or "places" allows the Reformers to concentrate on what is for them the chief article, justification by faith. Moreover, such division allows them to stipulate what is proper for discussion at *locus* and what is not (such as teaching about the necessity of love and good works needing to be done apart from the teaching about justification). Again generally consistent with the preceding tradition drawing on significant philosophical figures, although somewhat adapting the method to make its application consistent with Scripture, the Reformers make such a supra-sentential use of philosophy in service to theology at the same time as and in spite of their second-order repudiation of philosophy that was seen in Chapter I. Chapters III and IV make clear how the Reformers' first-order supra-sentential uses of philosophy include reasoning by induction and deduction.

## Chapter III: Use of Inductive Argumentation

*Examples ought to be interpreted according to the rule, that is, according to sure and clear passages of Scripture, not against the rule or the passages.*

—*Apology XXVII:60*

Generally in keeping with inductive reasoning as described by philosophers such as Aristotle, *The Book of Concord* both uses examples to establish general principles or rules and uses those general principles to interpret other examples. Similarly, *The Book of Concord* uses analogy to argue inductively to and from general principles. The general principles themselves can also be used for deductive arguments, as will be seen in Chapter IV.<sup>1</sup> This chapter considers the inductive dialectical and rhetorical arguments of example and analogy. For this consideration, the following subsection initially offers information on the philosophical background of these methods, and later subsections proceed through a more detailed examination of their uses, both positively for the Reformers' own positions and negatively against their opponents' positions. (In the case of example, there is also a subsection addressing the Reformers' explicit principles for the use of example.)

### Philosophical background of example and analogy

For Aristotle, induction, whether under the heading of dialectics or rhetoric, argues from known specific particulars to general universal conclusions; the general universals are then in turn used in deduction to conclude something about a specific particular.<sup>2</sup> This procedure is clear in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he explicitly says induction is used for acquiring universals and first principles (also called primitives

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<sup>1</sup> On the two types of reasoning in Aristotle, see Smith, "Logic."

<sup>2</sup> For general treatments, see Lloyd, *Aristotle*, 125-127; Timothy A. Robinson, *Aristotle in Outline* (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 1995), 116; and Smith, "Logic," 29-33.

or immediate principles).<sup>3</sup> In Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, without calling it "induction", he traces the process from sensation to memory to experience to science or art, the knowledge of universal propositions, and he illustrates the process with the case of a certain medicine or therapy benefiting someone who suffers from a certain disease.<sup>4</sup> The process is similar and specifically called "induction" in Aristotle's *Posterior Analytics*, although there illustrated with the development of concepts such as that of "human beings" or a certain animal.<sup>5</sup> Also in the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle goes so far as to say that without induction there can be no view or perception of universals.<sup>6</sup> Perhaps in part because induction provides the universals to be used in deduction and perhaps in part because induction makes up a form of argument of its own, Aristotle's line between induction and deduction is not always clearly and firmly drawn, with inductions sometimes being presented syllogistically and being reduced to deductive forms.<sup>7</sup> With those considerations in mind, Aristotle certainly can be taken to suggest that induction belongs most properly to dialectics,<sup>8</sup> but he also can speak of induction in connection with rhetoric, which he sees as an offshoot of dialectics, anyway, with all people using

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<sup>3</sup> *EN* VI.3, 1139<sup>b</sup>14-35, Barnes, II:1799. Confer *APo.* I.1, 71<sup>a</sup>8-9, Barnes, I:114; *Top.* VIII.1, 156<sup>a</sup>5-7, Barnes, I:262.

<sup>4</sup> *Metaph.* I(A).1, 980<sup>a</sup>22-982<sup>a</sup>2, Barnes, II:1552-1553.

<sup>5</sup> *APo.* II.19, 99<sup>b</sup>31-100<sup>b</sup>7, Barnes, I:165-166. Another example of induction leading to a generalization can be found in *APr.* II.23, 68<sup>b</sup>8-36, Barnes, I:109-110.

<sup>6</sup> *APo.* I.18, 81<sup>a</sup>38-81<sup>b</sup>9, Barnes, I:132. (On which, confer Lloyd, *Aristotle*, 126.) See also *APo.* I.31, 88<sup>a</sup>4-17, Barnes, I:144; *APo.* II.13, 97<sup>b</sup>7-36, Barnes, I:161-162. Although Aristotle is said to have assumed the validity of induction (Lloyd, *Aristotle*, 127), induction has its problems, which are said not to have been given serious attention until after Aristotle's death (Barnes, *Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction*, 94).

*Topics* VIII.8 seems to suggest the universal can be secured "by means either of induction or of likeness" (160<sup>a</sup>38-39, Barnes I:270; E. S. Forster translates ὁμοιότητος with "similarity" [710, 711]), and *Topics* VIII.1 distinguishes induction from likeness, which resembles it, thusly: "in induction it is the universal whose admission is secured from the particulars, whereas in arguments from likeness, what is secured is not the universal under which all the like cases fall" (156<sup>b</sup>13-16, Barnes, I:263; Forster translates ὁμοίων and ὁμοιά with "similars" [682, 683]). (Aristotle, "Topica," trans. E. S. Forster, *The Loeb Classical Library*, ed. G. P. Goold [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1960], vol. Aristotle II.) There is more on analogy in the text below, beginning on p.143.

<sup>7</sup> Robinson, *Aristotle in Outline*, 116; Lloyd, *Aristotle*, 125. As an example, Robinson gives *APr.* II.23, 68<sup>b</sup>15-25 (Barnes, I:109). *Topics* VIII may be an attempt to systematize both kinds of arguments.

<sup>8</sup> *Top.* I.2, 101<sup>a</sup>25-101<sup>b</sup>4, Barnes, I:168; *Top.* I.12, 105<sup>a</sup>10-19, Barnes I:174-175.

both dialectics and rhetoric to some extent.<sup>9</sup> Both induction and deduction are uniquely applied in persuasion; Aristotle said, “Induction is more convincing and clear ... and is applicable generally to the mass of men; but deduction is more forcible and more effective against contradictory people.”<sup>10</sup>

The dialectical method of argumentation known as induction is equated by Aristotle to the rhetorical method of persuasion known as example (as deduction is equated to enthymemes).<sup>11</sup> Although under the heading of rhetoric Aristotle refers back to his discussion of induction while discussing example, he also states it simply: “When we base the proof of a proposition on a number of similar cases, this is induction in dialectic, example in rhetoric.”<sup>12</sup> The purpose of example is not surprisingly also like that of induction: to provide a general proposition which can be the basis for deduction or enthymemes.<sup>13</sup> And, like in dialectics, in rhetoric the inductive example can be subsumed under the classification of the deductive enthymeme.<sup>14</sup> Arguments by example can be refuted by a counter-example, “a single negative instance”, Aristotle said, although he also said one could argue that the counter-example “is dissimilar, or that its conditions are dissimilar, or that it is different in some way or other”.<sup>15</sup> Thus, example is more formally treated as a method of argumentation than that of which is treated here next, namely analogy.

Analogy apparently is for Aristotle another way of arguing inductively, to go from particulars to a universal.<sup>16</sup> Some universal principles of a specific science are

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<sup>9</sup> *Rh.* I.1, 1354<sup>a</sup>1-6, Barnes, II:2152; *Rh.* I.2, 1356<sup>a</sup>25-26, Barnes II:2156.

<sup>10</sup> *Top.* I.12, 105<sup>a</sup>16-18, Barnes, I:175. Confer *Top.* VIII.2, 157<sup>a</sup>18-20, Barnes, I:264.

<sup>11</sup> *APo.* I.1, 71<sup>a</sup>9-11, Barnes, I:114. Confer Smith, “Logic,” 64; Irwin and Fine, Aristotle: Selections 568.

On deduction and enthymemes, confer *Rh.* I.1, 1354<sup>a</sup>14, Barnes, II:2152; 1355<sup>a</sup>5-14, Barnes, II:2153-2154. On the use of commonplaces in enthymemes, see *Rh.* II.22, 1395<sup>b</sup>23, Barnes, II:2224. On enthymemes, see also n.34 below, p.204.

<sup>12</sup> *Rh.* I.2, 1356<sup>b</sup>2-15, Barnes, II:2156.

<sup>13</sup> *Rh.* II.25, 1402<sup>b</sup>15-18, Barnes, II:2236.

<sup>14</sup> *Rh.* II.25, 1402<sup>b</sup>13, Barnes, II:2236.

<sup>15</sup> *Rh.* II.25, 1403<sup>a</sup>6-10, Barnes, II:2237. Confer Smith, “Logic,” 31.

<sup>16</sup> Analogy (*ἀναλογία*, “right relationship”, “proportion”, or “agreement”) is related to homonymy. Confer above, where it was noted that Aristotle in one place said likeness resembled induction but was distinguished from it (see n.6, p.142).

common to those in other sciences, Aristotle said, by analogy.<sup>17</sup> Analogy comes into play when “no single definition usefully explains the nature of the thing or property, but it is not a case of pure homonymy without any connection”.<sup>18</sup> Analogy is frequently employed, then, in excerpting anatomies and divisions of animals.<sup>19</sup> Aristotle also frequently uses analogy to find something in common between different abstract things, such as different “goods” all being “one by analogy”.<sup>20</sup> The purpose here, however, is not to trace out every illustration of Aristotle’s use of analogy but to see how he uses it to reason. In *Physics*, analogy helps Aristotle discover the underlying nature of substance.

The underlying nature can be known by analogy. For as the bronze is to the statue, the wood to the bed, or the matter and the formless before receiving form to any thing which has form, so is the underlying nature to substance, i.e. the ‘this’ or existent.<sup>21</sup>

Analogy can function not only as a tool of discovery but also as a way of demonstrating a point.<sup>22</sup> And, Aristotle’s analysis of actuality in *Metaphysics* contextually connects induction and analogy.

Actuality means the existence of the thing, not in the way which we express by ‘potentially’; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it

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<sup>17</sup> *APo.* I.10, 76<sup>a</sup>38, Barnes, I:124. Confer accidents being analogous across categories of being as discussed in *Metaph.* XIV(N).6, 1093<sup>b</sup>16-20, Barnes, II:1728.

<sup>18</sup> Irwin and Fine, *Aristotle: Selections*, 566. Homonymy technically occurs when things share a name but not identical definitions or accounts, although there can be “extreme” homonymy with little in common and “moderate” homonymy with more in common (Irwin and Fine, *Aristotle: Selections*, 588). See *Cat.* I.1, 1<sup>a</sup>1-6, Barnes, I:3; *Top.* I.15, 106<sup>a</sup>1-8 and 107<sup>a</sup>3-12, Barnes, I:176 and 178. In the case of the last example, ὁμώνυμον το λεγόμενον is translated by Barnes “homonymous” and by Forster “equivocal” (Aristotle, “Topica,” 314, 315). Confer and compare also Apostle’s translation of *Categories* and his discussion of this phrase (Aristotle, “Aristotle’s Categories and Propositions,” trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle, [Grinnell, IA: The Peripatetic Press, 1980], 1, 51 ).

<sup>19</sup> *APo.* II.14, 98<sup>a</sup>20-22, Barnes, I:162. Empedocles is said to have been the first to notice the analogous relationship between animals such as hand to claw and hair to feather or scale (Robert J. Hankinson, “Philosophy of Science,” *The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy*, ed. A. S. McGrae [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003] 124).

<sup>20</sup> *EN* I.6, 1096<sup>b</sup>27-29, Barnes, II:1733. See also the more general discussion of different things being one or the same by analogy and having the same causes, principles, and elements by analogy in *Metaph.* V(Δ).6, 1016<sup>b</sup>31-1017<sup>a</sup>2, Barnes, II:1605; *Metaph.* V(Δ).9, 1018<sup>a</sup>12-14, Barnes, II:1607; *Metaph.* XII(Λ).4, 1070<sup>a</sup>31-35 and 1070<sup>b</sup>16-19, Barnes, II:1691.

<sup>21</sup> *Ph.* I.7, 191<sup>a</sup>9-12, Barnes, I:326. Generally this dissertation quotes Aristotle in English only, referring to Greek and Latin only as needed.

<sup>22</sup> Thus, there is both a dialectical and rhetorical aspect to analogy.

might be separated out, and even the man who is not studying we call a man of science, if he is capable of studying. Otherwise, actually. Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy,— that as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, so is the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which is shaped out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought to the unwrought. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other. But all things are not said in the *same sense* to exist actually, but only by analogy—as *A* is in *B* or to *B*, *C* is in *D* or to *D*; for some are as movement to potentiality, and the others as substance to some sort of matter.<sup>23</sup>

So, analogy can be for Aristotle a means of discovery and a method of leading to a universal principle like induction.

Aristotle's discussion and use of analogy is said to be behind various medieval theological discussions. For example, in view of Aristotle's *Categories*, *Sophistical Refutations*, and *Metaphysics*, God's attributes were said to be analogous to those of human beings. In the thirteenth century writers distinguished between three types of analogies: analogies of proportionality, analogies of attribution, and analogies of limitation or participation. In the fourteenth century the focus is said to have shifted more to "the nature of the concepts that corresponded to the words used," though some, such as Duns Scotus, rejected analogy.<sup>24</sup> Against Meister Eckhart and Henry of Ghent, Scotus is said to have wanted being predicated of both God and creatures univocally. Others, such as Cajetan, resolved the matter by speaking of being by an analogy of proportionality.<sup>25</sup>

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<sup>23</sup> *Metaph.* IX(Θ).6, 1048<sup>a</sup>30-1048<sup>b</sup>9, Barnes, II:1655 (emphasis original).  
On a common middle term in analogy, see *APo.* II.17, 99<sup>a</sup>16, Barnes, I:164.

<sup>24</sup> E. Jennifer Ashworth, "Language and Logic," The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGraw (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 85-89. Maimonides is said to have denied knowledge of God by analogy (Idit Dobbs-Weinstein, "Jewish Philosophy," The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGraw [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 132). On the *Metaphysics* as interpreted by Arabic commentators fueling the thirteenth-century Oxford dispute over supposition and appellation that involved Roger Bacon, see Alain de Libera, "The Oxford and Paris traditions in logic," The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 182, 184.

<sup>25</sup> Stephen P. Menn, "Metaphysics: God and being," The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. S. McGraw (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 162-166. Confer John F. Wippel, "Essence and existence," The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 406 n.101.

Another controversy that involved “analogy” was between Albert the Great and Avicenna over the nature of motion.<sup>26</sup>

Thus both example and analogy have their origins in philosophical dialectics and rhetoric, and at least analogy was used in some controverted matters in the medieval period. With that background detailed, attention is now given to the uses by the authors of the works in *The Book of Concord* first of example and then of analogy.<sup>27</sup>

## Example

*The Book of Concord*’s uses of example are discussed in this section under the headings of uses for the Reformers’ positions, uses against their opponents’ positions, and their expressed principles for the use of example. The uses considered here are those where what is being given as an example is specifically called an example in either the work’s authoritative language or its translation (Latin *exemplum*, *exempli*; German *das Exempel*).<sup>28</sup> Not all of the uses of the words for “example” refer to what we would think of as examples,<sup>29</sup> nor are the actual examples all easily classified as for the Reformers’ positions or against their opponents’ positions.<sup>30</sup> Moreover, some of the uses of “example”, many in the Large Catechism, make an illustration without specifically taking

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<sup>26</sup> James A. Weisheipl, “The interpretation of Aristotle’s *Physics* and the science of motion,” *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 528.

<sup>27</sup> A more contemporary presentation of “Analogy and Probable Inference” can be found in chapter 11 of Irving M. Copi and Carl Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, 11th ed. (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), 423-447.

<sup>28</sup> The idea that what is being given as an example is actually an example is often present in both the authoritative language versions of the works and their translations, even if what is being given as an example is only explicitly called an example in one. There are undoubtedly other examples of examples that are not called an example in either version of the works in *The Book of Concord*.

<sup>29</sup> For instance, reference is made to a copy of the Confutation in Ap Preface:2 and XXIII:68 and to the *Symbola* essentially as a rule of faith in SD R&N:1.

<sup>30</sup> An arguably “neutral” use is in the Large Catechism’s treatment of the First Commandment, where Saul and his eventual successor as king, David, are used as contrasting examples of wealth having an unfavorable impact and poverty having a beneficial one (LC I:44). One of the more subjective uses of “example” is the use in the article on Both Kinds discussed below (see at n.46, p.149). Of course, one might say that an example for the Reformers’ position in a matter of dispute would by its very nature be an example against their opponents’ position; presumably examples on which they would agree are not being discussed at all.



the Reformers' or their opponents' side.<sup>31</sup> That there are nearly 100 total uses is not surprising. Both Martin Luther and Philip Melancthon were familiar with and used the pedagogical techniques of medieval Latin schools, including *exempla* for patterns of human strengths and weaknesses, although the use in *The Book of Concord* also relate to *exempla* as stories illustrating theological doctrine.<sup>32</sup> And, where some examples were arguably neutral, the vast majority of examples used are either for the Reformers' positions or against the positions of their opponents.

### ***For Reformers' positions***

In the Reformers' supporting their positions, they at times refer to Bible passages as examples,<sup>33</sup> but other cases are individuals or groups of people or things referred to by category. In part to show how someone or something can be an example of more than one point, this subsection examines the Reformers' use of examples for their own positions in what can be considered chronological order of the examples being used, starting with Old

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<sup>31</sup> The Large Catechism gives a number of examples in connection with the Ten Commandments: LC I:5 gives common examples of failing to keep First Commandment; LC I:184 (Latin: *Exempli causa*) gives an envious neighbor as an example of a reason to be at enmity and sin against the Fifth Commandment; LC I:225 (Latin: *Exempli causa*) gives the example of servants stealing by damaging or permitting damage and thereby sinning against the Seventh Commandment; LC I:239 (in the Latin only) refers to other examples beyond that of the ancient Romans punishing offenders and giving warning so as to stave off sins against the Seventh Commandment; LC I:282 refers to church discipline of a gossip sinning against the Eighth Commandment as a warning to others (Latin: *exemplum*); a few lines later, in LC I:284, the Latin refers to public punishment as *exemplis monitus* ("example of warning"); LC I:301 gives fighting for an inheritance as an example of lawsuits produced by coveting and thus sins against the Ninth and Tenth Commandments; in LC I:306 Luther discusses men who can trick husbands out of their wives, such as King Herod who coveted his brother's wife and took her, but Luther trusts people will not find such examples of sins against the Ninth and Tenth Commandment amongst his readers; LC III:102 refers to other people as bad examples that lead believers into temptation and thus motivate them to pray the Sixth Petition of the Lord's Prayer; SC V:23 has people confess their being a bad example; and SD XI:11 refers to the example of those who did not persevere in the faith wrongfully leading to thoughts of God predestining both to salvation and damnation.

*Exemplis monitus* seems to be a technical term from civil law that may have its origins in the early-CE writing of Valerius Maximus (his sections 7.3 and 7.8, for example). The concept seems also to have come into the German as *wahrendes Beispiel* and have been current in Aesop.

<sup>32</sup> See Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. Willard R. Trask (New York: Pantheon Books, 1953), 57-61. See also LC I:44 for what may be a reference to secular histories used in schools. Curtius also traces *exemplum* to the παράδειγμα ("paradigm") of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*.

<sup>33</sup> For example, SD VII:36 (Latin: *exempli* [BKS, 983]). This particular passage from the Formula also demonstrates the Reformers' hermeneutic of Scripture interpreting Scripture. Other places where Scriptures serve as "examples" are discussed below in the text.

Testament figures, proceeding to New Testament figures, and concluding with examples from the New Testament church essentially after the period of the New Testament itself. The subsection concludes with a summary of the *loci* addressed.

Old Testament examples used by the Reformers begin with the beginning. Adam is used in the Apology's article on Penitence as an example of someone having contrition resulting from the rebuke of the law and receiving forgiveness of sins by faith in God's promises.<sup>34</sup> Adam's son Abel's sacrifice is given in the Apology's article on Justification as an example of a sacrifice righteous by faith and one that invites others to believe.<sup>35</sup> Following Paul's use (presumably in Romans 9:17), the Reformers in the Solid Declaration's article on Election use the Egyptian pharaoh of the exodus as an example of God offering grace and salvation up to a point at which the person's obduracy then leads God to harden the person's heart.<sup>36</sup> In the Augsburg Confession's article on the Saints, David's good works are held up to the emperor as an example to follow, even as in the same paragraph the good works of the saints in general are said to be an example for everyone else.<sup>37</sup> David is used further in the Apology's article on Penitence as an example of someone who had contrition brought about by the law and followed it with saving faith in the Gospel promises.<sup>38</sup> Similarly, the Ninevites, presumably at the time of the prophet Jonah, are given in the same article as an example of how penitence—namely, contrition, faith, and good fruits—can mitigate public and private punishments.<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>34</sup> Ap XII:55; BKS, 262 (*Et exempla ostendunt similiter has duas partes; Und die Exempel, wie die Heiligen sind fromm worden, zeigen auch die obgedachten zwei Stücke an ...*). Rendering "These two parts also appear in the lives of the saints", Tappert (189) does not translate literally; the Triglotta is better, "And the examples show likewise these two parts" (265; confer K-W, 195, "These following examples similarly demonstrate these two parts"). Confer Ap XII:53-54.

<sup>35</sup> Ap IV:202, BKS, 198 (German: *die andern durch sein Exempel und Bekenntnis zu gläuben reizet*). Confer also the deed and word distinction born out in the other examples of examples that follow, such as at n.49, p.150.

<sup>36</sup> SD XI:86. See the passage below and what it says about what can and cannot be reasoned, at n.249, p.311.

<sup>37</sup> AC XXI:1.

<sup>38</sup> Ap XXII:56. Confer ¶53-54 and ¶55 discussed above in n.34, p.148, and note the additional use of *Exempel* in the German of ¶57 (BKS, 262).

<sup>39</sup> Ap XXII:166; confer 164.

And finally, in the Apology's article on Justification, Daniel is referred to as an example of the voice of faith confessing the worthlessness of works.<sup>40</sup>

Like the Old Testament examples, New Testament examples used by the Reformers to support their own positions also take in a range of people and *loci*, also using the same individuals or things for more than one point. The woman in Luke 7:36-50 (who at a Pharisee's banquet washed Jesus' feet with her tears, wiped them with her hair, and poured perfume on them) is given in the Apology's article on Justification as an example both that moved Christ to chide the Pharisee and with which Christ reproved him.<sup>41</sup> She is also used in the Apology's article on Penitence as another example of the two parts of penitence, contrition and faith, the respective results of God's two works in human beings (terrifying and justifying), which further correspond to the two parts of Scripture, law and Gospel.<sup>42</sup> In the Apology's article on Human Traditions, the Reformers point to Christ's excusing His apostles when they violated traditions in order to give the Pharisees an example of how the traditions were useless acts of worship.<sup>43</sup> One of those apostles, Peter, who was forgiven after denying Jesus, is used in the Apology's article on the Invocation of the Saints as an example of the right honor given to the saints by strengthening the faith of believers.<sup>44</sup> In the Apology's article on Justification, Paul's conversion is given as an example of the church's testimonies that faith comforts, justifies, and quickens.<sup>45</sup> In the Augsburg Confession's article on Both Kinds, the Corinthians' communion practice as described by Paul provides the Reformers an example of a whole congregation receiving both the bread/body and the wine/blood.<sup>46</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ap IV:337, with reference to 331.

<sup>41</sup> Ap IV:154.

<sup>42</sup> Ap XII:57. Confer ¶53-55 and n.34 above, p.148.

<sup>43</sup> Ap XV:36, BKS, 304 (*exemplum*; *Gegenexempel*).

<sup>44</sup> Ap XXI:5.

<sup>45</sup> Ap IV:63, BKS, 173 (German: *Dieses ist je einfältig und klar geredt; so wissen fromme Herzen, daß es also ist; so sind die Exempel, daß es mit allen Heiligen so gegangen von Anbeginn, in der Kirchen verhanden, wie an der Bekehrung Pauli und Augustini zu sehen ist*). Note that Augustine's conversion, outside the New Testament canon, is used in the German of this passage as an equal example.

<sup>46</sup> AC<sub>L</sub> XXII:3, BKS, 85 (Latin: *Et ne quis possit cavillari, quod hoc ad sacerdotes tantum pertineat, Paulus ad Corinthios exemplum recitat, in quo apparet totam ecclesiam utraque specie usam esse*). In the Apology's article on Two Kinds, the Reformers point out that their opponents cannot provide a

In the discussion of apostolic rites in the Apology's article on the Church, the Reformers first refer to Paul's and the other apostles' writings over their examples and then refer to the example of their rites and instruction as communicating.<sup>47</sup> Similarly, in the Apology's article on Human Traditions the Reformers refer to the apostles' "precept and example" (*docendo et exemplis*) as opposing the teaching that traditions justify.<sup>48</sup> Likewise, in the Solid Declaration's article on Church Usages, the Reformers point not only to Paul's instruction to the congregations in Rome regarding yielding on adiaphora (so-called "matters of indifference") but also the example of his doing so.<sup>49</sup> Finally, the authors of the Solid Declaration's article on Election point to Paul's example of not exploring or explaining everything on the topic of election.<sup>50</sup>

The Reformers' examples supporting their own positions in *The Book of Concord* are also drawn from the New Testament church although past the time of the New Testament itself. The authors of the works in *The Book of Concord* cite "the example of the church" to support their position on a number of different points, such as in the Augsburg Confession's article on Both Kinds.<sup>51</sup> Similarly, the Augsburg Confession's article on the Mass in support of the Reformers' position cites "the example of the church as seen from the Scriptures and the Fathers".<sup>52</sup> In the Apology's article on Human Traditions, the Reformers likewise point to the church Fathers and how they used human

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comparable example of one kind (Ap XXII:7). What examples or the lack thereof mean is discussed further below in the text.

<sup>47</sup> Ap VII/VIII:40.

<sup>48</sup> Ap XV:34, Tappert, 220; *BKS*, 304. The German does not have a direct equivalent.

<sup>49</sup> SD X:9. Confer above, n.35, p.148.

<sup>50</sup> SD XI:64, *BKS*, 1081 (Latin: *docet divus Paulus suo ipsius exemplo*). Confer the discussion in the text below, beginning on p.313.

<sup>51</sup> AC<sub>L</sub> XXII:10, Tappert, 50; *BKS*, 86 (*Haec vero consuetudo non solum contra scripturam, sed etiam contra veteres canones et exemplum ecclesiae recepta est*). The setting parallel of the "ancient canons" and "the example of the church" may be significant, as may be the absence of the example of the church from the German edition of AC XXII, which mentions "God's command" and "the ancient canons" (*Gottes Gebot ... die alten Canones*). Confer below, n.52. The "example of the church" is a technical term; for example, customs can be said to be the foundation of law, canons to be the expression of customs, and the example of the church to be the foundation of new canons.

<sup>52</sup> AC<sub>L</sub> XXIV:40, Tappert, 60-61; *BKS*, 95 (*exemplum ecclesiae, ex Scriptura et patribus*). In this case (confer above, n.51), the German simply refers to what existed "in the church from ancient times" (*in der Kirche vor alters*).

rites as an example of doing things decently and in good order.<sup>53</sup> In the Smalcald Articles' locus on Ordination and Vocation, the Reformers cite "the examples of the ancient churches and Fathers".<sup>54</sup> The Solid Declaration's article on Original Sin cites specific Fathers as examples of those using the Latin terms for substance and accident in scholarly discourse at this *locus*.<sup>55</sup>

The single largest type of example cited by the Reformers in support of their positions (and, as will be seen below, against their opponents' positions) is the example of the saints, and most of those come in the Apology's article on the Invocation of the Saints.<sup>56</sup> In that article, the Reformers positively refer to the saints as examples of God's mercy.<sup>57</sup> The works of the saints are also there said to be examples to people in their public or private lives to confirm their faith and imitate the saints' works.<sup>58</sup> In the same place the Reformers encourage recalling saints as examples of "faith or fear or the administration of public affairs."<sup>59</sup> The Reformers said the saints, apart from faith, were

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<sup>53</sup> Ap XV:20. Confer the discussion in the text below, beginning on p.155, where examples are cited in support of diversity in rites. The tension between examples supporting the use of one rite for good order and examples supporting the diversity of rites was lived out in Christian freedom in the past and continues to present a challenge for the present and future.

<sup>54</sup> SA III:x:3, Tappert, 314; BKS, 458 (*die alten Exempel der Kirchen und der Väter; veteran exempla ecclesiae et partum*).

<sup>55</sup> SD I:54, BKS, 862 (Latin: *exemplum*). The use of such terms as "substance" and "accident" are sub-sentential uses of philosophy and, therefore, are outside the scope of the dissertation, with its focus on the supra-sentential uses.

<sup>56</sup> The discussion in the text of the use of the examples regarding the saints against the opponents begins on p.161. Another significant type of example is that of the Church, just discussed, which relates closely to the analogy of faith and the analogy of the Word of God (see in the text below, beginning on p.171).

<sup>57</sup> Ap XXI:4. Confer ¶36.

<sup>58</sup> Ap XXI:36. Confer Ap XXI:6 where the Reformers encourage imitation of the saints' faith and other virtues (*ceterarum virtutum*), with the German specifying following the example of their patience (*ihrer Geduld Exempel nachfolgen*) (BKS, 318). Confer also the Reformers giving David as an example for the emperor to imitate, which was noted above at n.37, p.148.

<sup>59</sup> Ap XXI:36, Tappert, 234; BKS, 325 (*Huiusmodi exempla, quae vel fidem vel timorem vel administrationem reipublicae continent, proderat recitari; Solch Exempel des Glaubens, da man lernet Gott fürchten, Gott vertrauen, daraus man recht siehet, wie es gottfürchtigen Leuten in der Kirchen, auch in großen Sachen der hohen weltlichen Regiment ergangen, die hätte man fleißig und klar von den Heiligen schreiben und predigen sollen*).

examples of works righteousness (both in Old Testament and Reformation times),<sup>60</sup> which went to the very core of the Reformers' chief *locus* of justification by faith in Jesus Christ as the sole mediator and redeemer.

Thus, the Reformers use examples to support their own positions on a wide range of *loci*. Many of those relate directly to the chief *locus* of justification: original sin, faith, penitence, human traditions, works, saints, and election. The *loci* of ordination, both kinds, and the mass relate less-directly to justification but relate nevertheless in that they pertain to how the forgiveness of sins is distributed. As attention now turns to the Reformers' use of example against their opponents, the debate will be seen to take place at many of these same *loci*.

### ***Against opponents' positions***

Where the Reformers' use of example to support their positions is surveyed above roughly in chronological order of the examples themselves, the Reformers' use of example against their opponents' positions in this subsection is surveyed according to points at issue. As noted, examples are used for the Reformers' positions and against their opponents' positions at some of the same *loci*, but especially those "Articles about Matters in Dispute" (the Augsburg Confession's and Apology's articles XXII-XXVIII), although the disputed articles are not limited to those in that grouping.<sup>61</sup>

Examples explicitly come up four times in the articles on the Marriage of Priests. The Augsburg Confession's article refers to common complaints about examples of unchaste priests.<sup>62</sup> The Apology's article on the same *locus* dismisses the Confutation's

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<sup>60</sup> Ap IV:211; XV:24. Confer also: "The history of the people of Israel is a type of what was to happen in the church of the future" (*Et res gestae in populo Israel sunt exempla eorum, quae in ecclesia futura fuerunt*) (Ap IV:395, Tappert, 167; BKS, 233). Tappert's translation in this case is perhaps felicitous, since what seems to be meant is more the sense of the Greek παράδειγμα referring to a type than the kind of arguing by example on which this subsection is focusing.

<sup>61</sup> Knowing how many of these "examples" were initially raised by the opponents would be interesting, but tracing out their first use with any degree of certainty is difficult, since they may have been introduced outside the Augsburg Confession, the Confutation, and the Apology.

<sup>62</sup> AC<sub>L</sub> XXIII:1, BKS, 86 (*de malis exemplis sacerdotum, qui non continebant*).

Similar is the reference to examples of bad popes, although, at least in the following case, for different reasons: *Nec est ad pontifices transferendum, quod ad veram ecclesiam pertinet, quod videlicet sint columnae veritatis, quod non errent. Quotusquisque enim curat evangelium, aut iudicat dignum esse*

argument for a celibate priesthood on the basis of the example of Old Testament priests separated from their wives only while serving.<sup>63</sup> Moreover, the Reformers refer to examples of consciences troubled over the legitimacy of marriage,<sup>64</sup> and they say that public officials should use “warning examples” inviting people to marry.<sup>65</sup>

On the *locus* of the Mass the Reformers also discuss examples in arguing against their opponents’ positions. On this locus, the Reformers say that Sacrament of the Altar “is not the vain celebration of a show or a celebration for the sake of example, the way plays celebrate the memory of Hercules or Ulysses” (*Nam meminisse Christi non est otiosa spectaculi celebratio aut exempli causa instituta, sicut in tragoediis celebratur memoria Herculis aut Ulyssis; Denn solches zu Christi Gedächtnis tun, ist nicht ein solch Ding, das allein mit Geberden und Werken zugehet, allein zu einer Erinnerung und zu*

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*lectione? Multi etiam palam irrident religiones omnes, aut si quid probant, probant illa, quae humanae rationi consentanea sunt; cetera fabulosa esse arbitrantur et similia tragoediis poetarum.* (“Nor should that be transferred to the popes which is the prerogative of the true church: that they are pillars of the truth and that they do not err. How many of them care anything for the Gospel or think it worth reading? Many openly ridicule all religions, or if they accept anything, accept only what agrees with human reason and regard the rest as mythology, like the tragedies of the poets.”) *Darum soll man die Sprüche, so von der rechten Kirchen reden, nicht auf die Päbste oder Bischöfe deuten, nämlich daß sie Säulen der Wahrheit sein, item daß sie nicht irren können. Denn wie viel findet man wohl oder wie viel sind bisanher funden unter Bischöfen, Päbsten usw., die sich des Evangelii mit Ernst und herzlich angenommen oder das wert geachtet hätten ein Blättlin, einen Buchstaben darinnen recht zu lesen? Man weiß wohl leider viel Exempel, daß ihr viel in Welschland und sonst sein, welche die ganze Religion, Christum und das Evangelium verlachen und öffentlich für ein Spott halten. Und lassen sie ihnen etwas gefallen, so lassen sie ihnen das gefallen, das menschlicher Vernunft gemäß, das ander alles halten sie für Fabeln.* (“Therefore one should not apply the sayings about the true Church to the popes or bishops, namely that they are pillars of the truth, that is, that they cannot err. For how many does one find, or, better, how many are found up to now among bishops, popes, etc., who have dedicated themselves to the Gospel with earnestness and sincerity or that have regarded it worth their time to read correctly one little page or one letter therein? One unfortunately no doubt knows many examples, that there are many in Italy and elsewhere, who mock the whole religion, Christ, and the Gospel and hold them for laughing stock in public. And, if it pleases them to accept some, so they accept those that agree with human reason, everything else they regard as fables.”) (Ap VII/VIII:27, BKS, 240; English translation from the Latin, Tappert, 173; English translation from the German, this author’s, with reference to Triglotta, 235.) Elsewhere the Reformers say that examples show how the popes are more impudent than the canons that put them above councils and their decrees (Tr 49).

<sup>63</sup> AP XXIII:41, with reference to ¶27. On the Confutation, see Reu, ed., *The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources* \*365-366; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts* 124.

<sup>64</sup> Ap XXIII:47. Just whose consciences are in view and exactly how they were troubled about the legitimacy of marriage are unclear.

<sup>65</sup> Ap XXIII:55, Triglotta, 379 (“examples”, Tappert, 247); BKS, 344 (*exemplis munire coniugium; zu verbieten, auch mit Worten, Werken und Exempeln die Leute zu dem Ehestande vermehren*).

*einem Exempel, wie man in Historien Alexandri und dergleichen gedenkt usw.*).<sup>66</sup> Later, to argue against their opponents' understanding of the mass as a sacrifice, the Reformers, after citing some Bible passages, say they do not need to provide "further proofs" (*pluribus testimoniis*) and refer to ancient examples of the use of the word "liturgy" (λειτουργία), which examples they say "anyone who reads the Greek authors can find" (*ubique obvia sint legentibus graecos scriptores*).<sup>67</sup> Similar to what will be seen below<sup>68</sup> in the case of the Invocation of the Saints, the Reformers at this *locus* also argue that their opponents do not have an "the command of God and the example of Scripture" (*mandato Dei ... exemplo scripturae; Gottes Wort ... alle Schrift*) to support the application of the mass to the dead.<sup>69</sup> Finally, and perhaps most significantly at this *locus*, the Reformers say their opponents err in reasoning by example from the Old Testament sacrifices to sacrifices beyond Christ's death in the New Testament.

Tota via errant, qui fingunt sacrificia levitica coram Deo meruisse remissionem peccatorum, et hoc exemplo sacrificia applicanda pro aliis in novo testamento requirunt praeter mortem Christi. Haec imaginatio simpliciter obruit meritum passionis Christi et iustitiam fidei, et corrumpit veteris et novi testamenti doctrinam, et pro Christo alios mediatores et propitiatores nobis efficit pontifices et sacrificulos, qui quotidie vendunt operam suam in templis.

It is completely erroneous to imagine that the Levitical sacrifices merited the forgiveness of sins before God and that by analogy there must be sacrifices in the New Testament besides the death of Christ that are valid for the sins of others. This notion completely negates the merit of Christ's suffering and the righteousness of faith, it corrupts the teaching of both the Old and New Testament, and it replaces Christ as our mediator and propitiator with priests and sacrificers who daily peddle their wares in the churches.<sup>70</sup>

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<sup>66</sup> Ap XXIV:72, Tappert, 262; *BKS*, 370.

<sup>67</sup> Ap XXIV:83, Tappert, 264; *BKS*, 372. The German translation lacks this more academic discussion of *grammaticam*, owing likely more to the intended audience for the translation than to the lack of the German words to translate the discussion.

<sup>68</sup> See the discussion in the text, beginning on p.161.

<sup>69</sup> Ap XXIV:89, Tappert, 265-266; *BKS*, 373.

<sup>70</sup> Ap XXIV:57, Tappert, 260; *BKS*, 366. The German version lacks this more philosophical analysis of the opponents' argument by example. Tappert's translation "by analogy" may be a bit misleading, especially given the Latin original (compare "by this example", Triglotta, 405; "from this



Again, even here at the *locus* of the Mass is at stake the chief *locus*, justification by faith in the merits of Christ alone.

The *locus* of the Power of Bishops (or Ecclesiastical Power) is another place where the Reformers use examples against their opponents' positions. This *locus* is also among the Articles about Matters in Dispute. The opponents claimed to have authority to introduce ceremonies and make binding rules concerning foods, days, and the like. In the Augsburg Confession's article on Ecclesiastical Power, the Reformers respond to their opponents' supporting their argument with the example of the apostles commanding people to abstain from blood and what has been strangled and the example of the holy day being changed from Saturday to Sunday.<sup>71</sup> While the Reformers' greater argument on this *locus* is that what their opponents are doing is contrary to the Gospel (primarily the chief *locus* of justification), the Reformers do respond to their opponents' examples. In the case of the apostles' command regarding blood, the Reformers explain circumstances why that particular example does not lead to the universal principle their opponents claim it leads to: it was only given for a time.<sup>72</sup> In the case of the change in the holy day, the Reformers explain that it was done for good order, and they say in fact that example supports the general principle of Christian liberty.<sup>73</sup> When facing diversity in practice, the Reformers argue for uniformity on the basis of good order, but when facing the command for uniformity they argue from historical examples that there can be diversity.<sup>74</sup>

Another of the Articles about Matters in Dispute where argument by example is used is that of Monastic Vows. Against their opponents' position, the Reformers cite examples from the lives of Anthony and others who kept vocations on the same level and understood that justification was not due to a particular calling.<sup>75</sup> The opponents, to

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example", K-W, 268), although, as was seen above, in the discussion that begins on p.141, arguing by example and analogy are related in that they are both inductive forms.

<sup>71</sup> AC XXVIII:32, 33.

<sup>72</sup> AC XXVIII:65. The Reformers similarly argue that their opponents err in reasoning from the example of the law of Moses (AC XXVIII:40).

<sup>73</sup> AC XXVIII:60. See also the role of Christian liberty in regards to the discussion of examples in connection with the dating of Easter in relationship to Passover (Ap VII/VIII:43).

<sup>74</sup> A passage on the latter point is AC XXVI:45. Confer above, n.53, p.151.

<sup>75</sup> Ap XXVII:38.

support their position on poverty being needed for perfection, refer to Jesus' statement to the rich young man in Matthew 19:21:

NA26: εἰ θέλεις τέλειος εἶναι, ὕπαγε πώλησον σου τὰ ὑπάρχοντα καὶ δὸς [τοῖς] πτωχοῖς, καὶ ἔξεις θησαυρὸν ἐν οὐρανοῖς, καὶ δεῦρο ἀκολουθεῖ μοι.

Vulgate: si vis perfectus esse vade vende quae habes et da pauperibus et habebis thesaurum in caelo et veni sequere me

Luther Bibel: Willst du vollkommen sein, so gehe hin, verkaufe, was du hast, und gib's den Armen, so wirst du einen Schatz im Himmel haben; und komm und folge mir nach!

KJV: If thou wilt be perfect, go and sell that thou hast, and give to the poor, and thou shalt have treasure in heaven: and come and follow me

The Reformers, however, say both that the opponents distort the meaning of the passage by citing only the part of it dealing with poverty and that the example supports the universal need for obedience in one's calling not the universal calling of apostleship with its accompanying poverty.

Imo iniuriam faciunt textui, qui truncatum allegant. Perfectio est in hoc, quod addit Christus: Sequere me. Exemplum obedientiae in vocatione propositum est. Et quia vocationes dissimiles sunt, ita haec vocatio non est omnium, sed proprie ad illam personam, cum qua ibi loquitur Christus, pertinet, sicut vocatio David ad regnum, Abraham ad mactandum filium non sunt nobis imitandae. Vocationes sunt personales, sicut negotia ipsa variant temporibus et personis; sed exemplum obedientiae est generale. Perfectio erat futura illi iuveni, si huic vocationi credidisset et obedivisset. Ita perfectio nobis est obedire unumquemque vera fide suae vocationi.

... denn sie tun dem Text Gewalt, daß sie ihn nicht ganz anziehen. Vollkommenheit stehet in diesem Stück, da Christus spricht: Folge mir nach. Und darinne stehet eins jeden Christen Vollkommenheit, daß er Christo folge, ein jeder nach seinem Beruf, und sind doch die Beruf ungleich, einer wird berufen zu einem Regenten, der ander zu eim Hausvater, der dritt zu einem Prediger. Darum, obschon jener Jüngling beruft ist, daß er verkaufen sollt, betrifft sein Beruf nicht andere, wie Davids Beruf, daß er König werden sollt, nicht alle betrifft; Abrahams Beruf, daß er sein Sohn opfern sollt, betrifft nicht andere. Also sind die Beruf ungleich, aber der Gehorsam soll gleich sein, und darin stehet Vollkommenheit, so ich in meinem Beruf gehorsam bin, nicht so ich mich eines fremden Berufs annimm, da ich nicht Befehle oder Gottes Gebot von habe.

... they do violence to the text when they quote it in a mutilated form. Perfection consists in that which Christ adds, “Follow me.” This sets forth the example of obedience in a calling. Since callings vary [one is called to rulership, a second to be father of a family, a third to be a preacher], this calling is not for everyone, but only for the person with whom Christ is talking here. Thus, the call of David to rule, or of Abraham to sacrifice his son, are not for us to imitate. Callings are personal, just as matters of business themselves vary with times and persons; but the example of obedience is universal. It would have been perfection for this young man to believe and obeyed this calling. So it is perfection for each of us with true faith to obey his own calling. [Not that I should undertake a strange calling for which I have not the commission or command of God.]<sup>76</sup>

That their opponents err by identifying the wrong universal while reasoning by example from particulars to a universal is significant. Also significant is that in this same place, while speaking of perfection via poverty, the Reformers dismiss the examples of philosophers, regarding getting rid of wealth, as irrelevant to Christian perfection.<sup>77</sup>

The Reformers not only objected to vows of poverty, but they also objected to vows of celibacy. The Reformers’ opponents argued such vows could not be broken, but

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<sup>76</sup> Ap XXVII:48-50, BKS, 391-392; Tappert, 277. The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 437. Note that the first German addition provides an illustration from each of the three “estates”: father of a family, ruler of a kingdom, and preacher in the Church. (Another *Book of Concord* application of the three “estates” can be seen in the Table of Duties that is part of Luther’s Small Catechism.)

The Reformers’ discussion of the Matthew 19:21 passage begins in ¶45.

For more on the philosophical background of perfection and the Reformers’ discussion of it, see Jayson S. Galler, “A sham, pretense, and hypocrisy? Poverty in The Book of Concord of 1580,” 12th Annual ACMRS (Arizona Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies) Interdisciplinary Conference (Tempe, AZ: 2006). Such sub-sentential use of philosophy is outside this dissertation’s scope, which focuses on the supra-sentential uses.

<sup>77</sup> *Sinamus philosophos Aristippum praedicare, qui magnum auri pondus abiecit in mare. Talia exempla nihil pertinent ad christianam perfectionem.* (“Let the philosophers praise Aristippus for throwing a great weight of gold into the sea. Such examples have nothing to do with Christian perfection.”) *Es mügen aber die Cynici, als Diogenes, der kein Haus haben wollt, sondern lag in einem Faß, solche heidnische Heiligkeit rühmen; christliche Heiligkeit stehet viel auf höheren Sachen, denn auf solcher Heuchelei.* (“Cynics like Diogenes, who would have no house, but lay in a tub, may commend such heathenish holiness. Christian holiness rests more on higher matters than such hypocrisy.”) (Ap XXVII:46, BKS, 391; English from Latin, Tappert, 277; English from German, this author’s adaptation of the Triglotta, 435). The editors of the BKS refer to Diog. Laert. II, 77, and they note that Aristippus, the founder of the Hedonist school in the 5-4<sup>th</sup> century before the Common Era, threw the gold into the sea to keep pirates from getting it (BKS, 391 n.2; confer Tappert, 277 n.2; K-W, 285 n.561). In Plato’s *Phaedo*, Echecrates asks if (apparently this same) Aristippus was present at Socrates’ death, and *Phaedo* tells Echecrates that Aristippus and Cleombrotus were in Aegina (Plato, Apology, Crito, Phaedo, Symposium, Republic, trans. B. Jowett, Classics Club Library, ed. Louise Ropes Loomis [New York: W. J. Black, 1942], 87).

the Reformers opposed that position on the basis of the particular counterexample of the popes granting dispensations for the breaking monastic vows by the king of Aragon and others.<sup>78</sup> Thus, the Reformers essentially suggest such dispensations should be given to others, and the Reformers give the examples of those who fled to monasteries without understanding that God was to be served by keeping His commands and not those of human beings.<sup>79</sup> Still, despite their objections to monastic vows, the Reformers favorably cited the example of the monk Bernard against their opponents' position that the monastic way of life made someone righteous before God.<sup>80</sup> (Surely the Reformers used Bernard as an example in this case thinking his example would have additional weight because he was a monk.)

A different aspect of the example of St. Bernard as it was used by some Roman Catholics, however, was for the Reformers an indicator of their opponents' poor

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<sup>78</sup> *Nota est enim historia de rege Aragonum revocato ex monasterio; nec desunt exempla nostril temporis* ("Well known is the case of the king of Aragon, who was recalled from a monastery, and there is no want of examples in our time") (AC<sub>L</sub> XXVII:25-26, BKS, 114; Tappert, 74-75). The German does not specifically suggest the argument by example.

After the Reformers mentioned the king of Aragon in AC XXVII:25-26, their opponents argued in the Confutation that the counterexample had limited application due to its exceptional circumstances (CR 27:173-174; Reu, 379\*; K-N, 136).

<sup>79</sup> AC XXVII:56-57.

<sup>80</sup> Ap XXVII:70, BKS, 396. The Latin reads *Et necesse est sanctos viros, qui in his vitae generibus vixerunt, abiecta fiducia talium observationum didicisse, quod remissionem peccatorum propter Christum gratis haberent, quod propter Christum per misericordiam consecuturi essent vitam aeternam, non propter illos cultus, quod Deus tantum approbet cultus suo verbo institutos qui valeant in fide*. ("Holy men who followed this way of life must have come to reject any confidence in such observances, learning that they had forgiveness of sins freely for Christ's sake, that for Christ's sake by mercy they would attain eternal life and not for the sake of such services, and that God is pleased only with services instituted by His Word and done in faith.") The German, however, is more specific: *Darum fromme Leute, so im Klosterleben selig worden und erhalten sind, die haben endlich müssen dahin kommen, daß sie an allen ihrem Klosterleben verzagt, alle ihre Werk wie Kot veracht, alle ihre heuchlische Gottesdienst verdammt und sich und die Zusage der Gnade in Christo fest gehalten haben, wie man des denn von S. Bernhard ein Exempel hat, daß er gesagt: Perdite vixi, „Ich hab sündlich gelebt.“ Denn Gott will keine andern Gottesdienste haben, denn welche er selbst aufgerichtet durch sein Wort*. ("Therefore godly persons who were saved and continued to live in monastic life had finally come to this, namely, that they despaired of their monastic life, despised all their works like dung, condemned all their hypocritical service of God, and held fast to the promise of grace in Christ, as in the example of St. Bernard, saying, *Perdite vixi*, 'I have lived in a sinful way.' For God will have no other services than those which He Himself instituted through His Word.") (English translation from Latin, Tappert, 281; English translation from German, this author's adapted from the Triglotta, 443.)

The Rechabites in Ap XXVII:59 (twice) and 63 are another much-contested example being used inductively at the locus of Monastic Vows.

understanding of penitence.<sup>81</sup> Penitence is another locus, although one technically outside the Articles about Matters in Dispute, where examples are at issue in the Reformers' refutation of their opponents' positions. The Reformers insist that penitence, namely, contrition and faith, brings about the forgiveness of sins and not punishments or assigned "penance" or "satisfactions", what their opponents regarded as the third part of penitence.<sup>82</sup> The opponents give the example of David, among others, but the Reformers refute such examples by saying the punishment did not merit forgiveness, and they give as a counter-example the woman of Luke 7 who had contrition and heard absolution without Christ specifying any satisfactions.<sup>83</sup> While their opponents saw satisfactions as a meritorious part of penitence (or repentance), the Reformers said it was a relic of the older practice of *public* penitence, where the lapsed were chastised as an example.<sup>84</sup> The Reformers criticize the scholastics for seeing the particular practice of satisfactions, missing their purposes (one of which was for an example), and then reasoning to the wrong conclusion that the satisfactions placated God.<sup>85</sup> The error in reasoning by example is explicit in one passage. (Note in the following that "example" is being used in two senses, a problem Tappert's English translation ameliorates by only using "example" for one sense, thereby losing the explicit indication that the opponents are attempting to refute by counter-example).

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<sup>81</sup> SA III:iii:17

<sup>82</sup> See the Confutation's twelfth article in Reu, ed., *The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources*, \*355-\*357; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts*, 113-114. Note that in the case of David, the Confutation's reference to 2 Kings 12 refers to what is, in most modern Bibles, the book of 2 Samuel.

<sup>83</sup> Ap XII:57. The German makes the abundance of counter-examples explicit: *Und es sind auch wohl Exempel, da solche sonderliche Strafen nicht dazugetan werden, sondern diese zwei Stücke gehören allzeit fürnehmlich zu einer rechten Buße* ("And there are also, to be sure, examples where such special punishments are not added, but these two pieces have always belonged to a justified penitence.") (BKS, 262; this author's translation).

<sup>84</sup> Ap XII:113. To support this position, the Reformers refer to the gloss on the decree, and the editions specify Gratian, *Decretum*, II, chap. 24, q.3, c.18 (BKS, 275 n.2; Tappert, 199 n.5; and K-W, 206 n.338). Confer Ap XII:121, where the Reformers again refer to the gloss, this time, on the canons, and the German at least specifies the language of *Exempel* (BKS, 277). (In the case of this second reference the Gratian citation is broadened to include distinction 19.)

<sup>85</sup> Ap XII:120. Confer Ap XII:167, where again the purpose of satisfactions as an example is explicit, although the error in reasoning is only implicit.

Obiiciunt de Adam, de Davide, qui propter adulterium punitus est. Ex his exemplis faciunt universalem regulam, quod singulis peccatis respondeant propriae poenae temporales in remissionem peccatorum. Prius dictum est sanctos sustinere poenas, quae sunt opera Dei, sustinent contritionem seu terrores, sustinent et alias communes afflictiones. Ita sustinent aliqui proprias poenas a Deo impositas, exempli causa. Et hae poenae nihil pertinent ad claves, quia claves neque imponere neque remittere eas possunt, sed Deus sine ministerio clavium imponit et remittit.

Nec sequitur universalis regula: Davidi propria poena imposita est, igitur praeter communes afflictiones alia quaedam purgatorii poenae est, in qua singulis peccatis singuli gradus respondent.

Sie werfen uns Exempel für von Adam und David, welcher um seines Ehebruchs willen gestraft ist. Aus den Exempeln machen sie eine Regel, daß itzliche Sünde müsse ihr gewisse zeitliche Strafe haben, ehe die Sünde vergeben werden. Ich habe vor gesagt, daß die Christen Trübsal leiden, dadurch sie gezüchtigt werden, so leiden sie Schrecken im Gewissen, manchen Kampf und Anfechtung. Also legt unser Herr Gott auch etlichen Sündern eigene Peen und Strafe auf zu einem Exempel. Und mit den Peenen hat die Gewalt der Schlüssel nichts zu tun, sondern allein Gott hat sie aufzulegen und zu lösen, wie er will.

Es folgt auch gar nicht, ob David ein eigen Strafe aufgelegt ist, daß darum über die gemeine Kreuz und Trübsal aller Christen noch eine Pein des Fegfeuers sei, da ein itzliche Sünde ihre Grad und Maß der Pein hat.

In rebuttal they bring up the case of Adam, and also of David, who was punished for his adultery. From these instances [*exemplis*] they construct the universal rule that for the forgiveness of sins there must be temporal punishments corresponding to particular sins. We have said before that the saints suffer penalties which are the work of God, like contrition or terrors of conscience, as well as other common troubles. Some of them suffer punishments which God imposes on them, only for the sake of example [*exempli*]. These penalties have nothing to do with the power of the keys because the keys can neither impose nor remit them; God imposes and remits them apart from the administration of the keys.

From the particular penalty imposed on David it does not follow as a universal rule that over and above our common troubles there is a special penalty in purgatory, where the particular punishment fits the particular crime.<sup>86</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Ap XII:155-156, *BKS*, 286; Tappert, 207. (Emphasis added.) The Triglotta's English translation has its own problems with the double sense of "example", losing the sense of the warning example by turning it into an illustrating "example" (Triglotta, 301).

Note well the specific language of reasoning by induction: “particular” and “universal rule”. A few paragraphs later the Reformers favorably cite what they say is Gregory’s understanding of David’s punishment as an example.<sup>87</sup>

Though also not placed amongst the “Articles about Matters in Dispute”, the *locus* of the Invocation of the Saints is also the place for the greatest number of the Reformers’ uses of example against their opponents’ positions. The Reformers’ biggest concern with their opponents’ position on the invocation—and one made repeatedly—is that, “Neither a command nor a promise nor an example can be shown from Scripture for the invocation of the saints” (*Cum autem neque praeceptum neque promissio neque exemplum ex Scripturis de invocandis sanctis afferri possit; So man nun weder Gebot noch Zusage noch Exempel aus der Schrift mag fürbringen*).<sup>88</sup> (Note well that here Scriptural examples appear to be given the same weight as commands or promises from Scripture.<sup>89</sup>) The opponents claim the general “example of the church” but the Reformers

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<sup>87</sup> Ap XII:161. The *BKS* editors point out that Melancthon mixed up a citation at this point, and the *BKS* editors further identify the correct source of the passage cited as Augustine, *De peccatorum meritis et remissione* (*On the Merits and Remission of Sins*) II, c.34, 56 MSL 44, 183f. CSEL 60, 1257, (*BKS*, 287 n.1; confer Tappert, 208 n.2; K-W, 216 n.367, where the *NPNF* citation is given as ser. 1, 2:475).

<sup>88</sup> Ap XXI:10, Tappert, 230; *BKS*, 318. Confer the following: “what precept or example can our opponents produce from Scripture” (Ap XXI:18, Tappert, 231; *BKS*, 320, *quod possunt adversarii praeceptum, quod exemplum ex scripturis afferre; können die Widersacher kein Gottes Gebot, kein Exempel der Schrift bringen*); “neither God’s promise nor a command nor an example from Scripture” (Ap XXI:21, Tappert, 232; *BKS*, 321, *neque promissionem Dei neque mandatum neque exemplum Scripturae; Gebot noch Verheißung noch Exempel in der Schrift*); “Let him produce one example or precept from Scripture” (Ap XXI:24, Tappert, 232; *BKS*, 321, *Proferat exemplum ex Scripturis, aut praeceptum; Er bringe doch ein Wort, ein einig Exempel aus der heiligen Schrift*); “they have neither a Word of God nor an example from Scripture” (Ap XXI:31, Tappert, 233; *BKS*, 323, *neque verbum Dei, neque exemplum scripturae habeant; keinen Gottes Befehl haben, kein Gottes Wort noch Exempel altes oder neues Testaments haben*); “It is neither commanded nor recommended, nor does it have any example in the Scriptures” (SA II:ii:25, Tappert, 297; *BKS*, 424, *ist auch nicht geboten noch geraten, hat auch kein Exempel der Schrift; Non etiam est mandata nec consilio nec exemplo nec testimonio Scripturae nititur*). (Confer the lacking of an example in the case of Two Kinds, above n.46, p.149.) These passages use related technical terminology with rich backgrounds. “Precepts”, for instance, are given to a particular group, and “examples” are ways of teaching things such as precepts.

<sup>89</sup> There are other passages within the article on the Invocation of the Saints where the Reformers raise the question of the standard of proof without asking for examples. The following is one of the most demanding: “Why should it be defended if it has no command or proof in the Word of God (*nullum mandatum aut testimonium ex verbo Dei; keinen Gottes Befehl noch Wort haben*)? In fact, there is no proof (*testimonium; Gewisses*) for it either in the Fathers of the church.” (Ap XXI:33, Tappert, 233; *BKS*, 323.) Confer note 88 above, p.161.

claim the opponents do not have it; they innovate.<sup>90</sup> The opponents claim the example of Cyprian, but the Reformers refute it.<sup>91</sup> Similarly, the Reformers object to invoking Mary; instead, the Reformers say, she wants to have her example followed.<sup>92</sup> The example the Reformers claim that their opponents have for saints' spheres of influence is the example of pagan gods and goddesses,<sup>93</sup> knowledge of which no doubt came with the theologians' upbringing in Latin schools. Moreover, the Reformers find other secular influence in the examples connected with the saints, with Latin-school pedagogy also in view.

Sed histriones quidam nulla neque fidei neque rerumpublicarum regendarum scientia praediti confinxerunt fabulas imitatione poematum, in quibus tantum insunt superstitiosa exempla de certis precibus, certis ieiuniis, et addita sunt quaedam ad quaestum facientia. Cuiusmodi sunt miracula de rosariis et similibus ceremoniis conficta. Neque opus est hic recitare exempla. Exstant enim legendae, ut vocant, et specula exemplorum et rosaria, in quibus pleraque sunt non dissimilia veris narrationibus Luciani.

Solch Exempel des Glaubens, da man lernt Gott fürchten, Gott vertrauen, daraus man recht siehet, wie es gottesfürchtigen Leuten in der Kirchen, auch in großen Sachen der hohen weltlichen Regiment ergangen, die hätte man fleißig und klar von den Heiligen schreiben und predigen sollen. Nun haben etliche müßige Mönche und lose Buffen (welche nicht gewißt, wie große und schwere Sorge es ist, Kirchen oder sonst Leute regieren,) Fabeln erdichtet, zum Teil aus der Heiden Büchern, da nichts denn Exempel sind, wie die Heiligen hären Hemde getragen, wie sie ihre sieben Zeiten gebetet, wie sie Wasser und Brot gegessen, und haben das alles gericht auf ihre Kretschmerei aus den Wallfahrten Geld zu marken; wie denn sind die Wunderzeichen, welche sie vom Rosenkranze rühmen, und wie die Barfüßermönche von ihren hölzernen Körnern rühmen. Und ist hie nicht groß Not Exempel anzuzeigen, ihre Lügenlegenden sind noch vorhanden, daß mans nicht verneinen mag.

But the inventors of these fables, which imitate the epics and bring only superstitious examples of certain prayers, fasts, and other profitable ceremonies, are clowns who know nothing about either faith or public affairs [where there are nothing but examples as to how the saints wore

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<sup>90</sup> Ap XXI:13, Tappert, 230; BKS, 319 (*ecclesia exemplum*).

<sup>91</sup> Ap XXI:2. The BKS editors cite the Confutation and give corresponding Cyprian citations.

<sup>92</sup> Ap XXI:27. The German version specifies her example of "faith and humility" (*ihres Glaubens und ihrer Demut*) (BKS, 322).

<sup>93</sup> Ap XXI:32, BKS, 323 (*ex ethnicis exemplis*).



hair shirts, how they prayed at the seven canonical hours, how they lived upon bread and water]. There is no point in listing here the miracles they have invented about rosaries and similar ceremonies, or the legends, as they call them, and the mirrors and the rosaries, all of which contain many things that resemble the “true stories” of Lucian.<sup>94</sup>

Even with moderation, the Reformers say that teaching of the invocation of the saints would be a dangerous example.<sup>95</sup>

### ***Expressed principles regarding examples***

Aside from the already observed principles implicit in the reformer’s use of inductive reasoning by example, there are several places in *The Book of Concord* where the Reformers explicitly express their principles for such reasoning. In the Apology’s article on Monastic Vows, the Reformers succinctly say principles cannot be induced from examples apart from consideration of justification by faith.

Ceterum exempla iuxta regulam, hoc est, iuxta Scripturas certas et claras, non contra regulam seu contra scripturas interpretari convenit. Certissimum est autem observationes nostras non mereri remissionem peccatorum aut iustificationem.

Nu die Verständigen und Gelehrten wissen wohl, daß man alle Exempel nach der Regeln, das ist, nach der klaren Schrift, und nicht wider die Regel oder Schrift soll auslegen oder einführen. ... so ist es gewiß, daß sie ihre Weise und Zeremonie nicht darum gehalten haben, dadurch Vergebung der Sünden oder ewiges Leben zu verdienen ...

Besides, examples ought to be interpreted according to the rule, that is, according to sure and clear passages of Scripture, not against the rule or the passages. It is a sure thing that our observances do not merit the forgiveness of sins or justification.<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Ap XXI:37, *BKS*, 325; Tappert, 232. The English translation of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 353, 355; the Triglotta is a little more literal than Tappert even in its translation of the Latin, rendering, “Nor is there need here to recite examples” and “mirrors of examples”. The “mirrors of examples” likely refer to the collections and catalogs of moralized anecdotes that were provided to preachers, said to be medieval precursors to more-modern novels, fairy tales, and dramatic plots (Gerald Robert Owst, *Literature and Pulpit in Medieval England: A Neglected Chapter in the History of English Letters & of the English People* [New York: Barnes & Noble, 1961], 149-209).

<sup>95</sup> Ap XXI:33, *BKS*, 323 (*exemplum sit periculosissimum; ist das Exempel fährlich*).

<sup>96</sup> Ap XXVII:60-61, *BKS*, 394; Tappert, 279. Another place where examples are invalidated by the measure of Holy Scripture is SA III:iii:28-32. (The epigram at the beginning of this chapter is from this statement.)

The Reformers find nothing inherently wrong with the use of such inductive reasoning. Moreover, they call for detailed teaching of the people, illustrating their call with examples of examples.<sup>97</sup> Examples, they say, are better for the fools, which may recall Aristotle's statements noted above about using examples for the crowd.<sup>98</sup>

In one passage from the Apology's article on Justification, where the Latin gives a faith-based counter-example to criticize their opponents' error in inductive reasoning by analogy, there is an addition to the German version of the Apology, in which the Reformers use a concrete counter-example to point out their opponents' faulty analogy. First is the authoritative text.

Huc pertinet et sententia Christi Luc. cap. 17: Cum feceritis omnia, quae praecepta sunt vobis, dicite: servi inutiles sumus. Haec verba clare dicunt, quod Deus salvet per misericordiam et propter suam promissionem, non quod debeat propter dignitatem operum nostrorum. Sed adversarii mirifice ludunt hic in verbis Christi. Primum faciunt ἀντιστρόφον et in nos retorquent. Multo magis, inquiunt, dici posse: Si credideritis omnia, dicite, servi inutiles sumus. Deinde addunt opera inutilia esse Deo, nobis vero non esse inutilia. Videte, quam delectet adversarios puerile studium sophistices. Et quamquam hae ineptiae indignae sint, quae refutentur, tamen paucis respondebimus. Ἀντιστρόφον est vitiosum. Primum enim decipiuntur adversarii in vocabulo fidei, quod si significaret nobis notitiam illam historiae, quae etiam in impiis et diabolis est, recte ratiocinarentur adversarii fidem inutilem esse, cum dicunt: Cum credideritis omnia, dicite: servi inutiles sumus. Sed nos non de notitia historiae, sed de fiducia promissionis et misericordiae Dei loquimur. Et haec fiducia promissionis fatetur nos esse servos inutiles, imo haec confessio, quod opera nostra sint indigna, est ipsa vox fidei, sicut apparet in hoc exemplo Danielis, quod paulo ante citavimus: Non in iustificationibus nostris prosternimus preces etc. Fides enim salvat, quia apprehendit misericordiam seu promissionem gratiae, etiamsi nostra opera sint indigna. Et in hanc sententiam nihil laedit nos ἀντιστρόφον: Cum credideritis omnia, dicite: servi inutiles sumus, videlicet, quod opera

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<sup>97</sup> SC Preface:18: *und immer viel Exempel aus der Schrift; da Gott solche Leute gestraft und gesegnet hat, einführen; Sunt autem haec sacrarum literarum histories illustranda, ubi Deus vel graves poenas a transgressoribus hujus praecepti exegit vel illorum, qui servarint, omnia coepta mirabiliter fortunavit* ("Always adduce many examples from the Scriptures to show how God punished and blessed") (BKS, 505; Tappert, 340). In one sense, the Reformers are simply encouraging a teaching method by which they themselves were most likely taught in Latin schools, only making it clear that the source material is not to be classics but the Scriptures.

<sup>98</sup> See above at n.10, p.143.

nostra sint indigna; hoc enim eum tota ecclesia docemus, quod per misericordiam salvemur.

Here Christ's statement (Luke 17:10) also applies, "When you have done all that is commanded you, say, 'We are unworthy servants.'" These words clearly say that God saves through mercy and because of his promise, not as a payment which he owes to us for our good works. They argue that if we are unworthy though we have done everything, much more must we say that we are unworthy though we have believed everything. Then they add that works are worthless to God, but that to us they are worth something. Look how this childish sophistry delights our opponents! Though these absurdities do not deserve a refutation, we shall nevertheless give a brief answer. The argument is defective.

For one thing, our opponents are deceived with regard to the term "faith." If it meant the knowledge of history that the wicked and demons also have (James 2:19), their argument that faith is worthless would be correct when they say: "When we have believed everything, say, 'We are unprofitable servants.'" We are not talking about a knowledge of history, however, but about trust in God's promise and his mercy. This trust in the promise confesses that we are unworthy servants. Indeed, this confession that our works are worthless is the very voice of faith, as is evident from the example of Daniel referred to above, "For we do not present our supplications before thee on the ground of our righteousnesses," etc. Faith saves because it takes hold of mercy and the promise of grace, even though our works are worthless. On these grounds we are not bothered by the argument, "When you have believed everything, say, 'We are unworthy servants.'" For our works are worthless, and with the whole church we teach that we are saved by mercy.<sup>99</sup>

The refutation of the opponents' claims continues in the Latin for five more numbered paragraphs, one of which will be seen below.<sup>100</sup> Although the German version runs roughly parallel at the beginning of the paragraph, it quickly diverges over the explanation of the defective argument and ends up being relatively shorter than the whole of the Latin. (The German version also noticeably drops the Greek technical term "antistrophe".<sup>101</sup>)

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<sup>99</sup> Ap IV:334-338, *BKS*, 225-226; Tappert, 158-159. In contrast to Tappert, the Triglotta preserves the "antistrophe" as a technical term (Triglotta, 215). Compare the K-W translation of the *octavo* edition, where they render the Greek word word as "retortion" (K-W, 168).

<sup>100</sup> See Ap IV:339 at n.136 below, p.183.

<sup>101</sup> In Greek drama an "antistrophe" referred to the chorus returning and the song that accompanied the movement; the word also referred to "the second of a pair of movements or stanzas in an ode" that had the same meter as the strophe that came before (John A. Cuddon, "antistrophe," The Penguin Dictionary of

Hie haben die Widersacher ihre große Kunst trefflich bewiesen und den Spruch Christi verkehrt: Wenn ihr alles getan habt, so sprecht: Wir sind unnütze Knechte. Ziehen ihn von Werken auf Glauben, sagen, vielmehr, wenn wir alles gläuben, sind wir unnütze Knechte. Das sind je schändliche Sophisten, die die tröstliche Lehre vom Glauben so gar verkehren. Sagt, ihr Esel, wenn einer da liegt am Tode und fühlet, daß er kein Werk hat, das für Gottes Gericht gnug sei, und kann auf kein Werk vertrauen, was wollt ihr demselben raten? Wollt ihr ihm auch sagen, wenn du schon gläubest, so bist du doch ein unnützer Knecht, und hilft dich nicht? Da müsse das arm Gewissen in Verzweiflung fallen, wenn es nicht weiß, daß das Evangelium den Glauben eben darum fordert, dieweil wir untüchtige Knechte sind, und nicht Verdienst haben. Darum soll man sich hüten vor den Sophisten, so die Worte Christi also lästerlich verkehren. Denn es folget nicht: Die Werke helfen nicht, darum hilft der Glaube auch nicht. Wir müssen den großen Eseln ein groß Exempel geben. Es folget nicht: Der Heller hilft nicht, darum hilft der Gülden auch nicht. Also wie der Gülden viel höher und stärker ist denn der Heller, soll man verstehen, daß Gläuben viel höher und stärker ist denn Werk. Nicht, daß Glaube helfe um seiner Wirdigkeit willen, sondern darum, daß er auf Gottes Verheißung und Barmherzigkeit vertrauet. Glaub ist stark, nicht um seiner Wirdigkeit willen, sondern von wegen der göttlichen Verheißung. Und darum verbeut Christus hie vertrauen auf eigene Werk; denn sie können nicht helfen. Dagegen verbeut er nicht Vertrauen auf Gottes Verheißung. Ja er fordert dasselbig Vertrauen auf Gottes Verheißung eben darum, dieweil wir untüchtige Knechte sind und die Werke nicht helfen können. Derhalben ziehen die Bösewichte die Worte Christi unrecht von Vertrauen eigener Würdigkeit auf Vertrauen göttlicher Zusage. Damit ist ihre Sophisterei klar verlegt und aufgelöset. Der Herr Christus wolle die Sophisten, so sein heiliges Wort also zerreißen, bald zuschanden machen. Amen.

Here the opponents have masterfully demonstrated their great art and perverted the saying of Christ: “When you have done everything, then say, ‘We are worthless servants.’” They conclude from works to faith,

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Literary Terms and Literary Theory, Fourth ed. [New York: Penguin Books, 1998], 46). Lewis and Short confirm that the Latin term refers to the chorus or a rhetorical figure (Lewis and Short, A Latin Dictionary, 133). Liddell and Scott, however, note that the Greek term, which is what Melanchthon uses, can refer to “strophic correspondence” (as it seems to mean here in Ap IV:334-337), but they also indicate that in Aristotle’s usage the term can refer to an inversion, as in a logical conversion of terms (*APr.* 25<sup>a</sup>40), a retortion (*APr.* 61<sup>a</sup>22), and a change into the opposite (*APr.* 38<sup>a</sup>3, 39<sup>a</sup>28) (Liddell and Scott, A Greek-English Lexicon, 163-164).

Although they give no citation from Melanchthon’s works, the K-W editors observe the following: “Melanchthon uses the Greek term *antistrophe*, which, according to his own works on rhetoric and dialectics, represents an inversion of an argument, turning some case or evidence against an argument into something that favors it” (K-W, 168 n.219).

saying instead, “If we have believed everything, we are worthless servants.” These are really shameful sophists, who pervert so much the consolatory teaching of faith. What do you say, you asses, when someone lies there near death and feels that he has no work good enough for God’s judgment and can trust no work—what do you advise him? Will you also say to him, “Even if you already believe, then you are yet a worthless servant, and it will not help you”? There the poor conscience must fall into despair, if it does not know that the Gospel requires faith for the very reason that we are good-for-nothing servants and have no merits. Therefore one should guard himself from sophists, who therefore blasphemously reverse the words of Christ. Because it does not follow: Works do not help; therefore, faith also does not help. We must give the big asses a big example. It does not follow: The farthing does not help; therefore, the florin also does not help. Just as the florin is much higher and stronger than the farthing, one should understand that faith is much higher and stronger than work. Not that faith helps because of its worth, but for this reason, that it trusts in God’s promise (ordination) and mercy. Faith is strong, not because of its worth, but because of the divine promise. And therefore Christ here forbids trusting one’s own works, because they cannot help. On the other hand, He does not forbid trusting in God’s promise. Indeed, He demands the same trust in God’s promise precisely for these reasons, that we are good-for-nothing servants and works cannot help. For this reason, the scoundrels unjustly conclude the words of Christ from trust in one’s own worth to trust in God’s pledge. Therewith is their sophistry clearly disproved and undone. May the Lord Christ soon destroy the sophists who so rip up His holy Word. Amen.<sup>102</sup>

Even as the Reformers ridicule their opponents’ faulty analogy, the Reformers provide an example of a similarly faulty analogy to argue the general principle that the opponent’s analogy was faulty. Note how the Reformers’ verbs strikingly concretize abstract reasoning.

That the Reformers provide implicit and explicit principles for the use of induction by example is significant. The Reformers are clearly conscious of the method and its application. The chief article of justification by faith is their primary principle for interpreting other examples, and they also give concrete analogies to further make their

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<sup>102</sup> Ap IV:334-337, BKS, 225-226; the English translation is this author’s adaptation of the Triglotta, 215. The Triglotta translates *großen Eseln* as “uncultured men” and *groß Exempel* as “homely illustration”, but the paragraph seems more intended to ridicule the opponents than bring down the teaching to the level of the common person.

case in keeping with such primary principle—all just part of *The Book of Concord* use of induction by example.

### ***Summary of “example” use***

The Reformers, earlier and later, make fairly wide use of example both in support of their own positions and against their opponents’ positions. The Reformers, although surely influenced by their Latin-school upbringing, generally do not use the examples usually found in the schools, which examples they somewhat denigrate. Instead, Bible passages, Old Testament and New Testament Biblical figures, and other various people and groups of things serve the Reformers as examples on a wide range of *loci*, regardless of whether the particular example is supporting the Reformers’ positions or being used against those of their opponents, who in at least some cases appear to have introduced the examples into the discussion. An apparent favorite example is the woman of Luke 7, who was used in a number of different contexts, and the topic where explicit examples came up the most was that of the saints. When dealing with counter-examples raised against their own teaching or raising counter examples against their opponents’ teaching, the Reformers proceed much as Aristotle indicated, nearly two millennia before, and in some cases turn their opponents’ examples into their own, with no indication that they are breaking with the method of using examples that has preceded them. The Reformers state that teaching helps interpret examples and that examples themselves have a role in teaching (word and deed, as it were). Yet, no example can be understood apart from or in conflict with the universal principles they induce, such as the chief *locus* of justification by faith or Christian liberty, and from which deductions proceed. When properly understood, a Biblical example has in some cases essentially the same weight as a command or promise from God’s Word, and apart from God’s command or promise the lack of even an example thus can be, for the Reformers, enough to completely undermine a point of their opponents’ teaching. The Reformers’ regard for the example of the church is notable, if for no other reason, for what that regard says about the usual *sola scriptura* (“scripture alone”) strereotype. Since the Reformers use inductive examples dialectically and rhetorically (both homiletically and pedagogically) and in some cases explicitly state

their guidelines for doing so, that the Reformers also use analogy inductively is of little surprise.

## Analogy

Reasoning by example was not the only form of induction used by the authors of the documents in *The Book of Concord*; they also used analogy. Although used to a lesser extent than example, the Reformers, as is seen in this subsection, similarly use analogy both in support of their own positions and against their opponents' positions. The cases of induction by analogy considered here generally were indicated in the text of the various works by the Latin words *analogium*, *analogii*; *similitudo*, *similitudinis*; and *typus*, *typi*; the works generally used the German equivalents *gleich* and related cognates, as well as *Gleichnis*, *Anleitung*, and *Figur*.<sup>103</sup>

Although this section concentrates primarily on explicit places where the Reformers indicate by way of the words just mentioned that they are arguing by analogy, there are a number of other places—generally indicated by the use of the Latin *similis*, *simile*, *similior* -or -us, *simillimus* -a -um—where argument by analogy may be implicit. In some of these cases the reasoning appears to be from the particular to the general, although in other cases the reasoning is from the general to the particular, as a principle is applied.<sup>104</sup> A case especially worthy of note is when, at the *locus* of Election, the authors of the Solid Declaration indicate that people are to observe God's just punishment of

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<sup>103</sup> Not every use of every word referred to argument by analogy. For example, the Reformers also used *similitudo*, *similitudinis* to refer to other things: the likeness of God (Ap II:18, 19, 21); similarity of rites or uniformity of observances (Ap VII/VIII:31, 45); and the parables of Jesus (Ap VII/VIII:19; Tr 8).

Ap VII/VIII:34 deals with whether similar rites must be used and in the process makes use of an interesting "analogy" regarding dressing after the style of the French in comparison to the style of the Germans to at least illustrate its point.

<sup>104</sup> Application is made from and to similar testimonies or passages (Ap IV:103, 124, 155, 161, 259, 215, 371); similar works (Ap IV:203, 208; XII:163); similar acts of worship, rites, or related things (Ap IV:283; XV:21, 42; XXI:37; XXIII:29; XXIV:34, 50; XXVII:27, 55); similar dispositions (Ap XII:168); similar arguments (Ap XXII:14); similar vices and virtues (Ap XIII:54; XXVII:36); similar public expenses (Ap XXIV:81 [twice]); and similar ways of thinking, errors, or written expressions (Ap XXIV:96; SA III:i:10; Tr 33; Ep XII:30; SD I:20, 26, 45; III:59; VIII:62). The heaviest uses of the Latin word with this sense obviously is in Melancthon's Apology, with only the last grouping showing up in the Latin translations of Luther's Smalcald Articles and the later Formula of Concord.

those who reject His Word, find themselves to be similar, and reason that they might better receive God's grace.

Dann weil unsere Natur, durch die Sünde verderbet, Gottes Zorn und der Verdammnis würdig und schuldig, so ist uns Gott weder Wort, Geist oder Gnade schuldig, und wenn er aus Gnaden gibt, so stoßen wir oft von uns und machen uns unwürdig des ewigen Lebens, Act. 13. Und solch sein gerechtes, wohlverschuldetes Gericht läßt er schauen an etlichen Ländern, Völkern und Personen, auf daß wir, wann wir gegen ihnen gehalten und mit ihnen verglichen, desto fleißiger Gottes lautere, unverdiente Gnade an den „Gefäßen der Barmherzigkeit“ erkennen und preisen lernen.

Cum enim natura nostra peccato corrupta et idcirco irae divinae et aeternae damnationis rea sit, Deus nobis prorsus nihil debet neque ullo iure tenetur, ut nobis verbum suum et spiritum sanctum largiatur atque gratia et favore nos prosequatur. Quid? quod saepe etiam ea dona, quae ipse nobis ex gratia largitur, repudiamus nosque aeterna vita indignos reddimus. Iustum igitur suum iudicium, quod hominum impietas meretur, conspiciendum in quibusdam regnis, populis, personis proponit, ut nos cum illis collati et quam simillimi illis deprehensi, tanto accuratius Dei immensam misericordiam (quae nulli merito nostro debetur) in vasis misericordiae agnoscere et celebrare discamus.

Since our nature is corrupted by sin and is worthy and deserving of God's wrath and condemnation, God owes us neither his Word, nor his Spirit, nor his grace; in fact, when he does graciously give us these we frequently cast them from us and make ourselves unworthy of eternal life (Acts 13:46). But God permits us to behold his righteous and well deserved judgment over certain lands, nations, and people, so that, as we compare ourselves with them and find ourselves in the same condemnation, we may learn the more diligently to recognize and praise God's pure and unmerited grace toward the "vessels of mercy."<sup>105</sup>

The preceding passage is also significant in that it expects people are able to reason inductively by analogy. Other places in *The Book of Concord* argue by analogy much more explicitly, and it is to some of those places that attention now turns: first to those supporting the Reformers' positions, second to those opposing their opponents' positions.

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<sup>105</sup> SD XI:60, BKS, 1081; Tappert, 626.



## ***For Reformers' positions***

This subsection, considering the use of reasoning by analogy for the Reformers' positions, begins with what is called the "analogy of faith", or the "analogy of God's Word", or the "rule of faith".<sup>106</sup> The analogy of faith may be a case of a universal principle being applied to the particulars, but the precise universal principle in play has only come about through reasoning by analogy from all the relevant particulars. The Epitome of the Formula of Concord's article of the Person of Christ in introducing the affirmative theses says it sets out "To explain and to settle this controversy according to our Christian faith" (*Solchen Streit zu erklären und nach Anleitung unsers christlichen Glaubens hinzulegen; Ad explicandam hanc controversiam et iuxta analogiam fidei nostrae Christianae*),<sup>107</sup> and the Solid Declaration's equivalent article similarly sets out "to explain this controversy in a Christian way according to the Word of God and in accordance with our plain Christian creed, and to settle it definitely by God's grace" (*Diese Zwiespalt christlich vormöge Gottes Worts nach Anleitung unsers eingältigen christlichen Glaubens zu erklären und durch Gottes Gnade gänzlich hinzulegen; Ut autem haec controversia pie iuxta verbi Dei et fidei nostrae analogiam declaretur et per gratiam Dei componatur*).<sup>108</sup> The absence in the first case of an expressed desire to proceed in a Christian way, or of "the Word of God", or of the help of God's grace is not to be taken as suggesting a different standard, but, rather, the authors of the Formula are taken to indicate that, in order to proceed in a Christian way, the explaining and settling of the controversies must be based on the Word of God as understood by the analogy of faith expressed in true creeds (or symbols) ancient and modern.<sup>109</sup>

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<sup>106</sup> The "example of the church" is closely related; see the discussion above, beginning on p.150.

<sup>107</sup> Ep VIII:4, Tappert, 487; BKS, 805. The Triglotta translates *Anleitung* "guidance" and notes the translation of the Latin "analogy" in square brackets (Triglotta, 819).

<sup>108</sup> SD VIII:5, Tappert, 592; BKS, 1019. The Triglotta again translates *Anleitung* "guidance" and notes the translation of the Latin "analogy" in square brackets (Triglotta, 1017). Confer SD VIII:60, BKS, 1035; Tappert, 602 (*nach der Schrift; ex analogia verbi Dei*; "According to the Scriptures").

<sup>109</sup> The difference between "Christian creed" and "Christian faith" here is only in Tappert's translation; the Triglotta, in contrast, renders *Glaubens* as "faith" consistently between these paragraphs of the Epitome and Solid Declaration (Triglotta, 819 and 1017; confer K-W, 509 and 616).

In Ep VIII:19 and SD VIII:88, although "analogy" is not used in either place, the sense is the same: in introducing the negative theses "God's Word" and "our simple Christian Creed" are named in the

That “analogy of faith” is the same as “analogy of the Word of God” can be seen in how the authors of the Formula use “analogy of the Word of God”. The title of the Formula of Concord’s Solid Declaration says the controversies are “resolved and settled according to the Word of God and the summary formulation of our Christian doctrine” (*nach Anleitung Gottes Worts und summarischen Inhalt unser christlichen Lehre beigelegt und verglichen; ad normam et analogiam verbi Dei et compendiarium Christianae nostrae doctrinae formulam et rationem, decisionem atque conciliationem*).<sup>110</sup> The use in the Latin here of *norma*, *normae* (“standard” or “pattern”) is significant, for the nearly-immediately following “Rule and Norm” section explains both how Scripture norms everything and how the confessional writings themselves, once normed, also function as norms.<sup>111</sup>

Although the Lutheran Confessions in no place specifically set out to treat of the origin of this expression “analogy of faith”, some Lutheran theologians find *sedes*

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Epitome, and “the prophetic and apostolic writings”, “the orthodox creeds,” and “our Christian Augsburg Confession” are named in the Solid Declaration. (See K-W, 512 n.65, for a defense of translating “creed” at least, apparently, in that place; the *BKS*, which is the basis for so many notes in English editions, noticeably lacks a similar note.) Confer also the use of *Anleitung* and *analogiam* in SD IV:6, *BKS*, 939; the use of *Anleitung* (the Latin is *has rationes*) to refer to Scriptures, the ancient creeds, and the other works in *The Book of Concord* in Ep R&N:6, *BKS*, 769; and the use of *analogiam* in SD III:8, *BKS*, 917.

<sup>110</sup> Tappert, 501; *BKS*, 829. The Triglotta translates “according to the analogy of God’s Word” (Triglotta, 845). The title of the Epitome similarly uses *Anleitung* (*secundum Verbi Dei*) (*BKS*, 767). Confer also the first paragraph of the Preface to the Solid Declaration: “By the special grace and mercy of the Almighty, the teaching concerning the chief article of our Christian faith (which had been hideously obscured by human doctrines and ordinances under the papacy) was once more clearly set forth on the basis of the Word of God and purified by Dr. Luther, of blessed memory, and the popish errors, abuses, and idolatry were condemned” (*Nachdem aus sonderen Gnaden und Barmherzigkeit des Allmächtigen die Lehre von den fürnehmsten Artikuln unserer christlichen Religion (welche durch Menschenlehre und satzungen unter dem Papstumb greulich verfinstert gewesen) durch Doktor Luthern, seliger und heiliger Gedächtnus, wiederumb aus Gottes Wort erläutert und gereinigt, die päpstische Irrtumb, Mißbräuch und Abgötterei gestraft ... ; Immensa Dei Optimi Maximi bonitate atque miseratione factum est, ut doctrina de praecipuis Christianae nostrae religionis articulis, quae opinionibus et traditionibus humanis durante papatu horribiliter obscurata fuerat, opera D. Lutheri, piae sanctaeque memoriae, rursus secundum praescriptum et analogiam Verbi Dei sincere explicaretur et repurgaretur, pontificii vero errores, abusus et idolomaniae graviter redarguerentur*) (Tappert, 501; *BKS*, 829-830).

<sup>111</sup> See, for example, its title, “The Summary Formulation, Basis, Rule, and Norm, Indicating how all Doctrines should be judged in Conformity with the Word of God and Errors are to be Explained and Decided in a Christian Way” (*Von dem summarischen Begriff, Grund, Regel und Richtschnur, wie alle Lehr nach Gottes Wort geurteilt und die eingefallne Irrungen christlich erkläret und entscheiden werden sollen; de compendaria doctrinae forma, fundamento, norma atque regula, ad quam omnia dogmata iuxta analogiam verbi Dei diiudicanda et controversiae motae pie declarandae atque decidendae sunt*) (Tappert, 503; *BKS*, 833).

*doctrinae* (“seat of doctrine”) for it both in Scripture and in the Confessions. A verse from Romans 12, numbered either as 6 or 7, is sometimes given as a Scripture passage for the origin of the idea:<sup>112</sup>

NA26: ἔχοντες δὲ χαρίσματα κατὰ τὴν χάριν τὴν δοθεῖσαν ἡμῖν  
διάφορα, εἴτε προφητείαν κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως

Vulgate: habentes autem donationes secundum gratiam quae data est nobis  
differentes sive prophetiam secundum rationem fidei

Luther Bibel: Hat jemand Weissagung, so sei sie dem Glauben gemäß. Hat  
jemand ein Amt, so warte er des Amts. Lehrt jemand, so warte er der  
Lehre.

KJV: Having then gifts differing according to the grace that is given to us,  
whether prophecy, let us prophesy according to the proportion of faith

Lutherans take the Greek phrase κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῆς πίστεως, rendered in the  
Vulgate as *secundum rationem fidei* and in Luther’s 1545 German Bible as *dem Glauben  
gemäß*, as “in agreement with (in proportion to) the faith”.<sup>113</sup> The faith, with which the  
prophesying agrees by analogy, is the body of doctrine, known by its technical Latin term  
as *fides quae creditur* (“faith that which is believed”).<sup>114</sup> The Confessions envision the

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<sup>112</sup> Pieper, Christliche Dogmatik, 431-432 n.1170; Pieper, Christian Dogmatics, 357-358 n.160.  
(Pieper cites C. F. W. Walther’s essay on Confessional subscription.) The verse as given in the text above  
is Romans 12:6, but in the German the versification is slightly different so that the key phrase is in verse 7  
(Pieper, for example, cites Romans 12:7).

<sup>113</sup> BAGD, s.v. “ἀναλογία”, 57.

<sup>114</sup> BAGD, s.v. “πίστις”, 664; confer Rudolf Bultmann, “πιστεύω κτλ.,” trans. Geoffrey W.  
Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids:  
William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1968), 6:213. Compare Kittel, who says πίστις here “is not  
the *regula fidei* of the objective content of Christian faith or the doctrine of faith (*quae creditur*), although  
Kittel recognizes that objective view as “old and widespread”, and he cites those who hold it (Gerhard  
Kittel, “ἀναλογία,” trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed.  
Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1964], 1:347).  
Similarly Sanday and Headlam state that the objective view of faith was that of “most of the Latin Fathers  
and many later commentators” (whom they cite), but they find that objective genitive to be inconsistent  
with the meaning of πίστις in verse 3 and that it “gives a sense to ἀναλογίαν which it will not bear”  
(William Sanday and Arthur C. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the  
Romans, The International Critical Commentary, eds. S. R. Driver, A. Plummer and Charles A. Briggs, 5th  
ed. [Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1902], *ad loc* Romans 12:6, 356-357). Cranfield, their successor in the  
International Critical Commentary series, however, while acknowledging both the view of Bultmann and  
others Cranfield cites and also the view of Kittel, Sanday and Headlam, and others Cranfield cites, takes yet  
a slightly different view, making the standard more of a subjective one for each individual (Charles E. B.  
Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The Epistle to the Romans, The International Critical

general principle, by which other things—such as examples—are to be interpreted, to be derived by analogy from the many particular clear passages of Holy Scripture. Pieper, for example, points to the following passage from the Apology to the Augsburg Confession:<sup>115</sup>

Ceterum exempla iuxta regulam, hoc est, iuxta scripturas certas et claras, non contra regulam seu contra scripturas interpretari convenit.

... die Verständigen und Gelehrten wissen wohl, daß man alle Exempel nach der Regeln, das ist, nach der klaren Schrift, und nicht wider die Regel oder Schrift soll auslegen oder einführen.

... examples ought to be interpreted according to the rule, that is, according to sure and clear passages of Scripture not against the rule or the passages.<sup>116</sup>

Once established, the rule and its normative force are lived out in teaching and practice.<sup>117</sup>

How does the analogy of the faith get applied in a specific case? In the case of the Solid Declaration's article on Original Sin, the Reformers set out to present their position and explain the controversy according to the analogy of the faith.<sup>118</sup> After discussing the controversy as it involved the use of the terminology "substance" and "accident" at this

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Commentary, eds. J. A. Emerton, C. E. B. Cranfield and G. N. Stanton, 2 vols. [Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1979], *ad loc* Romans 12:6, 620-621). Luther, in his 1515-1516 glosses on Romans, rules out the subjective interpretation and says of the ἀναλογία, "the proportion, or the proper degree, that is, so that it does not go beyond the faith and its rubrics" (*proportionem, comparisonem, i.e. ne excedat fidem et regulas eius*) (Luther, *ad loc* Romans 12:6, AE 25:106, translated by Jacob A. O. Preus; Aland #646; WA 56:119). Confer the scholia (AE: 25:444-446; WA 56:451-454).

<sup>115</sup> Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 437-438; Pieper, *Christian Dogmatics*, 361-362.

<sup>116</sup> Ap XXVII:60, *BKS*, 394; Tappert, 279. (This passage was cited with greater length above at n.96, p.163.)

<sup>117</sup> The following addition to the German translation of the Apology's article on Human Traditions is, by way of *Anleitung*, potential evidence of this application of the analogy of the faith to the practice of the faith: "On the other hand, to teach absolute freedom has also its doubts and questions, because the common people need outward discipline and instruction" (*Wiederum schlechthin die Freiheit lehren, hat auch sein Bedenken und seine Frage, nachdem das gemeine Volk äußerlicher Zucht und Anleitung bedarf*) (Ap XV:49; Triglotta, 329; *BKS*, 306-307).

<sup>118</sup> SD I:3 (*nach Gottes Wort; iuxta verbi Dei analogiam*); 4 (*nach Gottes Wort; secundum verbi Dei analogiam*), *BKS*, 846.

locus,<sup>119</sup> the Reformers conclude that the terms can be used if their use is in keeping with the general principle of the faith.

Dergestalt denn [auf solche Weise wird] durch das Wort *accidens* die Erbsünde nicht verkleinert, wenn es nach Gottes Wort also erklärt wird, in maßen D. Luther in seiner lateinischen Auslegung über das dritte Kapitel des ersten Buchs Mose wider die Verkleinerung der Erbsünde mit großem Ernst geschrieben hat ...

Hac facta explicatione, per vocabulum accidentis peccatum originis haudquaquam extenuatur, cum videlicet illud iuxta Verbi Dei analogiam ita declaratur, quemadmodum D. Lutherus in Latino suo commentario in caput tertium Geneseos contra extenuationem peccati originalis magno zelo disseruit.

Thus the term “accident” does not in any way minimize original sin if the term is explained in harmony with the Word of God, just as Dr. Luther in his Latin exposition of Genesis 3 likewise writes earnestly against a minimizing of original sin.<sup>120</sup>

Applying the analogy of faith, however, did not allow every particular use the Reformers considered.

In the case of the Formula of Concord’s articles on Free Will, the Reformers similarly set out to resolve the controversy “according to the Word of God” (*nach Anleitung Gottes Worts; iuxta verbi Dei analogiam*).<sup>121</sup> But, in this case the Reformers reject two formulas expressing the idea that a free human will participates in conversion because those formulas do not agree with the analogy of faith.

... ist aus hievorgesetzter Erklärung offenbar, daß sie der Form gesunder Lehre nicht ähnlich, sunder derselben zuwider und demnach, wann von der Bekehrung zu Gott geredt, billich zu meiden.

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<sup>119</sup> Such sub-sentential use of philosophical terms certainly has bearing on the use of philosophy in *The Book of Concord* but is outside this dissertation’s scope that focuses on the supra-sentential uses of logic and argumentation.

<sup>120</sup> SD I:61, *BKS*, 865; Tappert, 519. The Luther work referred to is WA XLII:123<sub>38</sub>-125<sub>5</sub> (*BKS*, 865 n.1; confer Tappert, 519 n.7; K-W, 542 n.50, which gives the broader range of WA 42:120, 25-136, 20; *LW* 1:160-82). Significantly, as the Formula recognizes, Luther in his exposition of Genesis 3 does not talk about the use of the term “accident”. On this passage from the SD and the sources behind it, confer above n.33, p.103.

<sup>121</sup> SD II:6, Tappert, 521; *BKS*, 873.

... ex proposita declaratione manifeste apparet formae sanorum verborum ea non esse analogia, sed cum illa pugnare et idcirco, cum de conversione ad Deum agitur, merito vitanda esse.

It is evident from the preceding discussion that this position does not conform to the form of sound doctrine but rather opposes it and therefore is rightly to be avoided in the discussion of man's conversion to God.<sup>122</sup>

Clearly the analogy of faith applies to both form and content of the teaching, and the teaching is lived out in both words and practice.<sup>123</sup>

The Reformers relate the teaching import of the analogy of faith to their own writings, such as those in *The Book of Concord* written especially for teaching. A passage demonstrating this point is in the Formula of Concord Epitome's article on the Person of Christ (especially the Latin), as the Reformers explain how Christ's so-called session at the right hand of God allows Him to be truly and essentially present in His Supper.

Doh er auch vormag, und ihm ganz leicht ist, sein wahrhaftigen Leib und Blut im heiligen Abendmahl gegenwärtig mitzuteilen, *nicht nach der Art oder Eigenschaft der menschlichen Natur*, sondern *nach Art und Eigenschaft göttlicher Rechte*, saget D. Luther aus unserm | christlichen | Kinder glauben; welche Gegenwärtigkeit nicht irdisch, noch kapernaitisch, gleichwohl wahrhaftig und wesentlich ist, wie die Wort seines Testaments lauten: „*Das ist, ist, ist mein Leib*“ etc.

Inde adeo, et quidem facillime, corpus suum verum et sanguinem suum in sacra coena praesens distribuere potest. Id vero non fit secundum modum et proprietatem humanae naturae, sed secundum modum et proprietatem dextrae Dei, ut Lutherus secundum analogiam fidei nostrae Christianae in catechesi comprehensae loqui solet. Et haec Christi in sacra coena praesentia neque physica aut terrena est neque Capernaitica, interim tamen verissima et quidem substantialis est. Sic enim verba testamenti Christi sonant: Hoc est, est, est corpus meum etc.

Therefore he is able and it is easy for him to impart to us his true body and blood which are present in the Holy Supper, *not according to the mode or property of the human nature* but *according to the mode and property of God's right hand*, as Dr. Luther says on the basis of our Christian faith as we teach this to our children. This presence is not

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<sup>122</sup> SD II:86, Tappert, 538; *BKS*, 909. This passage is arguably a use of analogy against the opponents' position, but, as noted previously, on matters in dispute a use for the Reformers' position is also a use against their opponents' position.

<sup>123</sup> The application of general principles or rules can also be seen in Ap IV:185, 269, 277, 278 (German), 371 (German); Ap XVI:12; and SD I:33.

mundane or Capernaitic although it is true and essential, as the words of Christ's testament declare, "*This is, is, is my body,*" etc.<sup>124</sup>

Again, the analogy of faith is invoked by the Reformers and specifically said to allow some use of philosophical terms, and not just for the so-called experts. Terminology is also at issue at the close of the Epitome, where the analogy of faith and the Catechism are again conjoined.

Dies ist die kurz und einfältige Erklärung der streitigen Artikel,  
| so | ein Zeitlang von den Theologen Augsburgischer Confession  
widerwärtig disputiert und gelehret worden.

Daraus ein jeder einfältiger Christ nach Anleitung Gottes Worts  
und seines einfältigen Catechismi vernehmen kann, was recht oder unrecht  
sei, do nicht allein die reine Lehre gesetzt, sondern auch derselbigen  
widerwärtige irrige Lehre ausgesetzt, verworfen und also die eingefallene  
ärgerlichen Spaltungen gründlich entscheiden seind.

Haec brevis est et simplicissima articulorum controversorum  
explicatio, de quibus inter theologos Augustanae Confessionis aliquandiu  
disceptatum et discrepantibus inter se sentiis disputatum est. Et ex hac  
declaratione homo pius quantumvis simplex secundum analogiam verbi  
Dei et Catechismi simplicem doctrinam deprehendere potest, quid verum  
sit, quid falsum. Non enim tantummodo sincera doctrina diserte est  
recitata, verum etiam contraria et falsa doctrina repudiata est et reiecta, et  
controversiae illae, offendiculorum plenae, solide sunt decisae atque  
diiudicatae.

This is a brief and simple explanation of the various articles which  
for a time the theologians of the Augsburg Confession have been  
discussing and teaching in mutually contradictory terms. From it, under  
the guidance of the Word of God and the plain Catechism, every simple  
Christian can understand what is right and what is wrong, since we have  
not only set forth the pure doctrine but have also exposed the contrary  
errors. In this way the offensive controversies that have developed receive  
a basic settlement.<sup>125</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Ep VIII:17, *BKS*, 808; Tappert, 489 (emphasis original). (The *BKS* editors indicate the Luther writings referenced as WA XXVI:326ff.; XXIII:131ff. [confer Tappert, 489 n.2; K-W, 511 n.62, which narrows the page range and gives the corresponding AE equivalents 37:214-216, 55-59]). Confer SD VIII:23.

<sup>125</sup> Ep XI:22, *BKS*, 821; Tappert, 497. Note well that though numbered as part of the article on Election, this paragraph is more of a conclusion to the first eleven articles of the Epitome.

On this whole discussion of the analogy of faith, confer possibly also the uses of *Anleitung* in the Preface to *The Book of Concord* (numbered according to the German paragraphs), ¶5 (*BKS*, 743 line 25; "harmony" in Tappert, 4), ¶9 (*BKS*, 747 line 5; "direction" in Tappert, 6), and ¶20 (*BKS*, 756 line 30; "guidance" in Tappert, 12).

The Reformers use the analogy of faith, created by analogy from all the sure and clear passages of Scripture, to settle controversies, but that is not the Reformers' only use of analogy.

For three different specific points, the Formula of Concord uses analogies that have more of an explanatory force. In the case of the Solid Declaration's article on the Lord's Supper, the authors quote Luther at length, where he is discussing Christ's spiritual mode of presence that does not occupy space but nevertheless goes wherever He wants. By way of "some imperfect illustrations" (*grobe Gleichnis; crassa similitudine*) Luther likens it unto the penetration of vision and light, the transmission of musical sound and heat, and "many more like these" (*dergleichen viel mehr; multae comparationes*).<sup>126</sup> Similar is the use of analogy in the Formula of Concord's article on the Person of Christ. The Reformers there follow the church Fathers who explained the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Jesus Christ with the analogy (*Gleichnus; similitudine*) of fire and metal in glowing iron and of soul and body in a human being.<sup>127</sup> And, the personal union of the two natures in Christ is itself used by the Reformers, again after the precedent of church Fathers, as an explanatory analogy (*Gleichnus; similitudine*) for the sacramental union of the essences of Christ's body and blood with the essences of bread and wine.<sup>128</sup> These three specific uses of analogy significantly all follow precedents (that is, they are not the later authors innovating), and the greater explanatory force of the analogy is not to the exclusion of its nature as induction.

What is a more obvious example of arguing by way of analogy is a very practical case in Martin Luther's Large Catechism. Luther says the command to pray should make one prize one's personal prayers, and to support his position he reasons by analogy (or

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<sup>126</sup> SD VII:100, Tappert, 586; *BKS*, 1007. This particular extended quotation is from WA 26:335-336, Luther's 1528 *Confession Concerning Christ's Supper* (AE 37:222-223).

<sup>127</sup> Ep VIII:9, Tappert, 488; *BKS*, 806. Confer SD VIII:18 and 64, *BKS*, 1023 and 1038. The *BKS* editors point out with citations that Augustine attributes the analogy of glowing iron to Justin Martyr and that Origen is apparently the first to use the analogy of soul and body (*BKS*, 1023 n.1; confer Tappert, 594 n.5; K-W, 619 n.260 and 261).

<sup>128</sup> SD VII:37, Tappert, 575; *BKS*, 963. The sacramental presence, incidentally, is of the spiritual mode (SD VII:100).



“illustration”; *Gleichnis; similitudinem*) from the Fourth Commandment, where children’s obeying their parents is revered because of God’s command. Essentially the argument is that prayer is like obeying one’s parents, and, since obeying one’s parents is highly regarded because of God’s command, therefore prayer is highly regarded because of God’s command.<sup>129</sup> Clearly the Reformers use some analogies in support of their positions, but they also use others against their opponents’ positions.

### ***Against opponents’ positions***

The previous subsection showed how the Reformers use inductive reasoning by analogy to support their own positions, and it hinted at the Reformers’ use of the same method against their opponents, whether Roman Catholics in the earlier documents or pseudo-Lutherans in the later ones. This subsection discusses more at length the Reformers’ use of analogy against their opponents’ positions.

Especially against their later opponents the Reformers in several places object to their opponents referring the bread and wine in the Sacrament of the Altar as analogies of Christ’s corresponding body and blood. One of those objections, coming in a list of condemned positions, touches on linguistic theory.

... daß im Abendmahl dem Glauben allein die Kraft, Wirkung und Verdienst des weit abwesenden Leibs Christi ausgeteilet werde, und wir also seines abwesendes Leibs teilhaftig werden, und daß auf diese jtz erzählte Weise unio sacramentalis, das ist, sakramentliche Vereinigung, zu verstehen sei de analogia signi et signati, das ist, wie Brot und Wein mit dem Leib und Blut Christi ein Gleichnis haben.

Quod in Coena Domini *fidei* tantummodo virtus, operatio et meritum longe absentis corporis Christi distribuantur et communicentur, ut hac ratione *absentis* corporis Christi participes fiamus. Et quod iuxta hunc modum unio sacramentalis sit intelligenda, videlicet de analogia signi et signati, quatenus nimirum corpus et sanguis Christi cum pane et vino aliquid similitudinis habent.

... that in the Supper there is distributed to faith only the virtue, operation, and merit of the far-distant body of Christ, and that in this way we partake of his absent body. Accordingly the term “sacramental union” is to be understood in terms of the relation between the sign and that which is

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<sup>129</sup> LC III:12-13, Tappert, 422; *BKS*, 664-665.

signified—in other words, only as bread and wine have a similarity with the body and blood of Christ.<sup>130</sup>

Though not so much an example of argument by analogy, this use shows that analogy has its limits.

One of the more striking uses comes in the case of their opponents' argument for celibacy on the basis of its purity. The Reformers harshly criticize and then reverse their opponents' argument by analogy from the Old Testament priesthood intended to support celibacy to instead support marriage and intercourse.<sup>131</sup>

Et huc allegant ceremonias legis mosaicae, quod cum in lege tempore ministerii sacerdotes separati fuerint ab uxoribus, in novo testamento sacerdos, cum semper orare debeat, semper debeat continere. Haec inepta similitudo allegatur tamquam demonstratio, quae cogat sacerdotes ad perpetuum coelibatum, cum quidem in ipsa similitudine coniugium concedatur, tantum ministerii tempore consuetudo interdicatur. Et aliud est orare, aliud ministrare. Orabant sancti tunc quoque, cum non exercebant publicum ministerium, nec consuetudo cum coniuge prohibebat, ne orarent.

Und dazu ziehen sie an die Priester im Gesetz Mosis. Denn sie sagen, wenn die Priester haben im Tempel gedienet, haben sie sich ihrer Weiber müssen enthalten; darum, so im neuen Testament die Priester allezeit beten sollen, sollen sie sich auch allezeit keusch halten. Solch ungeschickt nährisch Gleichnis ziehen sie an als ein ganz klaren gewissen Grund, dadurch schon erstritten sei, daß die Priester schuldig sein, ewige Keuschheit zu halten, so sie doch, wenn auch das Gleichnis hie tütge oder sich reimte, nichts mehr damit erhalten, denn daß die Priester sich ihrer Weiber allein eine Zeit lang enthalten sollten, nämlich wenn sie Kirchendienst fürhätten. Auch so ist ein ander Ding beten, ein ander Ding, in der Kirche priesterlich Amt tun. Denn viel Heilige haben wohl gebetet, wenn sie gleich nicht im Tempel gedienet, und hat sie eheliche Beiwohnung daran nicht gehindert.

For this they refer to the ceremonies of the Mosaic law which prescribed that during the period of their ministration the priests of the Old Testament were to be separated from their wives; since the priests of the New Testament must pray continually, they must also preserve perpetual

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<sup>130</sup> SD VII:117, *BKS*, 1013; Tappert, 589-590. (The *BKS* editors note a number of writings of the Reformers' opponents where such position was taken.) Confer Ep VII:28; SD VII:115.

<sup>131</sup> On the opponents' use of this analogy, see article XXIII of the Confutation (CR 27:138-139 [confer *BKS*, 339 n.1]; Reu, ed., *The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources*, \*365-\*366; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts*, 124.)

continence. This clumsy analogy is presented as a proof to force perpetual celibacy on priests, though, in this very analogy marriage is permitted and intercourse is forbidden only during the time of ministration. Besides, prayer is one thing and ministration another. The saints prayed even when they were not carrying on their public ministry, and marital intercourse did not keep them from praying.<sup>132</sup>

The opponents' "clumsy" attempt at analogy ends up supporting the Reformers' position by their demonstrating that there is no support for a generalization from a limited aspect of the Old Testament priesthood's life to the whole of the New Testament priesthood's life.

Another place where the Reformers' opponents attempt to reason by analogy from the Old Testament and are similarly criticized harshly by the Reformers is in the Apology's article on Penitence, where the Reformers criticize the examination that was part of their opponents' practice of confession, which practice their opponents ostensibly supported elsewhere by an analogy from Proverbs 27:23.<sup>133</sup> Notice how the Reformers essentially ridicule their opponents' basic skills of reading and interpretation.

Et ridiculum est huc transferre dictum Salomonis: Diligenter cognosce vultum pecoris tui. Nihil enim dicit Salomon de confessione, sed tradit oeconomicum praeceptum patrifamilias, ut utatur suo et abstineat ab alieno, et iubet eum res suas diligenter curare; ita tamen, ne studio augendarum facultatum occupatus animus abiiciat timorem Dei aut fidem aut curam verbi Dei. Sed adversarii nostri mirifica metamorphosi transformant dicta Scripturae in quaslibet sententias. Hic cognoscere significat eis audire confessiones, vultus non externam conversationem, sed arcana conscientiae. Pecudes significant homines. Sane bella est interpretatio et digna istis contemptoribus studiorum eloquentiae. Quodsi velit aliquis per similitudinem transferre praeceptum a patrefamilias ad pastorem ecclesiae, certe vultum debet interpretari de externa conversatione. Haec similitudo magis quadrabit.

Und es ist nährisch und kindisch gnug bei Verständigen, den Spruch Salomonis, da er am 27. sagt: „Diligenter cognosce vultum pecoris tui“, das ist, „habe acht auf deine Schafe usw.“ an dem Ort von der Beichte oder Absolution einführen. Denn Salomon redet da gar nichts von

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<sup>132</sup> Ap XXIII:27, *BKS*, 338-339; Tappert, 243. Confer Ap XXIII:41 (see above at n.63, p.153).

<sup>133</sup> The corresponding twelfth article of the Confutation (CR 27:109-114; Reu, 355\*-356\*; K-N, 113-114) does not make the stated claim from Proverbs, and the *BKS* editors do not offer a source for the claim.

der Beicht, sondern gibt ein Gebot den Hausvätern, daß sie sollen mit dem Ihren zufrieden sein und sich fremdes Guts enthalten, und befiehlt mit dem Wort, ein jeder solle seines Viehes und Güter fleißig wahrnehmen, doch soll er aus Geiz Gottes Furcht, Gottes Gebot und Wort nicht vergessen. Aber die Widersacher machen aus der Schrift schwarz und weiß, wenn und wie sie wollen, wider alle natürliche Art der klaren Worte an dem Ort: *Cognosce vultum pecoris* etc. Da muß *cognoscere* Beicht hören heißen. Vieh oder Schafe muß da Menschen heißen. *Stabulum*, achten wir, heißt auch eine Schule, da solche *Doctores* und *Oratores* inne sein. Aber ihnen geschiehet recht, die also die heilige Schrift, alle gute Künste verachten, daß sie so grob in der Grammatik fehlen. Wenn jemand an dem Ort je Lust hätten, ein Hausvater, davon Salomo redet, mit einem Seelhirten zu vergleichen, so müßt *vultus* da nicht *arcana conscientiae*, sondern den äußerlichen Wandel bedeuten.

It is silly to transfer here the saying of Solomon (Prov. 27:23), “Know well the condition of your flocks.” Solomon is not talking about confession. He is merely giving a bit of domestic advice to the head of a household, telling him to pay diligent attention to his own property and leave other people’s alone, but warning him not to be so preoccupied with the increase of his holdings that he neglects the fear of God or faith or his concern for God’s Word. By a marvelous transformation, our opponents make passages of Scripture mean whatever they want them to mean. [They produce from the Scriptures black and white, as they please, contrary to the natural meaning of the clear words.] According to their interpretation, “know” here means to hear confessions, “condition” means the secrets of conscience and not outward conduct, “flocks” means men. [*Stable*, we think, means a school within which there are such doctors and orators. But it has happened aright to those who thus despise the Holy Scriptures and all fine arts that they make gross mistakes in grammar.] The interpretation surely is a neat one, worthy of these men who despise grammar. But if anybody wants by analogy to apply the commandment given a father to the pastor of a church, he should surely interpret “condition” as meaning outward conduct. That at least would be more consistent.<sup>134</sup>

Again in this case the Reformers are not objecting to the use of analogy *per se*, but they are objecting to the whether the two things being compared are actually analogous and if so what the induction means.

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<sup>134</sup> Ap XII:106, *BKS*, 273; Tappert, 197. (The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from Triglotta, 283.) There is no stable anywhere near Proverbs 27:23; clearly the Reformers are making sport of their opponents’ exegesis.

The opponents' attempt at induction by analogy from a New Testament verse at the locus of Justification is said by the Apology's article on that topic similarly to be "unwarranted". In Luke 17:10 Jesus says, "So likewise ye, when ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do" (KJV; NA26: οὕτως καὶ ὑμεῖς, ὅταν ποιήσητε πάντα τὰ διαταχθέντα ὑμῖν, λέγετε ὅτι δοῦλοι ἀχρεῖοι ἐσμεν, ὃ ὠφείλομεν ποιῆσαι πεποιήκαμεν). The Reformers say their opponents err in arguing by analogy from Christ's words to a conclusion that denigrates faith.<sup>135</sup>

Sed si ex simili ratiocinari volunt: cum feceris omnia, noli confidere operibus tuis, ita cum credideris omnia, noli confidere promissione divina: haec non cohaerent. Sunt enim dissimillima. Dissimiles causae, dissimilia obiecta fiduciae sunt in priore propositione et in posteriore. Fiducia in priore est fiducia nostrorum operum. Fiducia in posteriore est fiducia promissionis divinae. Christus autem damnat fiduciam nostrorum operum, non damnat fiduciam promissionis suae. Non vult nos de gratia et misericordia Dei desperare, arguit opera nostra tamquam indigna, non arguit promissionem, quae gratis offert misericordiam.

Likewise, the argument from analogy is unwarranted: from the statement, "When you have done everything, do not trust in your works," to the statement, "When you have believed everything, do not trust in the divine promise." The two statements are not analogous since the causes and objects of trust in the first are unlike those in the second. In the first, trust is a trust in our own works; in the second, trust is a trust in the divine promise. Christ condemns trust in our own works; he does not condemn trust in his promise. He does not want us to despair of God's grace and mercy. He denounces our works as worthless, but he does not denounce the promise that offers mercy gratis.<sup>136</sup>

Again, the similarity of the items in the analogy is questioned by the Reformers. One might say the homonymy in this case is so extreme as to make a proportional relationship nonexistent.

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<sup>135</sup> The argument begins in Ap IV:334ff.; the German does not follow the authoritative Latin; confer the discussion above (see above at n.102, p.167).

<sup>136</sup> Ap IV:339, *BKS*, 226; Tappert, 159. For other non-analogy uses of *simili* see AC XX:2 and LC I:190.

The Apology's article on the Mass is a final illustration of how the Reformers use induction by analogy to argue against their opponents' positions. At this *locus*, there are two central and explicit analogies first raised by the Reformers' opponents that are then refuted by the Reformers and turned to support the Reformers' own position.<sup>137</sup> The first regards the daily sacrifice of the Old Testament being analogous to the need for a daily sacrifice in the New, and the second regards the Old Testament priesthood being analogous to that of the New.

In discussing the first, that of the Old Testament's daily sacrifice being analogous to the need for a daily sacrifice in the New Testament, the Reformers variously refer to their opponents argument as "allegory" (*allegoriis*; *Allegorien*) and "type" (*typus*; *Figur*), but the force of the argument is an inductive argument reasoned by analogy.

Allegant et iuge sacrificium quod sicut in lege fuit iuge sacrificium, ita missa debeat esse iuge sacrificium novi testamenti. Bene cum adversariis agitur, si patimur nos vinci allegoriis. Constat autem, quod allegoriae non pariunt firmas probationes. Quamquam nos quidem facile patimur missam intelligi iuge sacrificium, modo ut tota missa intelligatur, hoc est, ceremonia cum praedicatione evangelii, fide, invocatione et gratiarum actione. Nam haec simul coniuncta sunt iuge sacrificium novi testamenti, quia ceremonia propter haec instituta est, nec ab his divellenda est. Ideo Paulus ait: Quoties comedetis panem hunc, et poculum Domini bibetis, annuntiate mortem Domini. Illud vero nullo modo sequitur ex hoc typo levitico, quod ceremonia sit opus ex opere operato iustificans aut applicandum pro aliis, ut mereatur eis remissionem peccatorum etc.

Auch so ziehen die Widersacher an das iuge sacrificium, das ist, das tägliche Opfer, und sagen, wie im Gesetz Mosi sei gewesen ein täglich Opfer, also sei die Messe iuge sacrificium des neuen Testaments. Wenn die Sache mit Allegorien auszurichten wäre, so würde jedermann Allegorien finden, ihm dienlich. Aber alle Verständige wissen, daß man in solchen hochwichtigen Sachen vor Gott gewiß und klar Gottes Wort haben muß, und nicht dunkele und fremde Sprüche herzu ziehen mit Gewalt. Solche ungewisse Deutungen halten den Stich nicht für Gottes Gericht.

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<sup>137</sup> See article XXIV of the Confutation (CR 27:146-157 [confer *BKS*, 360 n.1-2]; Reu, ed., The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources, \*369-\*373; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 127-131.)

Another explicit analogy regarding the mass being a sacrifice because Paul mentions an altar (*parabola altaris per similitudinem a Paulo*) that is also briefly treated, but only in the authoritative Latin (Ap XXIV:84; *BKS*, 372), was apparently not raised by the opponents in the confutation itself.

Wiewohl wir wollten den Widersachern zu Gefallen noch die Messe wohl iuge sacrificium oder täglich Opfer nennen lassen. wenn sie die ganze Messe, das ist, die Ceremonien mit der Danksagung, mit dem Glauben im Herzen, mit dem herzlichen Anrufen göttlicher Gnade iuge sacrificium nenneten; denn das alles zusammen möchte iuge sacrificium des neuen Testaments heißen. Denn die Ceremonia der Meß oder des Abendmahls ist um des alles willen aufgerichtet; denn sie ist um des Predigens willen eingesetzt, wie Paulus sagt: „So oft ihr das Brot esset und den Kelch trinket, sollt ihr den Tod des Herrn verkündigen.“ Das folget aber gar nicht aus der Figur des täglichen Opfers, daß die Messe sei ein solch Opfer, das ex opere operato Gott versühne, oder das man für andere halten oder tun könne, ihnen Vergebung der Sünde zu erlangen.

They cite refer to the daily sacrifice: as there was a daily sacrifice in the Old Testament, so the Mass ought to be the daily sacrifice of the New Testament. Our opponents will really achieve something if we let them defeat us with allegories, but it is evident that allegory does not prove or establish anything [that in matters so highly important before God we must have a sure and clear word of God, and not introduce by force obscure and foreign passages; such uncertain explanations do not stand the test of God's judgment]. We are perfectly willing for the Mass to be understood as a daily sacrifice, provided this means the whole Mass, the ceremony and also the proclamation of the Gospel, faith, prayer, and thanksgiving. Taken together, these are the daily sacrifice of the New Testament; the ceremony [of the Mass, or the Lord's Supper] was instituted because of them and ought not be separated from them. Therefore Paul says (1 Cor. 11:26), "As often as you eat this bread and drink the cup, you proclaim the Lord's death." From the Levitical analogy it does not follow at all that there must be a ceremony that justifies *ex opere operato* or that merits the forgiveness of sins when applied to others.<sup>138</sup>

The Reformers at a minimum say their opponents have again failed to recognize what is analogous between the two, with the opponents limiting the sacrifice to ceremony, but the Reformers taking it more broadly, with an emphasis on the preaching of the Gospel.<sup>139</sup> (As much as the Reformers might be taken, in the paragraph just quoted, to denigrate the nature of the argument, they ultimately claim this one for themselves, as will be seen.)

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<sup>138</sup> Ap XXIV:35, BKS, 360; Tappert, 256. (The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from Triglotta, 397.) The only other mention of *allegoria*, *allegoriae* is in Ap XXI:35 where the Reformers refer to the symbolism through allegory (*ut significaret per allegoriam; hat wollen anzeigen*) of a painting of St. Christopher (BKS, 324).

<sup>139</sup> See especially the preceding paragraph, Ap XXIV:34.

Et typus apte pingit non ceremoniam solam, sed etiam praedicationem evangelii. In Numer. cap. 28 tres ponuntur partes istius cotidiani sacrificii, crematio agni, libatio et oblatio similiae. Lex habebat picturas seu umbras rerum futurarum. Ideo in hoc spectaculo Christus et totus cultus novi testamenti pingitur. Crematio agni significat mortem Christi. Libatio significat, ubique in toto mundo credentes illius agni sanguine aspergi per evangelii praedicationem, hoc est, sanctificari, sicut Petrus loquitur: In sanctificationem spiritus, in obedientiam et aspersionem sanguinis Iesu Christi. Oblatio similiae significat fidem, invocationem et gratiarum actionem in cordibus. Ut igitur in veteri testamento umbra cernitur, ita in novo res significata quaerenda est, non alius typus tamquam ad sacrificium sufficiens.

Und wenn man iuge sacrificium oder das tägliche Opfer recht ansieht, so malets ab und bedeut nicht allein die Ceremonien, sondern auch die Predigt des Evangelii. Denn im 4. Buch Mosi am 28. werden gesetzt drei Stücke, die zu demselben täglichen Opfer gehörten. Erstlich ward geopfert ein Lamm zu einem Brandopfer und ward Wein darauf gossen. Danach ward auch geopfert ein Kuche mit Semmelmehl und Öl gemenget. Das ganze Gesetz Mosi ist ein Schatten und Figur Christi und des neuen Testaments, darum so wird Christus darin abgemalet. Das Lamm bedeutet den Tod Christi. Wein darauf gießen bedeutet, daß in aller Welt alle Gläubigen von des Lamms Blut besprengt werden durch das Evangelium, das ist, daß sie geheiligt werden. wie Petrus sagt 1. Petr. 1: „Durch Heiligung des Geistes im Gehorsam und Besprengung des Blutes Jesu Christi.“ Der Kuch bedeutet das Anrufen und die Danksagung in aller Gläubigen Herzen. Wie nu im alten Testament der Schatten ist und die Bedeutung Christi oder des Evangelii. also ist im neuen Testament dasselbige Evangelium und die Wahrheit, welche durch die Figur bedeut ist, zu suchen. und ist nicht erst ein neu typus oder Figur zu suchen, das sie möchten oder wollten sacrificium nennen.

This analogy symbolizes not only the ceremony but the proclamation of the Gospel. Num. 28:4ff. lists three parts of this daily sacrifice, the burning of the lamb, the drink offering, and the offering of flour. The Old Testament had pictures or shadows of what was to come; thus this depicted Christ and the whole worship of the New Testament. The burning of the lamb symbolizes the death of Christ. The drink offering symbolizes the sprinkling, that is, the sanctifying of believers throughout the world with the blood of that Lamb, by the proclamation of the Gospel, as Peter says (1 Pet. 1:2); “Sanctified by the Spirit for obedience to Jesus Christ and for sprinkling with his blood.” The offering of flour symbolizes faith, prayer, and thanksgiving in the heart. Therefore, as we discern the shadow in the Old Testament, so in the New we should



look for what it represents and not for another symbol that seems to be a sacrifice.<sup>140</sup>

The Reformers state that the real daily sacrifice is the commemoration of Christ's death, the proclamation of and faith that receives the Gospel. The Old Testament ceremonies, the Reformers continue, point to the spiritual worship and the heart's daily sacrifice brought about by the Holy Spirit.

Ex his satis apparet typum de iugi sacrificio nihil contra nos facere, sed magis pro nobis, quia nos omnes partes significatas iugi sacrificio requirimus. Adversarii falso somniant solam ceremoniam significari, non etiam praedicationem evangelii, mortificationem et vivificationem cordis etc.

Aus dem erscheint nu genug, daß das Gleichnis vom iuge sacrificio oder täglichem Opfer nichts wider uns ist, sondern vielmehr für uns. Denn wir haben klar angezeigt, daß alles, was zum täglichen Opfer im Gesetz Mosi gehöret hat, muß ein wahr, herzlich Opfer, nicht *opus operatum* bedeuten. Der Widersacher Traum ist falsch, da sie wännen wollen, es werde allein das schlechte, äußerliche Werk und Ceremonia bedeut, so doch der Glaube im Herzen, das Predigen, Bekennen, Danksagung und herzliches Anrufen die rechten täglichen Opfer sein und das Beste an der Messe, sie nennens gleich Opfer oder anders.

From this it is clear that the analogy of the daily sacrifice does not refute but supports our stand because we require all the actions that it symbolizes. [We have clearly shown all the parts that belonged to the daily sacrifice in the law of Moses, that it must mean a true cordial offering, not an *opus operatum*.] Our opponents imagine that it symbolizes the ceremony alone and not preaching the Gospel, being put to death and being made alive [which is the best part of the Mass, whether they call it a sacrifice or anything else].<sup>141</sup>

So, the Reformers took an analogy their opponents' used to support their position and, by way of an allegory that illuminated the analogy, turned the argument to support their own position. The Reformers do something similar with the next analogy to be considered.

The second central and explicit analogy in the Apology's article on the Mass regards the Old Testament priesthood being analogous to that of the New. Like the

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<sup>140</sup> Ap XXIV:36-37, *BKS*, 361; Tappert, 256-257.

<sup>141</sup> Ap XXIV:40, *BKS*, 361-362; Tappert, 257. (The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 397.)

previous case, this analogy was raised by the Reformers' opponents in the Confutation as an argument supporting the opponents' position.

Allegant et ex epistola ad Ebraeos: Omnis pontifex ex hominibus assumptus pro hominibus constituitur in his, quae sunt ad Deum, ut offerat dona et sacrificia pro peccatis. Hinc ratiocinantur, cum in novo testamento sint pontifices et sacerdotes, sequitur, quod sit et sacrificium aliquod pro peccatis. Hic locus vel maxime movet indoctos, praesertim cum illa pompa sacerdotii et sacrificiorum veteris testamenti offunditur oculis. Haec similitudo decipit imperitos, ut iudicent oportere ad eundem modum apud nos exsistere aliquod ceremoniale sacrificium, applicandum pro peccatis aliorum, sicut in veteri testamento. Neque aliud est ille cultus missarum et reliqua politia papae, quam levitica politia male intellecta.<sup>142</sup>

Auch so ziehen sie an aus der Epistel zu den Ebräern am 5. Kapitel. „Ein itzlicher Hoherpriester, der aus den Menschen genommen wird, der wird gesetzt für die Menschen gegen Gott, auf daß er opfere Gaben und Opfer für die Sünde.“ Da schließen sie: nachdem im neuen Testament Bischöfe sein und Priester, so folget, daß auch ein Opfer müsse sein für die Sünde. Dieses nu möchte am meisten die Ungelehrte und Unerfahrene bewegen, sonderlich wenn sie ansehen das herrliche Gepränge im Tempel und Kirchen, item die Kleidung Aaronis, da im Alten Testament auch viel Schmuck von Gold, Silber und Purpur gewesen, denken sie, es müsse im neuen Testament gleich also ein Gottesdienst, solche Ceremonien und Opfer sein, da man für anderer Leute Sünde opfere, wie im alten Testament. Denn der ganze Mißbrauch der Messen und päpstlichen Gottesdienst ist nirgend herkommen, denn daß sie haben wollen den Mosis Ceremonien nachfolgen und haben es nicht verstanden, daß das neue Testament mit andern Sachen umgehet und daß solche äußerliche Ceremonien, ob man sie zu Kinderzucht braucht, sollen ihr Maß haben.

They also quote the Epistle to the Hebrews (5:1), “Every high priest chosen from among men is appointed to act on behalf of men in relation to God, to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins.” From this they conclude that since the New Testament has priests and high priests, it must also have some sort of sacrifice for sins. This is a very convincing argument for the ignorant, especially when the pomp of the Old Testament priesthood [the garments of Aaron, since in the Old Testament there were many ornaments of gold, silver, and purple] and sacrifices is spread before their eyes. The analogy deceives them, and they think that we should have

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<sup>142</sup> A variant in the text of the Latin makes the last phrase after *quam* read: *κακοζηλία leviticae politiae male intellectae* (“false zeal in behalf of the misunderstood Levitical polity”) (*BKS*, 365, Triglotta, 403; confer K-W, 268, “false zeal arising from a misinterpretation of the Levitical order”).

some ceremony or sacrifice for sins, just the Old Testament did. The services of the Mass and the rest of the papal order are nothing but a misinterpretation of the Levitical order. [They have not understood that the New Testament is occupied with other matters, and that, if such ceremonies are used for the training of the young, a limit must be fixed for them.]<sup>143</sup>

Note well how the Reformers said this particular argument (*locus!*) by analogy is convincing for “the ignorant” (*imperitos; Ungelhrte und Unerfahrene*). Next, the Reformers discuss their opponents’ twisting passages from Hebrews and the proper understanding of those passages and the Epistle.<sup>144</sup> Then, on the basis of the correct understanding of the passages, the Reformers turn the argument to support their own position.

Cum igitur in veteri testamento sacrificia non mererentur reconciliationem nisi similitudine quadam, (merebantur enim reconciliationem politicam,) sed significarent venturum sacrificium: sequitur unicum esse sacrificium Christi, applicatum pro aliorum peccatis. Nullum igitur reliquum est in novo testamento sacrificium applicandum pro peccatis aliorum praeter unum Christi sacrificium in cruce.

So nu im alten Testament durch die Opfer niemand hat erlangt Vergebung der Sunde, denn allein sie haben bedeut das einige Opfer Christi: so folget, daß allein ein einiges Opfer ist, nämlich Christus, welcher für aller Welt Sunde bezahlt und gnug getan hat. Derhalben ist im neuen Testament fürder auch kein ander Opfer zu machen, dadurch die Sunde bezahlt werden, denn allein der einige Tod Christi, so am Kreuz einmal geopfert ist.

The Old Testament sacrifices, therefore, did not merit reconciliation—unless by a analogy, since they merited civil reconciliation—but only symbolized the coming sacrifice. From this it follows that only the sacrifice of Christ can be valid for the sins of others, and there is no other sacrifice left in the New Testament except the one sacrifice of Christ on the cross.<sup>145</sup>

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<sup>143</sup> Ap XXIV:52, *BKS*, 364-365. (The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 403.)

<sup>144</sup> Ap XXIV:53-55, which was previously discussed briefly above at n.54, p.114.

<sup>145</sup> Ap XXIV:56, *BKS*, 366; Tappert, 259-260. The following paragraph continues to discuss this inductive reasoning, although it refers to the argument as *exemplo* (“by example”); see above at n.70, p.154.

Again the overriding general or universal principle of justification only by faith in the merits of Christ—what is essentially a central part of the analogy of faith for the Reformers—affects how other particulars are understood and thus can function in analogies purportedly based on them. Also again, the Reformers, inductively reasoning by analogy, have successfully turned their opponents' argument in favor of the Reformers' own position. At the same time they acknowledge the power of reasoning by analogy, especially in the case of non-experts, and so make use of it themselves.

### ***Summary of “analogy” use***

The earlier and later Reformers thus in *The Book of Concord* show evidence of reasoning inductively by analogy on a wide variety of *loci*, though to a somewhat lesser extent than they show evidence of reasoning inductively by example. A greater number of the uses of analogy are in Melancthon's Apology of the Augsburg Confession, but such may simply be due to it being the longest of the works in *The Book of Concord*. None of the medieval controversies involving analogy arises in *The Book of Concord*, and the Reformers do not follow Duns Scotus in rejecting analogy. Instead, common people are expected to be able to use analogy in understanding God's will for their own lives and in understanding the Reformers' arguments for their own positions and their arguments against their opponents' positions. The “analogy of the Christian faith” is an important principle produced by the sure and clear (*certas et claras*) passages of the Word of God, which analogy then has normative force, along with *The Book of Concord*'s individual works, for interpreting other passages of Holy Scripture and permitting or prohibiting particular expressions of the faith (some including philosophical terminology), as in the cases of Original Sin and Free Will, respectively. Analogy has its limits for the Reformers, and, while they object to its use by their opponents in minimizing Christ's presence in His Supper, the Reformers in other cases, in keeping with the tactic Aristotle discussed, attack the degree of analogy or the inducted conclusion, especially when the conclusion goes against the chief article of the faith. And, in still other cases, the Reformers take the analogies their opponents use and turn them to support the Reformers' own positions. The Reformers are quick to attack their

opponents' analogies and use analogy for themselves because they recognize its power for the non-experts.

## Chapter III summary

The Reformers use the inductive methods both of reasoning by example and of reasoning by analogy. Given the nature of the works contained in *The Book of Concord* as apologetic (offering a defense of the faith), at some level telling whether the use of these methods of reasoning is strictly dialectical or rhetorical is impossible. In fact, the use of these methods is probably *both* dialectical *and* rhetorical, even as Aristotle recognized that all people use both dialectics and rhetoric. The Reformers, earlier and later ones, use both example and analogy similarly, both in support of their own positions and against those of their opponents, and on wide-ranging *loci*.<sup>146</sup> The Reformers saw as especially damaging to their opponents' positions the lack of example, essentially equivalent to a command or promise from Scripture. When their opponents did offer an example or analogy, the Reformers countered in an Aristotelian manner, and in many cases the Reformers also turned their opponents' arguments in their favor. The Reformers generally did not denigrate these inductive methods but recognized their power, especially on those who are not formally trained in logic or theology. In fact, the Reformers can be understood to see inductive reasoning as a necessary part of learning and recognizing God's grace (a necessity that can also be said of deduction, as will be seen below). The Reformers used these inductive methods to their advantage, at no place explicitly breaking with the preceding traditions of their use. Both of the inductive methods work from the particular examples to the universal principles, thus providing universal principles from which deductive reasoning operates. Such universal principles included the analogy of faith (in some ways like the example of the church or the analogy

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<sup>146</sup> Although the use of example and analogy might be said to be more frequent on controversial *loci* such may be due to the more extended treatment of these *loci* and possibly also to the opponents' bringing up a particular example or analogy and thereby making the Reformers address it. In the case of example, anyway, there was a great deal of overlap between the *loci* where the Reformers used example to support their positions and the *loci* where the Reformers used example against their opponents' positions. Still, many of the Reformers' uses against their opponents' positions did come at the *loci* of the so-called "Articles about Matters in Dispute".

of the word of God and including the Reformers own writings), justification by faith, and Christian liberty. As with Aristotle, so, too, with the Reformers the line is not always perfectly clear between example and analogy, nor is the line always clear between induction and deduction, to which attention now turns in Chapter IV.<sup>147</sup>

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<sup>147</sup> To some extent, a theologian might argue that the actual content of the faith will come before the individual passages can be closely considered. For example, while the analogy of faith or of Scripture is in theory the sum total of all the clear passages of Holy Scripture, an individual believer brought to faith by the Holy Spirit working through the Word of God is not necessarily going to read all the particular clear passages and inductively conclude the analogy of faith, even though to a greater or lesser degree those very passages led the believer to the universal principle. Rather, the individual believer will more likely come to faith and then learn how to understand the universal principle and apply it to particular passages and questions.

## Chapter IV: Use of Deductive Argumentation

*Hence if anyone so sets forth this teaching concerning God's gracious election that sorrowing Christians can find no comfort in it but are driven to despair, or when impenitent sinners are strengthened in their malice, then it is clearly evident that this teaching is not being set forth according to the Word and will of God but according to reason and the suggestion of the wicked devil. . . . it is certain that any interpretation of the Scriptures which weakens or even removes this comfort and hope is contrary to the Holy Spirit's will and intent. We shall abide by this simple, direct, and useful exposition which is permanently and well grounded in God's revealed will, we shall avoid and flee as abstruse and specious questions and disputations, and we reject and condemn all those things which are contrary to these true, simple, and useful expositions.*

—Solid Declaration XI:91-93

Chapter III gave evidence of the authors of the works contained in *The Book of Concord* making use of inductive reasoning within certain limits, and this Chapter will similarly give evidence of the use of deductive reasoning, again within certain limits. Given the authors' positive second-order regard for logic, which was seen in Chapter II, there is little surprise that the authors also make supra-sentential use of philosophy by reasoning deductively in the forms of syllogistic arguments. While some elements of such deductive reasoning have already been seen, this Chapter examines the Reformers' deductive reasoning more closely by consideration of the philosophical background of syllogisms; of Melancthon's method regarding "sophistries"; of expressions, formulae, and propositions; and of passages from *The Book of Concord* that more or less make formal syllogistic arguments, making observations about their use along the way.

### **Philosophical background of syllogisms**

To have a better understanding of *The Book of Concord's* use of the deductive method in the form of syllogistic arguments, an overview of the syllogism and its

philosophical background is necessary.<sup>1</sup> By a general definition, a συλλογισμός (syllogism) is “a valid deductive argument having two premises and a conclusion”, although the term “syllogism” can be applied more narrowly to what others might call a pure “categorical syllogism”, cases “where both premises and the conclusion are categorical propositions which have between them three, and only three, terms.”<sup>2</sup> Categorical propositions have both quantity (that is, they are universal or particular) and quality (that is, they are affirmative or negative). Moreover, the three terms themselves have technical terms and conventional general placement in the syllogism, with further conventions regarding placement within the particular premises. Consider the following usual example.

(Major premise) All human beings (middle term or “M”) are mortal (predicate or “P”).  
 (Minor premise) Socrates (subject or “S”) is a human being (M).  
 (Conclusion) Socrates (S) is mortal (P).<sup>3</sup>

Each premise contributes one term to the conclusion and shares a common term with the other premise. The major premise comes first and contributes the predicate (or “major term”, in this case “is mortal”) to the conclusion, and the minor premise comes second and contributes the subject (or “minor term”, in this case “Socrates”) to the conclusion. The shared term that does not appear in the conclusion is the “middle term” (in this case, “human being”).<sup>4</sup>

That categorical propositions have both quantity and quality was noted above, and those aspects relate to the distribution of the subject or predicate of the individual

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<sup>1</sup> Much of the background in this section came to medieval students through the sixth-century “Christian philosopher” Boethius and through those commenting on him, until works such as Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* were “rediscovered” (details follow in the text). Melanchthon’s logic textbooks, such as the second edition of 1528 and the third edition of 1547, naturally included the basics of syllogisms (Melanchthon, *De dialectica libri quatuor*, 112-136; CR 13:595-611).

<sup>2</sup> “Syllogism,” *The Encyclopedia of Philosophy*, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1972), 5:75-76. For trouble translating Aristotle’s use of the word with our word “syllogism”, see Smith, “Logic,” 30. Aside from categorical propositions (consisting of subject, copula, and predicate), there are also molecular ones (consisting of a pair of propositions connected by a term from a list that usually included such connectors as “and”, “or”, and “if”). See, for example, Alexander Broadie, *Introduction to Medieval Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), 15-16.

<sup>3</sup> Though the example given is the usual example of a syllogism, there are reasons why it is not particularly Aristotelian (Robinson, *Aristotle in Outline*, 33).

<sup>4</sup> “Syllogism,” *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, ed. Simon Blackburn (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 368-369.



proposition. The medieval notion of “distribution” refers to whether a term refers to all or part of a class or set of things. The quantity determines the distribution of the proposition’s subject, and the quality determines the distribution of the proposition’s predicate. If a proposition is universal, its subject is distributed (for example, “All human beings are mortal”), otherwise it is not. If a proposition is negative, its predicate is distributed (for example, “Some human beings are not lawyers”), otherwise it is not. Thus, propositions can have both subject and predicate distributed (for example, “No human beings are trustworthy”), one or the other (as in the previous examples), or neither (for example, “Some human beings are sick”). For a syllogism to be valid, the middle term must be distributed in at least one premise, and, if either term is distributed in the conclusion, it must be distributed in the premises.<sup>5</sup>

Syllogisms are generally classified in two ways: according to the figure of the syllogism and the validity of the combined forms of the premises and conclusion. First, the location of the middle term relative to the subject or predicate in the corresponding premises leads to the classification of syllogisms according to the four “figures” shown in Table 2 (the conclusion is the same in every case). Second, the propositions, both premises and conclusion, are distinguished as follows, according to whether they affirm or negate something about universals or particulars.

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<sup>5</sup> Daniel Bonevac, Simple Logic, ed. Robert C. Solomon (Austin: Harcourt Brace College Publishers, 1999), 198-200; Copi and Cohen, Introduction to Logic, 186-188.

Table 3 gives types and examples of the four kinds of propositions.<sup>6</sup> The proposition type of the major premise, minor premise, and conclusion taken together produce a three-letter type for the syllogism. Of the 256 possible combinations of figures and propositions, only 15 are generally regarded as valid (that is, the form is such that, if the two premises are true, the conclusion is taken as true, based on the form of the syllogism alone). The three-letter types of those valid forms, or “moods”, are known by names that use the corresponding three vowels and have consonants that indicate how the form might be reduced to the first figure, which figure, at least for Aristotle, had what Henrik Lagerlund calls “an axiomatic character”. Table 4 lists, according to the four figures, the names for the moods of syllogisms generally regarded as valid in medieval times and still regarded as valid today.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Where the use of letters to stand for subjects and predicates in propositions goes back to Aristotle, the use of the letters to designate the types of propositions dates from medieval times (Smith, “Logic,” 34). “A” and “I” are the first vowels of *affirmo*, and “E” and “O” are the vowels in *nego* (Broadie, *Introduction to Medieval Logic*, 64).

Where Aristotle formed his premises along the lines of “A belongs to all B”, Boethius is said to have changed the form to “All A is B” (see Lloyd, *Aristotle*, 116-117; Smith, “Logic,” 34).

<sup>7</sup> “Syllogism,” *Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*, 368-369; Bonevac, *Simple Logic*, 182-183. With Bonevac, confer Copi and Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, 217-247. As the sources detail, Aristotle held other moods to be valid, and the medievals, by not distinguishing the first and fourth figures (following Aristotle), apparently omitted others that are regarded as valid today. The table’s listing for Figure 4 follows Bonevac and Copi; *The Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy*’s listing is inexplicably inconsistent.

A verse dating back to 1200 helped medieval students memorize the valid moods (Bonevac, *Simple Logic* 185).

Bonevac writes that Aristotle did not distinguish between the first and fourth figures and did not distinguish between major and minor premises the way later logicians do. Bonevac gives the example of Peter of Spain as someone who regarded the first premise as the major premise, and Bonevac says John Philoponus in the sixth century was the first to connect the major premise with the conclusion of the predicate, although his definition reportedly did not become generally accepted until the 17<sup>th</sup> century. (Bonevac, *Simple Logic*, 185 n.1). But, compare Henrik Lagerlund (*Medieval Theories of the Syllogism*, 2004, Metaphysics Research Lab, Available: <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/medieval-syllogism>, 2006 February 2 2006), who ostensibly gives Aristotle’s Greek terms for the “major” and “minor” “extremes”, and Smith (“Logic,” 36) who says Aristotle called them major and minor premises and connected them with the predicate and subject of the conclusion (as well as the corresponding premises, at least in the first figure). Neither Lagerlund nor Smith cites a particular passage from Aristotle in reference to this particular claim.

In Aristotle’s *Prior Analytics* I.4, the following Greek words for the various parts of syllogisms do seem to be in use: ὅρος (“term”), ἄρας (“extreme”), μέζων (“major”), ἐλάττω (“minor”), μέσος (“middle”), and ἀναγκαῖος (“conclusion”) (*APr.* 26<sup>a</sup>4-30, Aristotle, “Prior Analytics,” trans. Hugh Tredennick, *The Loeb Classical Library* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962], 210-211; confer Aristotle, ed., *The Complete Works of Aristotle: The Revised Oxford Translation*, Sixth Printing, with Corrections ed., 2 vols. [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995], I:42).

**Table 2: Four “figures” of syllogisms**

Proposition	Figure 1	Figure 2	Figure 3	Figure 4
Major premise	M-P	P-M	M-P	P-M
Minor premise	S-M	S-M	M-S	M-S
Conclusion	S-P	S-P	S-P	S-P

**Table 3: Four “kinds” of propositions**

Identifier	Type	Example
A	universal affirmative	<u>All</u> human beings are mortal.
I	particular affirmative	<u>Some</u> human beings are sick
E	universal negative	<u>No</u> human beings are trustworthy.
O	particular negative	<u>Some</u> human beings are <u>not</u> lawyers.

**Table 4: Valid moods of syllogisms**

Figure 1	Barbara (AAA), Celarent (EAE), Darii (AII), Ferio (EIO)
Figure 2	Cesare (EAE), Cambestres (AEE), Festino (EIO), Baroco (AOO)
Figure 3	Disamis (IAI), Datisi (AII), Bocardo (OAO), Ferison (EIO)
Figure 4	Camenes (AEE), Dimaris (IAI), Fresison (EIO)

While the scheme just outlined was not precisely followed by Aristotle or every philosopher since him, the system does in essence go back to Aristotle, although logic was certainly discussed before him.<sup>8</sup> Historians frequently divide medieval logic into *logica vetus* (old logic) and *logica nova* (new logic), reflecting in part what ancient logical works from Aristotle were available. Old logic, from Boethius (c.480-525) to Abelard (1079-1142) relied on Aristotle’s *Categories* and *On Interpretation* (also called *Propositions*) and on Porphyry’s *Isagogue* (or *Introduction*) to Aristotle’s *Categories*.<sup>9</sup>

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<sup>8</sup> Aristotle himself recognized that, in contrast to rhetoric and other arts, he was the first to systematically treat of logic: “Of the present inquiry, on the other hand, it was not the case that part of the work had been thoroughly done before, while part had not. Nothing existed at all. For the training given by the paid professors of contentious arguments was like the practice of Gorgias. For he used to hand out speeches in the form of question and answer, which each supposed would cover most of the arguments on either side. And therefore the teaching they gave their pupils was rapid but unsystematic. For they used to suppose that they trained people by imparting to them not the art but its products ... Moreover, on the subject of rhetoric there exists much that has been said long ago, whereas on the subject of deduction we had absolutely nothing else of an earlier date to mention, but were kept at work for a long time in experimental researches.” (SE 34, 183<sup>b</sup>34-184<sup>b</sup>2, Aristotle, ed., *Complete Works of Aristotle*, I:314.) Confer Smith, “Logic,” 27, 64-65.

<sup>9</sup> One relevant note here on Boethius, Palmer traces various editions of his *De Consolatione Philosophiae* through northern European schools and vernacular texts, noting that the University of Erfurt, which Luther attended, called for a four-month lecture on the text (Nigel F. Palmer, “Latin and Vernacular in the Northern European Tradition of the *De Consolatione Philosophiae*,” *Boethius: His Life, Thought and Influence*, ed. Margaret Gibson [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1981], 380).

Although Aristotle's *Prior Analytics*, which contains the development of his theory of the syllogism, was known at that time through secondary sources, it did not reappear until the middle of the twelfth century in the West. At first there was not much "new" about the new logic, which is dated from the late-twelfth century until the Renaissance. Medieval commentaries on the *Prior Analytics* did not add much to Aristotle's systems, although they made some small changes and in some cases systematized it differently. Not until John Buridan in the mid-fourteenth century were there significant changes in how people understood logic. Notably, one of Luther's teachers, Jodocus Trutfetter wrote a book based on the work of Buridan.<sup>10</sup>

Aristotle, as mentioned, took first-figure syllogisms essentially as self-evident and often would prove the other figures by reducing them to the first. To that end, Aristotle developed conversion rules, such as those for *per accidens* (accidental) and *simpliciter* (simple) conversions. Aristotle also proved the other figures by *reduction ad impossibile* (reduction to the impossible) and *ekthesis* ("explanation" or "exposition"). Medieval logicians generally followed Aristotle in these methods, although they simplified and refined Aristotle's method.<sup>11</sup>

Those methods of practicing logic were passed down from one generation to the next in classrooms beginning in Latin schools and continuing up through universities.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> Lagerlund, Medieval Theories of the Syllogism. Confer Ashworth, "Language and Logic," 75-77. More specifically on Boethius, see Eleonore Stump, Dialectic and Its Place in the Development of Medieval Logic (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989). More specifically on the 14<sup>th</sup>-century, see Broadie, Introduction to Medieval Logic.

<sup>11</sup> Lagerlund, Medieval Theories of the Syllogism. Confer Smith, "Logic," 37-39.

For other accessible overviews of Aristotle's logic, see Lloyd, Aristotle, 116-122; Robinson, Aristotle in Outline, 30-42; and Barnes, Aristotle: A Very Short Introduction, 46-52.

<sup>12</sup> By examining school textbooks and school regulations and curricula, Dilwyn Knox traces the late-sixteenth and early-seventeenth century teaching of rhetoric in "Latin schools of German-speaking Protestant Europe" and found such instruction "responded to contemporary pedagogical exigencies". In his study of Lutheran town of Krems, Knox found dialectic and rhetoric were taught in the last of five class levels, when students were more than thirteen years old. Knox claims school officials delayed rhetoric and dialectic until that point because they did not consider students to be rational enough prior to that age. Knox notes that the practice elsewhere was similar and that in some cases Melancthon's simplified rhetoric and his dialectic were used (longer, Knox says, than most scholars think). Theory was not as important as practice, Knox says, and the schools apparently put all the traditional exercises behind preparing the students to put dialectic and rhetoric into practice in such professions as ecclesiastical preachers. And, Knox says that, while available measures of the instruction's success suggest it varied, the instruction was

Logic was one of the traditional seven liberal arts that was further broken down into two categories: the lower division *trivium* or arts of language, consisting of grammar, logic, rhetoric; and the upper division *quadrivium* or mathematical sciences, consisting of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, music.<sup>13</sup> (Where Aristotle might have made a distinction between logic for demonstrations in proofs and logic for dialectical arguments “in debates and exchanges between persons”,<sup>14</sup> dialectic in the broad sense is said to have been understood as logic until the 13<sup>th</sup>-century.<sup>15</sup>) Where initially instruction centered on Aristotle’s texts and Porphyry’s *Isagogue*, other manuals or textbooks for use in logic instruction were soon produced.<sup>16</sup> Charles B. Schmitt gives three reasons for textbooks replacing Aristotle’s own works.

(1) a dissatisfaction with the philosophical content of the works; (2) a realisation that Aristotle’s mode of exposition was not ideal for pedagogical purposes; and (3) a recognition that, even if Aristotelian philosophy was valid, it did not cover all areas of knowledge it was desirable to include.<sup>17</sup>

A transitional stage from Aristotle’s own works to such textbooks provided an introduction to the texts and commentary on the texts. For example, Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples’ *Introductiones* exposed Northern Europe to Italy’s humanistic approach to Aristotle.<sup>18</sup> Despite some expressed hostility to Aristotle, his philosophy nevertheless became foundational to Lutheran education as put forth by Melanchthon.<sup>19</sup> Schmitt writes that Melanchthon “set the trend in textbooks and expositions”.<sup>20</sup>

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definitely taken seriously. (Dilwyn Knox, “Order, Reason and Oratory: Rhetoric in Protestant Latin Schools,” *Renaissance Rhetoric*, ed. Peter Mack [New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994].)

<sup>13</sup> See, for examples, Ashworth, “Language and Logic,” 73; Broadie, *Introduction to Medieval Logic*, 1.

<sup>14</sup> Smith, “Logic,” 28.

<sup>15</sup> Ashworth, “Language and Logic,” 79. Confer Stump, *Dialectic and Its Place*, 2-3.

<sup>16</sup> Charles B. Schmitt, “The Rise of the Philosophical Textbook,” *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler and Jill Kraye (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 792-793.

<sup>17</sup> Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 793.

<sup>18</sup> Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 795.

<sup>19</sup> Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 797.

<sup>20</sup> Schmitt, “Philosophical Textbook,” 797.

How much of a role Aristotle and the preceding tradition played in Melanchthon's textbooks depended on the topic. In the case of his 1549 *Initia doctrinae physicae*, Melanchthon is said to have based his work solidly on Aristotle, rejecting "the *cavillationes* of late medieval scholasticism". Melanchthon's 1553 *Liber de anima* is said notably to have relied on the Greek text of Aristotle's work, quoting heavily in Greek, and to base the discussion of the immortality of the soul more on Scripture than on the preceding 300 years' worth of philosophical writings. In his 1538 *Philosophiae moralis epitome* and 1550 *Ethicae doctrinae elementa*, Melanchthon combined Aristotelian and Christian content, each with its respective area of independence. Moreover, each book took what can be called catechetical form, with questions framing the discussion.<sup>21</sup>

More relevant here are Melanchthon's works on rhetoric and dialectics, or logic. The first editions of Melanchthon's textbooks on those topics came first, perhaps in part due to Melanchthon's understanding that rhetoric and dialectics aided in the understanding of Scripture. That purpose central to the Reformation's cause may be why those works also went through dozens of printings.<sup>22</sup> Significantly, the later editions of

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<sup>21</sup> Schmitt, "Philosophical Textbook," 797-798. Confer Kusukawa, "Lutheran Method," 350-351. Knox, however, says Melanchthon's rhetoric and dialectic textbooks were not initially catechetical but were only made so later by his students, sometimes with Melanchthon's expressed permission (Knox, "Order, Reason and Oratory," 70).

On Melanchthon's philosophical books, confer Kusukawa, "Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought"; she comments, "Melanchthon's philosophy as set forth in his textbooks seems like an odd mixture of humanist learning and traditional scholastic ideas" (Sachiko Kusukawa, "Lutheran uses of Aristotle: a comparison between Jacob Schegk and Philip Melanchthon," *Philosophy in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Conversations with Aristotle*, eds. Constance Blackwell and Sachiko Kusukawa [Brookfield: Ashgate, 1999], 146).

Schmitt, in a final comment on the elementary nature of some of the period's philosophical textbooks makes mention of a 1599 work of John Case (c.1540-1600) with a significant title: *Ancilla philosophiae* (Schmitt, "Philosophical Textbook," 804.) Case's works were reportedly often reprinted in Germany.

<sup>22</sup> Kusukawa, "Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought," 144-145. Kusukawa notes: "Melanchthon's *Compendiaria dialectices ratio* went through 22 imprints between 1520 and 1545; *De rhetorica* 12 imprints between 1519 and 1537; *Institutiones rhetoricae* 24 imprints between 1519 and 1533; *Elementa rhetorices* 36 imprints between 1529 and 1599; *Dialectica/De dialectica libri quatuor* 40 imprints between 1525 and 1544; *Erotemata dialectices*, 23 imprints, between 1547 and 1560" (Kusukawa, "Uses of Philosophy in Reformation Thought," 145 n.7; Kusukawa cites Ralph A. Keen, *A Checklist of Melanchthon Imprints Through 1560* [St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1988]). Confer Jardine, who writes of the dialectic texts: "Between 1520 and the turn of the century these went through a staggering ninety-one editions" (Jardine, "Humanism and the teaching of logic," 801; Jardine cites Wilhelm

*Erotemata dialectices* were increasingly textbooks on Aristotelian logic and treated syllogisms more extensively.<sup>23</sup> Given human beings' fallen state, Melanchthon denied philosophy the roles of discovering the Gospel message and affirming theological doctrine's truth, though he allowed philosophy to confirm God's providential plan. Similarly, certainty gained from syllogisms was distinct from certainty that believers had from divine revelation.<sup>24</sup> Still, Melanchthon could put philosophy to work in the defense of the Gospel.<sup>25</sup> Sachiko Kusukawa summarizes the matter this way:

Melanchthon had also shown how philosophy, as a universal knowledge (i.e. not specific to faith) could be used to defend points that were perceived (by him) to be crucial to the survival of Luther's cause. Those points had become crucial, not as logical extensions of Luther's ideas, but for historical reasons, as Catholics and other Protestants developed their own positions that seemed to be wrong-headed or downright pernicious.<sup>26</sup>

Just how Melanchthon put philosophy to work in that Catholic-Protestant context is seen in this chapter.<sup>27</sup>

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Risse, *Bibliographia Logica: Verzeichnis der Druckschriften zur Logik mit Angabe ihrer Fundorte* [Band 1. 1472-1800], Studien und Materialien zur Geschichte der Philosophie [Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965]).

<sup>23</sup> Kusukawa, "Lutheran Method," 346-347.

<sup>24</sup> Kusukawa, "Lutheran Uses of Aristotle," 145-147.

<sup>25</sup> Kusukawa cites Melanchthon's 1545 charge to the Wittenberg philosophy faculty: "since this philosophical assembly should also be a part of the Church of God, we wish all who are received into this college to embrace the pure teaching of the Gospel which our church teaches unanimously and univocally with the universal church of God. They should recognise God and His Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and teach philosophy in such a way that they do not corrupt the teaching of the Gospel nor with curiosity or obtuseness, either sow, prove or defend abusive and prophane opinions against God..." (Kusukawa, "Lutheran Method," 351; Kusukawa cites *Urkundenbuch der Universität Wittenberg, Teil 1. [1502-1611]*, ed. Walter Friedensburg [Magdeburg: Selbstverl. der Historischen Kommission, 1926], 268.)

<sup>26</sup> Kusukawa, "Lutheran Uses of Aristotle," 147.

<sup>27</sup> Unlike Melanchthon, Luther did not write a systematic treatment of logic. Although, as has been seen, Luther did have things to say about logic. Considering Luther's practice, Knuuttila notes that, while Luther did not hold all the principles of philosophy to be true in theology, Luther nevertheless used logic in theology, although he denied "logical consequences priority to revealed truths". Knuuttila concludes Luther gave philosophy (or, in this case, logic) no more than "a limited handmaid role in theology", but Knuuttila also curiously says, "[Luther's] view of logic and revelation was not influential among Lutherans." (Simo Knuuttila, "The Question of the Validity of Logic in Late Medieval Thought," *The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory: 1400-1700*, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen, The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy [Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003], 134-137.) As will be seen, the evidence in *The Book of Concord* would not necessarily seem to bear out Knuuttila's claim regarding Luther's influence on other Lutherans.



Melanchthon's logical writings are said to have been influenced by the humanist logic of *De inventione dialectica* (1515) by Rudolph Agricola (1444-1485) and "to bear no trace of specifically medieval doctrines and developments".<sup>28</sup> Lisa Jardine characterizes Melanchthon's work on logic as follows:

His *Erotemata dialectices* (1547) preserves the key characteristics of Agricola's and Valla's dialectical approach. It provides an attenuated treatment of syllogistic, which is not allowed an important place in the text as a whole. Treatment of the predicables and categories is minimized (doing little more than familiarise the student with the terminology), demonstration gets cursory treatment, and there is a bare reference to the *parva logicalia*, the treatises presenting the innovations of terminist logic, with the statement that all the problems the *parva logicalia* are supposed to tackle are the province of the grammarian and do not arise at all if the precepts of grammar are carefully applied.<sup>29</sup>

Jardine recognizes that the rise of humanist logic did not mean the complete fall of scholastic logic, and, amid claims that humanist dialectics "perverted the purpose of scholastic logic", Jardine concludes that, at least at the time of her essay, the verdict is still out on whether humanism's influence impoverished or enriched the scholastic logic tradition.<sup>30</sup>

A shift from ascertaining validity and truth of an argument to using an argument to persuade accompanied the decline of medieval logic and the rise of humanistic logic,

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<sup>28</sup> E. Jennifer Ashworth, "The eclipse of medieval logic," *The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy*, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 791. Confer Jardine, "Humanism and the teaching of logic," and Lisa Jardine, "Humanistic Logic," *The Cambridge History of Renaissance Philosophy*, eds. Charles B. Schmitt, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler and Jill Kraye (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988). Kusukawa ("Lutheran Method," 338) somewhat negatively refers to Jardine's characterization elsewhere of Melanchthon's dialectics as "hybrid" (Jardine, "Humanistic Logic," 192), although Kusukawa herself writes of them as "a hybrid of Aristotelian demonstration and Ciceronian dialectics" and says that Jardine does not explicitly say that there. Kusukawa provides a listing of a number of essays on the potential sources of Melanchthon's rhetoric and dialectics (Kusukawa, "Lutheran Method," 339 n.7, 353 n.67).

<sup>29</sup> Jardine, "Humanism and the teaching of logic," 801-802. "On the chronology of Melanchthon's various texts on dialectic", Jardine in n.23 on p.801 refers to Cesare Vasoli, *La dialettica e la retorica dell'umanesimo: "invenzione" e "metodo" nella cultura del XV e XVI secolo*, I Fatti e le idee; saggi e biografie (Milano: Feltrinelli, 1968). Jardine's later statement regarding the *parva logicalia* refers in n.24 on p.802 to the 1555 Wittenberg edition of the *Erotemata dialectices*.

<sup>30</sup> Jardine, "Humanism and the teaching of logic," 807. The quoted phrase is from Jardine's quotation (p.805) of E. Jennifer Ashworth, *Language and Logic in the Post-medieval Period*, Synthese Historical Library (Reidel, 1974), 9.

dated by at least one author around the time of the presentation of the Augsburg Confession in 1530.<sup>31</sup> For Melanchthon rhetoric and dialectics were at least originally inseparable.<sup>32</sup> He recognized two kinds of argument: necessary arguments and contingent arguments. The contingent arguments, called dialectical by Aristotle, were regarded as only probable, and the necessary arguments were certain and a part of demonstration, the use of which Melanchthon said should not be limited to arithmetic and geometry.<sup>33</sup> Especially in rhetoric's use of dialectical reasoning not all of the premises of a syllogism would necessarily be expressed.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, not every argument needed such a developed form; some were "easier" to refute, such as those to which attention now turns.

## Melanchthon's method regarding "sophistries"

In the Preface to the Apology, Melanchthon describes his method: he has not taken up all his opponents' sophistries (*cavillationes*; *Ränke*) for that "would be an endless task", but rather he has dealt with "the main arguments" (*praecipua argumenta*; *höchsten Gründe*),<sup>35</sup> some of which "main arguments" are thus nevertheless regarded as "sophistries". Realize that as Melanchthon criticizes the specific arguments of his opponents he is at the same time implicitly affirming good argumentation. This section proceeds by observing Melanchthon's method on a number of different *loci*.

The *locus* of Original Sin provides a good opportunity to survey a number of such references. At the outset, though Melanchthon can describe some of the central issues as "quibbles" (*argutias*; *cavillatio*) or "sophistry" (*cavillatio*; *Deutungen*), he says they are

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<sup>31</sup> Ashworth, "The eclipse of medieval logic," 787, 790-791, 795-796. On the change itself, confer Broadie, *Introduction to Medieval Logic*, 139.

<sup>32</sup> Kusukawa, "Lutheran Method," 338.

<sup>33</sup> Kusukawa, "Lutheran Method," 344.

<sup>34</sup> Barnes points out that while English logic textbooks sometimes use the word "enthymeme" as a term for a deductive syllogism with one or more premises suppressed, Aristotle does not use the word that way, although Barnes says Aristotle nevertheless "thinks that orators will and should suppress premisses in their arguments" (Barnes, "Rhetoric and poetics," 269 n.14).

<sup>35</sup> Ap Preface:15, *BKS*, 143; Tappert, 99. *Ränke* is used elsewhere only at LC I:302 in reference to tricks of getting property one covets.

easy to refute (*facillime refelli possit; wohl wissen zu verlegen*).<sup>36</sup> Further into the Article, after citing Bible passages to help make his point, Melanchthon says, “No quibbling can overthrow these proofs” (*Haec testimonia nulla cavillatione everti possunt; da vermag kein Gloß, kein listiges Fündlein nichts wider; diese Sprüche werden alle Teufel, alle Menschen nicht mögen umstoßen*).<sup>37</sup> Then, at the conclusion of the Article, Melanchthon confidently states, “This, we believe, will satisfy His Imperial Majesty about the childish and trivial quibbling with which our opponents have slandered our article” (*de puerilibus et frigidis cavillationibus, quibus adversarii articulum nostrum calumniati sunt; wider das lose, kindische, ungegründt Fürbringen der Widersacher, durch welch sie der unsern Artikel ohne Ursache ganz unbillig anfechten*).<sup>38</sup> Note how the German more literally says the opponents have afflicted the Article without reason. Melanchthon, however, in connection with Penitence admits, in reference to Scripture, that “nothing can be said so simply that some quibbler cannot pervert it” (*Nihil tam simpliciter dicitur, quod non queat depravari cavillando; so klar kann man nichts reden oder schreiben, man kann ihm mit Worten ein ander Nasen machen*).<sup>39</sup>

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<sup>36</sup> Ap II:2, Tappert, 100; BKS, 146. Ap II:2 has the only use in the German of *cavillatio*. The German *Deutung* is also used with this sense of a sophistical or uncertain “interpretation” in Ap VII/VIII:3 and in Ap XXIV:35, which is discussed below at n.138, p.185. Elsewhere, the word is used positively of Old Testament symbolism (Ap XXIV:53; Tr 32), of the signification of Baptism (LC IV:73, 74, 78), and of the literal meaning of Christ’s words regarding His Supper (SD VII:48, 52, 113).

<sup>37</sup> Ap II:40, Tappert, 105; BKS, 155. The German *Fündlein* (“little find”) is also used in Ap XII:15, where it seems to be an addition to the text; in Ap XXIII:6 (discussed below at n.63); in LC I:227 where it appears in connection with sins of deceptive stealing; in LC I:305 where it appears in connection with a man coveting another man’s wife and manipulating circumstances to obtain her, and in SA II:ii:8 discussed below, n.41, p.207. The German *Glosse* (“gloss” or “annotation”) and the Latin *gloss* are used here and in AC XXII:3 (see below at n.54, p.213) and Ap IV:109 (see below at n.42, p.207) negatively of the Reformers’ opponents’ interpretations. However, the Reformers often use the words in reference to Gratian’s *Decretals* (AC XXV:12; Ap IV:282; Ap VII/VIII:11; Ap XII:113, 121) or commentaries on Lombard (Ap IV:65), though the word can refer to general published *Kommente* (Ap XI:9). Melanchthon can also use them to refer to explanations or solutions the Reformers offer (Ap IV:184), and Luther can use them to refer to the Apostolic Creed’s *communio sanctorum* as an appositive for *sanctam ecclesiam catholicam* (LC II:49). The authors of the Formula use them in regards to Luther’s interpretation (SD IV:27), his followers’ explanation (SD IV:28), and in contrast to a literal understanding (SD VIII:46).

<sup>38</sup> Ap II:51, Tappert, 106-107; BKS, 157.

<sup>39</sup> Ap XII:84, Tappert, 194; BKS, 269. The German’s reference to making “another nose” may reflect what is called a scholastic commonplace of authority being a “wax nose” being bent either direction without breaking, or the German’s reference may reflect a statement attributed (by, among others, former Cardinal Ratzinger) to medieval philosophers and theologians that “reason has a wax nose” that can be “pointed in any direction, if one is clever enough”.

Melanchthon makes a similar statement regarding their confession of the Church in Augsburg Confession VII and VIII.

Profecto verum est, quod aiunt: Nullum remedium esse adversus sycophantae morsum. Nihil tam circumspecte dici potest, ut calumniam evitare queat. Nos ob hanc ipsam causam adiecimus octavum articulum, ne quis existimaret nos segregare malos et hypocritas ab externa societate ecclesiae, aut adimere sacramentis efficaciam, quae per hypocritas aut malos administrantur. Itaque hic non est opus longa defensione adversus hanc calumniam. Satis nos purgat articulus octavus.

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James Luther Adams (“Conceptions of Natural Law from Troeltsch to Berman,” The Weightier Matters of the Law: Essays on Law and Religion, eds. John Jr. Witte and Frank S. Alexander, American Academy of Religion Studies in Religion [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988]), without any citation, attributes a statement about the Bible being a “wax nose” for Protestants to Spanish Cardinal Merry del Val (1865-1930), which, even if demonstrable, is way too late to influence Melanchthon’s 1531 use here in the Apology. The *Oxford English Dictionary* says the “nose of wax” expression, presumably in English, referring to the “writhing of Scripture” was very common from 1580-1700 and goes back to Tyndale in 1533 (*OED*, 20:10-13), which is also too late to influence Melanchthon’s use here and does not address its origin outside of English.

However, Alan of Lille (d. 1203) is early enough. In his *De Fide catholica*, book I, chapter 30, a chapter about proving the immortality of the human soul by Gentile philosophers, Lille writes, *Sed quia auctoritas cereum habet nasum, id est in diversum potest flecti sensum, rationibus roborandum est* (“But because authority has a wax nose, that is, is able to be bent into different senses, it ought to be reinforced by reason”) (Patrologiae cursus completus: Series Latina, ed. Jacques-Paul Migne [Paris & Turnout: Migne, 1859-1963], 210:332-333 ). Writing about John Wycliffe (c.1330-1384) and commenting on the manipulation or management of authoritative passages from the Bible and other sources, Kantik Ghosh refers to Lille’s statement (Kantik Ghosh, The Wycliffite Heresy: Authority and the Interpretation of Texts, netLibrary ed. [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003], 5-6). Lille is said to have held that reason could not understand the mystery of faith but nevertheless made use of reason. (Other published references to the “wax nose” expression also attribute it to Alan of Lille, for example, Gilles Rico, “‘Auctoritas cereum habet nasum’: Boethius, Aristotle, and the music of the spheres in the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries” Citation and Authority in Medieval and Renaissance Musical Culture: Learning from the Learned, eds. Suzannah Clark and Elizabeth Eva Leach [Rochester, NY: Woodbridge, 2005].) The expression in some way may go back even further to Aristotle himself, who wrote in his *Metaphysics* that after transposition the nature of wax remains but not its form (*Metaph.* V[Δ]:26, 1024<sup>a</sup>4-5; Barnes, II:1617). Aristotle’s *Metaphysics* also discusses the definitions of things that entail their matter, such as “snub” being “a concave nose” (*Metaph.* VI[E]:1, 1025<sup>b</sup>28-1026<sup>a</sup>6; Barnes, II:1620) and whether only substance is definable (*Metaph.* VII[Z]:5, 1030<sup>b</sup>14-1031<sup>a</sup>14; Barnes, II:1627-1628).

The English word “sincere” is sometimes said to come from the Latin *sine cera* “without wax”, but the *Oxford English Dictionary* says “There is no probability” in that explanation (*OED*, 15:508).

The use in the Latin of *depravo*, *depravare*, *depravavi*, *depravatus* in Ap XII:84 is typical of the use of this word in the Latin originals and translations in *The Book of Concord*. The Reformers use the verb to write of their opponents twisting Scripture (Ap IV:253, 286; Ep VIII:39; SD VII:32, 56, 119), the Augsburg Confession (Ap II:1; SD VII:1), the teaching of repentance (Tr 44), principles of the faith (SD VII:88), the Church Fathers (Ap IV:380), the writings of Luther (SA Preface:5; SD VII:31), and people with their false teaching (SD II:46). The verb is also used to write of original sin’s corruption of the human nature (SA III:ii:4; Ep I:1, 25; SD I:2, 53, 60; SD II:17, 87), of human sin against the Eighth Commandment (LC I:262), and of humans perverting the means of grace (SD XI:41). Generally the German equivalent is *verderben*.

Da sehen wir, daß wahr ist, wie man sagt, daß man nicht so deutlich reden kann, böse Zungen könnens verkehren. Wir haben eben darum und aus dieser Ursach den achten Artikel dazu gesetzt, daß niemand's darf Gedanken fassen, als wollten wir die Bösen und Heuchler von der äußerlichen Gesellschaft der Christen oder Kirchen absondern, oder als wäre unsere Meinung, daß die Sakrament, wenn sie durch Gottlose gereicht werden, ohne Kraft oder Wirkung sein. Darum darf diese falsche, unrechte Deutung keiner langen Antwort; der achte Artikel entschuldigt uns genugsam.

The saying is certainly true that there is no defense against the attack of slanderers. Nothing can be said so carefully that it can avoid misrepresentation. That was why we added the eighth article, to avoid the impression that we separate evil men and hypocrites from the outward fellowship of the church or deny efficacy to the sacraments which evil men or hypocrites administer. Thus we do not need to defend ourselves at any length against this slander. The eighth article exonerates us enough.<sup>40</sup>

The criticism of the opponents in this case is evident: Melancthon says they misrepresent the Reformers. And, Luther in the Smalcald Articles' treatment of the Mass specifically points out how "false human opinion and imagination" (*falschem Menschendunkel und Fundlin; opinionum et figmento humano*) lacks "God's Word" (*ohne Gottes Wort; absque Verbo Dei*).<sup>41</sup> Thus, in a sense, the Reformers essentially equate "tricks", "weak arguments", "false interpretations", and opinions without the support of Holy Scripture, and they have to deal with such on more than the *locus* of Original Sin.

Sophistries and quibbles are also raised at the related *locus* of Justification, where salvation only by faith in the merits of Christ is the primary focus. The Reformers see many passages attributing justification to faith and denying it to works, but the opponents are said to interpret passages dealing with justification by faith by way of "a piece of sophistry" (*cavillum, ein sophistische Gloß*), namely "faith fashioned by love" (*fide formata*), which can be attributed to Thomas Aquinas' *Summa theologiae*.<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup> Ap VII/VIII:2-3, *BKS*, 234; Tappert, 168-169. *Deutung* is used to refer to things positively signified, such as Christ's priesthood and passion and Baptism (Ap XXIV:53; Tr 32; LC IV:73, 74, and 78), and of things needing no interpretation, such as Christ's words regarding His body and blood (SD VII:48, 52, and 113). Regarding its use in Ap XXIV:35, see above at n.138, p.185.

<sup>41</sup> SA II:ii:8, Tappert, 294; *BKS*, 419.

<sup>42</sup> Ap IV:109 (107-110), *BKS*, 182-183; Tappert, 123. *Summa theologiae*, II, 1, q.113, a.4 ad 1 (*BKS*, 182 n.3; Tappert, 123 n.8; K-W, 138 n.116). (The *Summa* citations indicate the part, the *questio*, the

Melanchthon, however, makes a number of replies: that his opponents do not understand how mortal sin drives out faith, that the opponents' position abolishes the Gospel and returns to the law, that the opponents leave forgiveness at best unsure, that true love cannot take place at all without forgiveness being granted first, and that the Reformers also teach that faith should be followed by love.<sup>43</sup> The last portion of the Apology's article on Justification (§183-§400, more than half of the article by the usual paragraph numbers) is generally given the subheading "Reply to the Opponents' Arguments", and we find in that section reference to a goodly number of sophistries.<sup>44</sup> There, Melanchthon again addresses the "opponents' quibble" based on James 2:19 about the wicked believing (*Nam quod adversarii cavillantur multos impios ac diabolos etiam credere*) and repeats in a different way his earlier statement that faith is more than idle knowledge.<sup>45</sup> More "quibbles" over the interpretation of a passage in the same section of this same *locus* center on Luke 17:10. Melanchthon presents the opponents' arguments that if deeds are worthless faith must be more worthless and that though works are worthless to God they have value to people.<sup>46</sup> Then Melanchthon declares:

Videte, quam delectet adversarios puerile studium sophistices. Et quamquam hae ineptiae indignae sint, quae refutentur, tamen paucis respondebimus. Ἀντιστρέφον est vitiosum.

Look how this childish sophistry delights our opponents! Though these absurdities do not deserve a refutation, we shall nevertheless give a brief answer. The argument is defective.<sup>47</sup>

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question within that *quaestio*, the article, and then whether it is the response, objection, body, or end.) According to K-W, scholastic theologians using Aristotelian terms and concepts, held that assent to historical truths about Jesus, what they regarded as faith, was ""material"" that needed to be given the proper "form" by love (K-W, 138 n.116).

<sup>43</sup> Ap IV:110-116, Tappert, 123.

<sup>44</sup> For more on the structure of Apology IV, see the discussion in the text below, beginning on p.232.

<sup>45</sup> Ap IV:303, Tappert, 154; BKS, 219. (The German version lacks a direct equivalent.) James 2:19 reads, "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well: the devils also believe, and tremble" (KJV). An earlier statement about faith being more than idle knowledge is in Apology IV:249, and there is another one in Ap IV:337 and Ap XII:45.

<sup>46</sup> Ap IV:335 (334-343), Tappert, 159.

<sup>47</sup> Ap IV:336, BKS, 225; Tappert, 159. (The German lacks this precise critique of the argument.)

Melanchthon then goes on to give counterarguments; first, that again faith is more than historical knowledge but trust in God's promise, for which Melanchthon adduces another passage, Daniel 9:18. A second counterargument is Melanchthon's attack on the opponents' false argument by analogy.<sup>48</sup> Melanchthon strikingly concludes this second counterargument and this particular matter of Luke 17:10 thusly:

Sed adversarii suo more faciunt, contra fidei doctrinam detorquent sententias pro fide traditas. Verum haec spinosa reiiciamus ad scholas. Illa cavillatio plane puerilis est, cum interpretantur servos inutiles, quia opera Deo sint inutilia, nobis vero sint utilia. At Christus de ea utilitate loquitur, quae constituit nobis Deum debitorem gratiae. Quamquam alienum est hoc loco disputare de utili aut inutili. Nam servi inutiles significant insufficientes, quia nemo tantum timet, tantum diligit Deum, tantum credit Deo, quantum oportuit. Sed missas faciamus has frigidas cavillationes adversariorum, de quibus quid iudicaturi sint homines, si quando proferentur in lucem, facile possunt existimare viri prudentes. In verbis maxime planis et perspicuis repererunt rimam. At nemo non videt, in illo loco fiduciam nostrorum operum improbari.

As usual, our opponents twist against faith statements made in support of faith. We leave these thorny questions to the schools. It is obviously a childish quibble to interpret "unworthy servants" as meaning that works are worthless to God but worth something to us. Christ is speaking of that worthiness whereby God obligates himself to bestow his grace upon us, though it is out of place here to discuss what is worthy or worthless. "Unworthy servants" means "insufficient servants," since no one fears, loves, or trusts God as he ought. Let us have done with these petty quibblings of our opponents which intelligent men can easily judge when they are brought to light. Everyone can see that this passage condemns trust in our own works.<sup>49</sup>

Thus again for Melanchthon the opponents' quibbling or sophistical arguments do not need a major syllogism constructed against them but can be refuted by returning to the clear words of Holy Scripture, which the opponents are said to have obscured by their sophistry. Still, not all of the quibbling the opponents raised comes from simply distorting Scripture itself.

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<sup>48</sup> Confer the broader context of this passage quoted above at n.99, p.165.

<sup>49</sup> Ap IV:341-343, *BKS*, 226; Tappert, 159-160. (The German lacks a similar polemical statement.)

A case where the Reformers apparently are accused of wrongly letting philosophical thinking influence their teaching is in the Apology's article on the Church. There Melancthon takes up the "quibble" that the Reformers think of the Church as "some Platonic republic" and refutes it by pointing to the Church's visible marks.

Sunt enim membra regni diaboli. Neque vero somniamus nos Platoniam civitatem, ut quidam impie cavillantur, sed dicimus existere hanc ecclesiam, videlicet vere credentes ac iustos sparsos per totum orbem. Et addimus notas: puram doctrinam evangelii et sacramenta.

We are not dreaming about some Platonic republic, as has been slanderously alleged, but we teach that this church actually exists, made up of true believers and righteous men scattered throughout the world. And we add its marks, the pure teaching of the Gospel and the sacraments.<sup>50</sup>

The German here is less philosophical in nature.

Und wir reden nicht von einer erdichteten Kirchen, die nirgend zu finden sei, sondern wir sagen und wissen fürwahr, daß diese Kirche, darinne Heiligen leben, wahrhaftig auf Erden ist und bleibet, nämlich daß etliche Gottes Kinder sind hin und wieder in aller Welt, in allerlei Königreichen, Inseln, Ländern, Städten vom Aufgang der Sonnen bis zum Niedergang, die Christum und das Evangelium recht erkennt haben, und sagen, dieselbige Kirche habe diese äußerliche Zeichen: das Predigtamt oder Evangelium und die Sakrament.

We are speaking not of an imaginary Church, which is to be found nowhere; but we say and know certainly that this Church, wherein saints live, is and abides truly upon the Earth; namely, that there are many of God's children here and there in all the world—in various kingdoms, islands, lands, and cities from the rising of the sun to its setting—who have recognized Christ and His Gospel as right and who say that this Church has the following outward marks: the preaching-office or Gospel and the Sacraments.<sup>51</sup>

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<sup>50</sup> Ap VII/VIII:20, *BKS*, 238; Tappert, 171.

<sup>51</sup> Ap VII/VIII:20, *BKS*, 238; this author's translation based Triglotta, 233. The translation of the Latin *puram doctrinam evangelii et sacramenta* by the German *das Predigtamt oder Evangelium und die Sakrament* is notable, recalling AC V:1 where *Predigtamt eingesetzt* ("instituting the preaching office") is equated to *Evangelium und Sakrament geben* ("providing the Gospel and Sacraments") (*BKS*, 58).



The Confutation had not raised this specific “platonic” allegation against the Reformers, though the extent to which the church was hidden or revealed was clearly at issue.<sup>52</sup>

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<sup>52</sup> For the Confutation’s articles VII and VIII, see Reu, ed., The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources, \*353-\*354; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., Sources and Contexts, 110-112.

The specific allegation that Luther and Lutherans thought of the Church as in Plato’s “Republic” goes back to Thomas Murner, a Strassburg Franciscan, humanist, and ardent Reformation opponent. In 1520 Luther wrote three major tracts that prompted three separate responses from Murner, to whom Luther finally responded in 1521, where Luther brought up the platonic accusation. The following traces back the history of the claim.

Luther’s previous response to the allegation is in his 1521 *Auff das ubirchristlich, ubirgeystlich und ubirkunstlich buch Bocks Emszers zu Leypczik Antwortt D.M.L. Darynn auch Murnarrs synsz geselln dedacht wirt* (WA 7:621-688), translated by Eric W. Gritsch and Ruth C. Gritsch as *Answer to the hyperchristian, hyperspiritual, and hyperlearned book by Goat Emser in Leipzig—including some thoughts regarding his companion, the Fool Murner* (AE 39:143-224). (See BKS 238 n.1’s reference to WA VII:863<sub>8</sub> and K-W, 177 n.242’s reference to WA 7:683, 8-11 and AE 39:218. See also AE 39:140-141.) There, in the midst of responding to Murner about his use of reason without and over Scripture, Luther writes: *Denn bloße rationes wil ich auch nit, sie seyn zu fawl unnd tügen nichts: das wil ich dir tzeygen an eyner, die dich die aller feynest gedaucht hatt. Da ich die Christliuch kirch ein geystlich vorsamlung genennet het, spottistu meyn, also wolt ich ein kirch bawen wie Plato ein statt, die nyndert were, Und lest dyr deyn zufall so hertzlich wol gefallen, al habstu es sast wol troffen. Spricht: were das nit ein feyne statt, ßo geystlich maurenn, geystlich turn, geystlich büchßen, geystlich roß unnd als geystlich were? Und ist deyn endtlich meynung, die Christlich kirch mug nit on leyplich statt, rawm und gutter bestehen. Antwort ich, lieber Murnar: Sol lich umb der Ration willen die schrifft leugnen und dich ubir gott setzen? Warumb antworttistu nit auff meyne sprüch?* “I do not want your mere reasoning either. It is too spoiled, and worth nothing. This I shall show you in regard to one argument which you thought the very best: since I had called the Christian church a ‘spiritual assembly,’ you mocked me as though I wanted to build a church just as Plato built a city which is nowhere. And you are very pleased with your idea, thinking you had hit the mark. You say, ‘Would it not be a nice city, with spiritual walls, spiritual towers, spiritual cannons, spiritual horses, and everything spiritual?’ It is your final opinion that the Christian church cannot exist without a physical location, space, and goods.” My answer, dear fool Murner, is: Should I deny Scripture for the sake of reason and put you above God? Why do you not respond to my passages?” (WA 7:683<sub>8-18</sub>; AE 39:218 [the formatting and placement of the quotation marks within the quotation is given as from the AE but could be debated].)

One can tell that Luther is not afraid to use reason and logic in the dispute, for there is other philosophical “content” in this response to Murner (see WA 7:681-682; AE 39:216); Luther nevertheless calls Murner to Scripture (WA 7:682-683; AE 39:217-218). But, Luther did not place reason over Scripture. Luther said Murner did not deal enough with Scripture and accused Murner of putting reason above Scripture, directing Murner *lass deyn vornunfft schlaffen und tzeyg eynen buchstaben ynn der schrifft* “let your reason sleep and show me a single letter of Scripture” (WA 7:683-684; AE 39:219). For his part, Luther responded both from Scripture and with a logical argument *ad absurdum*, one characteristic of Luther’s typical earthy fashion. Finally, with a play on Murner’s name, Luther asked rhetorically, *Sihistu schier, meyn Murnarr, was da sey mit blosser vornunfft on schrifft Theologissiern?* “Do you see now, my fool Murner, what it means to do theology with mere reason and without Scripture?” (WA 7:683-684; AE 39:218-219).

In WA 7:683 n.1, the WA editors suggest that Luther’s previous reference to *ein geystlich vorsamlung* (“a spiritual assembly”) that prompted Murner’s comment was in WA 6:407, Luther’s 1520 *An den christlichen Adel deutscher Nation von des christlichen Standes Besserung* (WA 6:404-469), translated by Charles M. Jacobs (revised by James Atkinson) as *To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation Concerning the Reform of the Christian Estate* (AE 44:115-217). As the title might suggest, however, Luther in that work and at the page reference given by the WA editors, talks more about *der geystlich stand*

("the spiritual estate") (confer AE 44:127). Moreover, although Murner is said to have raised the "Republic" allegation in multiple writings, Murner's response to that particular work of Luther's (Thomas Murner, "An den Großmechtigsten und Durchlüchtigsten adel tütscher nation das sye den christlichen glauben beschirmen, wyder den zerstörer des glaubes christi, Martinum luther einem Verfierer der Einfeltigen Christen," An den grossmächtigsten und durchlauchtigsten Adel deutscher Nation, ed. Ernst Voss, Neudrucke deutscher Litteraturwerke des XVI. und XVII. Jahrhunderts, No. 153 [Halle: Max Niemeyer, 1899] ["To the highest and most illustrious nobility of the German nation, that they guard the Christian faith, against the destroyer of the faith of Christ, Martin Luther, a seducer of the simple-minded Christians"]) does not appear to have the comment regarding Plato that Luther seems to be addressing. (Confer Thomas Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften (Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation), Thomas Murners Deutsche Schriften mit den Holzschnitten der Erstdrucke, ed. Wolfgang Pfeiffer-Belli, 2 vols. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1927-1928) 7:59-117.)

On the other hand, Luther's 1520 *Von dem Bapstum zu Rome: wider den hochberumpten Romanisten zu Leipstzck* (WA 6:285-324), translated by Eric W. Gritsch and Ruth C. Gritsch as *On the Papacy in Rome against the Most Celebrated Romanist in Leipzig* (AE 39:49-104), argues at some length that Christ's Church is most properly not a physical but a spiritual community or assembly, based on the way Scripture most properly speaks about the Church in contrast to two other ways his opponents do (WA 6:292<sub>35</sub>-302<sub>9</sub>, AE 39:65-76). Although the AE editors (AE 39:218 n.126) refer to AE 39:75, Luther writes there that the Church *in einen glauben vorsamlet, geistlich unnd nit leyphlich* ("assembled in one faith, spiritual and not physical"; WA 6:300<sub>36-37</sub>, AE translation slightly modified). Before that passage, Luther uses both *ein geistlich vorsamlung*, the specific expression he uses in his response to Murner (WA 6:296<sub>5-6</sub>, AE 39:69), and equivalent phrases, such as *ein vorsamlung ym geist* ("an assembly in spirit"; WA 6:293<sub>6</sub>, AE 39:65) and *geystlichenn gemeyne* ("a spiritual community"; WA 6:296<sub>26-27</sub>, AE 39:68). However, Murner's response to this work, *Von dem babstentum das ist von der höchsten oberkeyt Christlichs glauben wyder Martinum Luther* (Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften [Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation], 7:3-55) does not contain the passage to which Luther in his response apparently refers. Murner does, however, discuss what he says is Luther's claim that the Christian Church can only be taken spiritually (7:45<sub>18</sub>-47<sub>2</sub>), and he does appear to accuse Luther of *ignorantia logice* ("ignorant logic") (7:50<sub>15-17</sub>).

Luther's third work to which Murner responded was his 1520 *Eyn Sermon von dem neuen Testament. das ist von der heyliges Messe* (WA 6:3530378), translated by Jeremiah J. Schindel (revised by E. Theodore Bachmann) as *A Treatise on the New Testament, that is, The Holy Mass* (AE 35:75-111). Although this Luther work does not seem to have a reference to the "spiritual community", it appears to be Murner's response to this particular work of Luther's (Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften (Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation) that has the specific comments regarding Plato that Luther seems to be addressing. The final section before the conclusion is titled *Es ist kein geistliche kirch on leibliche ynwoner* ("There is no spiritual church without physical inhabitants") and there Murner writes: *Du beschreibest dir eben ein meß und ein kirchen wie im Plato selbs ein stat beschreib und ein ebenbild formiert wy ein iede state sein solt. es ist aber noch nie kein lut seiner beschreibung erfunden worden.* ("You write for yourself even a Mass and a Church how Plato himself describes a city and forms an image how every city should be. But there has never yet been one city founded according to his description.") Further down Murner writes: *So würt mir als dan billich für ein antwort gang du in dein geistliche stat in geistliche thürn und schüß gegen den feinden geistliche büchsen und geistliche feuer und puluer und reit hin uff einem geistlichen roß uff einem geistlichen sattel. mit einem geistlichen zaum.* ("So for me it is an easy answer if you went into your spiritual city in a spiritual door and shot against the enemy with spiritual guns and spiritual fires and powder and ride forth on a spiritual horse on a spiritual saddle with a spiritual bridle.") (Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften [Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation], 6:74.) The introduction to this Murner work in the collection of his writings notes that while it is specifically targeted to the particular Luther work Murner's title suggests that Murner nevertheless had all three of the writings discussed here in view (Murner, Thomas Murner: Kleine Schriften (Prosaschriften gegen die Reformation) 6:21).

Melanchthon may have been thinking of previous allegations or anticipating his opponents' responses, as he did in other cases.

Already in the Augsburg Confession and continuing in the Apology Melanchthon tried to pre-empt sophistries the opponents might raise. In the Augsburg Confession's article on Faith and Good Works, Melanchthon pre-empted a "captious" or crafty objection to the interpretation of Paul (*Et ne quis cavillettur a nobis novam Pauli interpretationem excogitari*) by referring to Augustine and adding a citation of pseudo-Ambrose in the Latin.<sup>53</sup> Similarly in the Augsburg Confession's article on Both Kinds in the Sacrament, anticipating the "captious" argument that Matthew 26:27 applies only to priests, the Reformers adduce 1 Corinthians 11:20ff. and refer to the precedent of the Fathers.<sup>54</sup> In the Apology's article on Justification Melanchthon anticipates that "Some sophist may quibble" (*si quis sophista cavillatur*) about righteousness being in the will and thus not of faith, "which is in the intellect", and so he states that both "terrors of sin and death" and faith are in both intellect and will.<sup>55</sup> In addition, Melanchthon uses justification understood forensically and as an imputation of someone else's righteousness as an answer to the medieval voluntarist-intellectualist controversy.<sup>56</sup> Shortly thereafter in Apology IV, Melanchthon anticipates that "Someone may quibble" (*Si quis hoc etiam cavillettur*) that faith and hope are confused; to which concern Melanchthon answers first that hope and faith cannot be distinguished "as they are in idle scholastic speculations" (*in scholis distrahunt otiosis cogitationibus*), and then Melanchthon gives a way of distinguishing the two that does not conflict with present forgiveness by faith.<sup>57</sup> The way Melanchthon anticipates and dismisses such "quibbling"

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Further discussion of "platonistic" things are outside this dissertation's focus on supra-sentential uses of philosophy, namely logic and argumentation.

<sup>53</sup> AC XX:12, Tappert, 42-43; BKS, 77.

<sup>54</sup> AC XXII:3, Tappert, 49-50; BKS, 85 (*Et ne quis possit cavillari; Und damit niemand diese Worte anfechten und glossieren könne*).

<sup>55</sup> Ap IV:304, Tappert, 154; BKS, 219. The German lacks this comment.

<sup>56</sup> Ap IV:304-307, Tappert, 154.

<sup>57</sup> Ap IV:312, Tappert, 155; BKS, 220. The German version lacks a direct equivalent, although it contains a statement regarding a distinction between faith and hope, although without the specific criticism of the nature of the opponents' argument (see BKS, 221<sup>7-10</sup>).

with other passages or citations of the Fathers is significant, as is the absence of much of such technical discussion from the German translation of the Apology, though the terminology of formal syllogistic arguments is used in some cases even where the syllogisms themselves are not.

## Expressions, formulae, and propositions

Technical terminology is not completely absent from the German, however. In a number of places, chiefly—though not exclusively—in the Solid Declaration, the German and the Latin of the confessional writings refer to “propositions”, and sometimes the Latin word for “proposition” is itself used in the German, along with *Rede(n)* as a German translation of the term.<sup>58</sup> The German nouns *Rede(n)* are used, likewise heavily—though again not exclusively—in the Formula of Concord, to refer to teaching, opinions, ideas or notions, statements or sayings, assertions or propositions for debate, expressions, and words. Latin equivalents include *dictum, dicti; doctrina, doctrinae; phrasis, phrasis; sententia, sententiae; sermo, sermonis; verbum, verbi; vox, vocis*; and the like. Some of the heaviest uses of the words come at the *loci* of Original Sin, Free Will, Good Works, and the Holy Supper of Christ. The German words are used in favorable contexts referring to the Reformers’ own statements and expressions and those of others (such as God, Paul, the Bible, and even Gerson), and the words are used in

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<sup>58</sup> The Latin *proposition, propositionis* is used in both the Latin and German of Ap IV:87; SD IV:2, 3, 15, 22, 24, 37, 39, 40; VII:38; and VIII:35. In SD IV:2 (first use) the Latin *propositiones* is used by and then translated in the German as *Reden* (“sayings”), and in SD IV:3 the German uses the Latin word and then translates it simply *Rede* (“sayings”). In SD IV:15 the German word is used first and then the Latin technical term is used, and in all the rest the Latin word is used alone in the German original (Ap IV:87; SD IV:22, 24, 37, 39, 40; VII:38; VIII:35 [where the Latin *praedicationes* is also used]). In SD IV, where the term is frequently used, one observes the movement from the Latin with the more elaborate German translation, to the simpler German translation, to the German term followed by the Latin term, and finally to the Latin term alone. There are just a few other places where the Latin term *proposition, propositionis* is used in the Latin where the German does not also use the Latin term: in one the meaning is different (AC Preface:9, referring to the Emperor’s edict), in others the German version does not closely follow the Latin text (Ap IV:80, 339) or the Latin version does not closely follow the German text (SD IV:23), in still others the German original uses *Rede(n)* alone (SD I:55; VII:36; VIII:45) or translates in a different way (SD IV:1, *Worte und Art*), and in others the Latin translation uses the term where the German original lacks a comparable noun (SD III:12; IV:2 [second use]).

English translations refer to “proposition(s)” in still other places, such as where the Latin uses *sententia, sententiae* and the German version is quite different (Ap Preface:9; II:1) or where *sententiam* is rendered by the German *Spruch* (Ap IV:69).

unfavorable contexts referring to the statements and expressions of the Reformers' opponents and others (such as philosophers, modern Manicheans, Chrysostom, pseudo-Basil, and the scholastics). Many of the uses of *Rede(n)* come in richly philosophical contexts.

A few of the uses of *Rede(n)* merit closer examination to highlight a few central points. That there is a close connection between expressions and doctrine is worth noting. In the Solid Declaration's article on the Person of Christ, the authors identify the following tactic of their opponents.

... etliche solche Wort und Reden arglüstig und boshaftig, die reine Lehr darmit verdächtig zu machen, wider ihr eigen Gewissen verkehret haben;  
...

... quidam vocabula et phrases illas astute et malitiose falsa interpretatione, contra conscientiam suam, pervertere non dubitarunt, tantum, ut piam doctrinam suspicionibus iniquissimis gravarent.

Some of our opponents, against their own conscience, have maliciously and wickedly twisted our words and terminology in this direction in order to cast suspicion on the pure doctrine.<sup>59</sup>

The Reformers are not the only ones to take note of appropriate ways of speaking and make necessary corrections, as they indicate in the Augsburg Confession's article on Monastic Vows.

Es hat auch Gerson in Vorzeiten den Irrtumb der Moniche von der Vollkommenheit gestraft und zeigt an, daß bei seinen Zeiten dieses eine neue Rede gewesen sei, daß das Klosterleben ein Stand der Vollkommenheit sein solle.

Et ante haec tempora reprehendit Gerson errorem monachorum de perfectione et testatur, suo tempore novam hanc vocem fuisse, quod vita monastica sit status perfectionis.

In former times Gerson censured the error of the monks concerning perfection and indicated that it was an innovation of his time to speak of monastic life as a state of perfection.<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>59</sup> SD VIII:63, *BKS*, 1037; Tappert, 603.

<sup>60</sup> AC XXVII:60, *BKS*, 118-119; Tappert, 80 (translation from the German). Compare, however, Ap XXVII:36, where the praise of Gerson's correction seems to be a little more tongue-in-cheek.

In the foregoing case, the Reformers cite favorably the former way of speaking, but not everything that has been said before in every place can be so favorably cited, as is clear in the Apology's article on Original Sin.

Sed in scholis transtulerunt huc ex philosophia prorsus alienas sententias, quod propter passiones nec boni nec mali simus, nec laudemur nec vituperemur. Item nihil esse peccatum nisi voluntarium. Hae sententiae apud philosophos de civili iudicio dictae sunt, non de iudicio Dei. Nihilo prudentius assuunt et alias sententias, naturam non esse malam. Id in loco dictum, non reprehendimus; sed non recte detorquetur ad extenuandum peccatum originis. Et tamen hae sententiae leguntur apud scholasticos, qui intempestive commiscent philosophicam seu civilem doctrinam de moribus cum evangelio.

Aber die Sophisten in Schulen haben zu dieser Sache wider die klare öffentliche Schrift geredt und aus der Philosophie ihre eigen Träume und Sprüche erdichtet, sagen, daß wir umb der bösen Lüste willen weder böß noch gut, noch zu schelten noch zu loben sind. Item daß Lüste und Gedanken inwendig nicht Sünde sind, wenn ich nicht ganz drein verwillige. Dieselbigen Rede und Worte in der Philosophen Büchern sind zu verstehen von äusserlicher Ehrbarkeit für der Welt und auch äusserlicher Strafe für der Welt. Denn da ists wahr, wie die Juristen sagen: *L. cogitationis*, Gedanken sind zollfrei und straffrei. Aber Gott erforschet die Herzen, mit Gottes Gericht und Urteil ists anders. Also flicken sie auch an diese Sache andere ungereimte Sprüche, nämlich: Gottes Geschöpf und die Natur könne an ihr selbst nicht böß sein. Das fecht ich nicht an, wenn es irgend geredt wird, da es statt hat; aber dazu soll dieser Spruch nicht angezogen werden, die Erbsünde gering zu machen. Und dieselbigen Sprüche der Sophisten haben viel unsägliches Schadens getan, durch welche sie die Philosophie und die Lehre, welche äusserlich Leben für der Welt belangend, vermischen mit dem Evangelio, und haben doch solchs nicht allein in der Schule gelehret, sondern auch öffentlich unverschämt vor dem Volk gepredigt.

Here the scholastics have taken over from philosophy the totally foreign idea that because of our emotions we are neither good nor bad, neither to be praised nor condemned. Or they say that nothing is sin unless it is voluntary [inner desires and thoughts are not sins, if I do not altogether consent thereto]. The philosophers said this about the civil courts, not about the judgment of God. [For there it is true, as the jurists say, *L. [presumably Lex] cogitationis*, thoughts are exempt from custom and punishment. But God searches the hearts; in God's court and judgment it is different.] It is no wiser to say that [God's creature and] nature is not [cannot in itself be] evil. In its place we do not object to this statement, but

it is not right to twist it in order to minimize original sin. Yet these ideas appear in the scholastics, who improperly mingle philosophical and civil ethics with the Gospel.<sup>61</sup>

On the same *locus*, the Solid Declaration indicates from where the right way to speak comes.

Was aber die Wörter und Weise zu reden anlanget, ist das Beste und Sicherste, daß man das Fürbild der gesunden Wort, wie in der heiligen Schrift und in den obgemelten Büchern von diesem Artikel geredet wird, brauche und behalte.

Es sollen auch *aequivocationes vocabulorum*, das ist, die Wörter und Reden, so in mancherlei Vorstande gezogen und gebraucht werden, Wortgezänk zu vorhüten, fleißig und unterschiedlich erkläret werden.

Quod vero ad vocabula et phrases attinet, utilissimum est et tutissimum, ut forma sanorum verborum (quibus in hoc articulo explicando sacrae litterae et supra commemorata scripta publica et recepta utuntur) usurpetur et retineatur.

Sed et *aequivocationes vocabulorum*, ad cavendas *λογομαχίας* diligenter et diserte sunt explicandae.

With specific reference to vocabulary and phraseology, however, the best and safest procedure is to use and keep the pattern of sound words, as the Holy Scriptures and the above-mentioned books use them in treating this article. In order to avoid all contentions about words, it is necessary to explain carefully and distinctly all equivocal terms, that is, words and formulas that have two or more accepted meanings in common use.<sup>62</sup>

Not only do the words *Rede* and *Reden* figure prominently in discussions of the right way to speak, but, as is seen in the Apology's article on the Marriage of Priests, the right way to speak itself is involved in forming the propositions central to philosophical disputations. The *locus* of the Marriage of Priests is one where in the Apology Melancthon does not think necessary such a dispute—the philosophical nature of which is clearer in the following Latin and German than the English.

Aliae controversiae nostrae aliquam disputationem doctorum desiderant: in hac ita manifesta res est in utraque parte, ut nullam requirat

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<sup>61</sup> Ap II:43, *BKS*, 155-156; Tappert, 106. English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 117. Confer the discussion of this passage above at n.221, p.81, where the quotation is extended and the German is given a translation of its own.

<sup>62</sup> SD I:50-51, *BKS*, 860; Tappert, 517.

disputationem. Tantum requirit iudicem virum bonum et timentem Dei. Et cum defendatur a nobis manifesta veritas, tamen adversarii calumnias quasdam architectati sunt ad cavillanda argumenta nostra.

Die andern Artikel unserer Confession, wiewohl sie gewiß gegründet, sind dennoch so klar nicht, daß sie nicht mit einem Schein möchten angefochten werden. Aber dieser Artikel ist so klar, daß er auf beiden Seiten gar nahe keiner Rede darf; allein wer ehrbar und gottfürchtig ist, der kann hie bald Richter sein, und wiewohl wir die öffentliche Wahrheit hie nun für uns haben, noch suchen die Widersacher Fündlin, unser Gründe etwas anzufechten.

Our other controversies call for some theological discussion, but in this one the situation is so clear that no discussion is necessary, only the judgment of any honest and God-fearing man. In the face of the clear truth we have advanced, our opponents have thought up some subterfuges to satirize our position.<sup>63</sup>

Melanchthon goes on to make six specific replies to the opponents' *cavillanda* in this place, where no propositions were needed. At the *locus* of Good Works, however, propositions that had been advanced were at the very center of the later controversy addressed by the Epitome.

Über die Lehr von guten Werken sein zweierlei Spaltungen in etlichen Kirchen entstanden.:

Erstlich haben sich etzliche Theologen über nachfolgenden Reden getrennet, da der eine 1. Teil geschrieben: Gute Werke seind nötig zur Seligkeit; es ist unmöglich ohne gute Werk selig zu werden. Item: Es ist niemals jemand ohne gute Werk selig worden. Der ander aber dagegen geschrieben: Gute Werk seind schädlich zur Seligkeit.

In doctrina de bonis operibus duae controversiae in quibusdam ecclesiis ortae sunt:

I. Primum schisma inter theologos quosdam factum est, cum alii assererent, bona opera necessaria esse ad salutem; impossibile esse salvari sine bonis operibus; et: neminem unquam sine bonis operibus salvatum esse; alii vero docerent bona opera ad salutem esse perniciosam.

Two controversies have arisen in some churches concerning the doctrine of good works:

1. The first division among some theologians was occasioned when one party asserted that good works are necessary to salvation; that it is impossible to be saved without good works; and that no one has ever been

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<sup>63</sup> Ap XXIII:6, *BKS*, 334; Tappert, 240.



saved without good works. The other party asserted that good works are detrimental to salvation.<sup>64</sup>

Elsewhere in the Formula of Concord not the wording of the propositions but their meaning was in dispute, as in the Epitome's article on the Lord's Supper.

Zu Erklärung dieses Streits ist anfänglich zu merken, daß zweierlei Sakramentierer seien. Etzliche sein grobe Sakramentierer, welche mit teutschen klaren Worten fürgeben, wie sie im Herzen halten, daß im heiligen Abendmahl mehr nicht denn Brot und Wein gegenwärtig sei, ausgeteilet und mit dem Munde empfangen werde. Etzliche aber sind verschlagene und die allerschädlichste Sakramentierer, die zum Teil mit unsern Worten ganz scheinbar reden und fürgeben, sie glauben auch eine wahrhaftige Gegenwärtigkeit des wahrhaftigen, wesentlichen, lebendigen Leibes und Bluts Christi im H. Abendmahl, doch solches geschehe geistlich, durch den Glauben. Welche doch unter diesen scheinbaren Worten eben die erste grobe Meinung behalten, daß nämblich nichts denn Brot und Wein im heiligen Abendmahl gegenwärtig fei und mit dem Mund empfangen werde.

Ad solidam huius controversiae explicationem primum sciendum est duo esse Sacramentarium genera. Quidam enim sunt Sacramentarii crassi admodum; hi perspicuis et claris verbis id aperte profitentur, quod corde sentiunt, quod videlicet in coena Domini nihil amplius quam panis et vinum sint praesentia ibique distribuantur et ore percipiantur. Alii autem sunt versuti et callidi et quidem omnium nocentissimi Sacramentarii; hi de negotio coenae dominicae loquentes ex parte nostris verbis splendide admodum utuntur et prae se ferunt, quod et ipsi veram praesentiam veri, substantialis atque vivi corporis et sanguinis Christi in sacra coena credant, eam tamen praesentiam et manducationem dicunt esse spirituales, quae fiat fide. Et hi posteriores Sacramentarii sub his splendidis verbis eandem crassam, quam priores habent, opinionem occultant et retinent, quod videlicet praeter panem et vinum nihil amplius in coena Domini sit praesens et ore sumatur.

In order to explicate this controversy, it is necessary to mention, first of all, that there are two kinds of Sacramentarians. Some are crass Sacramentarians who set forth in clear German words what they believe in their hearts, namely, that in the Holy Supper only bread and wine are present, distributed, and received orally. Others, however, are subtle Sacramentarians, the most harmful kind, who in part talk our language

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<sup>64</sup> Ep IV:1-2, *BKS*, 786; Tappert, 475 (emphasis added). With the translation of *Reden* as “controversies, confer K-W, 497; compare “divisions” (Triglotta, 797).

Tappert surely errs by numbering the first paragraph reproduced “1”, so the number is printed in the text above more in keeping with the German original and its Latin translation.

very plausibly and claim to believe a true presence of the true, essential, and living body and blood of Christ in the Holy Supper but assert that this takes place spiritually by faith. But under this plausible terminology they really retain the former crass opinion that in the Holy Supper nothing but bread and wine are present and received with the mouth.<sup>65</sup>

The mention of the clear words as *deutschen* is significant. Premises are important, but how they are understood is also important.<sup>66</sup> As is seen below, the Reformers can use premises in syllogisms.

That the Formula of Concord can be taken to be more concerned about the meaning of words and ways of speaking or arguing is not necessarily the result of a greater philosophical training of its authors; rather, that particular emphasis of the Formula is the result of its different nature and the different purpose it served. The very nature of the Formula is to comment on the Augsburg Confession and settle disputes about words. The Augsburg Confession set forth the clear doctrine against the errors of the Roman Catholics and argued for the legitimacy of the Lutherans' confession. Once that confession more or less was granted standing by the civil government, others tried to come under its umbrella of legitimacy without necessarily believing, teaching, and confessing the same thing. The Formula thus has a greater emphasis on expressions and their meanings, although the content of the faith and its expression are both concerns for all of the works contained in *The Book of Concord*. And, they all show the same supra-sentential uses of philosophy in the way that they proceed to argue.

## Arguing passages and observations

That the Reformers refer to “arguments” has been noted previously,<sup>67</sup> and, before turning to a closer examination of the way the Reformers proceed in a formal argument, it is worth noting further their references to “arguments” and “arguing”. The Latin noun

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<sup>65</sup> Ep VII:3-4, *BKS*, 796-797; Tappert, 482. Though not a use of *Rede* or *Reden* in the German original, the quotation makes the point that the use of the words or expressions alone is not enough.

<sup>66</sup> Other than the seven uses of *Rede* and *Reden* just discussed, the others (including those noted above where *proposition*, *propositionis* is used in the Latin) are as follows: AC XX:7; XXIII:13; Ap XII:141; XX:9; XXVII:4; LC Long Preface:9 (twice); III:40; Ep II:15, 16 (twice); IV:9, 17; VII:25, 41; SD I:45, 51, 55; II:12, 46, 82, 86 (thrice); IV:2, 3, 14, 15, 36; VII:2, 7, 35, 36 (twice), 38, 45, 76 (twice), 127; VIII:45, 63; XI:1.

<sup>67</sup> See the reference to Ap Preface:15 above at n.35, p.204.

*argumentum*, *argumenti* is used some 35 times, chiefly in—but not limited to—the writings of Melanchthon, principally the Apology to the Augsburg Confession.<sup>68</sup> The Latin deponent verb *argumentor*, *argumentari*, *argumentatus sum* is only used nine times, and all but one of those are in works by Melanchthon.<sup>69</sup> Strikingly, in a number of places, in earlier and later documents, the German translation or German original uses essentially transliterated or borrowed Latin words, *das Argument* and *argumentieren*, sometimes with or without a German equivalent used alongside.<sup>70</sup> German equivalents of the noun include *der Grund*, *die Ränke*, *der Spruch*, *die Ursache*;<sup>71</sup> and German equivalents of the verb are *sagen* and *schließen*. Although at least one word that might be termed a synonym for “argue” is used more discriminately,<sup>72</sup> the uses of these words are

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<sup>68</sup> Melanchthon’s original uses of this Latin noun are as follows: BOC Forward:18; AC XX:2; Ap Preface:6, 15; IV:84, 117, 182; XII:113; XXIII:2, 6, 62, 64, 66, 70; XXIV:10, 78; XXVII:10; Tr 24. The uses in the Latin translation of the Formula of Concord are SD II:8; VII:91 (twice), 92, 102, 103 (twice); VIII:2, 52, 56.

Other than LC IV:59, the other seven of the eight uses in the translations of the Catechisms of Luther seem to either be used in senses other than “argument” (SC Preface 23; LC Preface 8; I:68; III:83; IV:50) or be additions to the German text (LC I:69; III:4). Some of the uses in the Latin translations that have senses other than “argument” render the original German words *Zeichen*, *Anzeichen*, and *abzeucht*.

The Latin noun *argumentatio*, *argumentationis* is used only twice: Ap XX:12; SD VIII:52.

<sup>69</sup> Ap IV:42, 67, 75; XX:13; XXII:10; XXIV:58, 84; Tr 11; SD VII:55.

<sup>70</sup> The only places where the German uses *Argument* or *argumentieren* where the Latin does not are as follows: Ap IV:318 (rendering the Latin *docent*); Ap XXIII:64 (rendering *rationem*); and Ap XXIV:9 (also rendering *rationem*).

<sup>71</sup> *Ränke* is only used in Ap Preface 15 (see above at n.35, p.204).

<sup>72</sup> The Latin deponent verb *ratiocinor*, *ratiocinari*, *ratiocinatus sum* (“compute, calculate; consider, deliberate; argue, infer, conclude” [Cassell’s *Latin Dictionary*, ed. D. P. Simpson (New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, 1968), 501.]) is used 17 times, all but one of which (Ap XXVII:20) are either critical of opponents’ faulty reasoning or indicating a way reasoning should not proceed. Similarly all but one of the uses (SD XI:55) are in the Apology, and 12 of those 16 are in the “Reply to the Opponents’ Arguments” subsection of the article on Justification. The remaining 15 uses are as follows: Ap IV:222 (twice), 226, 231, 235, 246, 253, 263, 337, 339, 357, 376; XX:12 (twice); XXIV:52. In some cases the German version uses the same word to translate *ratiocinor* that it used to translate *argumentor* (that is, *schließen*), in other cases the German version uses different words (that is, *abnehmen*, *folgen*, and *hinzuflücken*), and in still other cases the German version either expresses the thought altogether differently or lacks the paragraph completely. The negative references to the opponents’ faulty reasoning from Scripture and the like should by no means be taken as critical of reasoning in general.

Adverbs that are used with *ratiocinor* in the foregoing passages are notable. For example, in Ap IV:235 the opponents are said to “argue indiscreetly” (Triglotta, 185 [Tappert doesn’t translate the passage literally]; BKS, 205, *imprudenter ratiocinantur, schließen ... nicht recht*) and in Ap IV:253 the opponents are said to “infer shamelessly” (Tappert, 143; BKS, 210, *impudenter ratiocinantur, hinzuflücken*). Although *imprudenter* is used only in that passage of *The Book of Concord*, *impudenter* is used another ten times, most of which similarly speak of the reformer’s opponents: of the Confutation impudently blaspheming

not limited to the Reformers or their opponents or any particular author or *loci*.

Nevertheless, a closer examination of several of the uses of “argument” and “argue” is productive.

Closer examination of several uses of the uses of *argumentum*, *argumenti* yields contextual synonyms and indications of what matters to the Reformers when it comes to “arguments”. The first use to be considered comes in the Apology at the *locus* of Monastic Vows, where Melancthon gives another indication of his method in contrast to his opponents, while introducing four responses that follow in his text. Note well the convergence of vocabulary related to the method.

Ac operae pretium est audire, quomodo cavillentur nostras rationes et quid afferant ad muniendam suam causam. Ideo breviter percurramus pauca quaedam argumenta nostra, et diluamus in his obiter cavillationes adversariorum. Cum autem haec tota causa diligenter et copiose a Luthero tractata sit in libro, cui titulum fecit: De votis monasticis, volumus hic librum illum pro repetito habere.

Es will aber hie not sein anzuzeigen, wie sie doch unser Gründe anfechten, und was sie fürbringen, ihre Sache zu erhalten. Darum wollen wir kurz verlegen, was die Widersacher fürbringen, und so nu dieser Handel fleißig und reichlich gehandelt ist in dem Buch Doctoris Martini Von den Klostegelübden, so wollen wir dasselbige Buch hie als für erneuert und erholet achten.

It is worthwhile to hear how they twist our arguments, and what they adduce to support their case. Therefore we shall briefly run through a few of our arguments, and in passing we shall refute our opponents’ quibbles against them. Since Luther discussed this whole issue carefully

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(Ap XX:2), of the monks and scholastics impudently fabricating (Ap XXIV:31), of the pope’s kingdom impudently profiting by abuses (Tr 43), of the monks impudently boasting about their perfect calling (LC I:197), of the papal rabble seducing people about their life (LC I:213), of their impudently indulging their lusts (LC I:214), and of the opponents impudently defending the error that a person’s faith enacts the real, physical presence of Christ in the Lord’s Supper (SD VII:90). The remaining two uses, both in the Latin translation of Luther’s Large Catechism, refer to people in general sinning both against the Second Commandment by slanderous the truth and God’s Word (LC I:55) and against the Eighth Commandment by acting like a knave by telling others things they cannot prove to be true (LC I:270).

Confer also above, n.4, p.92.

In English, noun “inference” (which is related to “infer”, the word the Triglotta often uses to translate *rationator*, *rationatorum*, *rationatorum sum*) first had a general sense before being used as a technical term in Logic, where its first use pertained to the conclusion of a deductive syllogism (“mediate inference”); later it was used to refer to conclusions from single propositions (“immediate inference”) and in induction (“inductive inference”), although different logicians restrict the term either to deduction or induction (*OED*, 7:924).

and fully in his book called *Monastic Vows*, we want to be interpreted here as reiterating that book.<sup>73</sup>

Clarity in discussion is crucial, as Melancthon points out in the Apology's article on the Mass.

Et hic causae status est, de quo ita nobis admonendi sunt lectores, ut Aeschines admonebat iudices, ut, perinde ac pugiles de statu inter se certant, ita cum adversario dimicarent ipsi de statu controversiae, nec sinerent eum extra causam egredi. Ad eundem modum hic adversarii nostri cogendi sunt, ut de re proposita dicant. Et cognito controversiae statu facillima erit diiudicatio de argumentis in utraque parte.

Und das ist die Hauptfrage in dieser ganzen Sache, davon wollen wir ein jeden christlichen Leser verwarnet haben, daß er den Widersachern genau darauf sehe, ob sie auch bei der Hauptfrage bleiben. Denn sie pflegen aus der Hauptsächlich viel vergebliche, ungereimte Umschweife zu machen. Denn wenn man gleich und ungewankt bei der Hauptfrage bleibt und nichts Fremdes einmenget, da ist desto leichter zu urteilen auf beiden Seiten.

We want to remind our readers of the real issue. Aeschines reminded the Jews [*sic* “judges”] that both parties in a controversy must deal only with the point at issue and not wander off into side issues, like wrestlers fighting for their position. In the same way our opponents should be forced to discuss the point at issue. Once the real issue of the controversy is clear, it will be easy to evaluate the arguments both sides have presented.<sup>74</sup>

In the case of the Mass, as the following paragraph goes on to say, the central point relates to the chief *locus* of justification by faith. In the Forward to *The Book of Concord*,

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<sup>73</sup> Ap XXVII:10, *BKS*, 380; Tappert, 270. *The Book of Concord* in this place gives a “deutero-confessional” status to Luther’s 1521 *De votis monasticis iudicium* (Aland #755; WA 8:573-669; translated by James Atkinson as *Monastic Vows* in AE 44:243-400), other writings of Luther and of others are elsewhere given similar status. This status to some extent singles out and elevates such writings of the Reformers above their other works and the works of others. Another example is Formula IX’s mention of Luther’s so-called Torgau Sermon, for which see Jayson S. Galler and Susanne Hafner, “Martin Luther: ‘The Third Sermon, On Easter Day’,” *Logia* XII.3 (2003): 37.

<sup>74</sup> Ap XXIV:10, *BKS*, 352; Tappert, 251. On Tappert’s error in translation confer the Triglotta, 387, and K-W, 259. Note that the German lacks the references to Aeschines. For the reference of Aeschines, see *Ctesiphontem* 206 (*BKS*, 352 n.1; Tappert, 251 n.6; K-W, 259 n.494). Aeschines was apparently an orator in Athens, a student of Socrates, and political opponent of Demosthenes; Aeschines is said to have accused Ctesiphon for illegally rewarding Demosthenes, and *In Ctesiphontem* is one of his three extant speeches.

the authors point to God's Word as the preferred basis for argument, especially discussing the Holy Supper and Person of Christ.

... do sie bei diesem Grund unangefochten bleiben, von andern Gründen nicht disputieren, sondern mit einfältigem Glauben bei den einfältigen Worten Christi vorharren, welches am sichersten und bei dem gemeinen Laien auch erbaulich, der diese disputation nicht ergreifen kann. Wann aber die Widersacher solchen unsern einfältigen Glauben und Verstand der Wort des Testaments Christi anfechten und als ein Unglauben schelten und uns vorwerfen, als sei unser einfältiger Verstand und Glaub wider die Artikel unsers christlichen Glaubens und demnach falsch und unrecht: solle durch wahrhaftige Erklärung der Artikel unsers christlichen Glaubens angezeigt und erwiesen werden, daß obgemelter unser einfältiger Verstand der Wort Christi denselben Artikeln nicht zuwider seie.

Et sane cum hoc fundamentum ab adversariis impugnatum non fuerit, de aliis probandi rationibus in hoc argumenti genere non contentent, sed in vera fidei simplicitate verbis apertissimis Christi firmiter insistent, quae ratio tutissima et erudiendis imperitis hominibus accommodatissima est; neque enim illi ea, quae de his rebus accuratius disputata sunt, intelligunt.

At vero cum illa assertio nostra et simplex verborum testamenti Christi sensus ab adversariis impugnatur, et veluti impius et rationibus verae fidei repugnans reiicitur, denique articulis Symboli Apostolici (praesertim de filii Dei incarnatione, ascensione in coelum et sessione ad dexteram omnipotentis virtutis et maiestatis Dei) contrarius et proinde etiam falsus esse contenditur: vera solidaque articulorum illorum interpretatione demonstrandum est, nostram illam sententiam nec a verbis Christi neque ab articulis illis dissidere.

When they remain unattacked on this basis, but with ingenuous faith they are to stay with the plain words of Christ. This is the surest and most edifying way as far as the common layman is concerned, for he cannot comprehend this discussion. But when the adversaries assail this our ingenuous faith and interpretation of the words of the testament of Christ and decry and condemn them as impiety, as if our ingenuous faith and interpretation contradicted the articles of our Christian Creed (especially those pertaining to the incarnation of God's Son, his ascension, and his session at the right hand of God's almighty power and majesty) and hence must be false and incorrect, we should indicate and demonstrate by a correct explanation of the articles of our Christian Creed that our

ingenuous understanding of the words of Christ as described above does not contradict these articles.<sup>75</sup>

In fact, “Scriptures and arguments derived from the Scriptures” (*testimoniis scripturae et argumentis ex scriptura sumptis*; *Sprüchen der Väter und der Schrift*) are often said to be the basis for what the Reformers show or demonstrate (*ostendimus, angezeigt*).<sup>76</sup> When it comes to the communication of attributes related to the Person of Christ, the Solid Declaration even says it has “three strong and irrefutable arguments” (*drei starke, unwiderlegliche Argument und nachfolgende Gründe*; *tribus firmissimis atque adeo invictis argumentis, quae iam recitabimus, demonstrari potest*), and then provides them on the basis of the “unanimously accepted rule of the entire ancient orthodox church” (*einhellige Regel der ganzen alten rechgläubigen Kirchen*; *regula communissima, maximo totius ecclesiae orthodoxae consensu approbata*) and from Scripture.<sup>77</sup> Thus, the Reformers hold that all sorts or arguments are to be evaluated and that those with the weight of Scripture as the Church (and Luther) has understood it are to be preferred, even when they go against reason and philosophy.<sup>78</sup>

With those introductory remarks regarding arguments and arguing complete, attention can now be directed to passages in *The Book of Concord* using arguments more or less structured in the form of syllogisms. Proceeding in the order of the passages from the works contained in the Confessions, the subsections that follow generally treat one or two such passages that help make the point about the use of such arguments as indicated in the subsection’s heading. Other examples of such uses of syllogistically-structured arguments are noted either in the text or the footnotes. The emphasis in this examination of these passages is more on the arguments’ form and other characteristics than specifically on its point, although the conclusion of the specific argument is not ignored.

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<sup>75</sup> Forward to *The Book of Concord*: 18 (numbered according to German paragraphs), *BKS*, 753-754; Tappert, 10 (apparently following the insertion of the Latin).

<sup>76</sup> Ap IV:117, Tappert, 123; *BKS*, 184. The German version’s rendering might be taken as equating the statements of the Church Fathers with “arguments derived from the Scriptures”.

<sup>77</sup> SD VIII:56-59, Tappert, 601-602; *BKS*, 1034-1035. That the analogy of the Scriptures is immediately mentioned in ¶60 significantly reinforces the role of Scripture.

<sup>78</sup> SD II:8. (See at n.234 above, p.85.)

The first subsection treats of a relatively simple syllogism given in-full in *The Book of Concord*.

### ***Full syllogisms, as in Apology IV:67-68***

Many of the formal deductive arguments used in *The Book of Concord* have to do with justification by faith, even if not located at the *locus* of Justification as is the first example of a full syllogism treated here.<sup>79</sup> In the Apology's article on Justification, Melancthon defines faith<sup>80</sup> and then presents a syllogistic argument that faith justifies.

At cum Deo non potest agi, Deus non potest apprehendi nisi per verbum. Ideo iustificatio fit per verbum, sicut Paulus inquit: Evangelium est potentia Dei ad salutem omni credenti. Item: Fides est ex auditu. Et vel hinc argumentum sumi potest, quod fides iustificet, quia, si tantum fit iustificatio per verbum et verbum tantum fide apprehenditur, sequitur, quod fides iustificet. Sed sunt aliae maiores rationes. Haec diximus hactenus, ut modum regenerationis ostenderemus et ut intelligi posset, qualis sit fides, de qua loquimur.

Nu kann man mit Gott doch je nicht handeln; so läßt sich Gott nicht erkennen, suchen noch fassen denn allein im Wort und durchs Wort, wie Paulus sagt: Das Evangelium ist eine Kraft Gottes allen, die daran gläuben. Item, zu den Römern am 10.: Der Glaub ist aus dem Gehör. Und aus dem allein sollte je klar genug sein, daß wir allein durch den Glauben für Gott fromm werden. Denn so wir allein durchs Wort Gottes zu Gott kommen und gerecht werden, und das Wort kann niemand fassen, denn durch den Glauben, so folget, daß der Glaube gerecht macht. Doch sind andere Ursachen, die sich zu dieser Sache besser reimen. Dieses hab ich bisher gesagt, daß ich anzeige, wie es zugehet, wie wir neu geboren werden, und daß man verstehen möcht, was der Glaub ist oder nicht ist, davon wir reden.

But one cannot deal with God or grasp him except through the Word. Therefore justification takes place through the Word, as Paul says (Rom. 1:16), "The Gospel is the power of God for salvation to every one who has faith," and (Rom. 10:17), "Faith comes from what is heard." From this we can prove that faith justifies. For if justification takes place only through the Word, and the Word is received only by faith, then it follows that faith

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<sup>79</sup> Ap IV:43 is another example of where the confessors argue from a premise to a conclusion at the *locus* of justification. AC XXVII:36-39 has two examples of the confessors arguing syllogistically at the *locus* of Monastic Vows, in one why such vows are null and void and in the other how the Roman Catholic opponents use of vows detracts from Christ and denies the righteousness of faith.

<sup>80</sup> Ap IV:61-64 (§65 is an attack on his opponents' failure to meaningfully discuss regeneration).



justifies. But we have more telling arguments. By what we have said so far we have sought to show the manner of regeneration and the nature of the faith [what is, or is not, faith] we have been discussing.<sup>81</sup>

The syllogisms Melanchthon has in mind can be represented as follows, with the presumed premises indicated in square brackets. Note the significant role Scripture plays as a basis for the syllogisms.

- 1) All dealing with or grasping God (M) is that which takes place through the Word (P).
- 2) [All justification (S) is a dealing with or grasping God (M).]
- 3) All justification (S) is that which takes place through the Word (P).
- 4) [All that which takes place through the Word (M) is that by which one receives the Word (P).]
- 3) All that which justifies (S) is that which takes place through the Word (M).
- 5) All that which justifies (S) is that by which one receives the Word (P).
- 5) All that which justifies (P) is that by which one receives the Word (M).
- 6) Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one receives the Word (M).
- 7) Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P).

The first syllogism (1-2-3) is a 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogism with the valid mood AAA, which is known as Barbara. Note how Melanchthon simply states the major premise (1) and the conclusion (3), which leaves the minor unstated but clearly implied given the nature of the syllogism and the valid figures and their moods. (No figure and valid mood other than Barbara have the universal affirmative in both the major and conclusion, and stating one premise and the conclusion identifies all three of the terms—the subject, predicate, and the middle term). The first syllogism (1-2-3) is related to the second (4-3-5), in that the conclusion of the first (3) is also the minor premise of the second, which is also a 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood AAA, or Barbara. In the second, only the minor and conclusion are expressed, but, again, the major premise is easily determined. The third syllogism (5-6-7) is a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood AEE known as Cambestres. In the case of the third syllogism, all three premises are clearly expressed. One might argue that Melanchthon has taken a questionable liberty with his “proof text”, as “faith comes from what is heard” is not quite “the Word is received only by faith” (rendered in the syllogism above, 6, as “Nothing other than faith is that by which one receives the

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<sup>81</sup> Ap IV:67-68, *BKS*, 173; Tappert, 116. The English translation of the German additions provided in square brackets is from the Triglotta, 139.

Word”). Note well that the terminology used in laying out the foregoing syllogisms in the text of the Apology quoted is typical of that used in *The Book of Concord*.<sup>82</sup>

In the paragraph that immediately follows, Melanchthon goes on to show how two other propositions that—presumably his opponents would agree—must be defended entail the proposition (in these cases we might say “conclusion”) that “faith justifies”.<sup>83</sup>

Nunc ostendemus, quod fides iustificet. Ubi primum hoc monendi sunt lectores, quod sicut necesse est hanc sententiam tueri, quod Christus sit mediator, ita necesse sit defendere, quod fides iustificet. Quomodo enim erit Christus mediator, si in iustificatione non utimur eo mediatore, si non sentimus, quod propter ipsum iusti reputemur? Id autem est credere, confidere meritis Christi, quod propter ipsum certo velit nobis Deus placatus esse. Item sicut oportet defendere, quod praeter legem necessaria sit promissio Christi: ita necesse est defendere, quod fides iustificet. Lex enim non docet gratuitam remissionem peccatorum. Item: lex non potest fieri, nisi prius accepto spiritu sancto. Necesse est igitur defendere, quod promissio Christi necessaria sit. At haec non potest accipi nisi fide. Itaque qui negant fidem iustificare, nihil nisi legem abolito evangelio et abolito Christo docent.

Nu wollen wir anzeigen, daß derselbige Glaube, und sonst nichts, uns für Gott gerecht macht. Und erstlich will ich dieses hie den Leser verwarnen, gleichwie dieser Spruch muss und soll stehen bleiben und kann ihn niemand umstoßen: Christus ist unser einiger Mittler: also kann auch diesen Spruch niemands umstoßen: Durch den Glauben werden wir rechtfertigt ohne Werke. Denn wie will Christus der Mittler sein und bleiben, wenn wir nicht durch den Glauben uns an ihn halten, als an

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<sup>82</sup> While *sequitur* generally is used by the Reformers of a logical result, there are a few exceptions: Ap VII/VIII:8 (referring to a following phrase); LC I:212 (roughly equivalent to “for this reason”); LC III:1 (sequence of the Lord’s Prayer after the Ten Commandments and the Creed); LC IV:71 (the old man follows the inclinations of a nature without Baptism, although some logical consequence could be intended); SD II:6 (the explanation of free will comes next); and SD V:6 (something that follows in the sequence of Scripture). There are also a number of passages where *sequitur* indicates how love follows faith (such as Ap IV:292, 366 [see below at n.19, p. 323]; Ap XII:60, 82; SA III:iii:40 (cited by SD II:34); SD III:54). These relationship implied in these “faith therefore love” passages is discussed further in the text below in the section dealing with the Reformers’ logical distinction between justification and sanctification beginning on p.322.

<sup>83</sup> Just why Melanchthon picks these two propositions to claim must be defended is not immediately clear. The Confutation does not seem to grant them in its fourth, fifth, sixth, or twentieth articles (the ones Apology IV is addressing). Melanchthon had written about Christ as the mediator in Apology IV:18 and about the promise of Christ in Apology IV:43, but he does not seem in those places to have made the propositions explicit in such a way as to use them as general principles from which to argue support for justification by faith. The German version suggests at least one of these propositions is self-evident in Scripture.

Mittler, und also Gott versühnet werden, wenn wir nicht gewiß im Herzen halten, daß wir um seinetwillen für Gott gerecht geschätzt werden? Das heißt nun glauben: also vertrauen, also sich getrösten des Verdiensts Christi, daß um seinetwillen Gott gewiss uns wolle gnädig sein. Item, wie dieses klar in der Schrift ist, daß über das Gesetz zur Seligkeit not ist die Verheißung Christi: also ist auch klar, daß der Glaub gerecht macht; denn das Gesetz predigt nicht Vergebung der Sunde aus Gnaden. Item, das Gesetz können wir nicht erfüllen noch halten, ehe wir den heiligen Geist empfanhen. Darum muß das bestehen, daß zur Seligkeit die Verheissung Christi vonnöten ist. Dieselbigen kann nu niemands fassen noch empfanhen, denn allein durch den Glauben. Darum diejenigen, so lehren, daß wir nicht durch den Glauben für Gott gerecht und fromm werden, was tun die anders, denn daß sie Christum und das Evangelium unterdrücken und das Gesetz lehren?

Now we will show that faith [and nothing else] justifies. In the first place, we would remind our readers that if we must hold to the proposition, “Christ is the mediator,” then we must defend the proposition, “Faith justifies [without works].” For how will Christ be the mediator if we do not use him as mediator in our justification and believe that for His sake we are accounted righteous? But to believe means to trust in Christ’s merits, that because of him God wants to be reconciled to us. In the same way, if we must defend the proposition, “The promise of Christ is necessary over and above the law,” then we must defend the proposition, “Faith justifies.” For the Law does not teach the free forgiveness of sins. Again, we cannot keep the law unless we first receive the Holy Spirit. Therefore we must maintain that the promise of Christ is necessary. But this can only be accepted by faith. Therefore anyone who denies that faith justifies teaches only the law and does away with Christ and the Gospel.<sup>84</sup>

The syllogisms Melanchthon has in mind can be represented as follows, with the unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets.

8) Nothing other than using Christ as a mediator (M) is that which justifies (P).

9) [All things other than faith (i.e., only faith) (S) are other than using Christ as a mediator (M).]

10) Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P).

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<sup>84</sup> Ap IV:69-70, *BKS*, 173-174; Tappert, 116. The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 141.

The Reformers in this case specifically say defending a second proposition necessarily follows from defending a first. There are other passages where the necessity is specifically mentioned (for examples, Ap IV:159; XX:15; SA III:iii:11; LC II:19 “inevitably”), but even where things are only said “to follow”, the context is usually such that the “necessity” of the following is nevertheless implied.

11) All trusting in Christ's merits (M) is by faith (P).

12) [All using Christ as Mediator (S) is trusting in Christ's merits (M).]

13) All using Christ as Mediator (S) is by faith (P).

*Contrapositive*

9) All things other than faith are other than using Christ as our mediator.

14) All that justifies (P) is a receiving of the promises of Christ and not the law alone (M).

15) [Nothing other than faith (S) is a receiving of the promises of Christ and not the law alone (M).]

10) Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P).

16) All earned forgiveness (M) is by the law alone and not by the promise (P).

17) [Everything other than faith (S) is earned forgiveness (i.e., not free forgiveness) (M).]

18) All other than faith (S) is by the law alone and not by the promise (P).

*Obversion*

15) Nothing other than faith is a receiving of the promises of Christ and not the law alone.

19) All done before receiving the Spirit (M) is done by the law without the promise of Christ (P).

20) All that is other than faith (S) is done before receiving the Spirit (M).]

18) All that is other than faith (S) is done by the law alone and without the promise of Christ (P).

21) [All those who do away with faith (M) are those who teach the law and do away with Christ and the Gospel (P).]

22) [All who deny that faith justifies (S) are those who do away with faith (M).]

23) All who deny that faith justifies (S) are those who teach the law and do away with Christ and the Gospel (P).

The two principal propositions that Melanchthon assumes his opponents will join him in holding are that "Christ is the mediator" (8) and that "The promise of Christ is necessary above the law" (14), with justification implicit in both of those propositions. In both cases of these major premises, Melanchthon draws the conclusion that "faith justifies" (10) by implying a minor premise (9 and 15, respectively), which minor premises he then proceeds to prove by stating major premises (11 and 16, respectively) for syllogisms (which themselves have implied minor premises: 12 and 17, respectively) that produce conclusions (13 and 18, respectively) that give the needed minor premises (9 and 15, respectively) by direct inference.<sup>85</sup> The first syllogism (8-9-10) is a 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood EAE, which is known as Celarent, and the proof of its minor (9) is the second syllogism (11-12-13), which is a 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood AAA, or Barbara. The third syllogism (14-15-10) is a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood AEE, or Cambestres, and the proof of its minor (16-17-18) is another Barbara. Melanchthon does not stop there, however, in the fifth syllogism (19-20-18), which is another Barbara,

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<sup>85</sup> For the contrapositive, see below, n.218; for obversion, see below, n.217.

Melanchthon gives another proof that by obversion of its conclusion (18) supports the claim that faith alone receives the promises of Christ (15). Finally, the sixth syllogism (21-22-23, another Barbara), for which Melanchthon states only the conclusion (23) seems to bring together both of the principal propositions that Melanchthon assumed his opponents would grant to indicate that denying their implicit conclusions (that is, that faith justifies) is to teach the law and do away with Christ and the Gospel (23).

In the paragraph that follows Melanchthon elaborates on faith and its relationship to justification. First, with a passing reference to a Plato quote, Melanchthon explains that faith is more than just the beginning of justification. Then, he defines justification as an unrighteous man being made righteous (*ex iniustus iustus effici*), and he gives as equivalent terms being regenerated (*regenerari*), pronounced or accounted righteous (*iustus pronuntiari seu reputari*), and receiving the forgiveness of sins (*accipiat remissionem peccatorum*). Finally, Melanchthon anticipates the next major section of Apology IV, ¶75-121, which argues in greater details that forgiveness is obtained only by faith in Christ.<sup>86</sup>

One other paragraph comes before that section, however, in which Melanchthon treats of the word “alone” (*sola; sola*) and its use in connection with speaking of justification by faith. Melanchthon is also careful to indicate that as the Reformers write of justification they exclude from justification “trust in the merit of love or works” (*fiducia meriti dilectionis aut operum; das Vertrauen auf Verdienst, auf Werk*) but not in such a way that love and good works “did not follow” (*ne sequantur; nicht folgen sollten*) faith.<sup>87</sup>

### ***Proving forgiveness is by faith, as in Apology IV:75-121***

In Alister E. McGrath’s *Iustitia Dei*, he wrote of three propositions that characterize the state of affairs between God and human beings: “1) God is righteous, 2) Man is a sinner, and 3) God justifies man.” The third proposition obviously does not

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<sup>86</sup> Ap IV:71-72, Tappert, 117; BKS, 174. The German version at this point does not follow the Latin precisely, omitting, for example, the Plato reference.

<sup>87</sup> Ap IV:73-74, Tappert, 117; BKS, 174-175. The close logical connection between justification and the good works that follow is the topic of Chapter V below.

follow from the other two, and McGrath wrote that Christians have not held the three to be inconsistent but have nevertheless been challenged to explain the “how” of the third proposition.<sup>88</sup> Without specifically discussing the three propositions and their potential inconsistency, the works in *The Book of Concord* nonetheless treat of them and argue quite explicitly regarding the “how”. In both the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, Article I confesses God (albeit not specifically His righteousness), and Article II confesses the sinfulness of human beings. After Article III’s confession of the Son of God, Jesus Christ, Article IV confesses God’s justification of sinners by faith in Christ. The center of Article IV is in some ways ¶75-121, in which Melanchthon argues deductively that sinners obtain the forgiveness of sins (justification) only by faith. Before examining how Melanchthon argues there, an overview of Apology IV and its theis and antitheses is helpful.

### **Overview of Apology IV leading into ¶75**

Apology article IV on Justification, as its author Melanchthon describes it, addresses the reformer’s opponents’ condemnation of the position the Reformers had taken in the Augsburg Confession regarding justification. Melanchthon indicates that their opponents had condemned both the affirmative and negative expressions of the same position:

damnant nos, quod docemus, homines non propter sua merito, sed gratis propter Christum consequi remissionem peccatorum fide in Christum. Utrumque enim damnant, et quod negamus homines propter sua merita consequi remissionem peccatorum, et quod affirmamus homines fide consequi remissionem peccatorum et fide in Christum iustificari.

verdammen die Widersacher unser Bekenntnis, daß wir lehren, daß die Gläubigen Vergebung der Sunde durch Christum ohne alles Verdienst allein durch den Glauben erlangen, und verwerfen gar trötzlich beides. Erstlich, daß wir nein dazu sagen, daß den Menschen durch ihren Verdienst sollten die Sunde vergeben werden. Zum andern, daß wir halten, lehren und bekennen, daß niemand Gott versühnet wird, niemand's Vergebung der Sunde erlanget, denn allein durch den Glauben an Christum.

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<sup>88</sup> Alister E. McGrath, *Iustitia Dei: A History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification*, Second (in one volume) ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 5.

they condemn us for teaching that men do not receive the forgiveness of sins because of their own merits, but freely for Christ's sake, by faith in him. [They reject quite stubbornly both these statements.] They condemn us both for denying that men receive the forgiveness of sins because of their merits, and for affirming that men receive forgiveness of sins by faith and by faith in Christ are justified.<sup>89</sup>

That Melanchthon sees the one position expressed in multiple ways, positively and negatively, and with equivalent terms is significant as this section proceeds. From the outset of Apology IV, Melanchthon criticizes his opponents for failing to understand forgiveness, faith, grace, and righteousness, which failure he says confuses the teaching of justification, obscures Christ's glory, and robs people of consolation in Christ.<sup>90</sup> As the article begins, there appear to be one major thesis and four major antitheses, logically derived from the thesis, that Melanchthon puts forth and defends. (Two of those antitheses can be taken as relating to justification, and two of those antitheses can be taken as relating to sanctification.)<sup>91</sup>

As mentioned but worth repeating is that various expressions are often equivalent in Melanchthon's usage. For example, early in Apology IV Melanchthon writes:

Et quia iustificari significat ex iniustis iustos effici seu regenerari, significat et iustos pronuntiari seu reputari. Utroque enim modo loquitur scriptura. Ideo primum volumus hoc ostendere, quod sola fides ex iniusto iustum efficiat, hoc est, accipiat remissionem peccatorum.

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<sup>89</sup> Ap IV:1, *BKS*, 158-159; Tappert, 107. (The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the *Triglotta*, 121.) Just before this excerpt, the paragraph makes it clear that Apology IV is itself responding to the Confutation's arguments corresponding to the AC's articles IV, V, VI, and XX. For some specific passages from the Confutation, see *BKS*, 158-159 n.3.

<sup>90</sup> Ap IV:3. Confer n.210 below, p.281.

<sup>91</sup> While some titles for the Apology's articles were added later, the usual headings that break Apology IV into subsections appear to be original (see, for example, Tappert, 27 n.2): "What is justifying faith" ¶48-60; "Faith in Christ justifies" ¶61-74; "We obtain the forgiveness of sins only by faith in Christ" ¶75-121; "Love and the keeping of the law" ¶122-182; and "Reply to the opponents' arguments" ¶183-400. Having addressed how saving faith differs from historical knowledge in the section "What is justifying faith", Melanchthon in ¶61 seems to refer to the "Faith in Christ Justifies" section with "how faith comes into being", the "We obtain the forgiveness of sins only by faith in Christ" section with "show that it justifies", the "Love and the keeping of the law" section with "what this means", and the "Reply to the opponents' arguments" section with "answer our opponents' objections". Confer Jacobs, II:341-343, and observe there (and in the *Triglotta*) the sometimes-used different numbering scheme where "Love and the keeping of the law" and the following subsection are treated as if they were a separate article and paragraph numbers start anew with ¶1 (what is ¶122 in "the original arrangement of the Apology"; see, for example, Tappert, 124 n.9).

And “to be justified” means to make unrighteous men righteous or to regenerate them, as well as to be pronounced or accounted righteous. For Scripture speaks both ways. Therefore we want to show first that faith alone makes a righteous man out of an unrighteous one, that is, it receives the forgiveness of sins.

Und nachdem das Wort *iustificari* auf zweierlei Weise gebraucht wird, nämlich, für bekehrt werden oder neu geboren, item für gerecht geschätzt werden, wollen wir das erst anzeigen, daß wir allein durch den Glauben aus dem gottlosen Wesen bekehrt, neugeboren und gerecht werden.

As the word *iustificari* is used in two ways, namely, for being converted or newly-born, also for being reckoned righteous; we wish to show first that only through faith do we, from a godless creature, become converted, newly-born, and righteous.<sup>92</sup>

The understanding expressed in this passage is crucial, as the Reformers see justification to be both an internal change and an external judgment. As a result of such an understanding regarding other terms also, Melancthon in his syllogisms will freely substitute those other expressions for justification, as well as substituting various equivalent expressions for attempts to obtain forgiveness by works.

Before getting to the heart of the matter, Melancthon addresses some prefatory matters to reveal the sources of both the Reformers’ and the opponents’ teaching. First, Melancthon discusses the division of Scripture into law (such as the Ten Commandments) and the Gospel (such as the promises of the Messiah and the details of His having come).<sup>93</sup> Melancthon says their Roman Catholic opponents focus on the law and try to obtain justification by its works, but the Reformers, Melancthon says, focus on the Gospel and are justified by faith in Christ. Melancthon seems to set out to draw precisely this contrast, but his execution in the text itself is not as clear as it could be.<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>92</sup> Ap IV:72; *BKS*, 174; Tappert, 117; the English translation from the German is this author’s expansion of the Triglotta, 141.

<sup>93</sup> Ap IV:4-6.

<sup>94</sup> In ¶7 he clearly sets forth the opponents as selecting the law. Then, he draws a parallel between the opponents and the Reformers in ¶22-24, and in ¶25-28 he introduces the four false antitheses. Even while in ¶29-33 he begins to discuss the sources for the Reformers’ position in those antitheses, he does not seem to be finished critiquing the opponents’ position, which task he continues to do in ¶34-42. Finally, in ¶43-47 Melancthon addresses what the Gospel is and argues from its being given that justification is by faith. Compare Jacobs’ breakdown that seems more arbitrary and less driven by Melancthon’s own statements in the text (Jacobs, II:341).



In discussing the Roman Catholics' focus on the law and obtaining justification by works, Melanchthon touches on a number of important points. Melanchthon explains that human reason somewhat understands the law but cannot fully keep the Commandments because some of them require works beyond reason's reach.<sup>95</sup> Melanchthon then links the Roman Catholic scholastics with the philosophers who teach only "the righteousness of reason—that is, civil works" (*iustitiam rationis, videlicet civilia opera; ein Gerechtigkeit und Frommkeit, da ein Mensch äußerlich für der Welt ein ehrbar Leben führet und gute Werk tut*),<sup>96</sup> indirectly indicting scholastics such as Biel and Bonaventure for false teaching and practice that God grants grace to people who do what they can.<sup>97</sup> Then, instead of listing all the related errors, Melanchthon argues that if the scholastic view of righteousness is right then there is no difference between philosophy and "the teaching of Christ" and Christ and His righteousness and regeneration are not needed.<sup>98</sup> Melanchthon then admits that his opponents require people to have some knowledge of Christ and a "disposition" (*habitus* in both Latin and German) "initial grace" (*primam gratiam; primam gratiam, die erste Gnade*)<sup>99</sup> that He merited, but Melanchthon argues that in the midst of the false claims about the human will and the related preceding and following merits Christ is buried and people look to be righteous by their own works.<sup>100</sup> Next, Melanchthon specifically attacks the congruent merits and the condign merits (*meritum congrui et meritum condigni; merito congrui und merito condigni, unterm gebührlichen Verdienst und rechtem ganzen Verdienst*)<sup>101</sup>, saying both

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<sup>95</sup> Ap IV:7-8.

<sup>96</sup> Ap IV:9, Tappert, 108; *BKS*, 160. (The German reads more literally, "a righteousness and piety where one leads an honorable life externally for the world and does good works" [this author's translation].) Notably the German in this passage does not include the idea that the "righteousness of reason" is even a form of righteousness.

Melanchthon does not in ¶9 name any philosophers, but Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle may well be in view; in ¶14-15, Aristotle, Socrates, and Zeno are named.

<sup>97</sup> Ap IV:9-11.

<sup>98</sup> Ap IV:12-16.

<sup>99</sup> Ap IV:17; Tappert, 109; *BKS*, 162.

<sup>100</sup> Ap IV:17-18.

<sup>101</sup> Ap IV:19, Tappert, 109; *BKS*, 163. The German version uses the Latin and translates them roughly as "appropriate merit" and "wholly-full merit" (this author's translation).

that the opponents are “playing” (*ludunt tantum; spielen und zanken sie allein mit Worten*<sup>102</sup>) to conceal that they are Pelagians and that in the process people doubt and despair, unless they happen to hear the Gospel.<sup>103</sup> Significantly, Melancthon makes clear the Reformers recognize that God requires “the righteousness of reason” (*iustitia rationis; äußerlichen Frommkeit*) but refuse to praise it at Christ’s expense.<sup>104</sup>

Next in the text come the four false antitheses (FA) that are essentially derived from the major thesis, namely, that justification is by faith alone.

FA#1: *Falsum est enim, quod per opera nostra meramur remissionem peccatorum.*

erdicht ists und nicht wahr, daß wir durch unser Werke sollten Vergebung der Sunde verdienen.

For it is false that by our works we merit the forgiveness of sins.<sup>105</sup>

FA#2: *Falsum est et hoc, quod homines reputentur esse iusti coram Deo propter iustitiam rationis.*

Auch ists Lüge und nicht wahr, daß ein Mensch für Gott könne gerecht und fromm werden durch seine Werke und äußerliche Frommkeit.

It is false, too, that men are accounted righteous before God because of the righteousness of reason.<sup>106</sup>

FA#3: *Falsum est et hoc, quod ratio propriis viribus possit Deum supra omnia diligere et legem Dei facere, videlicet vere timere Deum, vere statuere, quod Deus exaudiat, velle obedire Deo in morte et aliis ordinationibus Dei, non concupiscere aliena etc., etsi civilian opera efficere ratio potest.*

Auch ist es Ungrund und nicht wahr, daß die menschliche Vernunft aus ihren Kräften vermögen soll Got über alles zu lieven, sein Gebot zu halten, ihnen zu fürchten, gewiß darauf zu stehen, daß Gott das Gebet erhöhe, Gott zu danken und gehorsam zu sein in Trübsalen und aderm,

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<sup>102</sup> Ap IV:19, Tappert, 109; BKS, 163. The German version reads more literally: “they are only playing and quarreling with words” (this author’s translation).

<sup>103</sup> Ap IV:19-21. Tappert explains the original Pelagians thus: “Followers of Pelagius, who at the beginning of the fifth century taught that man is not sinful by nature and can be saved by an act of his own will aided by God’s grace” (Tappert, 29 n.3).

<sup>104</sup> Ap IV:22-24; Tappert, 110; BKS, 164. Again the German in this passage renders “external godliness”, and later in the same paragraph translates the Latin *iustitiae rationis* with *äußerlichen Leben und den guten Werken*.

<sup>105</sup> Ap IV:25, BKS, 165; Tappert, 110.

<sup>106</sup> Ap IV:26; BKS, 165; Tappert, 110.

was Gottes Gesetz gebeut, als nicht fremdes Gutes begehren usw. Denn das alles vermag Vernunft nicht, wiewohl sie äußerlich ehrbar Leben und gute Werke etlichermaßen vermag.

It is false, too, that by its own strength reason can love God above all things and keep his law, truly fear him, truly believe that he hears prayer, willingly obey him in death and in his other visitations, and not covet. But reason can produce civil works.<sup>107</sup>

FA#4: Falsum est et hoc et contumeliosum in Christum, quod non peccent homines facientes praecepta Dei sine gratia.

Auch ist es erdichtet und nicht wahr und ein Lästerung wider Christum, daß diejenigen sollten ohne Sünde sein, die Gottes Gebot allein äußerlich ehrbar Leben und gute Werke etlichermaßen vermag.

It is false, too, and a reproach to Christ, that men who keep the commandments of God outside a state of grace do not sin.<sup>108</sup>

Melanchthon immediately claims support for the Reformers' position in the Scriptures and Church Fathers. He then cites a number of Bible passages and Augustine, seemingly intending to provide a citation of some sort in support of each false antithesis (referred to below as "FA#").<sup>109</sup>

To FA#1: Augustine from *Nature and Grace* that human works do not merit grace (citing Galatians 2:21; 5:11; 5:4; Romans 10:3; 10:4)<sup>110</sup>

To FA#2: John 8:36 that reason cannot free from sin or merit forgiveness and John 3:5 that if birth of water and the Holy Spirit is necessary to enter the kingdom of God then the righteousness of reason does not justify<sup>111</sup>

To FA#3: Romans 3:23 that all people by nature lack God's righteousness<sup>112</sup>

To FA#4: Romans 8:7-8 that the flesh (that is, the sinful human nature) is hostile to God and cannot on its own please God<sup>113</sup>

Melanchthon says the support he has provided is so clear that, as Augustine says elsewhere, one only needs to listen to the statements attentively.<sup>114</sup>

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<sup>107</sup> Ap IV:27; BKS, 165; Tappert, 111.

<sup>108</sup> Ap IV:28; BKS, 165; Tappert, 111.

<sup>109</sup> For another *Book of Concord* example of false antitheses, see the heading between Ep III:11 and 12 in both German and Latin, where the Latin *Antithesis* is used in both (BKS, 785).

<sup>110</sup> Ap IV:29-30.

<sup>111</sup> Ap IV:31.

<sup>112</sup> Ap IV:32.

<sup>113</sup> Ap IV:32.

Extending off the last passage and the antithesis it supports (FA#4), Melanchthon goes on in ¶35 to argue that civil works done apart from God (the doing of which was granted leading into the four antitheses and as a part of FA#3) are sins, even if the works are praiseworthy before human beings.<sup>115</sup> Melanchthon makes use of the distinction between the two tables of the law (Commandments 1-3 and 4-10) and says the opponents focus on the second, essentially arguing that even if without the Holy Spirit one might keep the commands of the second table, the commands of the first table are still undone. Melanchthon's larger argument here is that apart from faith everything is sin before God.

Cum igitur haereant in natura hominis contemptus Dei, dubitatio de verbo Dei, de minis et promissionibus, vere peccant homines etiam cum honesta opera faciunt sine spiritu sancto, quia faciunt ea impio corde, iuxta illud: Quidquid non est ex fide, peccatum est. Tales enim operantur cum contemptu Dei, sicut Epicurus non sentit se Deo curae esse, respici aut exaudiri a Deo. Hic contemptus vitiat opera in speciem honesta, quia Deus iudicat corda.

It is inherent in man to despise God and to doubt his Word with its threats and promises. Therefore men really sin even when they do virtuous things without the Holy Spirit; for they do them with a wicked heart, and (Rom. 14, 23) "whatever does not proceed from faith is sin." Such people despise God when they do these things, as Epicurus did not believe that God cared for him or regarded or heard him. This contempt for God corrupts works that seem virtuous, for God judges the heart.

So nu alle Adamskinder in so großen Sunden geboren werden, daß wir alle von Art Gott verachten, sein Wort, seine Verheissung und Dräuen in Zweifel setzen, so müssen wahrlich unser besten gute Werke, die wir tun, ehe wir durch den Heiligen Geist neugeboren werden, sundlich und verdammt Werke vor Gott sein, wenn sie gleich für der Welt schön sein; denn sie gehen aus einem bösen, gottlosen, unreinem Herzen, wie Paulus sagt Röm. 14: „Was nicht aus dem Glauben gehet, das ist Sunde.“ Denn alle solche Werkheiligen tun Werke ohne Glauben, verachten Gott im Herzen und gläuben als wenig, daß Gott sich ihrer annehme, als Epicurus gläubt hat. Die Verachtung Gottes inwendig muß je die Werk unflätig und sündlich machen, wenn sie gleich für den Leuten schön sind; denn Gott forschet die Herzen.

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<sup>114</sup> Ap IV:33.

<sup>115</sup> Ap IV:33.

So now all Adam's children are born in such great sin that all of our kind despise God and doubt His Word, His promises, and threats, so that our best good deeds that we do before we are reborn through the Holy Ghost must truly be sinful and damned works before God, even if they seem beautiful before the world, because they proceed from an evil, godless, unclean heart, as Paul says in Romans 14: "What does not proceed from faith is sin." For all such saintly doers of good works who are doing works without faith despise God in their hearts and believe as little about God's regard for them as Epicurus did. The inner disdain for God must always make the works filthy and sinful, even if they seem beautiful for the people, because God searches the hearts.<sup>116</sup>

Although somewhat less-obvious in the German translation, Melanchthon's claim in ¶35 is the implied syllogism that follows. (Melanchthon does not express the implied major premise.<sup>117</sup>)

24) [Everything without the Holy Spirit (P) is not from faith (M).]

25) "Whatever does not proceed from faith [M] is sin [S]"

26) "Men really sin even when they do virtuous things (S) without the Holy Spirit (P)".

This syllogism is according to the first figure and the valid mood AAA (known as Barbara).

In the two paragraphs that follow, numbered as ¶36-42, Melanchthon, continuing somewhat to respond to the opponents' arguments, seems to be addressing all the antitheses,<sup>118</sup> although the statements of the opponents that he addresses are not in the same forms. Melanchthon begins by criticizing his opponents for claiming sinful people merit forgiveness by love (somewhat of a cross between FA#1 and FA#2), because people cannot love God without first accepting forgiveness by faith (an aspect of FA#3).<sup>119</sup> Then, as a result of that discussion, Melanchthon draws the conclusion that human beings cannot keep the law on their own and are all under sin because all are outside grace (somewhat of a cross between FA#3 and FA#4), and so the law cannot

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<sup>116</sup> Ap IV:35, *BKS*, 166-167; Tappert, 112; the English from the German is this author's translation. The reference to Epicurus apparently is from Cicero, *Laws*, I, 7, 21-22 (*BKS*, 166 n.2; Tappert, 112 n.7; K-W, 126 n.70). The use of a philosophical example in this place is significant, and the German translation notably seems to shorten the reference to Epicurus. The statement about God searching the heart seems to be an allusion to Psalm 44:21; Psalm 139:23; or Jeremiah 17:10.

<sup>117</sup> Confer n.34 above, p.204.

<sup>118</sup> The false antitheses (FA) are in the text above, beginning on p.236.

<sup>119</sup> Ap IV:36-39.

justify anyone (an aspect of FA#2).<sup>120</sup> From there, Melanchthon moves into discussion of the free forgiveness of sins and how making the promise conditional on human merits would make the promise useless.<sup>121</sup>

Finally in the opening section, Melanchthon writes of the Reformers' Gospel source for justification by grace through faith, and from justification by the promise Melanchthon reasons that people cannot justify themselves. Melanchthon contrasts the Gospel promise and its righteousness by faith to righteousness of the law, works, and perfection. In the process, although without using the terms, Melanchthon explains objective justification (God's being favorably disposed to all on account of Christ) and subjective justification (personal faith believing the objective reality and thereby obtaining forgiveness and justification). Melanchthon explains that faith consoles and encourages penitent hearts amidst terrors of conscience and thus regenerates and brings the Holy Spirit so good works follow. Melanchthon discusses faith as "true knowledge of Christ" and says there is "not a syllable" in the opponents' teaching about it.<sup>122</sup>

The next major section of Apology IV (§48-60) deals precisely with justifying faith as confidently accepting God's gifts of forgiveness and justification versus historical knowledge that remains with mortal sin. Faith is further contrasted with righteousness of the law and connected clearly with the Gospel promise and Christ's merits. Melanchthon makes clear that justifying faith belongs with the promise, the promise being free, and the merits of Christ. The fact that the promise is free for Melanchthon excludes human merits and points to God's mercy, the acceptance of which, he argues, requires faith.

Melanchthon regards faith as worship that seeks the forgiveness of sins, and he points to Old Testament saints who received mercy by faith and were therefore justified.<sup>123</sup>

In the section headed "Faith in Christ Justifies", Melanchthon sets out to move past the misunderstanding of faith as historical knowledge to talk about how faith comes

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<sup>120</sup> Ap IV:40.

<sup>121</sup> Ap IV:41-42.

<sup>122</sup> Ap IV:43-47.

<sup>123</sup> Ap IV:48-60.

into being.<sup>124</sup> Melanchthon points to the preaching of law (to declare sinful people in need of forgiveness) and the Gospel (to offer forgiveness and justification to be received by faith).<sup>125</sup> Melanchthon emphasizes the Holy Spirit coming through the Word and Sacraments but only to those who receive Him in faith.<sup>126</sup> The person who remains in faith, Melanchthon says, produces good works with the Holy Spirit's help, while the person who commits a mortal sin loses faith, at least temporarily.<sup>127</sup> With Apology IV leading up to ¶75 overviewed, discussion can now focus on the central argument that begins in that paragraph.<sup>128</sup>

### **The argument in IV:75-121**

In Apology IV:75-121, there appear to be four positions that Melanchthon supposes his opponents grant and from which positions Melanchthon then proceeds to argue, more or less syllogistically, that justification is only by faith in Christ.<sup>129</sup> The four positions are as follows: first, that justification requires forgiveness of sins (¶75-81); second, that sins are forgiven because of Christ (¶82); third, that Christ can only be received by faith (¶83); and, fourth, that forgiveness is promised for Christ's sake and therefore can only be accepted by faith (¶84 ff.). The argument from each position in a sense makes its own argument, but there is also a logical progression from one position to the next so that together they make up a larger argument. Significantly, in these

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<sup>124</sup> Ap IV:61.

<sup>125</sup> Ap IV:62.

<sup>126</sup> Ap IV:63.

<sup>127</sup> Ap IV:64-66.

<sup>128</sup> On Ap IV:67-68 see above at n.81, p.227; on Ap IV:69-70 see above at n.84, p.229; on Ap IV:71-72 see above at n.86, p.231; on Ap IV:72 also see above at n.92, p.234; and on Ap IV:73-74 see above at n.87, p.231.

Arand argues somewhat convincingly for a classical rhetorical structure to Apology IV (Arand, "Melanchthon's Rhetorical Argument"), but his understanding need not be taken as mutually exclusive to what has been outlined here; to be sure the logic is in service to Melanchthon's greater rhetorical purpose in the Apology. Although he does not identify as many syllogisms as are identified in this dissertation, Arand helpfully draws attention to the significant vocabulary used, to the role of "testimonies" in supporting the arguments, and to the inverting or reversing of opponents' arguments to the Reformers' favor.

<sup>129</sup> Confer K-W, 133 n.93, for this understanding of four "admissions", but compare Tappert, 117-119, where the four are presented more as arguments stemming from the necessity of forgiveness in justification, and compare Triglotta, 143, where forgiveness of sins is presented as some first step in justification, which surely is not the meaning.

paragraphs from Apology IV, as elsewhere, Scripture and the Church Fathers provide the evidence.<sup>130</sup>

The first position from which Melancthon argues is that, since all are sinful, “forgiveness of sins is supremely necessary in justification” (*in iustificatione primum necessaria sit remissio peccatorum*; für allen Dingen zu der Rechtfertigung vonnöten sei Vergebung der Sunde).<sup>131</sup> Then he proceeds to the specific argument.

Quare sic argumentamur:

Consequi remissionem peccatorum est iustificari iuxta illud: Beati, quorum remissae sunt iniquitates. Sola fide in Christum, non per dilectionem, non propter dilectionem aut opera consequimur remissionem peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem. Igitur sola fide iustificamur, ...

Darum so schließen wir nun also:

Vergebung der Sünde erlangen und haben, dasselbige heißt für Gott gerecht und fromm werden, wie der 31. Psalm sagt: „Wohl dem, dem die Übertretung vergeben ist. Allein aber durch den Glauben an Christum“, nicht durch die Liebe, nicht um der Liebe oder Werk willen, erlangen wir Vergebung der Sünde, wiewohl die Liebe folget, wo der Glaub ist, Derhalben muß folgen, daß wir allein durch den Glauben gerecht werden.

Therefore we argue this way:

... the forgiveness of sins is the same as justification according to Ps. 32:1, “Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven.” We obtain the forgiveness of sins only by faith in Christ, not through love, or because of love or works, though love does follow faith. Therefore we are justified by faith alone ...<sup>132</sup>

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<sup>130</sup> ¶86-102 can be taken as offering Scriptural support for the fourth position (or the larger argument as a whole); ¶103-106 offer support from the Church Fathers; ¶107-116 somewhat return to the topic of what faith is and how it relates to love that shows itself in good deeds and somewhat anticipate the next major section of Apology IV, which deals with love and the keeping of the law; and ¶117-121 summarize the section on justification only by faith in Christ (note again in ¶117 the mentions in the Latin of *testimoniis scripturae et argumentis ex scriptura* [“testimonies of Scripture and arguments from Scripture”] and in the German of *Sprüchen der Väter und der Schrift* [“sayings of the Fathers and the Scripture”] [BKS, 184; this author’s translation]). Although, ¶86 could be taken as introducing ¶87-106 as proof-texts for righteousness by faith. For his part, Jacobs takes ¶77-86 together as “The remission of sins attained by faith alone” and ¶87-106 together as “Faith the righteousness that avails before God”, listing ¶87-102 as “Proved from Scripture” and ¶103-106 as “Confessed by the fathers” (Jacobs, II:341).

<sup>131</sup> Ap IV:75, Tappert, 117; BKS, 175. The logical starting point is said to be true for Scotus but not for Aquinas (BKS, 175 n.1; confer K-W, 133 n.94).

<sup>132</sup> Ap IV:75-78, BKS, 175; Tappert, 117. As noted above (n.130), the English translations differ on precisely where the translation of *primum* (“first”) belongs. Tappert surely is unjustified in placing more than a sentence from where it occurs. (The German lacks the word.)



This argument can be represented in the following syllogistic form.

27) All forgiveness is justification. (All justification [P] is forgiveness [M].)

28) All forgiveness is by faith alone. (Nothing that is not faith [S] obtains forgiveness [M].)

29) Justification is by faith alone. (Nothing that is not faith [S] is justification [P].)

This syllogism takes the standard second-figure form (with the middle terms as the predicate of both the major and minor premises), and the mood of the syllogism is AEE, the valid mood known in that figure as Cambestres.

Since Melanchthon more or less assumed his opponents would grant the major premise (27 above), Melanchthon concentrates more immediately on the minor premise (28). Although Melanchthon, at least in the Latin, deals with a “quibble” of his opponents regarding the identification of forgiveness with infused grace, he says stating the minor premise (28) is easy, so he proceeds to prove it as follows.<sup>133</sup>

Sic igitur probamus minorem: Ira Dei non potest placari, si opponamus nostra opera, quia Christus propositus est propitiator, ut propter ipsum fiat nobis placatus Pater. Christus autem non apprehenditur tamquam mediator nisi fide. Igitur sola fide consequimur remissionem peccatorum, cum erigimus corda fiducia misericordiae propter Christum promissae. Item Paulus Rom. 5. ait: Per ipsum habemus accessum ad Patrem, et addit: per fidem. Sic igitur reconciliamur Patri et accipimus remissionem peccatorum, quando erigimur fiducia promissae misericordiae propter Christum. Adversarii Christum ita intelligunt mediatorem et propitiatorem esse, quia meruerit habitum dilectionis, non iubent nunc eo uti mediatore, sed prorsus sepulto Christo fingunt nos habere accessum per propria opera, et per haec habitum illum mereri, et postea dilectione illa accedere ad Deum. Annon est hoc prorsus sepelire Christum et totam fidei doctrinam tollere? Paulus econtra docet nos habere accessum, hoc est, reconciliationem per Christum. Et ut ostenderet, quomodo id fiat, addit, quod per fidem habeamus accessum. Fide igitur propter Christum accipimus remissionem peccatorum. Non possumus irae Dei opponere nostram dilectionem et opera nostra.

So beweisen wir nu dieses also, daß wir durch den Glauben an Christum und nicht durch Werk Vergebung der Sunde erlangen. Nämlich Gottes Zorn kann nicht versühnet noch gestillt werden durch unsere Werke, sondern allein Christus ist der Mittler und Versühner, und um seinetwillen allein wird uns der Vater gnädig. Nu kann Christum niemand als einen Mittler fassen durch Werk, sondern allein, daß wir dem Wort gläuben, welches ihn als einen Mittler prediget. Darum erlangen wir allein durch

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<sup>133</sup> Ap IV:79, Tappert, 117-118.

den Glauben Vergebung der Sunde, wenn unser Herz getröstet und aufgerichtet wird durch die göttliche Zusage, welche uns um Christus' willen angeboten wird. Item, Paulus zu den Römern am 5.: „Durch ihnen haben wir ein Zugang zum Vater“, und sagt klar dazu: „durch den Glauben.“ Also werden wir nu, und nicht anders, dem Vater versühnet, also erlangen wir Vergebung der Sunde, wenn wir aufgerichtet werden, festzuhalten, an der Zusage, da uns Gnad und Barmherzigkeit verheißen ist durch Christum. Die Widersacher, die verstehen dieses vom Mittler und Versühner Christo also, daß Christus uns verdiene die Liebe oder den habitum dilectionis, und sagen nicht, daß wir ihnen als einen einigen Mittler brauchen müssen, sondern stecken Christum wieder ins Grab, erdichten ein anders, als haben wir einen Zutritt durch unser Werk, item, als verdienen wir durch Werk den habitum, und können darnach durch die Liebe zu Gott kommen. Das heißt je Christum wieder ins Grab stecken und die ganze Lehre von Glauben wegnehmen. Dagegen aber lehret Paulus klar, daß wir einen Zutritt haben, das ist, Versöhnung Gottes durch Christum. Und daß er anzeige, wie dasselbige geschehe, so setzt er dazu: durch den Glauben haben wir den Zutritt, durch den Glauben empfanhen wir Vergebung der Sunde aus dem Verdienst Christi, und können Gottes Zorn nicht stillen, denn durch Christum. So ist leicht zu verstehen, daß wir nicht Vergebung verdienen durch unser Werke oder Liebe.

We prove the minor premise as follows. Since Christ is set forth to be the propitiator, through whom the Father is reconciled to us, we cannot appease God's wrath by setting forth our own works. For it is only by faith that Christ is accepted as the mediator. By faith alone, therefore, we obtain the forgiveness of sins when we comfort our hearts with trust in the mercy promised for Christ's sake. Thus Paul says in Rom. 5:2, "Through him we have obtained access" to the Father, and he adds, "through faith." In this way we are reconciled to the Father and receive the forgiveness of sins when we are comforted by trust in the mercy promised for Christ's sake. Our opponents suppose that Christ is the mediator and propitiator because he merited for us the disposition of love. And so they would not have us make use of him as our mediator. Instead, as though Christ were completely buried, they imagine that we have access through our own works, by which we merit this disposition, and then, through this love, have access to God. Does this not bury Christ completely and do away with the whole teaching of faith? Paul, on the other hand, teaches that we have access (that is, reconciliation) through Christ. And to show how this happens, he adds that through faith we have access. By faith, therefore, for

Christ's sake, we receive forgiveness of sins. We cannot set our own love and our own works over against God's wrath.<sup>134</sup>

Clearly not all of the premises or multiple steps in the argument are spelled out, but that is typical rhetorical practice. Nevertheless, this "proof" of the minor premise, that all forgiveness is by faith, can be illustrated as follows, with presumed premises indicated in square brackets.<sup>135</sup> (Importantly, Melanchthon freely substitutes various expressions of what he—and no doubt also his opponents—think are equivalent: appeasing God's wrath, propitiation, reconciliation, access to the Father, obtaining the forgiveness of sins.)

30) [Nothing that is by setting forth our works (P) is by Christ (M).]

31) All propitiation (S) is by Christ (M).

32) No appeasing of God's wrath (that is, propitiation) (S) is by works (P).

33) [Everything other than accepting Christ as a mediator (P) is by works (M).]

32) No obtaining forgiveness (that is, appeasing God's wrath) (S) is by works (M).

34) [No obtaining forgiveness (S) is other than by accepting Christ as mediator (P).]

34) [No obtaining forgiveness (P) is other than by accepting Christ as mediator (M).]

35) Everything other than by faith (S) is other than by accepting Christ as mediator (M).

28) Nothing other than faith (that is, that is not faith) (S) obtains the forgiveness of sins (P).

(Interestingly, in terms of form, Melanchthon stays with the second figure in all three syllogisms of this proof, but he uses alternates moods from EAE [Cesare], to AEE [Cambestre], and back to EAE [Cesare].) Even with only the minor premises and conclusions from only the first and last of the three syllogisms given, the other premises and conclusions can be deduced. Remember Melanchthon is trying to prove the minor premise from the earlier syllogism (28). He starts by giving the minor premise (30) and the conclusion (32) of the first syllogism in the proof of the original minor (28). (That conclusion [32] is itself the minor premise of the second syllogism, the conclusion for

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<sup>134</sup> Ap IV:80-81, *BKS*, 176; Tappert, 118.

Although used only in Ap IV:79 and 80 to refer to the "minor premise", the Latin *minor*, *minoris* and *minor -or -us* are used elsewhere: of Christ's inferiority to the Father (Athanasian Creed ¶31); of a false teaching regarding His lesser power (Ep VIII:35); of faults of no less importance (Ap IV:67); in quotations of 1 Timothy 5:9 (Ap XXVIII:66) and Genesis 25:23 (SD XI:88); to the smaller size of the Roman Catholic following (SA Preface ¶7); in reference to the lesser form of excommunication (SA III:viii:13); in reference to the Franciscans (SA III:v:3); in the title of the Small Catechism (also in SD RN 8, 11; SD I:38; II:40, 45; VII:10); to refer to people's ages (SC Preface ¶7; LC Preface ¶7; LC I:259; V:85); to the no less degree of diligence with which right words are to be used in comparison with right doctrine (SD IV:36); in a quotation from Luther's "Great Confession" (SD VII:30); in the title of Luther's "Small Confession" concerning the Holy Supper (SD VII:91).

<sup>135</sup> As indicated above in n.34, p.204, Aristotle said syllogisms used rhetorically should not express every premise.

which [34] is needed as the major premise in the third syllogism.) Then Melanchthon gives the minor premise (34) and repeats the conclusion of the third syllogism (28, which conclusion is the to-be-proved minor premise from the earlier syllogism). The argument as reconstructed here is valid and plausibly what Melanchthon consciously or subconsciously had in mind, although without his giving the full syllogism, the proof as given above remains only a plausible reconstruction.

Before proceeding to the second and third positions Melanchthon supposes his opponents will grant, permit a little more consideration of the foregoing larger argument and the proof of its minor premise. This demonstration from the first principle that Melanchthon supposes his opponents will grant (that is, all forgiveness is justification, or all justification is forgiveness<sup>136</sup>) is highly significant. The conclusion of the argument (that is, that justification is by faith alone) is at the conceptual center of not only Apology IV but also the Reformers whole dispute with their Roman Catholic opponents. The demonstration is the only place in the Apology where Melanchthon specifically gives a complete syllogism and refers to one of its constituent parts as the “minor” and proceeds to “prove” the very point that is at contention (that is, that all forgiveness is by faith alone), notably, if the reconstruction is correct, with a series of three other syllogisms. A first potential criticism might be that Melanchthon’s main syllogism proves nothing at all but simply substitutes one equivalent expression for another. A second but related criticism might be that all of the equivalent substituting going on in the proof itself conceals the fact that Melanchthon could be taken as arguing in a circle (for example, 30 and 33 essentially say the same thing that there is a dichotomy between human works and Christ, similarly 34 is essentially the conclusion of the main syllogism, that justification is by faith alone). A third potential criticism might be that his opponents were unlikely to accept some—if not all—of both the unexpressed and the expressed premises in the proof. For example, the opponents might argue against the unexpressed major premise that sets off the chain (30) that Melanchthon has made a false dichotomy, that Christ working in a person produces good works and that those good works are the basis for a

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<sup>136</sup> Whether or not justification is limited to forgiveness is another matter.

person's forgiveness and justification. In response, Melanchthon might answer in two ways: (a) that the opponent's claim would not apply in the case of a person's initial justification because apart from grace a person's works have no merit and cannot bring about forgiveness and justification, or (b) that, while a person's justification does necessarily bring about good works, the works are only correlative and not the cause of the justification. Against the expressed minor premise of the second syllogism in the proof (31, that all propitiation is by Christ), the opponents might argue that the merits of works done either before or after grace can appease God's wrath, or, against the expressed minor premise of the third syllogism in the proof (32, that no obtaining forgiveness is by works) they might argue that works do obtain forgiveness. Perhaps if Melanchthon himself had thought the proof was completely convincing he would have stopped after expressing it; instead, he offers other arguments for justification being only by faith, and he also addresses some of the very counterclaims that have just been suggested.

Melanchthon's arguments from the second and third positions Melanchthon supposes his opponents will grant are not as elaborately developed. The second position is that God forgives because of the Propitiator, Christ, and that His propitiation must be received by faith, which necessity of faith Melanchthon "proves", though he does not call the process that, by referring to Romans 3:25 and Hebrews 4:14-16.<sup>137</sup> The third position is that Christ can be received only by faith, which position Melanchthon supports with Acts 10:43, which passage itself claims the support of all the prophets, or, as Melanchthon puts it, "the authority of the church" (*ecclesiae auctoritatem; die christliche Kirchen oder katholick Kirche*).<sup>138</sup>

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<sup>137</sup> Ap IV:82, Tappert, 118. Though Melanchthon only refers to parts of the Bible verses, they follow in full. Romans 3:25: "Whom God hath set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his blood, to declare his righteousness for the remission of sins that are past, through the forbearance of God" (KJV). Hebrews 4:14-16: "Seeing then that we have a great high priest, that is passed into the heavens, Jesus the Son of God, let us hold fast our profession. For we have not an high priest which cannot be touched with the feeling of our infirmities; but was in all points tempted like as we are, yet without sin. Let us therefore come boldly unto the throne of grace, that we may obtain mercy, and find grace to help in time of need." (KJV)

<sup>138</sup> Ap IV:83, Tappert, 118-119; BKS, 177. The German version adds *Denn wenn alle heilige Propheten zeugen, das ist je ein herrlich, groß, trefflich, stark Decret und Zeugnis* ("For when all the holy

The fourth position that Melanchthon supposes and then argues from is that forgiveness is promised for Christ's sake, which, because of the nature of a promise and multiple Bible passages, leads him to the conclusion that forgiveness is accepted by faith alone.

Quarto. Remissio peccatorum est res promissa propter Christum. Igitur non potest accipi nisi sola fide. Nam promissio accipi non potest nisi sola fide. Rom. 4.: Ideo ex fide, ut sit firma promissio, secundum gratiam; quasi dicat: si penderet res ex meritis nostris, incerta et inutilis esset promissio, quia nunquam constituere possemus, quando satis meriti essemus. Idque facile intelligere queunt peritae conscientiae. Ideo Paulus ait Gal. 3.: Conclusit Deus omnia sub peccatum, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi detur credentibus. Hic detrahit meritum nobis, quia dicit omnes reos esse et conclusos sub peccatum; deinde addit promissionem, videlicet remissionis peccatorum et iustificationis, dari, et addit, quomodo accipi promissio possit, videlicet fide. Atque haec ratio sumpta ex natura promissionis apud Paulum praecipua est et saepe repetitur. Neque excogitari neque fingi quidquam potest, quo hoc Pauli argumentum everti queat. Proinde non patiantur se bonae mentes depelli ab hac sententia, quod tantum fide accipiamus remissionem propter Christum. In hac habent certam et firmam consolationem adversus peccati terrores et adversus aeternam mortem et adversus omnes portas inferorum.

Zum vierten, Vergebung der Sunde ist verheißen um Christus willen. Darum kann sie niemand erlangen, denn allein durch den Glauben. Denn die Verheißung kann man nicht fassen noch derselben teilhaftig werden, denn allein durch den Glauben. Röm. 4: „Derhalben muß die Gerechtigkeit durch den Glauben kommen, auf daß sie sei aus Gnaden und die Verheißung fest bleibe.“ Gleich als sollt er sagen: so unser Heil und Gerechtigkeit auf unserm Verdienst stünde, so wäre die Verheißung Gottes immer noch ungewiß und wäre uns unnütz; denn wir könnten nimmer des gewiß sein, wenn wir gnug verdienet hätten. Und dieses verstehen fromme Herzen und christliche Gewissen fast wohl, nähmen nicht tausend Welt, daß unser Heil auf uns stünde. Damit stimmt Paulus zu Galatern: „Gott hat alles unter der Sunde beschlossen, daß die Verheißung aus dem Glauben Jesu Christi den Gläubigen widerfahre.“ Da stößt Paulus allen unser Verdienst danieder; denn er sagt: wir sind alle schuldig des Todes und unter der Sunde beschlossen, und gedenkt der göttlichen Zusage, dadurch wir allein Vergebung der Sunde erlangen, und

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prophets bear witness, that is certainly a glorious, great excellent, powerful decretal and testimony” [Triglotta, 145]).

Acts 10:43: “To him give all the prophets witness, that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins” (KJV).

setzt noch weiter dazu, wie wir der Verheissung teilhaftig werden, nämlich durch den Glauben. Und dieser Grund, dieses Argument, da Paulus aus Art und Natur der göttlichen Verheissung schleußt, nämlich also: so Gottes Verheißung gewiss sein und feststehen soll, wie sie nicht feilen kann, so muss Vergebung der Sunde nicht aus unserm Verdienst sein, sonst wäre sie ungewiß, und wüßten nicht, wann wir genug verdienet hätten. Ja dies Argument, sage ich, und der Grund ist ein rechter Fels, und fast das stärkste im ganzen Paulo, und wirdet gar oft erholet und angezogen in allen Episteln. Es wird auch nimmermehr auf Erden ein Mensch etwas trachten und dichten oder erdenken, dadurch der einig Grund allein, wenn sonst nichts wäre, müge umgestoßen werden. Es werden auch fromme Herzen und christliche Gewissen sich in keinen Weg lassen hievon abführen, nämlich daß wir allein durch den Glauben um Christus Verdienstes willen Vergebung der Sunde haben. Denn da haben sie ein gewissen, starken, ewigen Trost wider die Sunde, Teufel, Tod, Hölle. Das andere alles ist ein Sandgrund und bestehet nicht in Anfechtungen.

Fourth, the forgiveness of sins is a thing promised for Christ's sake. Therefore it can be accepted only by faith, since a promise can only be accepted on faith. In Rom. 4:16 Paul says, "That is why it depends on faith, in order that the promise may rest on grace and be guaranteed," as though he were to say, "If it depended on our merits, the promise would be uncertain and useless inasmuch as we could never determine whether we had merited enough." Experienced consciences can readily understand this [and would not, for a thousand worlds have our salvation depend upon ourselves]. Therefore Paul says (Gal. 3:22), "God consigned all things to sin, that what was promised to faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe." Here he denies us any merit, for he says that all are guilty and consigned to sin. Then he adds that the promise of the forgiveness of sins and justification is a gift, and further that the promise can be accepted by faith. Based upon the nature of a promise, this is Paul's chief argument [a veritable rock], which he often repeats (Rom. 4:16; Gal. 3:18). Nothing one can devise or imagine will refute Paul's argument. So pious men should not let themselves be diverted from this declaration, that we receive the forgiveness of sins for Christ's sake only by faith; here they have a certain and firm consolation against the terrors of sin, against eternal death, and against all the gates of hell (Matt. 16:18). [Everything else is a foundation of sand that sinks in trials.]<sup>139</sup>

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<sup>139</sup> Ap IV:84-85, *BKS*, 177-178; Tappert, 119. The English translations of the German additions are provided in square brackets as from the Triglotta, 145, 147. Tappert's translation leaves something to be desired; the parallel *nisi sola fide* is not rendered in a parallel fashion: "accepted only by faith ... only be accepted on faith". Compare the parallel "except by faith alone" (Tappert, 145) and the parallel "in any other way than by faith alone" (K-W, 134).

Melanchthon's argument in the preceding paragraph can be represented syllogistically as follows.

- 36) Anything by which one accepts forgiveness (P) is that by which one accepts a thing promised for Christ's sake (M).  
37) Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one accepts a thing promised for Christ's sake (M).  
38) Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one accepts forgiveness (P)<sup>140</sup>
- 39) Nothing by which one accepts a thing promised for Christ's sake (P) is that which depends on merits (M).  
40) [Everything other than faith (S) is that which depends on merits (M).]  
37) Nothing other than faith (S) is that by which one accepts a thing promised for Christ's sake (P).
- 41) If [accepting what is promised] depended on merits (p), then the promise would be useless (q)  
42) [The promise is not useless (~q)]  
39) Accepting what is promised does not depend on our merits (~p)
- 43) [All love and works (M) are things that depend on merits (P).]  
44) [Everything (that accepts what is promised) other than faith (S) is love and works (M)]  
40) [Everything other than faith (S) is that which depends on merits (P).]

Much as with the first position Melanchthon supposed his opponents would grant, with the fourth he also takes that position as a major premise (36), expresses a minor (37), and then draws the similar conclusion (38) that only by faith can people accept forgiveness, that is, that justification is by faith alone. (Notably Melanchthon used a second-figure syllogism in the valid AEE mood known as *Cambestres*.) Again like with the first assumed position, Melanchthon then proceeds to prove the minor premise (37), although he does not specify that is what he is doing. While there are again three steps to the proof of the minor (37), the steps are relatively different (although the main syllogism in the proof of the minor is also a second-figure syllogism in the valid mood EAE known as *Cesare*). Melanchthon begins the proof of the minor (37) by adducing Romans 4:16 in its support and rephrasing the passage as the major premise (39) in the proof of the minor, which itself is proved using propositional logic, drawing the major premise (39) as a conclusion from the inference rule known as *modus tollens* operating on one expressed premise (41) and one unexpressed but implied premise (42). Melanchthon does not seem

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<sup>140</sup> Another way of getting to the same conclusion would be the following Barbara syllogism:  
All by way of accepting a promise (M) is faith (P).  
All receiving of forgiveness (S) is by way of accepting a promise (M).  
All receiving of forgiveness (S) is faith (P).



to offer a proof of the minor premise (40) for the proof of the minor (37), although two premises (43 and 44) that would produce the minor as a conclusion of a first-figure syllogism in the valid AAA mood known as Barbara can easily be taken as implied. One potential attack on the minor (40) in the proof of the minor (37) is that faith itself could be considered a work, but Melanchthon argues elsewhere that being made righteous by faith must be understood as faith laying hold of Christ on whose account people are righteous.<sup>141</sup> Other potential counter-arguments seem to be taken up within the broader sweep of Apology IV. In the final analysis, although Melanchthon's argument is rational and depends on the nature of a promise as expressed in Scripture,<sup>142</sup> the ultimate goal of his argument is the comfort of the sinner, something that ultimately God accomplishes only by the very faith Melanchthon is arguing justifies.

### **Subsequent “arguments” regarding Justification**

Apology IV is not the only place Melanchthon and the Reformers argue syllogistically in support of the chief *locus* of justification by faith alone. Although the works considered in this subsection—namely, Melanchthon's theses for a disputation titled “We Are Justified by Faith and Not by Love”, Melanchthon's *Loci Communes*, and Chemnitz's *Loci Theologici*—are outside of *The Book of Concord*, they nevertheless relate quite directly to it.

As Melanchthon was finishing the Apology of the Augsburg Confession early in 1531, he wrote more than three dozen theses about the relationship between justification and works, which theses he then printed and distributed for reactions to his arguments used in the teaching on righteousness. The theses were titled as if for a disputation on the topic “We are Justified by Faith and Not by Love”, and the three groups into which

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<sup>141</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 109; Philipp Melanchthon, *Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555*, trans. Clyde L. Manschreck, Library of Protestant Thought (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965), 167.

<sup>142</sup> Melanchthon does not explain why the nature of a promise presupposes faith, but one can easily understand why. Even between two people, one person *promising* to do something for the other gives a higher degree of expectation than the one saying he or she *might* do something for the other. In the case of God, the promise is absolutely certain, so the promise can elicit faith, and the believer can be comforted. Of course, Scripture is how God's promise is communicated to people, so Melanchthon's leap is not as wide as it might seem at first glance.

Melanchthon places the theses essentially correspond with the headings of the last three subsections of Apology IV. Even though not every syllogistic argument in Apology IV has been extracted, some of the premises used in the syllogisms extracted above from Apology IV nevertheless can be found among the theses.<sup>143</sup> Moreover, the philosophical nature of a disputation for which the theses were ostensibly prepared at least indirectly has influenced the argument over justification in Apology IV.

There are also relevant syllogistic arguments over justification in Melanchthon's *Loci Communes*, which Luther once praised by saying, "No better book has been written after the Holy Scriptures than Philip's" (*Non est melior liber post scripturam sanctam*).<sup>144</sup> Melanchthon's *Loci* essentially had four editions: the first edition from 1521-1522 (Latin), the second edition from 1535-1543 (Latin), the third edition (Latin) of 1543, and the fourth edition of 1555 (German).<sup>145</sup> In the preface to his translation of the 1543 edition, Preus comments of the different editions, "they are quite different, both in the titles of the loci and in their content, as well as in length"<sup>146</sup> The first edition notably was published before the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, while the second and all subsequent editions were published after those two works. A comparison between the various editions of the *Loci* finds the arguments related to justification in some cases

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<sup>143</sup> See Kolb and Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts*, 140-143. The theses are translated there by Charles P. Arand as found in Philipp Melanchthon, "Melanchthons *loci praecipui* und Theses über die Rechtfertigung aus dem Jahre 1531," *Abhandlungen Alexander von Oettingen zum siebenzigsten Geburtstag gewidmet von Freunden und Schülern*, ed. Johannes Haussleiter (Munich: Beck, 1898). The introduction in Kolb-Nestigen refers to 38 theses, but Arand's translation lists 39.

Examples of theses from the 1531 disputation similar to premises extracted from *The Book of Concord* in this dissertation follow. On thesis #5, see premises 7, 10, 29, 34, 74, and 80. On thesis 8, see premise 12. On thesis 12, see premise 9. On thesis 14, see premise 44. And, on thesis 15, see premises 14, 15, 16, and 18.

<sup>144</sup> Luther's tabletalk recorded by Caspar Heydenreich in the winter of 1542-1543, #5511, translated by Theodore G. Tappert in AE 54:440; WA Tr 5:204. This sentence in Latin comes in the midst of an entry that is otherwise predominantly German.

<sup>145</sup> Confer and compare the history of Melanchthon's *Loci* in Hill ("Prolegomena"), who follows the seven periods laid out by Georg Theodor Strobel, *Versuch einer litterär Geschichte von Philipp Melanchthons Loci theologicis als dem ersten evangelischen Lehrbuche* (Altdorf und Nürnberg: L. Schöpfel, Universitäts Buchhändles, 1776).

<sup>146</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 7-8.

expanded and developed but in other cases also contracted.<sup>147</sup> At the *locus* of Good Works in his 1543 *Loci Communes*, Melanchthon delineates eighteen different major arguments of his opponents regarding justification by faith, what Melanchthon identifies in the arguments' introduction as "the very essence of the Gospel".<sup>148</sup> Melanchthon presents most of the arguments as complete syllogisms, although some lack the minor premise in keeping with the more-rhetorical use of the syllogism and others are simply Bible passages incorrectly understood. A listing of the eighteen arguments<sup>149</sup> and Melanchthon's point of attack follows.<sup>150</sup>

1. Righteousness is obedience to the commandments, faith is not the work of the commandments, so not justified by faith (grants major, attacks shift in meaning of righteousness)<sup>151</sup>
2. Impossible for knowledge alone to justify, faith is only knowledge, so impossible for faith alone to justify (attacks minor that faith is only knowledge)<sup>152</sup>
3. The person without love remains in death, [presumably for the opponents a person with faith alone is without love, and presumably death is the opposite of being righteous], so impossible to say a person is righteous by faith alone (grants the

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<sup>147</sup> Melanchthon's dedicatory letter to the 1521 *Loci* lists *capita* ("heads") of "faith" and "renewal through Christ" but not "justification" or "sanctification", although in the section "On Justification and Faith" there are some similarities to the more fully-developed arguments discussed in the text below (Melanchthon, *The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521]*, 171-202). See also the 33 summary statements on law, Gospel, and faith (pp.215-218). As for a distinction between justification and sanctification, see also in the 1521 edition "On the Efficacy of Faith", where, works are described as the fruits of the Spirit and signs of faith (pp.202-204). And, in the section "On the Old and New Man", Melanchthon regards sanctification as not perfected (p.234), which, although his senses of the words are not strict, is similar to his earlier statement that justification is just begun and not completed (p.197).

The discussion that follows in the text follows the third edition of 1543, but the notes indicate some of the similarities with the first edition of 1521-1522, with the second edition that covered 1535-1543 and has never been translated into English (found in CR 21:230 ff.), and with the fourth edition of 1555.

<sup>148</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 107-108.

<sup>149</sup> In the German 1555 *Loci*, the number of counter-arguments is reduced to eight (Melanchthon, *Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes*, 1555, 163-172).

<sup>150</sup> Not all of the arguments are syllogistic; #9 and #10, for examples, seem more to be arguments by analogy. In some sections dealing with these major arguments there are other related syllogistic arguments, passages, etc. On the whole, confer Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, 630-639.

<sup>151</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 108. Confer #5 in Melanchthon, *Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes*, 1555, 167-169.

<sup>152</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 108-109. Confer #2 in Melanchthon, *The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521]*, 172-173; #1-2 in Melanchthon, *Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes*, 1555, 163-165.

- argument if faith is understood as never alone and argues that the exclusive particle does not exclude the presence of virtues)<sup>153</sup>
4. Righteous by faith, faith is a work, so righteous by works (argues major must be understood correlatively that faith lays hold of Christ on whose account people are righteous)<sup>154</sup>
  5. Righteous by grace, grace is infused love, so righteous by infused love (minor defines grace incorrectly)<sup>155</sup>
  6. Impossible to know will of God toward a person, to believe in grace is to affirm something about the will of God toward a person, so affirm something impossible when saying a person must believe he or she is in grace (grants major but only outside of God's revelation and argues human reason problematic on this matter)<sup>156</sup>
  7. No one pleases God without attitudes from Holy Spirit, no one can affirm these attitudes because they are similar to virtues from human reason, so no one can affirm he or she pleases God (denies minor and argues affirmation is based on God's Word)<sup>157</sup>
  8. Theological virtues (faith, hope, and love) are separate and distinct, if faith is confidence then also hope, so distinction of virtues is lost (effectively denies the major by arguing that virtues always joined in a correlative sense)<sup>158</sup>
  9. Evil works merit punishments, [evil works are comparable to good works and punishments are comparable to eternal life], so good works merit eternal life (contrary points are not completely comparable)<sup>159</sup>
  10. Sin is hatred of God, so righteousness is love of God (not completely parallel, despite what the philosophers say)<sup>160</sup>
  11. Righteousness is in will, faith is not in will, so not justified by faith (deny minor by arguing faith as assent is in intellect and is joined with trust in will)<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>153</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109. Confer #3 and 7 in Melancthon, Melancthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 165-167, 171.

<sup>154</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109. Confer CR 21:443; #4 in Melancthon, Melancthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 167.

<sup>155</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109.

<sup>156</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 109. Confer #6 in Melancthon, Melancthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555, 169-171.

<sup>157</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110.

<sup>158</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110.

<sup>159</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110.

<sup>160</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110.

<sup>161</sup> Melancthon, Loci Communes 1543, 110-111. Confer CR 21:444.

12. James 2:24 justified by works and not faith alone (in that context faith is understood only as historical fact, profession of dogma without trust; similarly argues to justify means be approved but not in this context forgiven)<sup>162</sup>
13. 1 Corinthians 13:2 have faith without love is nothing (like #3, Melanchthon grants this argument and that love must be present but denies reconciliation on love's account)<sup>163</sup>
14. Matthew 19:7 Jesus' says keep commandments to enter life so must be possible to keep them and merit life by obedience (fail to distinguish law and Gospel, adduces many other passages)<sup>164</sup>
15. Matthew 6:14 one who forgives is forgiven (law and promises both present but not linked as cause and effect, for adding of the condition would make it uncertain; adduces other passages such as Isaiah 1:17-18; 58:7-8; Daniel 4:27)<sup>165</sup>
16. Greatest virtue justifies most greatly, love is greatest virtue, so love justifies most greatly (grants major in terms of Christ but not in terms of people; light of truth drives out Epicurean and academic darkness)<sup>166</sup>
17. Luke 7:47 woman's many sins forgiven because she loved much, so remission is on account of love (twofold absolution or synechdoche)<sup>167</sup>
18. Eternal life is a reward, [rewards are owed on account of works], so eternal life is owed on account of works (eternal life is reward but for another reason; opponents very mixed up on rewards and merits affecting their interpretation of other passages, such as Matthew 5:12; 10:42; 2 Corinthians 5:10)<sup>168</sup>

As with the 1531 theses discussed above being present in the extracted syllogisms, many of these arguments are also present in Apology IV.<sup>169</sup>

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<sup>162</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 111. Confer #5 in Melanchthon, *The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521]*, 178-182; CR 21:439-440.

<sup>163</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 111-112. Confer #7 in Melanchthon, *Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes*, 1555, 171; CR 21:440.

<sup>164</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 112. Confer CR 21:438-439.

<sup>165</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 112-113. Confer CR 21:440-441.

<sup>166</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 113-114. Confer #8 in Melanchthon, *Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes*, 1555, 171-172.

<sup>167</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 114. Confer #6 in Melanchthon, *The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521]*, 182.

<sup>168</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 114-116. Confer #7 in Melanchthon, *The Loci communes of Philip Melanchthon [1521]*, 198-200; CR 21:441-443.

<sup>169</sup> Examples of major arguments from the *Loci* similar to passages from Apology IV follow. On major argument 1, see ¶49. On major argument 2, see ¶48. On major argument 3, see ¶73-74. On major argument 13, see ¶118-224. And, on major argument 15, see ¶261-268.

Martin Chemnitz's *Loci Theologici*, a posthumously published commentary and expansion of Melanchthon's *Loci Communes*, reproduces Melanchthon's arguments but also sets up classes of arguments and shows how to respond correctly to them. Chemnitz offers four reasons for examining the arguments and solidly refuting them: first, to keep faith from uncertainty; second, to "convince the gainsayers"; third, to raise awareness of erring positions; and fourth, to let the antitheses illuminate points that otherwise might be missed.<sup>170</sup> While Chemnitz acknowledged not only Melanchthon but also Johannes Aepinus (1499-1553) who effectively refuted opponents' arguments with good explanations, he also thought analyzing all individual arguments was "an enormous and fruitless endeavor". So, instead of setting forth and analyzing all the arguments, such as Melanchthon's 18 (but not taking away anything from his and others' work), Chemnitz set up eleven classes of arguments that could be applied to whatever argument the opponents might raise.<sup>171</sup> Many of the classes pertain to reconciling what otherwise might be taken to be contradictory passages of Holy Scripture. A listing of the eleven classes follows, with the essence of Chemnitz's response given in parentheses.

1. Conversion can be thought of as having three ordered parts (faith, contrition, and new obedience) so faith alone is not enough (faith is the only part of conversion that causes justification by laying hold of the Gospel promise and thereby providing comfort)<sup>172</sup>
2. Human reason argues against the righteousness of the Gospel on the basis of the philosophers' and Pharisees' thinking about civil righteousness (some passages speak about righteousness before human beings and others of righteousness before God, which righteousness before God people cannot obtain on their own)<sup>173</sup>
3. According to the teaching of the law, philosophers, civil righteousness, and popular speech words such as "justification", "righteousness", "grace", "imputation", "faith", etc. are used differently than those who support justification by faith would claim (Scripture, and even different authors within Scripture, use the words differently than in common speech)<sup>174</sup>

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<sup>170</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:639.

<sup>171</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:639, 649.

<sup>172</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:639-640.

<sup>173</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:640.

<sup>174</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:640.

4. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say that justification is based on the way we live (some passages describe the quality or character of the justified)<sup>175</sup>
5. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say that repentance mitigates punishment (some passages referring to temporal punishments are misapplied to eternal punishments)<sup>176</sup>
6. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say there are rewards for deeds (rewards of this life must be distinguished from rewards of the next life, and rewards in heaven for certain deeds cannot be understood as if heaven itself were a reward for deeds)<sup>177</sup>
7. Some passages in Scripture can be taken to say certain deeds are righteous (faith's righteousness before God is different from the righteousness of works that follows faith's righteousness, works in the abstract can be said to be pleasing to God, and there are various reasons for why works might be said to be righteous but not on the merit of the work itself)<sup>178</sup>
8. In some passages of Scripture saints seem to trust in their own works by opposing their own righteousness or innocence to God's judgment (they are speaking of the rightness of their cause)<sup>179</sup>
9. Some passages can be taken to say salvation depends on the individual person (the correct teaching of salvation not by works but freely by grace through faith is clear in many passages that can explain the others)<sup>180</sup>
10. Old Testament rites and rituals seem to justify *ex opere operato* (they pointed to Christ without faith in whom no one was saved, just as with New Testament sacraments)<sup>181</sup>
11. Some passages can be taken to say certain actions do away with sin (those passages speak not of propitiation but repentance)<sup>182</sup>

Although Chemnitz does not delineate any connections between his eleven classes of arguments and the 18 specific arguments of the opponents Melancthon detailed, there

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<sup>175</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:640-642.

<sup>176</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:642-644.

<sup>177</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:644-646.

<sup>178</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:646-647.

<sup>179</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:647-648.

<sup>180</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:648.

<sup>181</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:648-649.

<sup>182</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:649.

are some obvious connections, as there are similarities between Melanchthon's refutation of the opponents' arguments in Chemnitz's *Loci* and Chemnitz's refutation in SD III.<sup>183</sup>

### Summary of Ap IV:75-121's argument

For the Reformers, Justification is the chief *locus* of the faith, and in many ways the *locus* is the center of *The Book of Concord* and its syllogistic reasoning, with Melanchthon's Apology IV on Justification being its longest article. Although chiefly in Apology IV:75-121, essentially from the beginning of Apology IV to its end (as well as both before the Apology and after), Melanchthon uses syllogistic reasoning fully in keeping with the forms and terminology of the logic of the medieval tradition, even if showing a penchant for syllogisms in the second figure with the valid moods Cesare and Cambestres. In *The Book of Concord* as a whole and in Apology IV in particular, the Reformers criticize philosophy and philosophers in regards to justification and righteousness,<sup>184</sup> but, somewhat ironically, at the same time—sometimes within words of each other—they make use of philosophy's methods to demonstrate the truth of their claims. Justification, righteousness before God, forgiveness of sins—all are only by faith in the merits of Christ, with love, civil righteousness, and the works of the law excluded as a cause of justification, although necessarily occurring as a result of justification. Melanchthon argues from positions he expects his opponents would grant and brings in other evidence from Scripture and Church Fathers. In keeping with a custom that goes back at least as far as Aristotle, Melanchthon does not delineate every premise or syllogism (although plausible completions have been given); instead he leans more toward the rhetorical use of dialectic and demonstration. If in the end one is left thinking that the Reformers' syllogisms in support of justification by faith alone are less than convincing, one wonders whether in the end Melanchthon and the other Reformers would have much of a problem with that. For Melanchthon at least,<sup>185</sup> logical methods cannot discover or affirm but only confirm the message of the Gospel; the message of the

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<sup>183</sup> Examples of Chemnitz's classes of arguments similar to passages from SD III follow. On class 1, see ¶9-21, 25. On class 3, see ¶22-35. And, on class 4, see ¶45.

<sup>184</sup> See the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.79.

<sup>185</sup> See the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.199.



Gospel, like justification itself, can only be received by faith. If in the end the arguments on justification do not convince, the arguments nevertheless might still serve the other three of Chemnitz's four purposes.<sup>186</sup>

Although this section has focused on syllogistic arguments "proving" that forgiveness is by faith, such use of syllogistic reasoning is but one part of the larger picture of *The Book of Concord's* use of deductive reasoning. Although Apology IV's treatment of justification continues to be treated in some of the following subsections, those subsections are intended to make other points and provide other parts of the larger picture.

### ***Replying to opponents' arguments, as in Ap IV:182***

At the end of Apology IV's section on Love and the Keeping of the Law, Melancthon succinctly states what he has been arguing in the immediately preceding paragraphs: that love and works of the law do not justify but nevertheless follow justification by faith alone. (The German version of the following paragraph is notably different and the syllogistic argument is at least less explicit.)

Ex his constat sola fide nos iustificari coram Deo, quia sola fide accipimus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem propter Christum, quia reconciliatio seu iustificatio est res promissa propter Christum, non propter legem. Itaque sola fide accipitur, etsi donato Spiritu Sancto sequitur legis impletio.

From this it is evident that we are justified before God by faith alone, since by faith alone we receive the forgiveness of sins and reconciliation for Christ's sake, and reconciliation or justification is something promised because of Christ, and not because of the law. Therefore it is received by faith alone, though the keeping of the law follows with the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Aus dem allen ist klar genug, daß allein der Glaube uns für Gott gerecht macht, das ist, er erlanget Vergebung der Sunde und Gnade um Christus willen und bringt uns zu einer neuen Geburt. Item, so ists klar genug, daß wir allein durch den Glauben den heiligen Geist empfangen; item daß unsere Werk und da wir anfanhen, das Gesetz zu halten, an ihm selbst Gott nicht gefallen. So ich nu, wenn ich gleich voll guter Werke bin, wie Paulus war und Petrus, dennoch anderswo muß meine Gerechtigkeit

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<sup>186</sup> See above at n.170, p.256.

suchen, nämlich in der Verheißung der Gnade Christi, item so allein der Glaube das Gewissen stillet, so muß je das gewiß sein, daß allein der Glaub für Gott gerecht macht. Denn wir müssen allezeit dabei bleiben, wollen wir recht lehren, daß wir nicht um des Gesetzes willen, nicht um Werke willen, sondern um Christus willen Gott angenehm sein. Denn die Ehre, so Christo gebühret, soll man nicht dem Gesetz oder unsern elenden Werken geben.

From this it is clear enough that only faith makes us righteous before God, that is, it obtains the forgiveness of sin and grace for Christ's sake, and brings us to a new birth. Likewise, it is clear enough that only by faith do we receive the Holy Spirit, likewise, that our works and where we begin to keep the Commandments by themselves do not please God. So now I, even if I am full of good works like Paul and Peter were, yet I must seek my righteousness elsewhere, namely in the promise of the grace of Christ; likewise, if only faith stills the conscience, so indeed it must be certain that only faith makes righteous before God. For, we must always remain with this, if we wish to teach correctly, that not on account of the law, not on account of works, but for Christ's sake do we please God. For the honor, due Christ, must not be given to the law or our miserable works.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>187</sup> Ap IV:182, BKS, 196; Tappert, 132. The English translation of the German is this author's adaption of the the Triglotta, 171. In translating the Latin, Tappert loses the sense of the double *quia* construction that makes explicit the two premises from which the preceding conclusion follows (confer Jacobs, I:114; but compare the Triglotta, 171). In translating the German, the Triglotta refers to "inchoate fulfilling of the law", and, while the word itself is not present in the German text, the idea behind the word is nevertheless expressed.

As here in Apology IV:182, the authors and translators of the works in *The Book of Concord* elsewhere make notable use of the impersonal Latin verb *constat* (3<sup>rd</sup> person singular, present active indicative of *consto, constare, constati, constatus*) for things that are "agreed, evident, understood, correct, or well-known" (Whitaker, *Words by William Whitaker*; Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, 439). Various translated into English, by such words as "clearly", the expression also refers to a wide variety of things, the clarity of which one might well argue, as clearly the Reformers opponents did and even the Reformers must have suspected, since in some cases they add the support (see examples noted in the following).

The things that are said to be clear can be grouped as follows. There are obvious interpretations of Scripture: Ap IV:238; XII:197. Things about the Reformers' teaching are said to be manifestly evident: two parts of penitence (AC XII:2), good works required (Ap IV:140, seems to be demonstrated), and absolution and keys bringing comfort (XI:2). Especially things directly pertaining to justification by faith are said to be understood: monks taught observances make satisfaction and merit grace and justification (AC XXVII:38), faith alone justifies (Ap IV:182, demonstrated with syllogism), neither works nor the law justify (Ap IV:195, 257), obedience is distributive righteousness (Ap IV:308), promise given and Christ revealed because people can't keep the law (XII:80), people have given up offices and marriages to be holier (Ap XV:26), and monastic vows do not pay the price for forgiveness (Ap XXVII:35). A number of general rules or principles are said to be well-known: that customs contrary to God's Word are not approved (AC XXII:9, where support from church canons is immediately cited); how prayers end (Ap IV:385); wicked belong to the body of the devil (Ap VII/VIII:29); people do not remember or understand

sins (XI:8, according to Psalm 19:2); keys do not remove common troubles (Ap XII:154); allegories do not prove anything (Ap XXIV:35 discussed below at n.138); command of God to flee from idolatry, impious doctrine, and unjust cruelty (Tr 58); no other God apart from the God (LC I:19); Saul was a great king (LC I:45); Third Commandment is in force and fulfilled where one's life and work are guided by God's Word (LC I:92); people kill someone if they have the means to save the person but do not (LC I:190); Christians must recognize inherited and actual sin (SD I:5); and there have been different explanations of Christ's descent (SD IX:1). *Constat* is also used in connection with things that are not known: who changed the practice of communing in two kinds (AC XXII:4) and when or if the Mantua council will be held (SA Preface:1). However, the largest group consists of uses directly against the Reformers' opponents (Roman and reformed): priests were married (AC XXIII:10, examples given), there had long been complaints about masses (AC XXIV:10), vows displeased understanding monks (AC XXVII:10), traditions multiplied (AC XXVIII:37), prelates put more importance on their own authority than on the Gospel (Ap IV:390 [first use]), theologians mix philosophy with teaching (Ap IV:390 [second use]), cruelty towards godly men shows their spirit (Ap IV:399), foolish opinions about traditions crept into the church (Ap VII/VIII:32), poor judgment evident by thinking of Gospel as external (Ap XVI:8), invocation of saints is an innovation (Ap XXI:13 [see above at n.90, p.162]), both kinds instituted for church (Ap XXII:4), celibacy a superstition and dangerous (Ap XXIII:6 [see above at n.63, p.218]), friars multiplied private masses (Ap XXIV:7), no scriptural proof for masses for the dead (Ap XXIV:92 [see the discussion in the text below, beginning on p.297]), monastic abuses (Ap XXVII:4), twisting of Scripture (Ap XXVII:43), nothing commanded regarding the dead in purgatory (SA II:ii:12), no command for pilgrimages (SA II:ii:18); kingdom of Christ scattered all over world and not everyone is ordained or confirmed by the pope (Tr 16), Christ not sent to possess a worldly kingdom (Tr 31), Roman pontiffs defend godless teachings and practices (Tr 39), the pope rules in the church as a kingdom set upon the pretext of Scripture (Tr 40), all pastors have jurisdiction to excommunicate (Tr 74), Roman officials exercise arbitrariness (Tr 74), the real presence is true on account of Christ's words (LC V:14, consequence connection made), Christ's body and blood are not a vain thing (LC V:30), Anabaptist righteousness is a self-chosen spirituality (Ep XII:5), and apart from Christ people are dupes and captives of sin (SD II:43, in a Luther quote originally in German).

The German translation of the Latin *constat* and the use of *constat* to translate German is worth noting. The Latin word is used in a number of sections the German translation omits (including some that are more-technical in nature): Ap IV:195, 257, 308, 385, 390 [twice], 399. Where there are German equivalents, they are as follows: *ist wahr(e)* (AC XII:2; SD I:5), *dies wahr* (Tr 40), *(je) am Tag(e)* (AC XXVII:38; XXVIII:37; Ap XXVII:4; Tr 31, 39), *ist (es) gewiss* (Ap IV:140, 238; VII/VIII:29; XI:8; XII:80, 154; XXI:13; XXII:4; XXIV:7, 92; SA II:ii:18; Tr 16, 74), *klar genug* (Ap IV:182), *man weiß* (XII:137; XV:26; SA Preface:1 [nicht]), *So steht* (Tr 58), and *so muss auch* (LC IV:46). In two places in the Augsburg Confession the German version goes further than its equally authoritative Latin: *ist es auch den Historien und der Väter Schriften zu beweisen* (AC XXIII:10); *auf mancherlei Weise* (AC XXIV:10). The Latin *constat* is an addition in the majority of the cases of translated German works (SA II:ii:12; LC I:19, 45, 92, 190; LC V:14, 30; Ep XII:5; SD II:43; IX:1). Moreover, a number of those additions go beyond the simple use of *constat*, adding the following: *satis* (Ap XXVII:35), *pro certo* (LC I:19, 190), and *pro certo sane* (LC I:45).

Melanchthon, the only author of the works in *The Book of Concord* writing in Latin, used *constat* the most, and he seemed to use it rhetorically, where the degree to which something was "evident" was most likely in question. The Latin translators of the German works used *constat*, but their uses generally were additions with some sort of amplification for neither of which was there a corresponding statement in the German original.

Similar is the use in Ap IV:182 by the German translator of the Apology of the Augsburg Confession of the German expression *klar genug*. The expression is most often used in connection with justification by faith (Ap IV:67 [*sumi potest*], 182 [twice, the second is an addition in the German], 220 [a German addition], 362 [*supra ostendimus*]; Ap XXIII:64 [*diximus*]; Ap XXVII:14 [*testatur*]). But, the phrase is also used regarding James being on the Reformers side (Ap IV:248, *Ex his liquet*), that the sacraments are efficacious when distributed by evil men (Ap VII/VIII:29, *satis clare diximus*), that one accepts the promise by faith before keeping the laws (Ap XII:87, *satis perspicua*), that the Gospel does not

Melanchthon's argument in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows.

32) All that justifies (P) is a thing that receives what is promised because of Christ and not because of the law (M).

33) Nothing other than faith (S) is a thing that receives what is promised because of Christ and not because of the law (M).

34) Nothing other than faith (S) is that which justifies (P).

The foregoing final argument in the "Love and the Keeping of the Law" section of Apology IV again uses a syllogism in the form of the second figure with the valid mood AEE known as *Cambestres*, although Melanchthon seems to give the argument in the text in the inverse order before restating the conclusion and the effect justification causes. Likewise, again the minor premise (46) is the critical argument, and one his opponents are not so likely to think is "evident" or "clear enough".<sup>188</sup> In short, Melanchthon's practice has not changed from one section of Apology IV to the next. The German version of this paragraph essentially removes the premises, but the content it inserts addresses potential counter-arguments to the minor premise. This paragraph is not the only example of the German version simplifying or adding to the Apology's Latin, as is the focus of the next subsection.

### ***The Apology's German: simplifying and sharpening***

As has been seen to some extent, the arguments of the Apology's Latin original are often simplified in its German translation, but the German translation can also sometimes sharpen the Latin's polemic. In this section, Apology IV:265-276 is an example of the German version's simplifying, and Apology IV:225-228 is an example of the German version's sharpening.

First is the example of the German version's simplifying. In Apology IV's section replying to the opponents' arguments, the authoritative Latin has twelve numbered paragraphs (§265-276) dealing with such things as human reason admiring works and

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command canonical satisfactions (Ap XII:172, *hactenus ostendimus*), that Paul makes it clear he is talking about human traditions (Ap XV:30, *clare testatur*), and that the Emperor wants to improve the Church (Ap XXI:42, a German addition). As with *constat*, the use of the expression seems to be more rhetorical than indicating a standard of proof achieved, which is not to deny that what the Reformers say is "clear enough" is in fact clear enough.

<sup>188</sup> See n.187 above, p.260.

thinking that they justify, potential support for such an opinion from the book of Daniel, general principles that must be used to properly understand passages that might be taken as praising works and preaching the law, and the application of those principle to specific passages. In the midst of this larger passage comes the following paragraph.

Teneamus igitur has regulas in omnibus encomiis operum, in praedicatione legis, quod lex non fiat sine Christo, sicut ipse inquit: Sine me nihil potestis facere. Item, quod sine fide impossibile sit placere Deo. Certissimum est enim, quod doctrina legis non vult tollere evangelium, non vult tollere propitiatorem Christum. Et maledicti sint pharisaei, adversarii nostri, qui legem ita interpretantur, ut operibus tribuant gloriam Christi, videlicet quod sint propitatio quod mereantur remissionem peccatorum. Sequitur igitur semper ita laudari opera, quod placeant propter fidem, quia opera non placent sine propitiatore Christo. Per hunc habemus accessum ad Deum, non per opera sine mediatore Christo.

Whenever good works are praised and the law preached, therefore, we must hold fast to these rules: that the law is not kept without Christ—as he himself has said, “Apart from me you can do nothing” (John 15:5)—and that “without faith it is impossible to please God” (Heb. 11:6). The teaching of the law is certainly not intended to abolish the Gospel of Christ, the propitiator. Cursed be our opponents, those Pharisees, who interpret the law in such a way that they attribute Christ’s glory to works and make of them a propitiation that merits the forgiveness of sins. It follows, therefore, that works are praised for pleasing God on account of faith, since they do not please him without Christ, the Propitiator. “Through him we have obtained access” to the Father (Rom. 5:2), not by works without Christ, the mediator.<sup>189</sup>

Melanchthon’s arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with the unexpressed premise enclosed in square brackets. Note that the first argument is propositional logic and the second syllogistic.

48) If our works are a propitiation that merits forgiveness of sins (p), then the teaching of the law would abolish the Gospel of Christ (q).

49) The teaching of the law does not abolish the Gospel of Christ (~q)

50) Our works are not a propitiation that merits the forgiveness of sins (~p)

51) No work that pleases God (P) is done without Christ (M).

52) [All not on account of faith (S) is done without Christ (M).]

53) Nothing not on account of faith (S) is a work that pleases God (P).

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<sup>189</sup> Ap IV:269, *BKS*, 214; Tappert, 147. Cited here again, Romans 5:2 also recalls for the reader earlier arguments involving the passage (for example, Ap IV:81, 256; confer the later uses in Ap IV:291, 297, 314).

In this case, the two arguments do not combine to form one larger proof but demonstrate two somewhat-separate but nevertheless related points. First, by way of *modus tollens* again, the two premises in the propositional argument (48 and 49) lead to the conclusion that works do not merit forgiveness (50), thereby denying works a role in justification. Second, the syllogistic argument (again a second figure syllogism with the valid mood EAE known as Cesare), with only its major premise (51) and conclusion (53) expressed in the text, indicates that faith must come before works in any way please God. Melancthon is allowing that there are two senses to works pleasing God: works propitiating God's wrath and works giving evidence of faith. (This distinction between works pleasing God so as to propitiate His wrath and works pleasing God on account of faith is akin to the distinction between justification and sanctification discussed in Chapter V.) Also notable in the preceding passage from the Latin is that Scripture provides the "rules" for interpreting Scripture, and the particular passages so properly understood remove the basis for the Reformers' opponents' argument that works justify and instead support the Reformers' own argument that works please God only because of faith.

Instead of the preceding and the others of the eleven numbered Latin paragraphs at this point in the authoritative text, the German version provides one much simpler paragraph.

Also ist auch auf den Spruch aus dem Evangelio zu antworten:  
 „Vergebet, so wird euch vergeben.“ Denn es ist gleich eine solche Lehre von der Buße. Daß erste Stück an diesem Spruch fordert Besserung und gute Werke, das andere Stück setzt dazu die Verheißung, und man soll daraus nicht schließen, daß unser Vergeben uns ex opere operato Vergebung der Sunde verdiene. Denn das sagt Christus nicht, sondern wie in andern Sakramenten Christus die Verheißung heftet an das äußerliche Zeichen, also heftet er auch hier die Verheißung von Vergebung der Sunde an die äußerlichen guten Werke. Und wie wir im Abendmahl nicht erlangen Vergebung der Sunde ohne den Glauben ex opere operato, also auch nicht in diesem Werk und unserm Vergeben; denn unser Vergeben ist auch kein gut Werk, es geschehe denn von denjenigen, welchen von Gott in Christo die Sunde schon zuvor vergeben sind. Darum unser Vergeben, soll es Gott gefallen, so muß es nach der Vergebung, da uns Gott vergibt, folgen. Denn Christus pflegt die zwei also zusammen zu

setzen, das Gesetz und Evangelium, beide den Glauben und auch die guten Werke, daß er anzeige, daß kein Glaube da sei, wenn nicht gute Werk folgen. Item daß wir äußerliche Zeichen haben, welche uns verinnern des Evangelii und Vergebung der Sunde, dadurch wir getröstet werden, daß also mannchfältig unser Glaube geübet werde. Also sollen solche Sprüche verstanden werden, denn sonst wäre es stracks wider das ganze Evangelium, und würde unser bettelisch Werke an Christus Statt gesetzt, welcher allein soll die Versöhnung sein, welcher je nicht zu verachten ist. Item wo sie sollten von Werken vestanden werden, so würde die Vergebung der Sunde ganz ungewiß; denn sie stünde auf einem losen Grunde, auf unsern elenden Werken.

The same answer must also be given in reference to the passage from the Gospel: *Forgive, and you will be forgiven*. For this is just such a doctrine of repentance. The first part in this passage demands amendment of life and good works, the other part adds the promise. Nor are we to infer from this that our forgiving merits for us *ex opere operato* remission of sin. For that is not what Christ says, but as in other sacraments Christ has attached the promise to an external sign, so He attaches the promise of the forgiveness of sin in this place to external good works. And as in the Lord's Supper we do not obtain forgiveness of sin without faith, *ex opere operato*, so neither in this action, when we forgive. For, our forgiving is not a good work, except it is performed by a person whose sins have been previously forgiven by God in Christ. If, therefore, our forgiving is to please God, it must follow after the forgiveness which God extends to us. For, as a rule, Christ combines these two, the Law and the Gospel, both faith and good works, in order to indicate that, where good works do not follow, there is no faith either, that we may have external marks, which remind us of the Gospel and the forgiveness of sin, for our comfort, and that thus our faith may be exercised in many ways. In this manner we are to understand such passages, otherwise they would directly contradict the entire Gospel, and our beggarly works would be put in the place of Christ, who alone is to be the propitiation, which no man is by any means to despise. Again, if these passages were to be understood as relating to works, the remission of sins would be quite uncertain; for it would rest on a poor foundation, on our miserable works.<sup>190</sup>

Although the German version has some discussion of reasoning, in this case it omits the discussion of reason itself and of its opinions regarding the justification of works, of the discussion of the Daniel passage, of the general principles regarding interpreting passages about works and the law, of the syllogism regarding works pleasing God on account of

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<sup>190</sup> BKS, 213; Triglotta, 197.

faith, and the discussion of all the other passages save the one, apparently part of Luke 6:37, which is roughly equivalent to Matthew 6:14, which is discussed in the otherwise omitted Apology IV:272. There are a number of other places in Apology IV where the German version is notably different even by glancing at the paragraphs.<sup>191</sup>

An example where the German version is more pointed than the Latin is earlier in Apology IV, ¶225-228. Drawing a correct conclusion from a statement of Scripture is again the nature of the dispute, and justification by faith is again at the center of the contention.

Sed obiiciunt praeferri dilectionem fidei et spei. Paulus enim ait: Maior horum caritas. Porro consentaneum est maximam et praecipuam virtutem iustificare. Quamquam hoc loco Paulus proprie loquitur de dilectione proximi et significat, dilectionem maximam esse, quia plurimos fructus habet. Fides et spes tantum agunt cum Deo. At dilectio foris erga homines infinita habet officia: tamen largiamur sane adversariis, dilectionem Dei et proximi maximam virtutem esse, quia hoc summum praeceptum est: Diliges Dominum Deum. Verum quomodo inde ratiocinabuntur, quod dilectio iustificet? Maxima virtus, inquiunt, iustificat. Imo sicut lex etiam maxima seu prima non iustificat, ita nec maxima virtus legis. Sed illa virtus iustificat, quae apprehendit Christum, quae communicat nobis Christi merita, qua accipimus gratiam et pacem a Deo. Haec autem virtus fides est. Nam, ut saepe dictum est, fides non tantum notitia est, sed multo magis velle accipere seu apprehendere ea, quae in promissione de Christo offeruntur. Est autem et haec obedientia erga Deum, velle accipere oblatam promissionem, non minus *λατρεία* quam dilectio. Vult sibi credi Deus, vult nos ab ipso bona accipere, et id pronuntiat esse verum cultum.

They object that love is preferred to faith and hope since Paul says (I Cor. 13:13), “The greatest of these is love.” Therefore it follows that the greatest and the main virtue should justify. In this passage, however, Paul speaks specifically about love to our neighbor, and he indicates that love is the greatest because it has the most fruits. Faith and hope deal only with God, while love has infinite external duties to men. Nevertheless, we concede to our opponents that love of God and neighbor is the greatest virtue because the great commandment is, “You shall love the Lord your

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<sup>191</sup> Ap IV:189-201 get one short formatted paragraph in the German; 258-260 are omitted, 285-315 is one paragraph (confer ¶303), 319-333 (four formatted paragraphs) get thirteen formatted paragraphs; 344-355 are omitted, and 375-377 and 378-400 get one formatted paragraph. Confer below, n.201, p.275; n.206, p.278; n.209, p.280; and n.25, p.326. On the refocusing of the Apology for the *octavo* edition that roughly coincided with the German version, see the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.143.



God” (Matt. 22:27 [*sic* for v.37]). How will they conclude from this that love justifies? The greatest virtue, they say, justifies. But even as the first and greatest law does not justify, neither does the greatest virtue of the law. But that virtue justifies which takes hold of Christ, communicating to us Christ’s merits and, through them, grace and peace from God. This virtue is faith. As we have often said, faith is not merely knowledge but rather a desire to accept and grasp what is offered in the promise of Christ. This obedience toward God, this desire to receive the offered promise, is no less an act of worship than is love. God wants us to believe Him and to accept blessings from Him; this he declares to be true worship.

Aber hie sagen sie auch, die Liebe werde dem Glauben und der Hoffnung vorgezogen. Denn Paulus sagt 1 Korinth. 13.: „Die Liebe ist die größest unter den dreien.“ Nu sei es zu achten, daß die Tugend, so Paulus die größest nennet, für Gott uns gerecht und heilig mache. Wiewohl nu Paulus da eigentlich redet von der Liebe gegen dem Nächsten, und so er spricht: „Die Liebe ist die größest“, sagt er darum denn die Liebe gehet weit und trägt viel Früchte auf Erden. Denn Glaub und Hoffnung handeln allein mit Gott. Aber die Liebe gehet auf Erden untern Leuten um und tut viel Guts mit trösten, lehren, unterrichten, helfen, raten, heimlich, öffentlich. Doch lassen wir zu, daß Gott und den Nächsten lieben die höhest Tugend sei. Denn dies ist das höhist Gebot: „Du sollst Gott lieben von ganzem Herzen.“ Daraus folgt nu nicht, daß die Liebe uns gerecht macht. Ja, sprechen sie, die höhist Tugend soll billig gerecht machen. Antwort: Es wäre wahr, wenn wir um unserer Tugend willen einen gnädigen Gott hätten. Nu ist droben bewiesen, daß wir um Christus willen, nicht um unser Tugend willen angenehm und gerecht sind; denn unser Tugend sind unrein. Ja, wie dieses Gesetz das höhist ist: „Du sollst Gott lieben“, also kann diese Tugend, Gott lieben, am allerwenigsten gerecht machen. Denn so das Gesetz und Tugend höher ist, so wirs weniger tun können, darum sind wir nicht um der Liebe willen gerecht. Der Glaub aber macht gerecht, nicht um unsers Tuns willen, sondern allein derhalben, daß er Barmherzigkeit sucht und empfähet, und will sich auf kein eigen Tun verlassen, das ist, daß wir lehren, Gesetz macht nicht gerecht, sondern das Evangelium, das glauben heißt, daß wir um Christus’ willen, nicht um unsers Tuns willen ein gnädigen Gott haben.

But here they also say love is preferred to faith and hope, since Paul says in 1 Corinthians 13:13: “Love is the greatest of these three.” Now it is to consider whether the virtue that Paul takes as the greatest, makes us righteous and holy before God. Now Paul, however, there speaks strictly of love to our neighbor, and so he says, “Love is the greatest”; he says that because love reaches far and produces much fruit on earth and because faith and hope deal with God alone. But love goes forth on earth among people and does much good, by consoling, teaching, instructing,

helping, and counseling privately and publicly. Of course we concede to our opponents that love of God and neighbor is the highest virtue, because this is the highest commandment: “You should love God with your whole heart.” From that does not follow that love makes us righteous. Yes, they say, the highest virtue should properly make righteous. Answer: It would be true, if we had a gracious God on account of our virtue. Now, it was proven above that on Christ’s account, not on account of our virtue, we are accepted and righteous; for, our virtues are impure. Yes, as this Commandment is the highest: “You should love God”, so this virtue, love of God, least of all can make righteous. So, because the Commandment and virtue are higher, so we can do less, therefore we are not righteous on account of love. But faith makes righteous, not on account of our deeds, but only because it seeks and receives mercy, and will count on no deed of its own, that is, that we teach, the law does not make righteous, but the Gospel tells us to believe that we will have a gracious God on Christ’s account, not on account of our deeds.<sup>192</sup>

In both the Latin and the German versions the Reformers are refuting the argument of their opponents that 1 Corinthians 13:13 can be taken to support the opponents’ claim that love justifies. Both grant to the opponents that love is the greatest virtue, although the German elaborates on what love can do. Both say the opponents’ reasoning is flawed, but, where the Latin asks a rhetorical question, the German is definitive and claims to have already proven that people are righteous only on Christ’s account and not on the basis of their impure virtue.

The key to the differences between the translations may well be their different audiences.<sup>193</sup> While the German of the Apology is often simplified and shortened, in

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<sup>192</sup> Ap IV:225-228, *BKS*, 203; Tappert, 138-139. The English of the German is this author’s adaptation of the Triglotta, 183. For this particular argument of the opponents, *BKS*, 203 n.1, refers to the Confutation in CR, 27:100 (confer Reu, 352\*; K-N, 110).

<sup>193</sup> Ap XXIII:70 in two German additions warns the leaders of state and church of consequences on judgment day for false teaching. The Latin reads: *Talibus argumentis tam vanis defendunt legem impiam et perniciosam bonis moribus. Talibus rationibus muniunt Principum animos adversus iudicium Dei, in quo Deus reposcet rationem, cur dissipaverint coniugia, cur cruciaverint, cur interfecerint sacerdotes. Nolite enim dubitare, quin, ut sanguis Abel mortui clamabat, ita clamet etiam sanguis multorum bonorum virorum, in quos iniuste saevitum est. Et ulciscetur hanc saevitiam Deus; ibi comperietis, quam sint inanes hac rationes adversariorum, et intelligetis in iudicio Dei nullas calumnias adversus verbum Dei consistere, ut ait Esaias: Omnis caro foenum, et omnis gloria eius quasi flos foeni.* The German reads: *Mit solchen schwachen, losen Gründen schützen und verteidigen sie des Pabsts Gesetz vom Zölibat, das so zu großen Lastern und Unzucht hat Ursach geben. Die Fürsten und Bischöfe, so diesen Lehrern glauben, werden wohl sehen, ob solche Gründe den Stich halten, wenn es zu der Todesstunde kommt, daß man für Gott soll Rechenschaft geben, warum sie frommer Leute Ehe zerrissen haben, warum sie diese gestöckt und geplöckt*

other instances it is sharpened. Sometimes the German of the Apology omits Greek terms from the Latin original<sup>194</sup> or simplifies other more-technical language.<sup>195</sup> Consistent with the different audiences being the factor is the fact that in some cases Latin translations of German originals are made more technical.<sup>196</sup>

### ***Arguing over particles, as in Apology IV:281-284***

As was seen above in the philosophical background of syllogisms,<sup>197</sup> properly using particles such as “all” is significant in the sound logic. While replying to their opponents’ arguments, the Reformers accuse their opponents of misinterpreting that very particle as it comes up in a statement of Scripture.<sup>198</sup>

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*haben, warum sie so viel Priester erwürgt und unschuldig Blut über alles Klagen, Heulen und Weinen so vieler Witwen und Waisen, vergossen haben. Denn das dürfen sie ihnen nicht in Sinn nehmen. Die Zähren und Tränen der armen Witwen, das Blut der Unschuldigen ist im Himmel unvergessen, es wird zu seiner Stund als stark, als des heiligen, unschuldigen Habels Blut über sie in hohen Himmel schreien und für Gott, dem rechten Richter, rufen. Wenn nu Gott solche Tyrannei richten wird, werden sie erfahren, daß ihr Argumente Stroh und Heu sind und Gott ein verzehrend Feuer, für dem nichts bleiben kann außer göttlichs Wortes, 1 Petr. 1.* In English: “With false arguments like these they defend a wicked and immoral law. With reasons like these they persuade the princes to take a position contrary to the judgment of God [the princes and bishops who believe this teaching will see whether their reasons will endure the test, when the hour of death arrives], who will call them to account for breaking up marriages and torturing [flogged and impaled] and killing priests [regardless of the cries, wails, and tears of so many widows and orphans]. Have no doubt that as the blood of Abel cried out in death (Gen. 4:10), so the blood of the many innocent victims of their rage will also cry out. God will avenge this cruelty. Then you will see the emptiness of our opponents’ arguments and understand that in the judgment of God no perversion of God’s Word will stand, as Isaiah says (40:6), ‘All flesh is grass, and all its beauty is like the flower of the field’ [that their arguments are straw and hay, and God a consuming fire, before whom nothing but God’s Word can abide, 1 Pet. 1, 24].” (BKS, 348-349; Tappert, 249; English translations of the German insertions provided in the square brackets are from the Triglotta, 383.)

<sup>194</sup> One example is Ap XXIII:64, where the Latin says *Hanc rationem, quam ostendant velut maxime εὐπρόσωπον, supra diluimus* (“We have already refuted this very specious argument”) in the Latin and the German says simply *Das Argument haben wir hie oben verlegt* (“That argument we have put off above”) (BKS, 346-347; Tappert, 248; English from the German is this author’s translation). *εὐπρόσωπον*, which literally means “fair face”, has the metaphorical meaning of “fair in outward show” or “specious” (Liddell and Scott, *A Greek-English Lexicon*, 728), as in Aristotle’s *Politics*, II.5, 1263<sup>b</sup>15, Barnes, II:2005, where Barnes translates “specious appearance”.

<sup>195</sup> Compare the significantly different treatments of the arguments about the Mass from various related words in Ap XXIV:78-88.

<sup>196</sup> The Latin translation of LC IV:46 seems to be more technical, as does Ep R&N:8.

<sup>197</sup> See the discussion in the text above, beginning on p.193.

<sup>198</sup> See the citation of Luke 11:41 in article XX of the Confutation (Reu, ed., *The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources*, \*359; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts*, 117), which article is also in view in Apology IV (Ap IV:1). Confer BKS, 215 n.2, which cites CR, 27:122.

Citatur mutilatus et hic locus Lucae 11.: Date eleemosynam, et ecce omnia munda sunt vobis. Plane surdi sunt adversarii. Toties iam dicimus ad praedicationem legis oportere addi evangelium de Christo, propter quem placent bona opera, sed illi ubique excluso Christo docent mereri iustificationem per opera legis. Hic locus integer prolatus ostendet fidem requiri. Christus obiurgat phariseos, sentientes se coram Deo mundari, hoc est, iustificari crebris ablutionibus. Sicut papa, nescio quis, de aqua sale conspersa inquit, quod populum sanctificet ac mundet; et glossa ait, quod mundet a venialibus. Tales erant et phariseorum opiniones, quas reprehendit Christus, et opponit huic fictae purgationi duplicem munditiam, alteram internam, alteram externam. Iubet, ut intus mudentur, et addit de munditie externa: Date eleemosynam de eo, quod superest, et sic omnia erunt vobis munda. Adversarii non recte accommodant particulam universalem omnia; Christus enim addit hanc conclusionem utrique membro: Tunc omnia erunt munda, si intus eritis mundi, et foris dederitis eleemosynam. Significat enim, quod externa mundities collocanda sit in operibus a Deo praeceptis, non in traditionibus humanis, ut tunc erant illae ablutiones, et nunc est cotidiana illa aspersio aquae, vestitus monachorum, discrimina ciborum et similes pompae. Sed adversarii corrumpunt sententiam, sophisticè translata particula universali ad unam partem: Omnia erunt munda datis eleemosynis. Atqui Petrus dixit: Fide purificari corda. Sed totus locus inspectus sententiam offert consentientem eum reliqua Scriptura, quod si corda sint mundata, et deinde foris accedant eleemosynae, hoc est, omnia opera caritatis: ita totos esse mundos, hoc est, non intus solum, sed foris etiam. Deinde cur non tota illa concio coniungitur? Multae sunt partes obiurgationis, quarum aliae de fide, aliae de operibus praecipunt. Nec est candidi lectoris excerpere praecepta operum, omissis locis de fide.

Luke 11:41 is also quoted in a garbled form: “Give alms; and behold, everything is clean for you.” Our opponents must be deaf. Over and over we say that the Gospel of Christ must be added to the preaching of the law, that for his sake good works please God. Yet everywhere they exclude Christ and teach that we merit justification by the works of the law. An examination of the whole passage shows that it requires faith. Christ is upbraiding the Pharisees for thinking that they are cleansed before God and justified by frequent washings. Just as some Pope—I am not sure which—said that sprinkling water mixed with salt “sanctifies and cleanses the people,” and the gloss says that it cleanses from venial sins. Such were the opinions of the Pharisees, too. These Christ rejects, and in place of this false cleansing he puts a twofold cleanness, one internal and the other external. He commands that they be cleansed inwardly and then adds concerning the outward cleanness, “Give alms from what you have left over, and thus all things will be clean for you.”

Our opponents misinterpret the universal particle “all.” Christ adds this conclusion to both clauses: all things will be clean if you are clean inwardly and if you give alms. He means that outward cleanness is to be sought in works commanded by God, not in human traditions like the ablutions in those days, or in our own time the daily sprinkling of water, the habit of the monks, the distinctions of foods, and similar pompous acts. Our opponents twist his meaning by sophistically transferring the universal particle to a single part: “All things will be clean when you have given alms.” Yet Peter says (Acts 15:9) that hearts are purified by faith. A study of the whole passage shows its agreement with the rest of Scripture; for if hearts are clean and then the outward giving of alms is added (that is, all the works of love), then men are completely clean, outwardly as well as inwardly. Moreover, why do they not present the whole sermon? The admonition has many parts, some of which command faith, others works. An honest reader would not pick out the commands about works and skip the passages about faith.

Auch ziehen sie an den Spruch Christi: „Gebet Almosen, so wird euch alles rein sein.“ Die Widersacher sein taub und haben dicke Ohren, darum müssen wir ihnen die Regel oft erholen, daß das Gesetz ohne Christo niemand für Gott fromm mache und daß alle Werk allein um Christus willen angenehm sein. Aber die Widersacher schließen Christum allenthalben aus, tun gleich, als sei Christus nichts, und lehren unverschamt, daß wir Vergebung der Sünden erlangen durch gute Werke usw. Wenn wir aber den Spruch unzerrissen ganz ansehen, so werden wir sehen, daß er auch vom Glauben mit redet. Christus schilt die Pharisäer, daß sie wollten wähnen, sie würden für Gott heilig und rein durch allerlei baptismata carnis, das ist, durch allerlei leibliches Bade, Waschen und Reinigung am Leibe, an Gefäße, an Kleidern. Wie auch ein Papst in seine Canones gesetzt hat ein nötig päpstlich Stücke vom Weihwasser, daß, wenn es mit geweihtem Salz besprengt wird, so heiligt und reinigt das Volk von Sunden. Und die Glosse sagt, es reinige von täglichen Sünden. Also hatten die Pharisäer auch Irrtüm unter sich, welche Christus strafet und setzt gegen die erdichteten Reinigungen zweierlei Reinigkeit, eine innerlich, die ander äußerlich, und vermahnet, daß sie inwendig sollen rein sein; das geschieht, wie Petrus sagt in Geschichten der Apostel am 15. durch den Glauben. Und setzt dazu von äußerlicher Reinigkeit: „Gebet Almosen von dem, das ihr übrig habt, so wird euch alles rein sein.“ Die Widersacher führen nicht recht ein das Wort alles. Denn Christus setzt den Beschluß auf beide Stücke, auf die innerliche und äußerliche Reinigkeit, und sagt: „Alles wird euch rein sein.“ Das ist, wenn ihr euch nicht allein leiblich badet, sondern Gott gläubet, und also inwendig rein seid und auswendig Almosen gebt, so wird euch alles rein sein. Und zeigt an, daß auch die rechte äußerliche Reinigkeit stehe in den Werken, welche Gott

geboten habe, und nicht in menschlichen Satzungen, als da waren dieselben traditiones Pharisaeorum usw. und wie bei unserer Zeit ist das Bespritzen und Sprengen den Weihwassers, die schneeweißen Mönchskleider, die Unterschied der Speis und dergleichen. Die Widersacher aber ziehen dies signum universale, nämlich das Wort alles, sophistisch allein auf einen Teil und sagen: Alles wird euch rein sein, wenn ihr Almosen gebet usw. Als wenn einer sagt: Andreas ist da, darum sein alle Aposteln da. Darum im antecedent oder vorgehend Stücke dies Spruchs soll beides beinander bleiben: Gläubet und Gebet Almosen. Denn darauf gehet die ganze Sendung, das ganze Amt Christi, darum ist er da, daß sie glauben sollen. Wenn nu beide Stück zusammen gefasset werden: gläuben und Eleemosynen geben, so folget recht, daß alles rein sei, das Herz durch Glauben, der äußerlich Wandel durch gute Werk. Also soll man die Predigt ganz fassen und nicht das eine Stück umkehren und deuten, daß das Herz von Sunden rein wird durch unsere Eleemosynen. Es sind auch wohl etliche, die da meinen, daß es wider die Pharisäer von Christo ironice oder spöttisch geredet sei, als sollt er sagen: Ja, lieben Junkern, raubet und stehlet und gehet darnach hin, gebet Almosen, so werdet ihr bald rein sein. Daß also Christus etwas herbe und höhnisch ansteche ihre pharisäische Heuchelei. Denn wiewohl sie voll Unglaubens, voll Geiz und alles Argen waren, so hielten sie doch ihre Reinigung, gaben Almosen und meinten, sie wären gar reine, zarte Heiligen. Die Auslegung ist dem Text daselbst nicht entgegen.

They also drag out the saying of Christ: "Give alms, so all things will be clean for you" [Luke 11:41]. Our opponents are deaf and have thick ears, therefore we often have to repeat the rule that the law without Christ makes no one godly before God and that only on Christ's account is all work pleasing. But the opponents exclude Christ everywhere, as they like to do, and behave as if Christ were nothing, and teach shamelessly that we merit forgiveness of sins through good works, etc. But if we examine the whole saying without interruption, we will see that He also speaks of faith. Christ scolds the Pharisees that they will presume that they are holy and clean before God by all sorts of *baptismata carnis*, that is, by all sorts of baths, washings, and cleansings of the body, of vessels, and clothing. Just as a Pope in his canons has the sentence requiring a papistic writing on holy water, that, when it is sprinkled with blessed salt, so it sanctifies and cleanses the people from their sins. And the gloss says it cleanses from daily sins. The Pharisees also had such errors under them, which Christ rebuked and against the fictitious cleansings puts a twofold cleanness, one inner, the other outer, and exhorts that they should be clean inwardly; that happens, as Peter says in the history of the Apostles, the 15<sup>th</sup> chapter [Acts 15:9], through faith. And then He adds on the outer cleanness, "Give alms from what you have remaining, so all things will be

clean for you.” The opponents do not rightly introduce the word “all”. For Christ adds on the conclusion to both parts, to the inner and outer cleanness, and says: “All things will be clean for you.” That is, if you do not merely bathe bodily, but believe God, and so be inwardly clean and outwardly give alms, so all things will be clean for you. And He shows that also the outer cleanness stands in works, which God has commanded, and not in human ordinances, such as the same *traditiones pharisaeorum*, etc., and in our time the sprinkling and spraying of holy water, the snow-white monks’ clothing, the distinction of foods, and the like. But, the opponents sophistically drag out the *signum universale*, namely the word “all”, only from one part and say: All things will be clean for you, when you give alms, etc. As if one says: Andrew is there, therefore all the Apostles are there. Therefore in the *antecedent* or previous piece of the saying both should remain together: Believe and give alms. Then there goes the whole mission, the whole office of Christ, therefore He is there, that they should believe. Now if both pieces are combined together: believing and giving *eleemosynen*, it rightly follows that all things will be clean, the heart by faith, the outer conduct by good works. So one should combine the whole sermon and not revert and expound that one piece that the heart becomes clean from sins through our *eleemosynen*. There are doubtless also a few who think the meaning there, that is against the Pharisees by Christ spoken ironically or mockingly, as if He should say: Yes, my dear knights, rob and steal and then go forth, give alms, so you will soon be clean. In other words, Christ goads their their pharisaical hypocrisy harshly and ironically. For although they were full of unbelief, full of thriftiness, and all wickedness, so they yet kept their cleansings, gave alms, and supposed they were quite clean, tender saints. The interpretation is not contrary to the same text.<sup>199</sup>

For their part, the Reformers argue that they properly understand the particles, and they claim they do not exclude works the way their opponents exclude faith.<sup>200</sup> To be sure, the central point of the Latin original and point of the German version are essentially the same, but the German version adds the illustration concerning Andrew and the apostles as an example of similar faulty reasoning. The use of the Latin terms in the German, usually with a German equivalent, is also significant, and such problems with particles have a close connection with errors of logic. One can question whether what the Reformers draw out of the Luke passage is really present there, although as they claim, their interpretation

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<sup>199</sup> Ap IV:281-284, *BKS*, 215-217; Tappert, 149-150. The English translation of the German is this author’s adaptation of the Triglotta, 201.

<sup>200</sup> See also Ap IV:73-74, above at n.87, p.231.

does not appear to be contrary to the text. Thus, the Reformers make syllogistic arguments based on biblical texts, no doubt following the precedent of arguments they perceived in Scripture itself.

### ***Finding arguments in Scripture, as in Apology IV:285***

Continuing the section that replies to the opponents' arguments, the very next passage from Apology IV on Justification is one where an argument from Scripture itself is described, summarizing Paul's discussion in Romans 4, again with a view towards comforting consciences, especially contrasting the opponents' teaching's lack of comfort with the comfort the Reformers' teaching provides. (Note the convergence of words used in this passage.)

Postremo hoc monendi sunt lectores, quod adversarii pessime consulunt piis conscientiiis, cum docent per opera mereri remissionem peccatorum, quia conscientia colligens per opera remissionem non potest statuere, quod opus satisfaciat Deo. Ideo semper angitur et subinde alia opera, alios cultus excogitat, donec prorsus desperat. Haec ratio exstat apud Paulum, Rom. 4, ubi probat, quod promissio iustitiae non contingat propter opera nostra, quia nunquam possemus statuere, quod haberemus placatum Deum. Lex enim semper accusat. Ita promissio irrita esset et incerta. Ideo concludit, quod promissio illa remissionis peccatorum et iustitiae fide accipiatur, non propter opera. Haec est vera et simplex et germana sententia Pauli, in qua maxima consolatio piis conscientiiis proposita est et illustratur gloria Christi, qui certe ad hoc donatus est nobis, ut per ipsum habeamus gratiam, iustitiam et pacem.

Finally, we would remind our readers that our opponents counsel pious consciences very badly when they teach that works merit the forgiveness of sins, because a conscience that seeks forgiveness through works cannot be sure that its work will satisfy God. It is always tormented and constantly invents other works and services until it despairs utterly. Describing this process in Rom. 4:5 ff., Paul proves that the promise of righteousness does not depend upon our works, because we could never be sure that we have a gracious God. The law always accuses. Thus the promise would be vain and unsure. He concludes that not works but faith accepts the promised forgiveness of sins and righteousness of faith. This is what Paul really and truly means. This offers the greatest consolation is faithful consciences and illumines the glory of Christ, who was surely



given to us that through him we might have grace, righteousness, and peace.<sup>201</sup>

Melanchthon's argument in the preceding passage of the Apology may be represented syllogistically as follows, with unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. (Note that Melanchthon roughly identifies "being sure that its work will satisfy God" and "being sure that we have a gracious God"—either brings peace to the conscience.)

54) No state of depending on works (P) is a state of being sure of a gracious God (M).

55) [All states of receiving God's promise of righteousness (S) are states of being sure of a gracious God (M).]

56) No state of receiving God's promise of righteousness (S) is a state of depending on works (P).

57) [All accusations of an individual's sin (M) make the promise vain and unsure (P).]

58) All uses of the law (S) are an accusation of an individual's sin (M).

59) All uses of the law (S) make the promise vain and unsure (P).

60) All teaching that properly counsels consciences (P) is teaching that gives assurance of a satisfied God (M).

61) No teaching that works merit forgiveness of sins (S) is a teaching that gives assurance of a satisfied God (M).

62) No teaching that works merit forgiveness of sins (S) is teaching that properly counsels consciences (P).

In this case Melanchthon is not using one syllogism to prove part of another but making three related points about how the teaching that works save nullifies the promise and leaves consciences to despair. The three syllogisms are figures and valid moods that already have been seen: 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cesare (54-55-56); 1<sup>st</sup> figure Barabara (57-58-59); and 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres (60-61-62). Significantly in Romans 4 Paul is also making an argument from Scripture, in his case from Genesis 15:6. The preceding passage from the Apology is not the only place where the Reformers find arguments in Scripture, of course, although more likely is their use of Scripture as support for an argument.<sup>202</sup> In other cases, their arguments are supported with appeals to fundamental principles, as is seen in the next subsection, where the same topic of *lex semper accusat* is also discussed.

### ***Fundamental principles in a proof, as in Apology IV:291-300***

Once a particular point is "proven" by the use of Scripture, that point itself can become a premise in another argument. Apology IV:291-300 illustrates how this

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<sup>201</sup> Ap IV:285, BKS, 217; Tappert, 150. (The German omits this section, see above, n.191, p.266.)

<sup>202</sup> For example, Tr 24.

procedure works for the Reformers. In the immediately preceding paragraphs (§287 ff.), the Reformers discuss their opponents' two possible modes of justification, one based on reason and the other on the law, and reject both, because both exclude Christ.<sup>203</sup> Then, the Reformers argue for what is essentially a third mode, that of receiving forgiveness through the promise of the Gospel by faith in Christ. That Christ would not be given in vain seems to become a fundamental principle that figures prominently in proving their larger point that forgiveness, reconciliation, and victory over sin and death are received by faith in Christ.<sup>204</sup> (Though the need for Christ is going to be taken as a fundamental principle, Melancthon does discuss the Scriptural support for the position.<sup>205</sup>)

Melancthon's use of the fundamental principle and others comes next, and the concessions and qualifications he makes with a view to sanctification are significant.

Et ex hoc fundamento facile iudicari potest, quare fidei tribuamus iustificationem, non dilectioni, etsi dilectio fidem sequitur, quia dilectio est impletio legis. At Paulus docet nos non ex lege, sed ex promissione iustificari, quae tantum fide accipitur. Neque enim accedimus ad Deum sine mediatore Christo, neque accipimus remissionem peccatorum propter nostram dilectionem, sed propter Christum. Ac ne diligere quidem possumus iratum Deum, et lex semper accusat nos, semper ostendit iratum Deum. Necesse est igitur nos prius fide apprehendere promissionem, quod propter Christum Pater sit placatus et ignoscat. Postea incipimus legem facere. Procul a ratione humana, procul a Moise reiiciendi sunt oculi in Christum, et sentiendum, quod Christus sit nobis donatus, ut propter eum iusti reputemur. Legi nunquam in carne satisfacimus. Ita igitur iusti reputamur non propter legem, sed propter Christum, quia huius merita nobis donantur, si in eum credimus. Si quis igitur haec fundamenta consideraverit, quod non iustificemur ex lege, quia legem Dei humana natura non potest facere, non potest Deum diligere, sed quod iustificemur ex promissione, in qua propter Christum promissa est reconciliatio, iustitia et vita aeterna: is facile intelliget necessariotribuendam esse iustificationem fidei, si modo cogitabit Christum non esse frustra promissum, exhibitum, natum, passum, resuscitatum, si cogitabit promissionem gratiae in Christo non frustra, praeter legem et extra legem factam esse statim a principio mundi, si cogitabit promissionem fide accipiendam esse, sicut Iohannes inquit: Qui non credit Deo, mendacem

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<sup>203</sup> Ap IV:287-290, Tappert, 150-151.

<sup>204</sup> Ap IV:291, Tappert, 151-152. See the reference in §294.

<sup>205</sup> Ap IV:292-293, Tappert, 152.

facit eum, quia non credit in testimonium, quod testificatus est Deus de filio suo, et hoc est testimonium, quod vitam aeternam dedit nobis Deus, et haec vita in filio eius est. Qui habet filium, habet vitam, qui non habet filium Dei, vitam non habet. Et Christus ait: Si vos Filius liberaverit, vere liberi eritis. Et Paulus: Per hunc habemus accessum ad Deum, et addit: per fidem. Fide igitur in Christum accipitur promissio remissionis peccatorum et iustitiae. Nec iustificamur coram Deo ex ratione aut lege.

From this fundamental article it is clear why we ascribe justification to faith rather than to love, though love follows faith since love is the fulfilling of the law. Paul teaches that we are justified not by the law but by the promise, which is received by faith only. We cannot come to God without Christ, the mediator; nor do we receive forgiveness of sins because of our love but because of Christ. We cannot even love an angry God; the law always accuses us and thus always shows us an angry God. Therefore we must first take hold of the promise by faith, that for Christ's sake the Father is reconciled and forgiving. Later we begin to keep the law. Far away from human reason, far away from Moses, we must turn our eyes to Christ, and believe that he was given for us to be justified on his account. In the flesh we never satisfy the law. Thus we are not accounted righteous because of the law but because of Christ, whose merits are conferred on us if we believe in him. [¶297] If any one, therefore, has considered these foundations, that we are not justified by the Law, because human nature cannot observe the Law of God and cannot love God, but that we are justified from the promise, in which, for Christ's sake, reconciliation, righteousness, and eternal life have been promised, he will easily understand that justification must necessarily be ascribed to faith, if he only will reflect upon the fact that it is not in vain that Christ has been promised and set forth, that He has been born and has suffered and been raised again; if he will reflect upon the fact that the promise of grace in Christ is not in vain, that it was made immediately from the beginning of the world, apart from and beyond the Law; if he will reflect upon the fact that the promise should be received by faith, as 1 John 5, 10 sq. says: *He that believeth not God hath made Him a liar, because he believeth not the record that God gave of His Son.* And this is the record that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life is in His Son. He that hath the Son hath life, and he that hath not the Son of God hath not life. And Christ says, John 8, 36: *If the Son, therefore, shall make you free, ye shall be free indeed.* And Paul, Rom. 5, 2: *By whom also we have access to God; and he adds: by faith.* By faith in Christ, therefore, the promise of

remission of sins and of righteousness is received. Neither are we justified before God by reason or by the Law.<sup>206</sup>

In this excerpt Melanchthon more or less treats summarily arguments he has made before. The new arguments of the preceding paragraph may be represented syllogistically as follows, with the unexpressed premises provided in square brackets. Again, Melanchthon treats various expressions as equivalent, such as loving God and observing the law. (Although not discussed in further detail here, the “proof texts” from the Bible are worth noting.)

63) No one who faces an angry God (M) is one who loves God (P).

64) All who rely on the law for justification (S) face an angry God (M).

65) [No one who relies on the law for justification (S) is one who loves God (P).]

66) [All who are justified by the law (P) are those who observe the law (M).]

67) No human nature/being (S) is one that can observe the law (M).

68) No human nature/being (S) is one who is justified by the law (P).]

69) [Justification is either by the law (p) or by the promise (q).]

70) [Justification is not by the law (~p).]

71) [Justification is by the promise (q).]

72) [If justification were not necessarily ascribed to anything other than faith alone (p), the promise would be in vain (q).]

73) The promise is not in vain (~q).

74) Justification is not necessarily ascribed to anything other than faith alone (~p).

In the case of the first syllogism above (63-64-65), which is a 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogism in the valid EAE mood Celarent, Melanchthon, uncharacteristically in comparison to what has been observed so far, gives the two premises but does not draw the conclusion. Next, in ¶297, Melanchthon assumes without saying so a major premise (66) that his opponents no doubt argued and could itself be proved from the Biblical text. Melanchthon states the minor (67) and draws the conclusion (68), to present a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood AEE known as Cambestres. Then, Melanchthon continues to reason that since justification must be either from the law or promise (69) and since it is not from the law (70 is really just a restatement of 68), then it must be from the promise (71), which is nothing more than the Gospel of forgiveness by grace through faith in Jesus Christ. The earlier fundamental principle that the promise of reconciliation, righteousness, and eternal

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<sup>206</sup> Ap IV:294-297, BKS, 218; English of ¶294-296 from Tappert, 152-153; English of ¶297 from Triglotta, 205. (Tappert deviates from a more literal translation of the Latin in ¶297.) The German version in this place is not a direct equivalent; confer above, n.191 p.266.

life for Christ's sake would not be given in vain (73) is the minor premise that Melanchthon uses to further reason, with an unexpressed major premise (72) that justification cannot be ascribed to anything other than faith alone (74). All of these arguments together are relatively convincing, but Melanchthon seemingly could have gone further.

Returning to the first syllogism above (63-64-65), worth noting are two other arguments that might be made—but were not in fact made—using its conclusion (68) as a premise. Presumably the Reformers' opponents would be willing to grant the other premise that all the justified love God (75, below), even if they would not be so willing to grant the two conclusions.

75) [All who are justified (P) are those who love God (M).]

65) [No one who relies on the law for justification (S) is one who loves God (M).]

76) [No one who relies on the law for justification (S) is one who is justified (P).]

65) [No one who relies on the law for justification (P) is one who loves God (M).]

75) [All who are justified (S) are those who love God (M).]

77) [Some who are justified (S) are not one who relies on the law for justification (P).]

This first syllogism (75-65-76) is a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood AEE known as Cambestres, and produces a strong argument against the law justifying. One is also tempted to resequence the premises in order to form the second syllogism (65-75-77), which in its 3<sup>rd</sup> figure form EAO is the mood known as Felapto that is known to be valid today but was not recognized as a valid mood in medieval times.<sup>207</sup> This second syllogism (65-75-77) does not make as strong of a conclusion as Melanchthon would no doubt like to make, saying only that some of the justified do not rely on the law for justification (an O statement), not that none of the justified do not rely on the law for justification (an E statement).<sup>208</sup> Although Melanchthon did not go this direction in his arguments, nor could he have gone as far as the last syllogism (65-75-77), given the valid moods of the 3<sup>rd</sup> figure that were recognized in the medieval period, significantly he is clear both that love follows faith and that works, while excluded from justification, are

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<sup>207</sup> On Felapto, see, for example Bonevac, *Simple Logic*, 185.

<sup>208</sup> EAE is not a valid mood in the 3<sup>rd</sup> figure, so the only way to make this a valid argument is to change the nature of the statement.

not excluded altogether. The close connection of works following faith as an effect follows a cause is taken up in Chapter V.

As the text of Apology IV continues, all of the reasoning expressed in ¶294-297 is immediately regarded as an unassailable proof, with the technical term used in the Latin, and the proof is one again intended for the comfort of troubled consciences.

Haec tam perspicua, tam manifesta sunt, ut miremur tantum esse furorem adversariorum, ut haec vocent in dubium. Manifesta ἀπόδειξις est, cum non iustificemur coram Deo ex lege, sed ex promissione, quod necesse sit fidei tribuere iustificationem. Quid potest contra hanc ἀπόδειξιν opponi, nisi totum evangelium, totum Christum abolere quis volet? Gloria Christi fit illustrior, cum docemus eo uti mediatore ac propitiatore. Piae conscientiae vident in hac doctrina uberrimam consolationem sibi proponi, quod videlicet credere se certo statuere debent, quod propter Christum habeant placatum patrem, non propter nostras iustitias, et quod Christus adiuvet tamen, ut facere etiam legem possimus.

These things are so clear and evident that we are astonished to see how furiously our opponents deny them. The proof is obvious: Since we are not justified before God by the law but from the promise, justification must necessarily be ascribed to faith. What argument can anybody possibly bring against this proof unless he wants utterly to abolish Christ and the Gospel? Christ's glory becomes brighter when we teach men to make use of him as mediator and propitiator. In this teaching, faithful consciences see the most complete consolation offered them. They are taught to believe and to rely on the sure fact that they have a reconciled Father because of Christ, not because of our righteousness but because Christ still helps us to keep the law.<sup>209</sup>

Note that the fundamental principle of not abolishing Christ is still in play, although it does not enter the formal syllogism. The “proof” given in the preceding paragraph may

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<sup>209</sup> Ap IV:298-299, *BKS*, 219; Tappert, 153. The German version in this place is not a direct equivalent; confer n.191 above, p.266. Tappert's English translation at the end of this Latin excerpt leaves some things to be desired. Pious consciences see in the teaching that they can believe and know two things: that they are reconciled with the Father on account of Christ and that Christ helps them with their incipient keeping of the law. Translating “but because” wrongly makes the incipient keeping of the law the basis of the justification. (Compare the Triglotta, 205, “and that, nevertheless”.)

The Greek ἀπόδειξις for “proof” is used only here in the Latin of Ap IV:298; *demonstratio* for “proof” is used only in the Latin of Ap XXIII:27 (rendered *Grund* by the German there; see above at n.132, p.181).

be represented syllogistically as follows, with the unexpressed premise indicated in square brackets.

78) [All things done by the promise (M) are ascribed to faith (P).]

79) All justification before God (S) is something done by the promise (P).

80) All justification (S) is necessarily ascribed to faith (P).

As with others that have been seen so far, this syllogism is a 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogism of the valid mood AAA known as Barbara. Melancthon uses the argument in this form to glorify Christ and at the same time to comfort faithful consciences.<sup>210</sup> Clearly Melancthon expects a person under the Holy Spirit's guidance to use such reasoning on the basis of the Gospel message as comfort.

Whether the general principle of the necessity of using Christ in justification, justification by faith itself as a general principle, or some other general principle, general principles are used elsewhere in the works contained in *The Book of Concord*. In Luther's Smalcald Articles, a general principle, although it is not termed such, that certain honors belong only to God comes into the argument over the invocation of saints, outweighing the fact that saints on earth and even possibly saints in heaven pray for believers.<sup>211</sup> In the Solid Declaration's article on Original Sin, one reads the following.

Und dieweil unter anderm auch dieses ein ungezweifelter,  
unwidersprechlicher Grundspruch in der Theologia ist, daß eine jede  
substantia oder selbständiges Wesen, sofern es eine Substanz ist, entweder  
Gott selber oder ein Werk und Geschöpf Gottes sei ...

Et cum sit indubitatum certissimumque axioma in re theologica,  
quod omnis substantia (quatenus est substantia) aut sit Deus ipse aut opus  
et creatura Dei ...

It is one of the unquestioned and irrefutable axioms in theology  
that every substance or self-subsisting essence, in as far as it is a  
substance, is either God himself or a product and creature of God.<sup>212</sup>

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<sup>210</sup> On the role of giving glory to Christ and comforting troubled consciences as hermeneutical principles in the Apology, see Arand, "The Apology as a Polemical Commentary," 179-180. Confer Arand, "Melancthon's Rhetorical Argument," 289. See also at n.90 above, p.233.

<sup>211</sup> SA II:ii:26; II:iv:3, Tappert, 297.

<sup>212</sup> SD I:55, BKS, 862; Tappert, 518. The German *Grundspruch* and the corresponding Latin *axioma* (both "axiom") are used only here in *The Book of Concord*. Note the use of the Latin terms in the German accompanied with a German equivalent. This particular passage is also discussed above, at n.211, p.281.

Elsewhere in the Solid Declaration a statement of Scripture about the purpose of Scripture is used to argue both against the false security and impenitence and against the anxiety and despair that can arise while considering the *locus* of election.

Wider diesen falschen Wahn und Gedanken soll man nachfolgenden klaren Grund, der gewiß ist und nicht fehlen kann, setzen, nämlich: weil „alle Schrift von Gott eingegeben“ nicht zur Sicherheit und Unbußsertigkeit, sondern „zur Strafe, Züchtigung und Besserung“ dienen soll, 2 Timoth. 3.

Contra hanc falsam opinionem et periculosas cogitationes huic solidissimo fundamento, quod exspectationem nostram fallere non potest, sed longe firmissimum est, inniti oportet, nempe: Certum est omnem scripturam divinitus inspiratam non ad alendam securitatem aut impenitentiam, sed ad arguendum, ad erudiendum in iustitia et ad vitae emendationem propositam esse.

We must oppose such false imagining and [dangerous] thoughts with the following clear, certain, and unfailing foundation: All Scripture, inspired by God, should minister not to security and impenitence but “to reproof, correction, and improvement” (II Tim. 3:16).<sup>213</sup>

A final notable reference to general principles is in the Solid Declaration’s article on the Person of Christ, where the Reformers write of those who would not publicly confess the Sacramentarians’ position on the Lord’s Supper but nevertheless used “the same basic arguments” (*ebendieselbigen Grundfest; eadem fundamenta*) about Christ.<sup>214</sup> The implication from this last passage is that arguments one uses is an indication of one’s belief, at least in some cases stronger than what one otherwise publicly confesses.

In short, Melancthon reasons from fundamental principles much as Aristotle describes a scientific system developing. For Melancthon, as has been seen in Apology IV, these principles can be points proven by the use of Scripture or points the Reformers have demonstrated by syllogistic arguments. Such reasoning is not without its purposes: glorifying Christ and comforting troubled consciences to keep them from despair—something Melancthon says the Reformers do better than their opponents. Of course,

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<sup>213</sup> SD XI:12, *BKS*, 1067; Tappert, 618.

<sup>214</sup> SD VIII:4, *BKS*, 1018; Tappert, 592. The only other use of *Grundfest* is in the quotation of Ephesians 1:4 found in SD XI:65.



Melanchthon is not the only reformer who can argue syllogistically, as begins to be seen in the next subsection that considers the necessity of Baptism.

### ***“Necessity” of Baptism, as in Apology IX:2 and LC IV:30-31***

There are at least two places in *The Book of Concord* where syllogistic arguments are used regarding the “necessity” of Baptism. The first is in the Apology’s article on Baptism, where the argument is made against the Anabaptists’ claim that baptizing children is useless.

Certissimum est enim, quod promissio salutis pertinet etiam ad parvulos. Neque vero pertinet ad illos, qui sunt extra ecclesiam Christi, ubi nec verbum nec sacramenta sunt, quia Christus regenerat per verbum et sacramenta. Igitur necesse est baptizare parvulos, ut applicetur eis promissio salutis, iuxta mandatum Christi: Baptizate omnes gentes. Ubi sicut offertur omnibus salus, ita offertur omnibus baptismus, viris, mulieribus, pueris, infantibus. Sequitur igitur clare infantes baptizandos esse, quia salus cum baptismo offertur.

It is most certain that the promise of salvation also pertains to little children. It does not apply to those who are outside of Christ’s church, where there is neither Word nor sacrament, because Christ regenerates through Word and sacrament. Therefore it is necessary to baptize children, so that the promise of salvation might be applied to them according to Christ’s command (Matt. 28:19), “Baptize all nations.” Just as there salvation is offered to all, so Baptism is offered to all—men, women, children, and infants. Therefore it clearly follows that infants should be baptized because salvation is offered with Baptism.

Denn es ist ganz gewiß, daß die göttlichen Verheißungen der Gnade des Heiligen Geistes nicht allein die Alten, sondern auch die Kinder belangen. Nu gehen die Verheißungen diejenigen nicht an, so außerhalb der Kirchen Christi sein, da weder Evangelium noch Sakramente ist. Denn das Reich Christi ist nirgend, denn wo das Wort Gottes und die Sakramente sind. Darumb ist es auch recht christlich und not die Kinder zu täufen, damit sie des Evangelii, der Verheißung des Heils und der Gnaden teilhaftig werden, wie Christus befiehet: „Gehet hin, täufet alle Heiden.“ Wie ihnen nu wird Gnade, Heil in Christo, also wird ihnen angeboten die Taufe, beide Mannen und Weiben, Knaben und jungen Kindern. So folget gewiß daraus, daß man die jungen Kinder täufen mag und soll, denn in und mit der Taufe wird ihnen die gemeine Gnad und der Schatz des Evangelii angeboten.

For it is completely sure that the divine promises of the grace of the Holy Spirit do not only concern the old, but also children. Now, the promises do not concern those who are outside of Christ's church, where there is neither Gospel nor sacraments. Because the kingdom of Christ is nowhere than where the Word and Sacraments are. Therefore it is also rightfully Christian and necessary to baptize the children, thereby so that they might receive the Gospel, the promise of salvation, and grace according to Christ's command (Matthew 28:19), "Go forth, baptize all heathen." Now, just as grace, salvation in Christ, is offered to them, so Baptism is offered to them—both men and women, children and infants. Therefore it clearly follows that one may and should baptize infants, because in and with Baptism is offered the universal grace and treasure of the Gospel.<sup>215</sup>

The arguments in the preceding authoritative paragraph may be represented as follows, with the unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Again note that expressions are being equated, in this case, the promise or offer of salvation and access to Christ's regeneration.

81) No Word and Sacrament (M) is apart from the church (P).<sup>216</sup>

82) All access to Christ's regeneration (S) is through Word and Sacrament (M).

83) No access to Christ's regeneration (S) is found apart from the church (P).

83) No access to Christ's regeneration is apart from the church.

*substitute "offer of salvation" for "access to Christ's regeneration"*

84) No one to whom salvation is offered is one who is apart from the church.

*obversion*

85) All those to whom salvation is offered are those who are not apart from the church.

86) [All those to whom baptism is not offered are those who are outside the church.]

*contrapositive*

87) [All those who are not apart from the church are those to whom baptism is offered.]

87) [All those who are not apart from the church (M) are those to whom baptism is offered (P).]

85) All those to whom salvation is offered (S) are those who are not apart from the church (M).

88) All those to whom salvation is offered (S) are those to whom baptism is offered (P).

88) All to whom salvation is offered (M) are those to whom baptism is offered (P).

89) All men/infants (S) are those to whom salvation is offered (M).

90) All men/infants (S) are those to whom baptism is offered (P).

The first syllogism (81-82-83) is fully expressed in the text and has the form of the 1<sup>st</sup> figure valid mood EAE known as Celarent. The conclusion of that argument (83) with a

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<sup>215</sup> Ap IX:2, BKS, 247; Tappert, 178. The English translation of the German is this author's adaptation of the Triglotta, 245.

<sup>216</sup> "Apart from the church" or "outside of the church" is not to be understood as if someone is absolutely or irrevocably barred from the church.

substitution of “offer of salvation” for “access to Christ’s regeneration” can be restated (84) and then transformed by obversion to yet another equivalent restatement (85), which becomes an explicit minor premise in the next syllogism (87-85-88).<sup>217</sup> The major premise for that syllogism (87), is the contrapositive of an implicit premise (70) that seems to be related to Melanchthon’s introduction of the maxim *extra ecclesiam non salus nulla* (“apart from the church there is no salvation”).<sup>218</sup> That second syllogism (87-85-88; 1<sup>st</sup> figure AAA, or Barbara) gives a conclusion (88) that as a major premise can then be combined with a minor premise based on Matthew 28:19 (89) to produce a third syllogism (88-89-90; also 1<sup>st</sup> figure AAA or Barbara) that gives the conclusion Melanchthon wants (90). To some extent the reconstruction is unconvincing, not only because so much is unexpressed, but also because on a more straight-forward reading the text seems to want to argue something like the following.

91) All promises of salvation (M) are offered with Baptism (P).

92) All little children/infants (S) are those to whom the promises pertain (M).

93) All little children/infants (S) are to be baptized (P).

This syllogism (91-92-93) is a 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogism in the valid mood AAA, known as Barbara, but seems to equivocate in both the middle and predicate terms. Another read of the text might see the crucial unexpressed link in Melanchthon’s argument to be understanding Baptism as the point of entry into the church where there is access to Christ’s regeneration. Furthermore, one wonders why Melanchthon did not make the more straightforward argument that follows (also a 1<sup>st</sup> figure valid AAA, or Barbara syllogism).

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<sup>217</sup> The four categorical propositions have logical relationships with each other that allow various logical moves. Obversion changes the quality of a proposition (in this case, from negative to positive) and replaces the predicate with what is called the “complement” but might be more usefully thought of as the opposite (in this case, from “one who is apart from the church” to “one who is not apart from the church”). See Bonevac, *Simple Logic*, 163-171.

<sup>218</sup> Similar to obversion discussed above (n.217), the contrapositive results from a logical operation on a categorical proposition that consists of first switching the order of the subject and the predicate and then replacing each term with its complement (as explained above in n.217). Again, see Bonevac, *Simple Logic*, 163-171.

94) All Gentiles<sup>219</sup> are to be baptized.

95) [All children are part of all Gentiles.]

96) All children are to be baptized.

Most likely the nature of Melanchthon's more complicated argument was the result of the very nature of the dispute with the Anabaptists and other reformed who denied that baptism was a means of grace and therefore also denied that it was necessary for salvation.<sup>220</sup>

Another place where a syllogistic argument is used regarding the "necessity" of Baptism is in Luther's Large Catechism's article on Baptism. Again, the Anabaptists are the target.

Nu sind sie so toll, daß sie voneinander scheiden den Glauben und das Ding, daran der Glaube haftet und gebunden ist, ob es gleich äusserlich ist. Ja, es soll und muss äusserlich sein, daß man's mit Sinnen fassen und begreifen und dadurch ins Herz bringen könne, wie denn das ganze Evangelium ein äusserliche mündliche Predigt ist. Summa, was Gott in uns tuet und wirket, will er durch solch äusserliche Ordnung wirken. Wo er nu redet, ja wohin oder wodurch er redet, da soll der Glaube hinsehen und sich daran halten. Nu haben wir hie die Wort: „Wer da gläubt und getauft wird, der wird selig“. Worauf sind sie geredet anders denn auf die Taufe, das ist, das Wasser in Gottes Ordnung gefasset? Darümb folget, daß, wer die Taufe verwirft, der verwirft Gottes Wort, den Glauben und Christum, der uns dahin weiset und an die Taufe bindet.

Jam nostri νεοσόφοι aut potius spermalogi spiritus usque adeo vecordes sunt et nullius judicii, ut disjungere non vereantur fidem et rem, cui fides adhaerescit et alligata est, tametsi externa sit. Verum haec non potest non externa esse, ut sensibus percipi et comprehendi possit atque ita deinceps animo infigi, quemadmodum totum evangelium externa quaedam et corporalis est praedicatio. In summa, quidquid Deus in nobis facit et operatur, tantum externis hisce rebus et constitutionibus operari dignatur. Ubicumque jam loquitur, imo potius quocumque aut per quemcumque locutus fuerit, eo fidei dirigendi sunt oculi eique adhaerendum. Jam hic

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<sup>219</sup> Matthew 28:19 uses the Greek word for heathen ἔθνη (the root word of which gives English "ethnic"), and the Latin and German of Ap IX:2 use, respectively, *gentes* and *Heiden*. While the usual English translation of the Greek word is "nations" (so KJV, ASV, NIV, NASB *et al.*), the sense is "all people" especially those outside the church as the spiritual children of Abraham, the spiritual Jews. The Latin *gentes* can have the sense of "nation" but the German *Heiden* is much more specifically "heathen" or "pagans" as in the Jew-Gentile dichotomy. To be sure, baptizing one representative person from each nationality is not what Jesus has in mind.

<sup>220</sup> The "necessity" taught by true catholics is tempered according to St. Augustine's maxim: *contemptus sacramenti damnat, non privatio* ("contempt of the sacrament damns, not deprivation").

verbum Dei in promptu habemus: ‘Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit.’ Quorsum ista verba alias quam de baptismo dicta sunt, hoc est de aqua divino ordine fundata et confirmata? Ex hoc sequitur, ut is, qui baptismum contemnit et rejicit, verbum Dei, fidem et Christum quoque rejiciat eo nos ducentem et baptismo alligantem.

Now, these people are so foolish as to separate faith from the object to which faith is attached and bound on the grounds that the object is something external. Yes, it must be external so that it can be perceived and grasped by the senses and thus brought into the heart, just as the entire Gospel is an external, oral proclamation. In short, whatever God effects in us he does through such external ordinances. No matter where he speaks—indeed, no matter for what purpose or by what means he speaks—there faith must look and to it faith must hold. We have here the words, “He who believes and is baptized will be saved.” To what do they refer but to Baptism, that is, the water comprehended in God’s ordinance? Hence it follows that whoever rejects Baptism rejects God’s Word, faith, and Christ, who directs us and binds us to Baptism.<sup>221</sup>

The arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with the unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets.

- 97) Everything that is grasped by the senses (M) is that which must be external (P).
- 98) All that must be brought into the heart (S) is that which must be grasped by the senses (M).
- 99) All that must be brought into the heart (S) is that which must be external (P).
- 99) All that must be brought into the heart (M) is that which must be external (P).
- 100) [The Gospel (S) is that which must be brought into the heart (M).]
- 101) The Gospel (S) is that which must be external (P).
- 101) The Gospel (M) is that which must be external (P).
- 102) All that faith looks to and holds to (S) is the Gospel (M).
- 103) [All that faith looks to and holds to (S) is that which must be external (P).]
- 103) [All that faith looks to and holds to (M) is that which must be external (P).]
- 104) [All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are that to which faith looks to and holds to (M).
- 105) [All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are that which must be external (P).]
- 106) [All external things (M) are rejected by these people (P).
- 105) [All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are external things (M).]
- 107) All God’s Word, faith, and Christ (S) are rejected by these people (P).
- 108) [All who reject something to which God directs us (M) are those who reject God’s Word, faith, and Christ (P).]
- 109) [All who reject Baptism (S) are those who reject something to which God directs us (M).
- 110) All who reject Baptism (S) are those who reject God’s Word, faith, and Christ (P).

Luther’s primary points are that Baptism is an external form of the Gospel to which God has bound His people and that, if one rejects Baptism, then one rejects God’s Word, faith,

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<sup>221</sup> LC IV:30-31, *BKS*, 697; Tappert, 440.

and Christ. To make these points Luther uses a series of syllogisms (although one is not a categorical Aristotelian syllogism in the strict sense), all of which are in the 1<sup>st</sup> figure with the valid mood AAA known as Barbara. The first syllogism (97-98-99) is fully expressed, and its conclusion (99) becomes the major premise in the second syllogism (99-100-101), where the minor (100) is just assumed. Similarly, the conclusion of that second syllogism (101) becomes the major premise in the third syllogism (101-102-103), where the minor (102) is just assumed, and its conclusion (103) becomes the major premise in the fourth syllogism (103-104-105). That fourth syllogism and the fifth syllogism (106-107-108) are reconstructions of Luther's argument but seem to be necessary to get the conclusion he more or less expresses (107), casting his Anabaptist opponents in the role of "these people". Perhaps as support for that conclusion or as an alternate but unrelated way of arriving at it, Luther seems to assume the sixth syllogism (108-109-110), supporting the minor premise (109) by reading the text of Mark 16:16 ("He who believes and is baptized will be saved") as God directing His people to Baptism as a means of grace.<sup>222</sup>

Thus, both Melancthon and Luther in somewhat strikingly different but both acceptable ways argue syllogistically about the necessity of Baptism. The primary opponents in regards to such arguments were the Anabaptists, but it is back to the Reformers' Roman Catholic opponents that in considering passages where the opponents' bad arguments are specifically identified and refuted.

### ***Opponents bad arguments identified, as in Apology XXIII***

Perhaps nowhere else in the Apology is the argumentation of the Reformers' opponents criticized for errors in such a way as the argumentation is criticized in the Apology's article on Sacerdotal Marriage. There, as they appeal to the emperor's judgment, the Reformers contrast their own arguments to those of their opponents thusly.

Sed quia nulla cadit in hos tuos mores vel turpitudine vel saevitia, speramus te et in hac causa clementer nobiscum acturum esse, praesertim ubi cognoveris, nos gravissimas habere causas nostrae sententiae sumptas ex

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<sup>222</sup> Despite Mark 16's textual issues, Luther uses it as authoritative Scripture here in the Large Catechism and in the Small Catechism (SC IV:8).

Verbo Dei, cui adversarii nugacissimas et vanissimas persuasiones opponunt.

[Dieweil aber Gott der Allmächtige Euer Majestät mit sonderlicher angeborner Güte und Zucht begnadet,] daß Euer Majestät aus hohem, adelichen, christlichem Gemüt so große Unzucht zu handhaben oder so ungehörte Tyrannei fürzunehmen, selbst Scheu haben und diese Handlung ohne Zweifel viel fürstlicher und christlicher bedenken, denn sie losen Leute, so hoffen wir, Euer Majestät werden in diesem ganz kaiserlich und gnädiglich sich erzeigen und bedenken, daß wir dieses guten Grund und Ursach haben aus der heiligen Schrift, dagegen die Widersacher eitel Lügen und Irrtum fürbringen.

Because your conduct is free of disgrace and cruelty, we hope that you will deal kindly with us in this case, especially when you learn that for our position we have the most serious of reasons, taken from the Word of God, while our opponents set against them their own foolish and vain opinions.<sup>223</sup>

The following paragraph accuses the opponents of not giving significant arguments on this topic.

Et tamen non tuentur serio coelibatum. Neque enim ignorant, quam pauci praestent castitatem, sed praetexunt speciem religionis regno suo, cui prodesse coelibatum putant, ut intelligamus Petrum recte monuisse, futurum ut pseudoprophetae fictis verbis decipiant homines. Nihil enim vere, simpliciter et candide in hac tota causa dicunt, scribunt aut agunt adversarii, sed re ipsa dimicant de dominatione, quam falso putant periclitari et hanc impio praetextu pietatis munire conantur.

Auch so ist es ihnen gewiß nicht Ernst, solchen Zölibat und ehelosen Stand zu verfechten; denn sie wissen wohl, wie reine Jungfern sie sein, wie wenig unter ihnen die Keuschheit halten. Allein sie bleiben bei ihrem Trostwort, das sie in ihrer Schrift finden: si non caste tamen caute, und wissen, daß keusch sich rühmen oder nennen und doch nicht sein, in der Welt einen Schein der Keuschheit hat, daß auch ihr Papstreich und Pfaffenwesen dadurch für der Welt desto heiliger scheint. Denn Petrus der Apostel hat recht gewarnet, daß solche falsche Propheten werden die Leute betrügen mit erdichteten Worten. Die Widersacher nehmen sich der Sache der Religion, welches die Hauptsache ist, gar nicht mit Ernst an. Was sie schreiben, reden, handeln, sind eitel Worte ad hominem; da ist kein Ernst, keine Treü, kein recht Herz zu gemeinem Nutz den armen Gewissen oder Kirchen zu helfen. Im Grund ists ihnen um

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<sup>223</sup> Ap XXIII:4, *BKS*, 333-334; Tappert, 239. The German text enclosed in square brackets is not reflected in the Latin or English as excerpted.

die Herrschaft zu tun, derselbigen haben sie Sorge und unterstützelen sie fein mit eiteln gottlosen, heuchlischen Lügen; so wird sie auch stehen wie Butter an der Sonnen.

But they are not serious in their defense of celibacy. They know good and well how few practise chastity, but [they stick to that comforting saying which is found in their treatise, *Si non caste, tamen caute* (If not chastely, at least cautiously), and] they use religion as a pretext to maintain their authority, which they think celibacy enhances. Now we see the correctness of Peter's warning (II Pet. 2:1) that false prophets would deceive people with their fictions. Our opponents will not speak, write, or act honestly [their words are merely an argument *ad hominem*], frankly, or openly in this whole business. All they are actually fighting for is their authority; they imagine that this is in danger and they are trying to fortify it with a wicked pretense of godliness [they support their case with nothing but impious, hypocritical lies; accordingly, it will endure about as well as butter exposed to the sun].<sup>224</sup>

Significant is the German version's specific mention of arguing *ad hominem* ("to the man"), perhaps as is also that the Reformers themselves more or less do the same thing in the process. The Reformers say serious discussion on this controversy is not needed, but they proceed to give six of their own arguments and dismiss their opponents' counter-arguments along the way.<sup>225</sup>

While not all of the six arguments need to be detailed here, the first is relevant to the discussion at hand regarding syllogistic reasoning.

Primum. Genesis docet homines conditos esse, ut sint foecundi, et sexus recta ratione sexum appetat. Loquimur enim non de concupiscentia, quae peccatum est, sed de illo appetitu, qui in integra natura futurus erat, quem vocant *στοργήν φυσικήν*. Et haec *στοργή* est vere ordinatio divina sexus ad sexum. Cum autem haec ordinatio Dei sine singulari opere Dei tolli non possit, sequitur ius contrahendi matrimonii non posse tolli statutis aut votis.

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<sup>224</sup> Ap XXIII:5, *BKS*, 334; Tappert, 239-240. The English translations of the German additions are provided in the square brackets as from the Triglotta, 365.

<sup>225</sup> Confer the discussion of Ap XXIII:6 above at n.63. Confer also Ap XXIII:62: *Obiter etiam, dum recensuimus argumenta nostra, indicavimus, quomodo adversarii unum atque alterum cavillentur, et calumnias illas diluimus. Nunc brevissime commemorabimus, quam gravibus rationibus defendant legem. Wir haben nu etliche unsere Gründe auf diesmal kurz angezeigt, auch haben wir vermeldet, wie die Widersacher so ungeschickten Behelf und Traum dawider aufbringen. Nu wollen wir anzeigen, mit was starken Gründen sie ihr Pabstgesetz verteidigen.* ("In presenting our own arguments, we have incidentally recited and refuted the silly counter-arguments of our opponents. Now we shall briefly review their weighty arguments in defense of the law.") (*BKS*, 346; Tappert, 247.)



Haec cavillantur adversarii, dicunt initio fuisse mandatum, ut repleretur terra, nunc repleta terra non esse mandatum coniugium. Videte, quam prudenter iudicent! Natura hominum formatur illo verbo Dei, ut sit foecunda non solum initio creationis, sed tantisper, dum haec corporum natura existet. Sicut hoc verbo terra fit foecunda: Germinet terra herbam virentem. Propter hanc ordinationem non solum initio coepit terra producere gramina, sed quotannis vestiuntur agri, donec existet haec natura. Sicut igitur legibus humanis non potest natura terrae mutari, ita neque votis neque lege humana potest natura hominis mutari sine speciali opere Dei.

Erstlich ist geschrieben Gen. am 1., daß Mann und Weib also geschaffen von Gott sein, daß sie sollen fruchtbar sein, Kinder zeugen usw., das Weib geneigt sein zum Mann, der Mann wieder zum Weibe. Und wir reden hie nicht von der unordentlichen Brunst, die nach Adams Fall gefolgt ist, sondern von natürlicher Neigung zwischen Mann und Weib, welche auch gewesen wäre in der Natur, wenn sie rein blieben wäre. Und das ist Gottes Geschöpf und Ordnung, daß der Mann zum Weib geneigt sei, das Weib zum Mann. So nu die göttliche Ordnung und die angeschaffene Art niemands ändern mag noch soll, denn Gott selbst, so folget, daß der Ehestand durch kein menschlich Statut oder Gelübde mag abgetan werden.

Wider diesen starken Grund spielen die Widersacher mit Worten, sagen, im Anfang der Schöpfung habe das Wort noch statt gehabt: „Wachset und mehret euch und erfüllet die Erde.“ Nu aber, so die Erde erfüllet ist, sei die Ehe nicht geboten. Sehet aber, wie weise Leute sein da die Widersacher. Durch dies göttliche Wort (Wachset und mehret euch), welches noch immer gehet und nicht aufhöret, ist Mann und Weib also geschaffen, daß sie sollen fruchtbar sein, nicht allein die Zeit des Anfangs, sondern so lang diese Natur währet. Denn gleichwie durch das Wort Gen. am 1., da Gott sprach: „Es lasse die Erde aufgehen Gras und Kraut usw.“, die Erde also geschaffen ist, daß sie nicht allein im Anfang Frucht bracht, sondern daß sie alle Jahr Gras, Kräuter und ander Gewächs brächt, so lang diese Natur währet: also ist auch Mann und Weib geschaffen, fruchtbar zu sein, so lang diese Natur währet. Wie nun das Menschengesetz und Gesetz nicht ändern kann, daß die Erde nicht sollte grüne werden usw., also kann auch kein Klostergelübde, kein Menschengesetz die menschliche Natur ändern, daß ein Weib nicht sollt eins Manns begehren, ein Mann eins Weibs, ohn ein sonderlich Gottes Werk.

*First*, Gen. 1:28 teaches that men were created to be fruitful and that one sex should have a proper desire for the other. We are not talking about sinful lust but about so-called “natural love,” the desire which was meant to be in uncorrupted nature [which would have existed in nature even if it had remained uncorrupted]. This love of one sex for the other is

truly a divine ordinance. Since this ordinance of God cannot be suspended without an extraordinary work of God, it follows that neither regulations nor vows can abolish the right to contract marriage.

[¶8] Our opponents reply with the silly argument that originally there was a command to replenish the earth, but now that the earth has been replenished marriage is not commanded. Look at their clever argument! The Word of God did not form the nature of men to be fruitful only at the beginning of creation, but it still does as long as this physical nature of ours exists. Just so this Word makes the earth fruitful (Gen. 1:11), “Let the earth put forth vegetation, plants yielding seed.” Because of this ordinance, the earth did not begin to bring forth plants only at the beginning, but yearly the fields are clothed as long as this universe exists. Just as human regulations cannot change the nature of the earth, so neither vows nor human regulations can change the nature of man [that a woman should not desire a man, nor a man a woman] without an extraordinary act of God.<sup>226</sup>

The arguments of the preceding paragraphs may be represented as follows, with the unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Note that “love of one sex for the other” and “the right to contract marriage” are equated and interchangeable.

111) All that can suspend a divine ordinance (M) is an extraordinary divine act (P).

112) All that can abolish the right to contract marriage (S) is that which can suspend the divine ordinance (M).

113) All that can abolish the right to contract marriage (S) is an extraordinary divine act (P).

113) All that can abolish the right to contract marriage (P) is an extraordinary divine act (M).

114) [No human regulation or vow (S) is an extraordinary divine act (M).]

115) No human regulation or vow (S) can abolish the right to contract marriage (P).

Melanchthon assumes that the love of one sex for the other is a divine ordinance and that expressing such love only in marriage is also a divine ordinance. Based on the accepted reading of the Biblical text, his opponents likely would be hard pressed to disagree on those points, but that is probably where their agreement would end, which is why Melanchthon starts his arguments at that point. The three propositions of the first syllogism (111-112-113) are more or less explicit and take the 1<sup>st</sup> figure form in the valid mood AAA known as Barbara. The conclusion of that first syllogism (113) becomes the major premise in the second syllogism (113-114-115; a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres), which, with the implicit minor premise (114) produces the conclusion Melanchthon wants.

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<sup>226</sup> Ap XXIII:7-8, *BKS*, 334-335; Tappert, 240. For the argument of the Confutation, see CR 27:142; Reu, \*367; K-N, 125.

Augsburg Confession XXIII had adduced Genesis 1 in support of the Reformers' position regarding the Marriage of Priests,<sup>227</sup> and Confutation XXIII had responded with an appeal to the church father Jerome's writing *Adversus Jovinianum* (*Against Jovinian*),<sup>228</sup> so the the discussion of Genesis 1 in Apology XXIII is of little surprise. The opponents' claim that, since the world was populated, the command to be fruitful and multiply no longer applied to priests, goes to the heart of the major premise of the first syllogism (111) and thus also its conclusion (113), which is the major premise of the second syllogism. Melancthon's response is a counter-argument by analogy: the non-human nature has not changed since the world supposedly has been populated, and human nature has not either. Melancthon no doubt thinks his opponents would agree that the command for the earth to continue producing vegetation was not limited and could not be limited by human regulations. So, he expects them to see the falsity of the analogy set up in the concluding sentence of ¶8:

human regulations : nature of the earth :: vows and human regulations : nature of man

Argument by analogy has been discussed.<sup>229</sup>

The foregoing are not the only examples of the Reformers' identifying their opponents' bad arguments. Elsewhere in Apology XXIII the Reformers accuse their opponent of a specious argument and say another "horrible argument" has an anachronism, although the Reformers do not term it such,<sup>230</sup> and elsewhere both in the Apology and in other confessional writings the Reformers criticize their opponents for their poor argumentation.<sup>231</sup> Not all of the Reformers' criticism of their opponents'

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<sup>227</sup> AC XXIII:5-9.

<sup>228</sup> On the argument of the Confutation, again see CR 27:142; Reu, \*367; K-N, 125.

<sup>229</sup> See Chapter III.

<sup>230</sup> Ap XXIII:64 (see above, n.194) and Ap XXIII:67.

<sup>231</sup> Other examples include the following. In Ap XXI:10 (see above at n.88, p.161), the Reformers say that the church invoking the saints does not follow (*non sequitur; so folget doch daraus nicht* [BKS, 318]) from the saints praying for the church, but technically the Confutation does not claim invoking the saints follows from the saints praying, although it does argue by analogy that since the angels pray for people so do the saints (CR 27:125-126; Reu, ed., *The Augsburg Confession: A Collection of Sources*, \*360; Kolb and Nestingen, eds., *Sources and Contexts*, 119.) and the opponents may have made the claim more specifically elsewhere. (Confer SA II:ii:26, and note that in ¶25 invocation is said to conflict with the

arguments has to do the form of the opponents' arguments, some criticism has to do with their opponents lack of support for their claims.

### ***No “proof” without Scripture, as in Ap XXI:10-13 and XXIV:92***

A more specific form of criticism of the Reformers' opponents' arguments involving syllogisms pertains to their lack of Scriptural evidence. Two examples illustrate such reasoning by the Reformers, one at the *locus* of the Invocation of the Saints and the other at the *locus* of the Mass.

The opponents' failure to produce even an example from Scripture for the invocation of the saints was discussed above,<sup>232</sup> but here closer examination is made of the implications of that failure.

Cum autem neque praeceptum neque promissio neque exemplum ex scripturis de invocandis sanctis afferri possit, sequitur conscientiam nihil posse certi de illa invocatione habere. Et cum oratio debeat ex fide fieri, quomodo scimus, quod Deus approbet illam invocationem? Unde scimus sine testimonio scripturae, quod sancti intelligant singulorum preces? Quidam plane tribuunt divinitatem sanctis, videlicet quod tacitas cogitationes mentium in nobis cernant. Disputant de matutina et vespertina cognitione, fortassis, quia dubitant, utrum mane an vesperi audiant. Haec comminiscuntur, non ut sanctos honore afficiant, sed ut quaestuosos cultus defendant. Nihil afferri potest ab adversariis contra hanc rationem, quod cum invocatio non habeat testimonium ex verbo Dei, non possit affirmari, quod sancti intelligant invocationem nostram, aut, ut maxime intelligant, quod Deus eam approbet. Quare adversarii non debebant nos ad rem incertam cogere, quia oratio sine fide non est oratio.

So man nun weder Gebot noch Zusage noch Exempel aus der Schrift mag fürbringen, so folget, daß kein Herz noch Gewissen darauf sich verlassen kann. Denn dieweil ein jeglich Gebet soll aus dem Glauben geschehen, woher will ich denn wissen, daß Gott ihm gefallen läßt Anrufen der

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chief article of the faith, which presumably trumps any other argument.) In Ap XXVIII:14, the Reformers say their opponents' claim that bishops "may institute new acts of worship" does not follow (*Quare non sequitur; so folget doch nicht* [BKS, 400]) from their limited jurisdiction. (The Confutation does more or less deduce authority to govern from spiritual jurisdiction; see CR 27:179; Reu \*381, K-N, 138. In Tr 30, the reformers argue that their opponents' claim of a special superiority for Peter does not follow (*nondum sequitur; folget noch nicht* [BKS, 480]) from passages such as John 21:15, 17, which refer to the commission common among all the disciples. And, in SD VIII:37, the Reformers say that something being a property of both natures does not follow (*folget nicht; non sequitur*) from ascribing something to the person with the two natures.

<sup>232</sup> See above at n.88, p.161.

Heiligen, wenn ich nicht Gottes Wort davon habe? Wodurch werde ich gewiß, daß die Heiligen mein Gebet und eines jeden besondern hören? Etliche machen schlechts Götter aus den Heiligen und sagen, sie können unser Gedanken wissen und uns ins Herz sehen. Dasselbige erdichten sie, nicht, daß sie damit die Heiligen ehren, sondern daß sie ihre Kretschmerei und Jahrmarkt, welcher ihnen Geld trägt, verteidigen. Wir sagen noch wie vor: in Gottes Wort, in der Schrift, steht nichts, daß die Heiligen unser Anrufen verstehen, und ob sie es verstünden, daß Gott ihm solch Anrufen gefallen lasse; so hats je kein Grund. Dawider können die Widersacher nichts aufbringen; darum sollten die Widersacher uns zu ungewissen Dingen nicht zwingen oder dringen, denn ein Gebet ohne Glauben ist nicht ein Gebet.

Neither a command nor a promise nor an example can be shown from Scripture for the invocation of the saints; from this it follows that consciences cannot be sure about such invocation. Since prayer ought to come from faith, how do we know that God approves such invocation? How do we know, without proof from Scripture, that the saints hear the individual's prayers? Evidently some attribute divinity to the saints, the power to perceive the unspoken thoughts of our minds. They argue about morning and evening knowledge, perhaps because they are not sure whether they hear us in the morning or in the evening. They have not thought this up to honor the saints but to defend their religious traffic. Our opponents can produce nothing against the argument that since invocation cannot be proved from the Word of God, we cannot affirm that the saints are aware of it or, even if they are, that God approves it. Therefore our opponents should not coerce us to adopt something uncertain, for a prayer without faith is not prayer.<sup>233</sup>

Melanchthon's arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Note the close connection between consciences being unsure and the lack of knowledge regarding the saints hearing invocation, as well as the close connection between praying without faith and the invocation lacking God's approval.

116) [All that of which the conscience can be sure (P) is commanded, promised, or exemplified in Scripture (M).]

117) No invocation of the saints (S) is commanded, promised, or exemplified in Scripture (M).

118) No invocation of the saints (S) is that of which the conscience can be sure (P).

119) [All done with faith (P) is that of which the conscience can be sure (M).]

118) No invocation of the saints (S) is that of which the conscience can be sure (M).

120) No invocation of the saints (S) is done with faith (P).

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<sup>233</sup> Ap XXI:10-13, *BKS*, 318-319; Tappert, 230.

121) [All that has God's approval (P) is that which comes from faith (M).]

120) No invocation of the saints (S) is done with faith (P).

122) No invocation of the saints (S) is approved by God (P).

123) All prayer (P) is done with faith (M).

120) No invocation of the saints (S) is done with faith (M).

124) No invocation of the saints (S) is prayer (P).

125) Everything known with certainty (P) is known by Scripture (M).

126) No hearing of our prayers by the saints (S) is known by Scripture (M).

127) No hearing of our prayers by the saints (S) is known with certainty (P).

128) If the invocation of the saints is to be commanded (p), one must know either God approves it (q) or the saints hear it (r).

129) One does not know that God approves it (~q) or that the saints hear it (~r).

130) The invocation of the saints is not to be commanded (~p).

There are two separate arguments here that come together in the end. One pertains to the uncertainty of the invocation leading to its not being made with faith and therefore not having God's approval, and the other pertains to the uncertainty of the saints hearing the prayers; both lead Melanchthon to conclude the invocation should not be commanded. What follows is how Melanchthon gets there. The first syllogism (116-117-118) is a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres with an unexpressed major premise (116) that produces a conclusion (118) that becomes the minor premise in the second syllogism (119-118-120), which is also a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres with an unexpressed major premise (119). In keeping with that pattern, that syllogism's conclusion (120) becomes the minor premise in the third syllogism (121-120-122), which is also a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres with an unexpressed major premise (121). The fourth syllogism (123-120-124), which is also a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres, also draws on the conclusion of the second syllogism (120), but this syllogism seems to not be a vital link in the chain but seems simply to make the point that the invocation is not really prayer. The fifth syllogism (125-126-127) is quite similar to the first (116-117-118; 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres), except that, instead of focusing on the certainty of the invocation, Melanchthon focuses on the certainty of the saints even hearing prayers addressed to them.<sup>234</sup> Armed with the two critical conclusions (122 and 127), Melanchthon can proceed to an argument in the form of propositional logic and deduces by *modus tollens* that the invocation is not to be commanded.

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<sup>234</sup> In the preceding paragraph (Ap XXI:8-9), Melanchthon grants that the saints in heaven might pray for people on earth (confer Luther in SA II:ii:26).

The matter of the opponents' lack of scriptural evidence for their claims also comes up in seemingly syllogistic form at the *locus* of the Mass. Consider the following paragraph regarding transferring the supposed merits of the mass to the dead.

Cum missa non sit satisfactio, nec pro poena nec pro culpa, ex opere operato sine fide: sequitur applicationem pro mortuis inutilem esse. Neque hic opus est longiore disputatione. Constat enim, quod illae applicationes pro mortuis nulla habeant ex scripturis testimonia. Nec tutum est in ecclesia cultus instituere sine auctoritate scripturae. Et si quando opus erit, prolixius de tota re dicemus. Quid enim nunc rixemur cum adversariis, qui neque quid sacrificium, neque quid sacramentum, neque quid remissio peccatorum, neque quid sit fides, intelligunt?

So die Messe nu nicht eine Genugtuung ist weder für eine Pein noch Schuld ex opere operato, so folget, daß die Messe, so man für die Toten hältet, unnütz und nichts sei. Und es darf nicht langer Disputation. Denn da ist gewiß, das solche Messe halten für die Toten in der Schrift gar kein Grund hat. Nu ist es ein Greuel, in der Kirchen Gottesdienst anrichten ohne alles Gottes Wort, ohne alle Schrift. Und wenn es not wird sein, so wollen wir von diesem Stücke ganz reichlich mehr und nach aller Notdurft weiter reden. Denn was sollen wir uns jetzund hier viel mit den Widersachern zanken, so sie gar nicht verstehen, was Opfer, was Sakrament, was Vergebung der Sunde, was Glaube sei?

Since the Mass is not a satisfaction for either punishment or guilt, *ex opere operato* and without faith, it follows that it is useless to transfer it to the dead. There is no need here of a very lengthy discussion. Clearly this transference to the dead cannot be proved from the Scriptures, and it is not safe to institute services in the church without the authority of Scripture. If the need ever arises, we shall discuss this whole issue more fully. Why should we wrangle with our opponents who understand the meaning of neither sacrifice nor sacrament nor forgiveness of sins nor faith?<sup>235</sup>

Melanchthon's arguments in the preceding paragraph may be represented as follows, with unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Note that Melanchthon is only granting for the sake of argument that a mass can provide satisfaction of punishment or guilt.<sup>236</sup>

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<sup>235</sup> Ap XXIV:92, *BKS*, 375; Tappert, 266-267.

<sup>236</sup> This is reading the *non* ("not") as primarily applying to *ex opere operato sine fide* ("from the work itself having worked without faith").

131) All who receive satisfaction of punishment or guilt by a mass (P) are those who exercise faith to the mass itself (M).

132) No dead person (S) is one who exercises faith the the mass itself (M).

133) No dead person (S) is one who receives satisfaction of punishment or guilt by a mass (P).

134) All things instituted without the authority of Scripture (M) are not sure (P).

135) All institutions of mass for the dead (S) are without the authority of Scripture (M).

136) [All institutions of mass for the dead (S) are not sure (P).]

The two syllogisms provide two relatively straightforward separate arguments. The first (131-132-133) is a 2<sup>nd</sup> figure Cambestres with all three propositions more or less expressed. The second (134-135-136) is a 1<sup>st</sup> figure Barbara for which Melanchthon leaves it to the reader to draw the obvious conclusion (136) from the two premises (134, 135).

This subsection has given two significant examples of the Reformers' criticizing their opponents for the lack of Scriptural support for their claims. Both examples are of Roman Catholic abuses that the Reformers had corrected, but more significantly both pertain to faith and its role in the comforting of consciences with the forgiveness of sins.

### ***Logical moves, as in LC I:63-64***

With Scripture on one's side, even when Scripture does not make the precise statement needed, various conclusions can be drawn after a little logical reasoning. A case in point is found in the Large Catechism's discussion of the Second Commandment, which regards not taking God's name in vain. Luther appears to make a logical move from those things prohibited to those things commanded.

Daneben muss Du auch wissen, wie man des Namens recht brauche. Denn neben dem Wort, als er sagt: „Du sollst Gottes Namen nicht vergeblich brauchen“, gibt er gleichwohl zu verstehen, daß man sein wohl brauchen solle. Denn er ist uns eben darümb offenbaret und gegeben, daß er im Brauch und Nutz soll stehen. Darümb schleußt sich's nu selbs, weil hie verboten ist, den heiligen Namen zur Lügen oder Untugend zu führen, daß wiederümb gepoten ist, ihn zur Wahrheit und allem Guten zu brauchen. Als nämlich, so man recht schweret, wo es not ist und gefordert wird, also auch, wenn man recht lehret, item, wenn man den Namen anrufet in Nöten, lobt und dankt im Guten etc. Welchs alles zuhauf gefasset und gepoten ist in dem Spruch, Psalm. 50.: „Rufe mich an zur Zeit der Not, so will ich Dich erretten, so sollst Du mich preisen.“ Denn das heißet alles ihn zur Wahrheit angezogen und seliglich gebraucht, und wird also sein Name geheiligt, wie das Vaterunser betet.



Ad haec scitu quoque opus est, quinam Dei nomine recte utamur. Hisce enim verbis, quibus praecepit: ‘Non assumes nomen Domini Dei tui in vanum,’ etiam illud intelligendum nobis proponit suo nomine nos etiam recte et utiliter uti posse. Non enim aliam ob causam nobis revelatum est, quam ut utentibus subinde sit fructuosum et utile. Inde hoc utro evincitur, quod, cum hic praecepto cautum sit, ne mentientes aut alioqui flagitiose delinquentes sanctum Dei nomen prave usurpemus, contra praeceptum nobis esse arbitremur, ut eo ad confirmandam veritatem ac reliquas actiones honestas utamur. Nempe, quando recte juramus, dum aut necessitas postulat, aut a nobis iusjurandum exigitur. Ita quoque, quando recte et sincere docetur veritas evangelii. Praeterea, quando in necessitatibus nomen Dei imploramus aut idem rebus secundis laudamus et gratias agimus etc. Quae omnia summatim comprehensa ac praecepta inveniuntur psal. L. : ‘Voca me in die tribulationis, eripiam te et glorificabis me.’ Omnibus hisce rationibus vere et salubriter divino nomine utimur, atque ita ejus nomen sanctificatur, quemadmodum in oratione Dominica precamur.

In addition, you must also know how to use the name of God aright. With the words, “You shall not take the name of God in vain,” God at the same time gives us to understand that we are to use his name properly, for it has been revealed and given to us precisely for our use and benefit. Since we are forbidden here to use the holy name in support of falsehood or wickedness, it follows, conversely, that we commanded to use it in the service of truth and all that is good—for example, when we swear properly where it is necessary and required. So, also, when we teach properly; again when we call on his name in time of need, or praise and thank him in time of prosperity, etc. All this is summarized in the commanded in Ps. 50:15, “Call upon me in the day of trouble: I will deliver you and you shall glorify me.” All this is what we mean by calling upon his name in service of truth and using it devoutly. Thus His name is hallowed, as we pray in the Lord’s Prayer.<sup>237</sup>

Although translated into English as a cognate of “conversion”, the move that Luther seems to be making is not conversion (switching the subject and predicate of a proposition<sup>238</sup>) but rather something closer to obversion (changing the quality and replacing the predicate with its complement<sup>239</sup>). Thus, “Do not support falsehood” becomes “Support truth”. This logical move is apparently not the only one Luther makes.

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<sup>237</sup> LC I:63-64, *BKS*, 576; Tappert, 373. (Emphasis added.) The Triglotta translates “natural inference” (Triglotta, 599); with Tappert confer “follows conversely” in K-W, 394.

<sup>238</sup> Bonevac, *Simple Logic*, 164-166.

<sup>239</sup> See above, n.217, p.285.

## ***Illustrating bad syllogisms, as in LC IV:58-59***

Luther seems to make use of another logical move later in the Large Catechism where he also illustrates the bad logic of his opponents.

Darümb sind es je vermeßene, tölpische Geister, die also folgern und schliessen: Wo der Glaube nicht recht ist, da müsse auch die Taufe nicht recht sein. Gerade als ich wollt' schließen: Wenn ich nicht gläube, so ist Christus nichts, oder also: Wenn ich nicht gehorsam bin, so ist Vater, Mutter und Oberkeit nichts. Ist das wohl geschlossen, wo jemand nicht tuet, was er tuen soll, daß darümb das Ding an ihm selbs nichts sein noch gelten soll? Lieber, kehre es ümb und schleuss vielmehr also: Eben darümb ist die Taufe etwas und recht, daß man's unrecht empfangen hat. Denn wo sie an ihr selbs nicht recht wäre, künnd' man nicht missbrauchen noch daran sundigen. Es heißet also: „Abusus non tollit, sed confirmat substantiam“, „Missbrauch nimmt nicht hinweg das Wesen, sondern bestätigt's“. Denn Gold bleibt nichts weniger Gold, ob es gleich eine Bübin mit Sunden und Schanden trägt.

Quocirca illi vesani baptismonastiges nimium sibi sumunt, qui ita concludentes inferunt: Ubi fides non est, ibi nec baptismus rectus esse potest. Quasi ita velim concludere: Si fidem non habuero, sequitur Christum nihil esse. Aut sic: Si majorum jussis morem non gessero, nec parentes nec magistratus quicquam esse constat. Nonne vero hoc est inepte et inefficaciter colligere, ubi quis non facit, quod illi faciendum fuerat, propterea sequi rem per se nihil esse aut valere? Quin potius argumentum inverte atque ita collige: Sane ob id ipsum baptismum quantivis pretii et rectus habendus est, quod non recte ab hominibus susceptus est. Quippe si per se baptismus rectus non esset, eo nullo modo possemus abuti aut abutendo delinquere. Ita enim dicitur: 'Abusus non tollit, sed confirmat substantiam.' Siquidem aurum manet aurum, tametsi hoc meretrix contumelioso quaestu corporis partum circumferat.

Therefore only presumptuous and stupid persons draw the conclusion that where there is no true faith, there also can be no true Baptism. Likewise I might argue, "If I have no faith, then Christ is nothing." Or again, "If I am not obedient, then father, mother, and magistrates are nothing." Is it correct to conclude that when anybody does not do what he should, the thing that he misuses has no existence or no value? My friend, rather invert the argument and conclude, Precisely because Baptism has been wrongly received, it has existence and value. The saying goes, "*Abusus non tollit, sed confirmat substantiam*," that is

“Misuse does not destroy the substance, but confirms its existence.” Gold remains no less gold if a harlot wears it in sin and shame.<sup>240</sup>

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<sup>240</sup> LC IV:58-59, *BKS*, 703; Tappert, 444. Note in this paragraph (and the next) the convergence of words used in connection with reasoning and syllogistic arguments. This note details the use of some of the relevant words and is placed as a note so as not to interrupt the flow of the main argument in the text.

The English translations of the works in *The Book of Concord* would suggest there are a number of places where specific conclusions are being reached or things are being concluded. A closer examination in the original languages, however, indicates fewer actual “conclusions” than the English would suggest. A number of the English uses are renderings of the words for reasoning or arguing (for example, Ap XXIV:52; see the discussion of this passage above at n.143, p.189, and the discussion of these words above in n.72, p.221) instead of translating the words for “conclusion” and “concluding”. However, the Latin works and translations do still use the noun *finis*, *finis* and the verbs *concludo*, *concludere*, *conclusi*, *conclusus*; *colligo*, *colligere*, *collegi*, *collectus*; and *statuo*, *statuere*, *statui*, *statutus*. Though the German versions often lack the more technical passages of reasoning, corresponding German words are the noun *der Beschluß* and verb *beschließen*.

Other words are used. The Latin noun *conclusum*, *conclusi* is used of a conclusion regarding the validity of Baptism (LC IV:60 [*sei beschlossen*]; see the discussion of this passage below, at n.241, p.304). The Latin noun *conclusio*, *conclusionis* is used of what Christ adds in Luke 11:41 (Ap IV:283 [*Beschluß*]) and as a heading (LC I:311 [*Beschluß*]). The Latin *epilogus*, *epilogi* is used in the heading to the Ausburg Confession’s Conclusion (*Schluss*) and LC I:219 (*zu beschliessen gesagt*). One other notable passage is SD VII:46, where the Reformers say Abraham had grounds for a disputation (*er wohl Ursach gnug gehabt zu disputieren*; *poterat certe occasionem disputandi arripere*) and could have debated the interpretation of God’s Word (*nach dem Buchstaben oder mit einer leidlichen oder sanften Glossa sollten zu verstehen sein*; *an verba secundum litteram accipere, an vero commode et tolerabiliore aliqua interpretatione lenire deberet*) but instead concluded and believed (*geschlossen und geglaubet*; *sciens* [“knowing”] *et credens*) against his reason (*Vornunft*; *rationi*) that God could do what He had promised (Tappert, 577; *BKS*, 986-987). This particular passage is quite significant for what it says about reason and revelation.

A number of references to “conclusions” and “concluding” come in Scripture passage quotations, some where the words just given are used and some where other words are used. Galatians 3:22 is cited using *conclusit* (the Vulgate’s word for the Greek συνέκλεισεν) and *beschlossen* (Ap IV:84 [leading to the use of *conclusus* immediately following]; XII:81). Romans 3:28 is cited by Ap IV:73, 87 using *arbitramur* (the Vulgate’s word for the Greek λογίζομεθα) and *halten* and by SA II:i:4 using *halten* translated by *statuimus*. Romans 11:32 is using *beschlossen* and *concluserit* (the Vulgate has *conclusit* for the Greek συνέκλεισεν) (Ep XI:10; SD XI:28).

The Latin noun *finis*, *finis* is used once in the translation of *zu beschliessen* (LC I:319) to refer to a rhetorical sort of “conclusion”. Other uses are more with the sense of a termination and are used in connection with the German *Ende* (Nicene Creed 6; SA III:iii:19; LC I:329). Still other uses have the sense of “end” or “goal”, either in a quotation of the Vulgate version of Holy Scripture rendering the Greek τέλος also in connection with *Ende* except where noted (Romans 10:4 in both Ap IV:30 and SD V:24; 1 Timothy 1:5 in Ap IV:245 [*Summa*]; 1 Peter 4:17 in Ap XII:151) or without both the quotation and the use of *Ende* (Ap IV:372 [German omits]; Ap XV:24 [German circumlocutes]; Ap XXIV:55 [German omits]; Ap XXIV:63 [*Ursache*]). (The German *Am Ende* is rendered by the Latin *Ultimo* in LC V:39.)

The Latin verb *concludo*, *concludere*, *conclusi*, *conclusus* is used of Paul’s conclusion that faith accepts promises (Ap IV:285 [German omits]); our conclusion, based on some reasoning, that we are justified, reconciled, and reborn by faith (Ap IV:386 [German omits]); of the opponents making a false conclusion from statements of Scripture, the Fathers, and the canons (Ap XII:122 [*beschließen*]); of the believer concluding that God hears prayer (LC III:121 [*schliessen*]); LC IV:58 (rendering *schliessen*); of the conclusion reasoned from Christ’s words that the Sacrament of the Altar is true regardless of the character of the person distributing it or receiving it (LC V:16 [*schliessen*]; confer SD VII:24, which cites the LC passage but uses *statuimus*); and Paul concludes a disputation about the salvation of Israel with words of doxology (SD XI:64; on this passage, see n.50 above, p.150). (In the Latin translation of the Large

Catechism forms of the verb render other German words with different senses: *concludi* for *stecken* in LC I:13; *conclusum sit* for *geht* in LC I:117; *concludatur* for *nicht so eng spanne* in LC I:250; and *conclusa* for *eingeschlossen haben* in LC III:73.)

The Latin verb *colligo*, *colligere*, *collegi*, *collectus* is used in a quotation from Augustine who therein concludes that justification is by faith (Ap IV:87 [*schliessen*]); of people perceiving things about the pope (SA Preface 3 [*merken*]); of inferring from the meaning of the Second Commandment when and how God's name is abused (LC I:53 [*ausrechnen*]); of anyone perceiving that those living according to the Fourth Commandment were holy (LC I:112 [*können nehmen daß*]); of praise of God being concluded from His many blessings (LC II:19 [*consequatur et colligitur* render *schliessen und folgen*]); of concluding and thinking from the command to pray (LC III:12 [*collige et cogita* render *schließen und danken*], well illustrated); of everyone concluding that Baptism is a greater work than anyone else's (LC IV:10 [*schliessen*]); of reasoning regarding the relationship between valid Baptism and faith (LC IV:58-59 [twice, rendering *wohl geschlossen* in ¶58 and *schleuss* in ¶59]); of the Sacramentarians implying that the unworthy do not receive the sacrament (SD VII:88 [*deuten*]); and of Paul in Romans drawing conclusions from Christians' election (SD XI:47 [Latin adds]). In other places, the same Latin word is used of "gathering" or "collecting" different things: truth (AC Introduction to Matters in Dispute ¶5 [German omits]); traditions (AC XXVI:14 [*zusammenzuziehen*], 15 [German omits]; Ap XV:27 [*schreiben*] with interpretations); examples (AC XXVI:45 [*zieht zusammen*]; AC XXVII:45 [*zusammenbringen*]); testimonies (Ap IV:171 [German omits]); similar instances (Ap VII/VIII:45 [*vorbringen und anzeigen*]); sins (Ap XI:1 [*errinern*]); circumstances of sins (Ap XI:7 [*zusammengelesen*]); arguments (Ap XII:133 [*sind*]); abuses of the mass (Ap XXIV:99 [*vorgetragen*]); writings (SD I:4 [*fassen*]); and the Church (SD II:40 [*sammelt*], quoting SC II:6 where *congregare* is used in the Latin translation, 50 [*sammelt*]). In still other places, the same Latin word is used of a "connection" or "link" between things (Ap IV:232 [twice]; LC I:329). A final notable passage, one omitted from the corresponding German version, is Ap IV:285 where the Reformers say a conscience "collecting" (*colligens*) remission of sins through works is never able to "conclude" (*non potest statuere*) God is satisfied. Although *colligo*, *colligere*, *collegi*, *collectus* is used with the sense "conclude" most heavily in the translation of the Large Catechism, the sense is not unknown to Melancthon's use in the original Apology nor to the translator of the Formula, and the meanings are related. Moreover, even if this Latin word was not used at all in those works with the sense of "conclude", its nonuse would not by itself indicate the unwillingness of those authors to draw logical conclusions. (In fact, other words for such logical conclusions are used more heavily in those works, as seen earlier in this note and as the note continues.)

The Latin verb *statuo*, *statuere*, *statui*, *statutus* is used of reasoning leading to conclusions about righteousness by faith (Ap IV:176 [German omits]); Apology X:1 is said to argue and conclude for the bodily presence of Christ in the Lord's Supper on the basis of 1 Corinthians 10:16 (SD VII:55 [*argumentatur et statuit* render *argumentiert und schleußt*]); no conclusions are to be reached in the case of what is not revealed in God's Word (SD XI:52, 55 [in both cases *statuere* renders *schließen*]); for more on this passage and the limit to reasoning on this justification-related matter, see the discussion in the text below, beginning on p.313). The tropological meanings of this Latin verb begin with establishing especially by example or other authority, but they also include deciding disputes; making up one's individual mind; and judging, being of or holding the opinion, thinking, or considering, especially a conclusion drawn as an inference (Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, 1752-1754). (The authors of the works in *The Book of Concord* and their translators may or may not follow all of the strict grammatical distinctions associated with the subtleties of these meanings.)

With reference to the meaning of making up one's individual mind, there are quite a number of other uses of the Latin verb *statuo*, *statuere*, *statui*, *statutus* where English translations do not translate anything about "concluding" but the German equivalents are similar to those mentioned and the use is significant. (There are still other uses of the Latin verb not detailed here where the meaning is more along the lines of "ordain" or "establish".) Although in the cases at hand the adverbs *certo* ("certainly") or *vere* ("truly") are frequently used with *statuere*, the presence or absence of the modifier does not seem to correspond to any difference in usage. Most frequently the Reformers are referring to holding the firm and decided conclusion that one is justified before God or otherwise regarded favorably by Him on account of

Christ (*propter Christum*). The list of passages in *The Book of Concord* where the verb is so used is lengthy: AC XX:15; Ap IV:8, 27, 34 (second use), 45, 110, 135, 141, 148, 163 (twice), 165, 174, 178, 180, 203, 217, 262, 285 (twice), 299, 320, 350, 386; XI:2; XII:80, 88; XIII:4; XX:8; Ep III:9). (For one to conclude such deliverance apart from Christ is a “papal idolatry” [SA II:ii:1].) The other forms of God’s favorable regard include His hearing prayer (for example, Ap IV:8, 303, 350; XII:89; XV:43 [the content of preaching]; XVIII:7, 8; XXI:20; confer LC III:13, 25), cares for a person (for example, Ap IV:303, 350; XVIII:7, 8). (The expression can also refer to God’s disfavor: His wrath at sin (Ap IV:34 [first use])

German equivalents in these cases include the following: *gewisslich schliesst* (AC XX:15); *im Herzen schliessen* (Ap IV:8; XXI:17); *gewiss zu stehen* (Ap IV:27); *im Herzen sollen verlassen* (Ap IV:34); *glauben* (Ap IV:135, 203); *glauben und schliessen* (Ap IV:141); *das Herz Gewiss drauf steht* (Ap IV:148); *sollen des gewiß sein* (Ap IV:163 [first use]); *verläßt* (Ap IV:262); *halten und wissen* (Ap IV:165); *gewiß bei uns dafürhalten* (Ap XI:2); *glauben gewiß* (Ap XII:80; XIII:20 [transposed]; Ap XXIV:49 [also transposed]); *gewiß sein* (Ap XII:89); *gewiß werden* (Ap XII:111); *gewiß dafürhalten* (Ap XVIII:8); *sollen’s gewiß dafürhalten* (Ap XXI:20); *wahrhaftig dafürhalt* (Ap XXIV:70); *für gewiss halten sollen* (Ep III:9); *für Wahrheit halten können* (SD II:9); and *sollen wir gewiß sein* (SD II:56). (Some passages where the Latin expression is used, frequently in contexts that are more technical in nature, the German version omits or rephrases: Ap IV:163 [second use]; 174, 176, 180, 217, 299, 303, 319, 320, 350; XII:88; XIII:4; XV:43; XVIII:7; XX:8).

These uses are akin to “belief” yet distinct. English translators sometimes render the Latin as “believe” (for example, Ap IV:27 in Tappert), as does the German version in some cases (for example, *glauben* in Ap IV:135, *glauben und schliessen* in Ap IV:141), but such faith in the heart is in other places explicitly mentioned along side *statuere*, suggesting some sort of a conjunction yet distinction, though not a separation, between the faith of the heart and the logical conclusion of the mind or heart (for example, Ap IV:203, 299). (See the discussion of the Reformers’ alleged complete separation, for example in the text above on p.138.) There are even places where the expression seems to be used to explain what faith is (for example, Ap IV:148, 386; Ap XII:94 [first use]), and others where faith seems to be the basis of the conclusion (for example, Ap IV:217; XII:80). In other places the Word of God is the basis for the conclusion (for example, Ap IV:262; Ep III:9; SD II:56; SD XI:29, 36), especially its sacramental forms (for example, Ap XI:2 [confer SD XI:38 first use]; XIII:4, 20; XXIV:49, 70; SD XI:38 [second use]). Words other than *credere* (“to believe”) used alongside *statuere* (“to conclude”) indicate either further distinctions or a rhetorical emphasis or desire for clarity (*sentire* [“to know”] in Ap XI:2; XVIII:7; *timere* [“to fear”] in Ap XVIII:7; *percipere* [“to perceive”] in SD II:9; *intelligere* [“to understand”] in SD II:9).

Furthermore, the conclusion in view is not a general conclusion about objective righteousness but an individual’s—frequently the conscience’s—conclusion about subjective righteousness (for example, Ap IV:285 [twice], 321; Ap XII:88). To not make the conclusion that one is forgiven is regarded as blasphemy (Ap XII:94 [second use]), and the Reformers often indicate the difficulty in reaching the conclusion if relying on works, the law, the need for a complete confession, or the invocation of the saints (for example, Ap IV:176, 285 [twice]; XII:111; XX:10; XXI:17). Some of these uses thus not surprisingly come in contexts where fallen human reason and the will, their uses and limitations, are being discussed (Ap IV:8, 303; XVIII:7; SD II:9).

The vast majority of these uses of *statuo*, *statuere* with the sense of concluding come in the Apology of the Augsburg confession. (Some of the uses of the verb in the Latin translations of German writings do not seem to really fit into the foregoing discussion: SA III:viii:3, 4; LC I:7, 29, 169; SD XI:9.) Of the some 45 uses in the Apology, more than half (28) are in the article on Justification, which could be due to that article’s being about one-third of the whole Apology but seems to be due more to the nature of the expression’s use primarily as referring to a person concluding that he or she is forgiven for Christ’s sake. Overall, various things are said to be so certain, but most cut right to the core of the Gospel and its central article of justification by faith on account of Christ (*propter Christum*). The salvation God so graciously offers is accepted by faith, but the person and his or her conscience also logically concludes on the basis of faith and God’s Word and Sacraments that he or she is forgiven. (Again, the absence of a greater number of uses in the works other than the Apology is not taken to be indicative of a rejection of such concluding by the authors writing in German.)

(Note the use of the Latin maxim, followed by a paraphrase in the German and a concrete illustration in both languages.) In the following paragraph Luther reiterates the argument and says that, even if only one person were baptized and did not have true faith, Baptism would still have validity and integrity.<sup>241</sup> The arguments Luther uses in the paragraph just quoted may be represented as follows, with unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets. Note that Luther is equating “confirming the substance” with “having existence and value”.

- 137) No abuses of Baptism (M) are true Baptisms (that is, have existence and value) (P).
- 138) All Baptisms in the absence of faith (S) are abuses of Baptism (M).
- 139) No Baptism in the absence of faith (S) is a true Baptism (that is, has existence and value) (P).
- 140) All abuses of Baptism (M) are true Baptisms (that is, have existence and value) (P).
- 138) All Baptisms in the absence of faith (S) are abuses of Baptism (M).
- 141) All Baptisms in the absence of faith (S) are true Baptisms (that is, have existence and value) (P).

Based on this passage, Luther seems to have in mind two related arguments—one which his opponents hold and the other which he holds. He provides absurd counter-examples to argue against his opponents, he and backs up his with a Latin maxim. The opponents’ syllogism is the first syllogism given (137-138-139), and it has a 1<sup>st</sup> figure form in the valid mood EAE known as Celarent. Luther’s syllogism is the second one given (140-138-141), and it has his usual 1<sup>st</sup> figure form in the valid AAA mood known as Barbara. Note that the minor premise (138) is the same in both syllogisms, for both

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Somewhat similarly, the use of the German *Beschluß* is sometimes used to refer to what the heart reasons, from its own experience of afflictions, regarding righteousness by faith (Ap IV:333 [a German addition]; confer the use of *schließen* in Ap IV:161 [German addition]). Other uses of *Beschluß* seem to less logical and more rhetorical (Ap VII/VIII:8 [German addition]; XII:66 [German addition]).

Thus, the Reformers themselves draw logical conclusions regarding matters of faith and expect others to do the same. Regardless of the word used in the original Latin or German, concluding is taking place and conclusions are being reached. The Reformers refer to people in the Bible concluding and to conclusions reached by Biblical figures. Likewise, the Reformers can refer to their opponents concluding and to their conclusions. For the Reformers, human reason has its limits: it must submit itself to the revealed Word of God and the corresponding Sacraments, which can be the basis for the concluding and conclusions. Human reason is not to make conclusions that contradict the principle of justification by faith for the sake of Christ or to draw conclusions about matters that are not revealed, such as the complete mysteries of election, concluding instead in and with doxology, praise of God. Although in some cases faith is the basis for the conclusion, the mind’s or the conscience’s logical conclusion itself serves a purpose for each individual believer, conjoined with and yet in some ways distinct from faith in the heart, even if the purpose is not more specifically detailed or always explicit, especially in the German.

<sup>241</sup> LC IV:60-63, Tappert, 444. The language of syllogistic arguments continues in that “paragraph” as well.

Luther and his opponents would seem to agree that Baptism received wrongly (that is, apart from faith) is an abuse of Baptism. Luther invites his opponents to “invert” their argument and “conclude” as he does (*kehre es ümb und schleuss vielmehr*; *argumentum inverte atque ita collige*). Although there appears to be a Greek logical term that can be translated as “inversion” more with the sense of “conversion”,<sup>242</sup> what Luther appears to have in mind is not switching the predicates<sup>243</sup> but changing the quality of the proposition from a negative to an affirmative, that is, take the contrary of the major premise (137 becomes 140).<sup>244</sup> The result is the contrary of the conclusion (139 becomes 141). Of course, the change is not a usual logical move because it does not produce an equivalent result, but Luther’s intention in this case is not to provide an equivalent opposite but illustrate the absurdity and falsity of his opponents’ claim and the logicity and truth of his own.

Both Melanchthon and Luther freely use syllogistic arguments to attack their opponents’ positions and defend their own, and the later Reformers continue their ministerial supra-sentential use of philosophy. In fact, the final two subsections show the later Reformers making quite clearly the points that individuals must use logic to comfort their souls but at the same time must keep logic in its place.

### ***Need to conclude about God’s will, as in SD XI:35-41***

While the Reformers are critical of their opponents’ poor reasoning and wrong and unsupported premises, the Reformers by no means reject syllogistic reasoning as a whole. In fact, as is seen in the Solid Declaration at the *locus* of Election, the Reformers see reasoning as a vital part of sinners receiving comfort through the Word and Sacraments.<sup>245</sup> Where their opponents falsely conclude from some people rejecting the Gospel that God does not really want all people to be saved, the Reformers say that

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<sup>242</sup> See above, n.101, p.165.

<sup>243</sup> See above, n.238, p.299.

<sup>244</sup> On contraries, see Bonevac, *Simple Logic*, 173; Copi and Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, 189-190.

<sup>245</sup> Confer the implicit argument by analogy in SD XI:60 that people need to be able to use induction to apply the law to themselves; see above in the text, beginning on p.169.

conclusion destroys the Gospel's comfort, and they look at the same evidence and come to quite a different conclusion than their opponents after critiquing pointing out the pitfalls of their opponents' conclusion.

Hoc enim esset Deo contradictorias voluntates affingere, das ist, solchergestalt würde gelehret, daß Gott, der doch die ewige Wahrheit ist, ihm selbst zuwider sein sollte; so doch Gott solche Untugend, da man sich eins Dinges erklärt und ein anderes im Herzen gedenkt und meinet, auch an Menschen strafet Psal. 5. und 12. Dadurch uns auch der nötige, tröstliche Grund gänzlich ungewiß und zunichte gemacht, da wir täglich erinnert und vermahnet werden, daß wir alleine aus Gottes Wort, dadurch er mit uns handelt und uns beruft, lernen und schließen sollen, was sein Wille gegen uns sei; und was uns solches zusagt und verheißt, daß wir das gewiß gläuben und daran nicht zweifeln sollen.

Derhalben auch Christus die Vorheißunge des Evangelii nicht allein läßt ingemein fürtragen, sondern durch die Sakrament, die er als Siegel der Vorheißung angehängt, und darmit einen jeden Gläubigen insunderheit bestätigt.

Darumb behalten wir auch, wie die Augsburgische Confession articulo 11. saget, die Privatabsolutio und lehren, daß es Gottes Gebot sei, daß wir solcher „Absolutio gläuben und für gewiß halten sollen, daß wir so wahrhaftig, wenn wir dem Wort der Absolutio gläuben, Gott versöhnet werden, als hätten wir eine Stimme vom Himmel gehöret“, wie die Apologia diesen Artikel erklärt; welcher Trost uns ganz und gar genommen, wenn wir nicht aus dem Beruf, der durchs Wort und durch die Sakramente geschicht, von Gottes willen gegen uns schließen sollten.

Es würde uns auch der Grund umbgestoßen und genommen, daß der H. Geist bei dem gepredigten, gehörten, betrachteten Worter gewißlich gegenwärtig und dadurch kräftig sein und wirken wölle. Derhalben hats die Meinung in keinem Wege, darvon hievor Meldung geschehen, daß nämlich diejenigen die Auserwählten sein sollten, wann sie gleich das Wort Gottes verachten, von sich stoßen, lästern und verfolgen, Matth. 22. Act. 15.; oder wenn sie es hören, ihre Herzen verstocken, Ebr. 4., dem H. Geist widerstreben, Act. 7., ohn Buß in Sünden vorharren Luc. 14., an Christum nicht wahrhaftig glauben, Mar. 16., nur einen äußerlichen Schein führen, Matth. 7. und 22., oder außer Christo andere Wege zur Gerechtigkeit und Seligkeit suchen, Rom. 9. Sondern wie Gott in seinem Rat verordnet hat, daß der Heilige Geist die Auserwählten durchs Wort berufen, erleuchten und bekehren, und daß er alle die, so durch rechten Glauben Christum annehmen, gerecht und selig machen wolle, also hat er auch in seinem Rat beschlossen, daß er diejenigen, so durch Wort berufen werden, wann sie das Wort von sich stoßen und dem Heiligen Geist, der in ihnen durchs Wort kräftig sein und wirken will, widerstreben und darin



vorharren, sie verstocken, verwerfen und verdammen wolle. Und also sind „viel berufen und wenig auserwählet“.

Denn wenig nehmen das Wort an und folgen ihm, der größte Haufe verachtet das Wort und will zu der Hochzeit nicht kommen.

Solcher Verachtung des Worts ist nicht die Ursach Gottes Versehung, sonder des Menschen vorgekehrter Wille, der das Mittel und Werkzeug des H. Geistes, so ihm Gott durch den Beruf fürträgt, von sich stößet oder verkehret und den H. Geist, der durchs Wort kräftig sein will und wirkt, widerstrebet; wie Christus spricht: „Wie oft habe ich dich versamblen wollen, und du hast nicht gewollt“. Matth. 23.

Hoc enim esset Deo contradictorias voluntates affingere, quasi is, qui aeterna veritas est, secum ipse dissentiret aut aliud loqueretur, aliud vero corde premeret. Hanc levitatem, hanc improbitatem (cum aliud verbis proponitur, aliud in corde fovetur) Deus ipse etiam in hominibus arguit et punit, ut David aliquoties testatur. Et hac ratione fundamentum fidei nostrae maxime necessarium et consolationis verae plenissimum prorsus verteretur, ex quo nobis quotidie admonitiones hac adferuntur et inculcantur, quod ex solo Dei verbo (per quod nobiscum agit nosque vocat) dicere atque statuere debeamus, quae sit ipsius erga nos voluntas, et quod omnia illa, quae nobis in verbo Domini promittuntur, firma fide amplecti neque de iis ulla ratione dubitare debeamus.

Et quidem eam ipsam ob causam (ne de revelata Dei erga nos voluntate dubitemus) promissionem evangelii Christus non tantum generaliter proponi curat, sed etiam sacramenta promissioni annectere voluit, quibus tamquam sigillis ad promissionem appensis unicuique credenti promissionis evangelicae certitudinem confirmat.

Ea de causa retinemus etiam privatam absolutionem (ut Augustana Confessio articulo undecimo loquitur) docentes Dei mandatum esse, ut absolutioni fidem habeamus ac certo statuamus, tam vere (quando verbis absolutionis fidem habemus) Deo reconciliatos nos esse, ac si vocem coelitus delapsam ea de re audivissemus, quam sententiam etiam Apologia confirmat. Haec vero consolatio eximia prorsus nobis eriperetur, si non ex vocatione, quae fit per Verbum et sacramenta, de voluntate Dei erga nos statuendum esset.

Quin etiam illud fundamentum religionis nostrae everteretur, quod credimus spiritum sanctum cum Verbo praedicato, audito et diligenter considerato praesentem atque efficacem esse et operari velle. Quare nequaquam sentiendum est, ut paulo ante monuimus, eos etiam in electorum numero habendos, qui Verbum Dei contemnunt, repellunt, execrantur atque persequuntur, qui audito Verbo corda sua contra illud obfirmant, qui spiritui sancto resistunt, qui in peccatis absque poenitentia perseverant neque in Christum vere credunt, externa tantum specie pietatem prae se ferunt aut extra Christum alias iustitiae et salutis rationes

quaerunt. Ut enim Deus in aeterno suo consilio ordinavit, ut spiritus sanctus electos per verbum vocet, illuminet atque convertat, atque omnes illos, qui Christum vera fide amplectuntur, iustificet atque in eos aeternam salutem conferat: ita in eodem suo consilio decrevit, quod eos, qui per Verbum vocati illud repudiant et spiritui sancto (qui in ipsis per verbum efficaciter operari et efficax esse vult) resistunt et obstinati in ea contumacia perseverant, indurare, reprobare et aeternae damnationi devovere velit. Et secundum has rationes intelligendum est, quod scriptura dicit: Multos vocatos, paucos vero electos esse.

Pauci enim Verbum Dei serio recipiunt eique sincere obtemperant, maior pars contemnit verbum neque in regiis illis nuptiis vult comparere. Huius contemptus verbi non est in causa vel praescientia vel praedestinatio Dei, sed perversa hominis voluntas, quae medium illud et instrumentum spiritus sancti, quod Deus homini per vocationem offert, reiicit aut depravat et spiritui sancto, qui per verbum efficaciter operari cupit, repugnat, sicut Christus dicit: Quoties volui congregare te, et noluisti.

In this way it would be taught that God, who is the eternal Truth, contradicts himself. Yet God himself punishes men for such wickedness when they say one thing and think and intend something different in their hearts (Ps. 5:10, 11; 12:3, 4). This would also completely undermine and totally destroy for us the necessary and comforting foundation, which daily reminds and admonishes us to learn and to determine God's will toward us and what assures and promises it to us solely from his Word, through which he deals with us and calls us, so that we should believe it with absolute certainty and not doubt it in the least.

For this reason Christ has the promise of the Gospel offered not only in general but also through the sacraments, which he has attached as a seal of the promise and by which he confirms it to every believer individually. For that reason also, as the Augsburg Confession states in Article. XI, we retain individual absolution and teach that it is God's command that we "believe this absolution and firmly hold that when we believe the word of absolution we are as truly reconciled with God as if we had heard a voice from heaven," as the Apology explains this article. We would be deprived of this comfort completely if we could not determine God's will toward us from the call which comes to us through the Word and through the Sacraments. This would also overturn and destroy for us the foundation, namely that the Holy Spirit wills to be certainly present with and most efficacious and active through the Word when it is proclaimed, heard, and meditated upon. Hence, as was mentioned before, there is no basis for the assumption that those might be the elect [among the elect are to be numbered such] who despise God's Word and who reject, blaspheme, and persecute it (Matt. 22:5, 6; Acts 13:40f., 46), or who harden their hearts when they hear it (Heb. 4:2, 7),

resist the Holy Spirit (Acts 7:51), remain in sin without repentance (Luke 14:18, 24), do not truly believe in Christ (Mark 16:16); make only an outward pretense (Matt. 7:15; 22:12), or seek other ways to righteousness and salvation outside of Christ (Rom. 9:31). On the contrary, as God has ordained in his counsel that the Holy Spirit would call, enlighten, and convert the elect through the Word, and that He would justify and save all those who accept Christ through true faith, so he has also ordained in his counsel that he would harden, reject, and condemn all who, when they are called through the Word, spurn the Word and persistently resist the Holy Spirit who wants to work efficaciously in them through the Word. In this sense “many are called, but few are chosen,” for few accept the Word and obey it; the majority despise the Word, and refuse to come to the wedding. The reason for such contempt of the Word is not God’s foreknowledge but man’s own perverse will, which rejects or perverts the means and instrument of the Holy Spirit, which God offers to him through the call and resists the Holy Spirit who wills to be efficaciously active through the Word, as Christ says, “How often would I have gathered you together and you would not!” (Matt. 23, 37).<sup>246</sup>

The arguments the formulators discuss in the preceding passage may be represented as follows, with the unexpressed premises indicated in square brackets.

- 142) If God offered salvation to all (p) and intended only a few to be converted (q) then He would be contradicting Himself (r).
- 143) [He has offered salvation to all (p).]
- 144) [He does not contradict Himself (~r).]
- 145) [He does not intend only a few be converted (~q).]
- 146) [All those whom God punishes (M) are those who are evil (P).]
- 147) All those who say one thing and mean something else (S) are those whom God punishes (M).
- 148) [All those who say one thing and mean something else (S) are evil (P).]
- 149) [If God said one thing and meant something else (p) then He would be evil (q).]
- 150) [God is not evil (~q).]
- 151) [God does not say one thing and mean something else (~p).]
- 152) If God said one thing and intended something else (p) then we could not trust what God says in His Word (q).
- 153) [We can trust what says in His Word (~q).]
- 154) [God does not say one thing and mean something else (~p).]
- 155) [All God’s words (M) are truly intended by God to be efficacious (P).]
- 156) All words of individual absolution (S) are God’s words (M).
- 157) [All words of individual absolution (S) are truly intended by God to be efficacious (P).]
- 158) All offers of salvation in the Gospel (M) are offers of salvation that are intended by God to be efficacious (P).
- 159) All men (S) are offered salvation in the Gospel (M).
- 160) All men (S) are those who are offered salvation that is intended by God to be efficacious (P).

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<sup>246</sup> SD XI:35-41, *BKS*, 1074-1076; Tappert, 622-623.

- 161) All who receive what God intends in the offer of salvation (M) are those who are saved (P).  
 162) All who receive the Gospel in faith (S) are those who receive what God intends in the offer of salvation (M).  
 163) All who receive the Gospel in faith (S) are those who are saved (P).  
 164) No elect are unbelievers (that is, depise the Word, seek other salvation, etc.).  
*obversion*  
 165) All the elect (M) are believers (that is, hear the Gospel in faith) (P).  
 166) [All those saved (S) are the elect (M).]  
 167) [All those saved (S) are believers (P).]  
 168) All who accept and “obey” (that is, believe) the Gospel (M) are among the few (P).  
 169) [All who are chosen (S) are those who accept and obey the Gospel (M).]  
 170) [All who are chosen (S) are among the few (P).]  
 171) No one who acts from a perverse will (M) is one who does so because of God’s foreknowledge (P).  
 172) All who reject God’s Word (S) are those who are acting (that is, rejecting it) from a perverse will (M).  
 173) No one who rejects God’s Word (S) is one who does so (that is, rejects it) because of God’s foreknowledge (P).

The second generation of Reformers make quite a logical argument against the teaching of double predestination and its related interpretations of Scripture. The Reformers begin by arguing against the idea that God offers salvation to all but does not intend for all to be saved. The first argument against this idea (142-143-144-145) centers on God not contradicting Himself and uses Modus Tollens, (what is today known as) one of DeMorgan’s laws, and a disjunctive syllogism to reach its conclusion in propositional logic.<sup>247</sup> The second argument against this idea centers on God not saying one thing and meaning another because it would make Him evil; this argument is in the form of a categorical syllogism (146-147-148, a 1<sup>st</sup> figure, namely Barbara) and an argument of propositional logic (149-150-151). The third argument against the idea (152-153-154), another in propositional logic, centers on God’s Word needing to be trustworthy for people to be saved.

Then, as if anticipating a counter argument by their opponents that God is not contradicting Himself but simply speaks to some as if to all, the Reformers take the argument down to an individual before taking it back out to a universal. In the first syllogism of this grouping (155-156-157, another Barbara), the Reformers argue from the

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<sup>247</sup> On DeMorgan’s laws and the disjunctive syllogism, see Bonevac, Simple Logic, 315-316, 309-310.

genuineness of individual absolution, which genuineness *genesio* Lutherans would recognize on the basis of the Apology, that even to individuals God's words mean what they say. (Presumably, if double predestination were true, then in at least some cases some words of private absolution would not be intended to be efficacious.) Then, as if by induction, the Reformers argue that what was true of absolution spoken to the individual is true of all of the Gospel's offers spoken to all (158-159-160, another Barbara).<sup>248</sup> Perhaps realizing that the conclusion of the second syllogism in this group (160) borders on the Lutheran-condemned *ex opere operato* teaching of the Roman Catholics, the Reformers then allude to faith by qualifying their statement about the Word "when it is proclaimed, heard, and meditated upon". The third syllogism in this group (161-162-163) brings faith into consideration.

Having more or less preached to believers, who might doubt their salvation on account of the teaching of election, good news about the sufficiency of hearing and believing the Word, the Reformers turn to preach law to unbelievers, who might be assuming they can be saved apart from the Word and Sacrament that produce faith and good works, the law about the necessity of hearing and believing the Word. The Reformers' simple statement that no elect are unbelievers (164) by obversion produces a major premise (165) from which a whole syllogism is extracted (165-166-167, also Barbara).<sup>249</sup>

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<sup>248</sup> Instead of the two categorical syllogisms—namely 155-156-157 and 158-159-160—the Reformers might have used one propositional argument:

If the offer of salvation is not intended to be efficacious (p), then people are without comfort (q).

People are not without comfort (~q).

The offer of salvation is intended to be efficacious (~p).

<sup>249</sup> Related to this discussion is the example of Pharaoh who hardened his own heart and whose heart God then further hardened. The Reformers refer to Paul's use of the example of Pharaoh, presumably the mention in Romans 9:17 in the larger context of chapter 9, and explain what conclusions can and cannot be reasoned from that example. SD XI:85-86 (BKS, 1088; Tappert, 630-631) follows below.

*Daß aber Gott Pharaonis Herz verhärtet, daß nämlich Pharao immer fort und fort sündiget, und je mehr er vernahmet, je verstockter er wird, das ist eine Strafe seiner vorgehenden Sünde und gräulichen Tyrannei gewesen, die er an den Kindern Israel viel und manniglei, ganz unmenschlich und wider das Anklagen seines Herzens geübet hat. Und weil ihm Gott sein Wort predigen und seinen Willen verkündigen ließ, und aber Pharao sich mutwillig stracks wider alle Vermahnung und Warnung auflehnete: hat Gott die Hand von ihm abgezogen, und ist also das Herz verhärtet und verstocket, und hat Gott sein Gerichte an ihm erzeiget; dann er anders nichts, dann „des hellischen Feuers schuldig war“; wie dann der heilige Apostel das Exempel Pharaonis auch anders nicht einführet, dann hiermit die Gerechtigkeit Gottes zu erweisen, die er über die Unbußfertigen und Verächter seines Worts erzeiget, keinesweges aber dahin*

Finally, the Reformers return to the Bible passage (about the many called and few chosen) that started the whole discussion. A person is either among the few chosen (also implicitly called) or among the many called but not chosen. The “few chosen” are the focus of the first syllogism in this grouping (168-169-170, a Barbara), and note that the minor premise (169) can be taken as teaching God alone being responsible for the salvation of an individual. The “many not chosen” are the focus of the second syllogism in this grouping (171-172-173, a Barbara), and note that its minor premise (172) can be taken as teaching that an individual human being alone is responsible for his or her damnation. The lack of “symmetry” or what might be perceived as a logical inconsistency in what the Lutherans regard as the proper teaching about election is part of what drove the reformed to hold to a double predestination.

The Lutherans’s explanation, however, is not logically inconsistent, even if it neither makes God responsible for both salvation *and* damnation (double predestination) nor human beings responsible for both damnation *and* salvation (synergism, where a person cooperates in their own salvation, in contrast to Divine monergism). People want

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*gemeinet noch verstanden, daß Gott ihm oder einigem Menschen die Seligkeit nicht gönnete, sondern also in seinem heimlichen Rat zur ewigen Verdammnis verordnet, daß er nicht sollt können oder mögen selig werden.*

*Quod autem Dominus cor Pharaonis indurat, ut Pharaos subinde peccando pergat, et quo gravius admonetur, eo magis ipse induretur, id poena est antecedentium ipsius peccatorum et immanissimae et multiplicis tyrannidis, quam in filios Israel (contra conscientiae suae stimulos) exercuerat. Et cum Dominus ipsi Verbum ac voluntatem suam annuntiari curaret, Pharaos vero nihilominus ex proposito et destinata malitia simpliciter adversus omnes exhortationes et admonitiones contumaciter insurgeret: Dominus manum ab eo suam retraxit, eum deseruit, atque ita cor ipsius induratum est et Dominus iustum iudicium suum adversus eum executus est. Omnino enim Pharaos aeterno gehennae incendio dignus erat. Et sane divus Paulus exemplum Pharaonis non alio fine adfert, quam ut eo ipso Dei iustitiam declararet, quam in impenitentibus hominibus et verbi divini contemptoribus puniendis demonstrat. Nequaquam autem Pauli mens est, quod Dominus Pharaoni aut ulli alii homini salutem invidet, aut quod in arcano suo consilio quendam ad damnationem praedestinaverit, ut ille nullo modo salutem consequi possit.*

“But that God hardened Pharaoh’s heart so that Pharaoh continued to sin and became the more obdurate the more he was admonished was a punishment for his preceding sin and his horrible tyranny with which he oppressed the children of Israel by many, various, and most inhuman devices contrary to the voice of his conscience. But after God arranged to have his Word proclaimed and his will revealed to Pharaoh, and he deliberately rebelled against all the admonitions and warnings, God withdrew his hand from him, and so his heart became hardened and calloused and God executed His judgment on him, for he was indeed guilty of ‘hell-fire.’ The holy apostle adduces Pharaoh’s example for the sole purpose of thereby setting forth the righteousness of God which God manifests toward the impenitent and despisers of his Word, and in no way does he want us to infer that God had not wanted to grant Pharaoh or any other person eternal life, or that in his secret counsel God had ordained him to eternal damnation so that he could not and might not be saved.”

an explanation that not only elucidate the difference in factors (as the Lutheran position above does) but also explains the difference in outcomes for the individual (which the Lutheran position does not). Without disparaging logic, the Lutherans reject such an unreasonable rationalism that requires a rationale for every query. Believers are to hold to God's Word and Sacraments for their certainty that God has elected them to salvation and take no credit for their salvation, but all blame for the loss of those who reject God's means of grace lies not with God but with those who reject Him. The Reformers, as will be seen in the next subsection, say attempting to resolve that apparent contradiction is one place reason is not to go.

### ***Limit to reason, as in SD XI:52-55***

The Reformers recognize that God has revealed some things in His Word but not other things, and they say that reason is not to try to go beyond God's revelation in an attempt to resolve things God has not revealed, even though that reasoning seems more exciting.

Es muß aber mit sonderem Fleiß Unterschied gehalten werden zwischen dem, was in Gottes Wort ausdrücklich hiervon offenbaret oder nicht geoffenbaret. Dann über das, davon bisher gesagt, so hiervon in Christo offenbaret, hat Gott von diesem Geheimnis noch viel verschwiegen und verborgen und allein seiner Weisheit und Erkenntnis vorbehalten, welchs wir nicht erforschen, noch unsern Gedanken hierinn folgen, schließen oder grübeln, sondern uns an das geoffenbarte Wort halten sollen. Welche Erinnerung zum höchsten vonnöten.

Dann damit hat unser Fürwitz immer viel mehr Lust sich zu bekümmern als mit dem, das Gott uns in seinem Wort darvon geoffenbart hat, weil wirs nicht zusammenreumen können, welches uns auch zu tun nicht befohlen ist.

Also ist daran kein Zweifel, daß Gott gar wohl und aufs allergewisseste vor der Zeit der Welt zuvor ersehen habe und noch wisse, welche von denen, so berufen werden, glauben oder nicht glauben werden. Item welche von den Bekehrten beständig, welche nicht beständig bleiben werden; welche nach dem Fall wiederkehren, welche in Verstockung fallen werden. So ist auch die Zahl, wieviel derselben beiderseits sein werden, Gott ohn allen Zweifel bewußt und bekannt. Weil aber solch Geheimnis Gott seiner Weisheit vorbehalten und uns im Wort davon nichts offenbaret, vielweniger solches durch unsere Gedanken zu erforschen uns befohlen, sondern ernstlich darvon abgehalten hat, Rom.

11: sollen wir mit unsern Gedanken nicht folgern, schließen noch darin grüblen, sondern uns auf sein geoffenbartes Wort, daran er uns weiset, halten.

Accurate autem discrimen observandum et retinendum est inter id, quod de hoc negotio expresse in sacris litteris revelatum est, et inter ea, quae non sunt revelata. Praeter illa enim, de quibus hactenus dictum est, et quae in Christo manifeste revelata sunt, multa adhuc Dominus de hoc mysterio reticuit et occultavit, eaque soli suae sapientiae et scientiae reservavit. Talia investigare, cogitationibus nostris indulgere, aliquid de iis statuere aut scrutari nobis non licet, sed toti a verbo Dei revelato, quod ipse nobis proponit, pendere debemus. Haec admonitio in hoc mysterio apprime necessaria est.

Ea enim est corruptae naturae nostrae curiositas, ut magis iis, quae abstrusa et arcana sunt, indagandis quam iis, quae de hoc negotio Deus in verbo suo nobis revelavit, cognoscendis delectemur, praesertim cum quaedam in hoc mysterio tam intricata et perplexa occurrant, quae nos in mentibus nostris acumine ingenii nostri conciliare non possumus; sed neque id nobis a Deo demandatum est.

Dubium quidem non est, quin Deus exactissime et certissime ante tempora mundi praeviderit et hodie etiam norit, quinam ex eorum numero, qui vocati sunt, in Christum credituri aut non credituri sint; qui ex conversis in fide perseveraturi sint, qui non; et qui in peccata gravia prolapsi reversuri sint et qui in sceleribus perituri. Et baud dubie etiam numerus eorum, qui salvabuntur, et damnandorum Deo probe notus est. Quia vero Dominus talia arcana soli suae sapientiae reservavit neque ea de re quicquam in Verbo suo revelavit, multo vero minus haec mysteria cogitationibus nostris indagare nos iussit, quin potius, ne id conaremur, prohibuit: non decet nos cogitationibus nostris indulgere, statuere aliquid, ratiocinari aut illa occultissima investigare velle, sed in Verbo ipsius revelato (ad quod ille nos ablegavit) acquiescere nos oportet.

We must, however, carefully distinguish between what God has expressly revealed in his Word and what he has not revealed. Beyond the matters which have been revealed in Christ and of which we have spoken thus far, there are many points in this mystery about which God has remained silent and which he has not revealed but has kept reserved solely to his own wisdom and knowledge. We are not to pry into these, nor are we to follow our own thoughts in this matter and draw our own conclusions and brood, but we are to adhere exclusively to the revealed Word. This admonition is eminently necessary. In our presumption we take much greater delight in concerning ourselves with matters [with investigating those things which are hidden and abstruse] which we cannot harmonize—in fact, we have no command to do so—than with those aspects of the question which God has revealed to us in His Word [since



certain things occur in this mystery so intricate and involved that we are not able by the penetration of our natural ability to harmonize them; but this has not been demanded of us by God].

Thus there is no doubt that before the world began God foresaw right well and with utter certainty, and that he still knows, who of those that are called will believe and who will not; likewise, who of the converted will persevere and who will not persevere; and who after falling away [into grievous sins] will return and who will become obdurate [will perish in their sins]. God is also aware and knows exactly how many there will be on either side. But because God has reserved this mystery to his own wisdom and not revealed anything concerning it in the Word, still less has commanded us to explore it through our speculations but has earnestly warned against it (Rom. 11:33), therefore we are not, on the basis of our speculations, to make our own deductions, draw conclusions, or brood over it, but cling solely to his revealed Word, to which he directs us.<sup>250</sup>

(Note that the Latin expresses more strongly the limitation of natural reason.) Obviously no syllogism is used in this discussion, but rather the general principle of limiting reason to the basis of revelation prevents the kind of syllogisms the Reformers' opponents were forming. Instead of forming such syllogisms that go beyond revelation, the Reformers instead follow Paul to doxology.<sup>251</sup>

## Chapter IV Summary

Deductive syllogisms such as those used in *The Book of Concord* by authors of its earlier and later works originate in the philosophy of Aristotle and figure prominently in logic all through the time period leading up to the Reformation. While not every argument merited such an elaborate structure, many did. The Reformers accused their opponents of “quibbling” and using distinctions that belong only to the schools on a number of different *loci*, and, while some of the opponents' arguments are more or less dismissed out of hand, others get a significant treatment, especially those regarding

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<sup>250</sup> SD XI:52-55, *BKS*, 1079-1080; Tappert, 625.

<sup>251</sup> Confer Ep XI:10; SD XI:28, 64. (SD XI:64 was mentioned above at n.50, p.150.) See also SD XI:91-93 where using reason in teaching election is said to deny comfort, drive to despair, and strengthen impenitence. On limits to reason, confer also SD VII:46, the significant passage noted above in which the Reformers say Abraham could have disputed with God over the meaning of His Word but instead concluded against reason (see n.240, p.301).

justification by faith alone. The Reformers' vocabulary regarding expressions, formulae, and propositions reflects their own philosophical training and alludes to the more structured form of arguments even when full or partial syllogisms are absent.

Significantly, the Reformers closely relate philosophical propositions and doctrinal expressions, and the Reformers were highly concerned over the proper use and meaning of both. Again Scripture was used as a basis for syllogisms (the lack of which was said to particularly undermine an argument) and generally resulted in sufficient proof. Other bases for arguments were statements from the Church Fathers, including the confessors themselves and their own confessional writings, or other general principles. Such can go against reason, but reason cannot go against them.

The close scrutiny of passages in *The Book of Concord* containing more or less full syllogisms yielded a number of insights. While a relatively simple syllogism could be used in some places, in other places more complicated syllogisms and proofs filled up to a whole section. The most frequent topic was justification by faith alone, but it was by no means the only content of syllogisms used. In some cases premises were assumed to be accepted by the opponents to argue that a conclusion was entailed in that position or had to follow from it. Most likely due to a slightly different audience, the German "version" of the Apology was seen both to simplify the philosophical content of some passages and to sharpen the polemic of others. Similarly, Luther's Catechism contained a number of syllogisms, but he also provided multiple illustrations of his opponents' bad reasoning to help make his point to those who might be less-trained in logic. Where the authors of the works contained in *The Book of Concord* widely used deductive reasoning and even said it was to some extent "necessary", they also knew its limits: reasoning could not go beyond revelation or otherwise probe hidden aspects of the mystery of God. Even with such limits, deduction by syllogism was often used for the expressed purpose of comforting troubled consciences by providing certainty for the content of their faith and for the Sacramental means by which they are to receive the forgiveness of sins.

Discussing the logic of the argument at hand was not a problem for the Reformers. As with the inductive methods, the matter came up when the Reformers

accused their opponents of errors in reasoning. The technical side of logic also arose when the Reformers made logical moves, such as obversion and changing the quality of the predicates—both used by Luther. As far as the forms used in the arguments that are analyzed in this chapter, Melancthon was seen to use syllogisms in the valid moods Barbara, Celarent, Cesare, and Cambestres. Luther was seen to use primarily Barbara, with one observed use of Celarent, which is, like Barbara, a 1<sup>st</sup> figure form. Chemnitz, or whoever authored SD XI:35-41, used 1<sup>st</sup> figure syllogisms Barbara and Celarent. Some propositional logic was also seen to be used. All such uses for the authors of the works contained in *The Book of Concord* were philosophy in service to theology.

Worth noting is that the use of inductive and deductive reasoning is not limited to the places identified in this dissertation. Those identified were generally identified by verbal markers, but there are no doubt other places where arguments were nevertheless also made by way of example and analogy. Furthermore, other verbal markers indicate logical relationships, such as the Latin word *prius* (essentially “before”), to which consideration now turns in Chapter V, which in some ways presents the Reformers’ distinction between justification and sanctification as a case study of the supra-sentential use of philosophy in its ministerial role serving theology.

## Chapter V: The Justification/Sanctification Distinction

*From this it follows that although converted persons and believers possess the beginning of renewal, sanctification, love, virtues, and good works, these should and must not be drawn or mingled into the article of justification before God, in order to preserve the glory due to Christ, the redeemer, and, because our new obedience is imperfect and impure, in order to supply tempted consciences with abiding comfort.*

—Solid Declaration III:35

At this point, *The Book of Concord's* supra-sentential uses of philosophy, in such forms as methods of organization and argumentation, are clear. Those uses are found at the same time and in spite of the Reformers' generally negative regard for "philosophy" and mixed regard for "logic", and those uses are generally continuous both with the preceding medieval tradition and within the Reformation era. A point of alleged theological discontinuity is the distinction the Reformers make between justification and sanctification. Already the Reformers' separating the two via the *loci* method has been seen; this chapter will show the distinction between justification and sanctification is the logical result of philosophy serving theology with the goal of preserving the teaching of justification by faith. While the Reformers refuse to allow the teaching of good works' necessity at the *locus* of justification, they nevertheless teach that good works necessarily follow. This chapter's first section looks at the various ways that necessity is expressed, such as by a more-than-chronological *prius*. The second section examines *The Book of Concord's* references to sanctification, especially how the authors logically distinguish sanctification from justification. The third section presents the claim that this distinction is an innovation, and the section also presents seven responses to that claim. Somewhat also a response to the claim of discontinuity, the final section discusses the medieval "formal distinction" and whether the justification-sanctification might be an example of precisely that philosophical idea that preserves the inseparability of justification and

sanctification, while also allowing the two to be defined separately.<sup>1</sup> First, however, are the various ways of expressing the necessity of good works, such as the use of the more-than-chronological *prius*.

## ***Prius* and other indications of necessity**

There are a number of places in *The Book of Concord* where something is said, using the Latin word *prius* (German *ehe, erst, vor, zuvor*),<sup>2</sup> to occur before something else and where the connection is more than chronological. The majority of these passages are in Melancthon's Apology of the Augsburg Confession and concern the relationship between faith and works, even if they are not found at the specific *locus* dealing with either justifying faith or good works.<sup>3</sup> That, in the case of the relationship between faith and works, faith, the "earlier" condition has the status of being logically necessary for works, the "later" condition, will be seen, as the confessions in *The Book of Concord* say the works cannot be done without faith. To explore this relationship, this section will first note general uses of *prius*, then describe uses where some sense of necessity is present apart from the uses in connection with faith and works, and finally detail the faith-and-works passages where *prius* bears this sense of logical necessity.<sup>4</sup>

### ***General uses of prius***

Not every use of *prius* has the more-than-chronological sense; some can be described as quite general, with a simple chronological sense. The first in that category is in the Athanasian Creed, where no Person of the Trinity is said to exist "before or after"

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<sup>1</sup> On the basis of Galatians, Das discusses the indissoluble connection between justification and sanctification and their necessary distinction (A. Andrew Das, "Oneness in Christ: The *Nexus Indivulsus* Between Justification and Sanctification in Paul's Letter to the Galatians," *Concordia Journal* 21.2 [1995]).

<sup>2</sup> The Latin word *prius*, a form of *prior*, is an adjective meaning "former", "first". The word can also be used as an adverb meaning "before", "previously". Used as a noun, the word can refer to a logically prior proposition. (See, for example, Whitaker, *Words by William Whitaker*.)

<sup>3</sup> Of the 50 uses of *prius* found by a Libronix search of the Triglotta, about 3/5 of the total are in the Apology, and about half of the total are in connection with faith and good works. These statistics are not surprising, as the Apology is not only the longest of the confessions written in Latin but also one of the longest confessions; moreover, Article IV on Justification is a significant portion of the Apology.

<sup>4</sup> In a number of the uses of *prius* produced by Libronix, the word appears to be an addition in the Latin translations of German works. Among those uses, I would list the following: LC Longer Preface 1; LC Short Forms 25; LC I:236, 265; LC II:26; LC IV:56; LC V:26, 83; and SD VII:32.

another (*prius aut posterius; keine die erste, keine die letzte*).<sup>5</sup> Similar is a use in the Large Catechism, where Luther writes of the devil doing damage “before we realize it” (*ehe man’s gewahr wird; ac citius, [other versions prius] quam persentiri potest aut iri obviam*).<sup>6</sup> A number of other uses come where the confessors describe how they are proceeding with their argument or presentation. A typical example is in the Apology’s article dealing with Original Sin.

Sed postea ostendemus pluribus verbis, nostram descriptionem consentire cum usitata ac veteri definitione. Prius enim consilium nostrum aperiendum est, cur his potissimum verbis hoc loco usi simus.

Aber danach wollen wir mit mehr Worten anzeigen, daß wir von der Erbsünde, nämlich was dieselbige sei oder nicht, auch auf geübte, alte Weise der Scholastiker und nicht so ungewöhnlich geredet haben. Ich muss aber erst anzeigen, aus was Ursachen ich an dem Ort fürnehmlich solcher und nicht ander Wort habe brauchen wollen.

Later on we shall show at length that our definition agrees with the traditional one. First we must show why we used these words here.<sup>7</sup>

There are other similar examples.<sup>8</sup> One other, from the Epitome’s treatment of Election, is worth quoting in full.

Wer nun sich also mit dem geoffenbarten Willen Gottes bekümmert und der Ordnung nachgeht, welche sanctus Paulus in der Epistel an die Römer gehalten, der zuvor die Menschen zur Buß, Erkenntnis der Sünden, zum Glauben in Christum, zum göttlichen Gehorsam weiset, ehe er vom Geheimbnis der ewigen Wahl Gottes redet, dem ist solche Lehr nützlich und tröstlich.

Qui igitur voluntatem Dei revelatam inquirunt eoque ordine progrediuntur, quem divus Paulus in epistola ad Romanos secutus est (qui hominem prius deducit ad poenitentiam, ad agnitionem peccatorum, ad fidem in Christum, ad obedientiam mandatorum Dei, quam de aeternae praedestinationis mysterio loquatur) iis doctrina de praedestinatione Dei salutaris est et maximam consolationem adfert.

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<sup>5</sup> Athanasian Creed, 24; Tappert, 20; BKS, 29.

<sup>6</sup> LC I:100, Tappert, 379; BKS, 586.

<sup>7</sup> Ap II:4, BKS, 147; Tappert, 101. Perhaps significantly this paragraph goes on to refer both to the confessors’ “scholastic opponents” (*Adversarii in scholis; Die Widersacher ... in ihren Schulen*) and those who “philosophize” (*philosophantur; aus der Philosophie*) about original sin.

<sup>8</sup> Ap XII:156; LC II:4; and LC III:4.

The doctrine of God's eternal election is profitable and comforting to the person who concerns himself with the revealed will of God and observes the order which St. Paul follows in the Epistle to the Romans. He there directs men first to repent, to acknowledge their sins, to believe in Christ, and to obey God, and only then does he speak of the mystery of God's eternal election.<sup>9</sup>

This example is worth quoting not only because it bases the presentation of its argument on Holy Scripture, but also because Paul's "order" (*Ordnung, ordine*) in Romans, and thus the order in the Epitome, seems to be more than the sequence in which he chose to present his discussion. That is to say, the doctrine of election can be profitable and comforting only after sorrow for sin, faith in Christ, and good works are established. This order at least comes close to having some sense of logical necessity.

### ***Prius with some sense of necessity***

There are a number of examples where *prius* is used with a more obvious and certain sense of logical necessity, though the chronological aspect remains important. Close to half of these uses are in the Apology's article dealing with Penitence. Melancthon grants that judges have to hear cases before (*prius, erst*) pronouncing sentences, but he says that does not mean pastors have to investigate sins before pronouncing absolution.<sup>10</sup> Even though in the past priests had to know the offenses of the lapsed before (*prius, ohne*) they could prescribe satisfactions,<sup>11</sup> waiting for evidence of penitence before (*prius, ohne*) accepting the lapsed is no longer necessary.<sup>12</sup> However, in two other places in the Apology Melancthon writes that some things—instruction, examination, and absolution—are necessary before (*prius, erst*) people receive the Lord's Supper.<sup>13</sup> Luther in the Smalcald Articles writes that Lorenzo Campegio would have died from torture before (*ehe, prius*) giving up the Mass and that the papists would put the

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<sup>9</sup> Ep XI:11, *BKS*, 818; Tappert, 495-496.

<sup>10</sup> Ap XII:103, *BKS*, 273.

<sup>11</sup> Ap XII:112, *BKS*, 275.

<sup>12</sup> Ap XII:113, *BKS*, 275.

<sup>13</sup> Ap XV:40, *BKS*, 304-305; Ap XXIV:49, *BKS*, 364.

Reformers to death before (*ehe, prius*) they let the Mass and papacy fall.<sup>14</sup> With an allusion to Romans 10:8-11, Luther in the Large Catechism under the Second Commandment writes of belief in the heart coming before (*zuvor, prius*) the confession of the lips.<sup>15</sup> And, under the Large Catechism's heading of the Third Commandment, Luther writes that the doer of work must be holy before (*zuvor, prius*) the work itself is holy.<sup>16</sup> Finally, the authors of the Solid Declaration, at the *locus* of Election and with reference to 2 Timothy 2:21, write that someone who is to be purified must first (*zuvor, prius*) be impure.<sup>17</sup> All of these uses of *prius* have a chronological sense plus some sense of necessity.

### ***Faith and works passages with prius***

The use of *prius* with the sense of necessity is especially evident and significant in passages dealing with faith and works. On good authority, the confessors can say any of a number of equivalent things comes first: accepting or taking hold of forgiveness by faith; the promise that one is reconciled by faith or through Christ or by the promise; being justified, reborn or reconciled; receiving the Holy Spirit, mercy by faith, forgiveness; or being accounted righteous. Likewise, the confessors can say any number of things follow: keeping the law, love, love of God, or doing good works. Some of these will be seen below. For example, a simple declaration to this effect is found in the Apology's article on Penance.

Nec prius dilectio adest, quam sit facta fide reconciliatio. Lex enim non fit sine Christo ...

Denn eigentlich ist in keinem Herzen einige Liebe Gottes, es sei denn, daß wir erst Gott versühnet werden, durch Christum. Denn Gottes Gesetz oder das erste Gebot kann ohne Christum niemand's erfüllen noch halten ...

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<sup>14</sup> SA II:ii:10, *BKS*, 419.

<sup>15</sup> LC I:70, *BKS*, 578. Luther in this paragraph refers to his previous comment in LC I:50.

<sup>16</sup> LC I:94, *BKS*, 584.

<sup>17</sup> SD XI:82, *BKS*, 1087.



Nor is love present before [*prius*] faith has effected the reconciliation. For the law is not kept without Christ ...<sup>18</sup>

Such statements are made with good authority. In the Apology's treatment of justification, such a statement is made in connection with two passages from Paul's epistles.

Nam iustitia evangelii, quae versatur circa promissionem gratiae, gratis accipit iustificationem et vivificationem. Sed impletio legis, quae sequitur fidem, versatur circa legem, in qua non gratis, sed pro nostris operibus offertur et debetur merces. Sed qui hanc merentur, prius iustificati sunt, quam legem faciunt. Itaque prius sunt translati in regnum filii Dei, ut Paulus ait, et facti coheredes Christi.

The righteousness of the Gospel, which deals with the promise of grace, receives justification and new life gratis. The keeping of the law that follows faith deals with the law, in which a reward is offered and owed, not gratis but for our works. Those who merit this are justified before [*prius*] they keep the law. First [*prius*] they have been "transferred into the kingdom of God's Son," as Paul says (Col. 1:13), and made fellow heirs with Christ (Rom. 8:17).<sup>19</sup>

Earlier in the same article, St. Augustine is adduced in support of this relationship between faith and works.<sup>20</sup>

The before-after sequence is not only declared, but the confessors also say that one cannot keep the law without faith and those things that accompany faith coming first. A short statement from the Apology's article on Justification, just a few lines down from the preceding quotation, denies the very possibility.

Nec legem prius facimus aut facere possumus, quam reconciliati Deo, iustificati et renati sumus.

We neither do nor can keep the law before [*prius*] we have been reconciled to God, justified, and reborn.<sup>21</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> Ap XII:37, *BKS*, 258; Tappert, 186. (Emphasis added.) The Latin of the Apology goes on to quote Romans 5, while in the German reference is made to Ephesians 2 and 3.

<sup>19</sup> Ap IV:366, *BKS*, 229; Tappert, 163. (Emphasis added.) The German at this place seems to go off on another point and does not appear to make the same statement.

<sup>20</sup> Ap IV:106.

<sup>21</sup> Ap IV:368, *BKS*, 229; Tappert, 163. (Emphasis added.) Again, the German at this place seems to go off on another point and does not appear to make the same statement.

Earlier in the same article from the Apology, love's impossibility to precede faith was stated.

Postremo hoc imprudentissime scribitur ab adversariis, quod homines, rei aeternae irae, mereantur remissionem peccatorum per actum elicitum dilectionis, cum impossibile sit diligere Deum, nisi prius fide apprehendatur remissio peccatorum. Non enim potest cor, vere sentiens Deum irasci, diligere Deum, nisi ostendatur placatus. Donec terret et videtur nos abiicere in aeternam mortem, non potest se erigere natura humana, ut diligat iratum, iudicantem et punientem.

Zuletzt, so ist je das auch aufs närrisch und ungeschicktest von den Widersachern geredt, daß die Menschen, die auch ewiges Zorns schuldig sein, Vergebung der Sünden erlangen durch die Leibe oder actum elicitum dilectionis; so es doch unmöglich ist Gott zu lieben, wenn das Herz nicht erst durch den Glauben Vergebung der Sünden ergriffen hat. Denn es kann je ein Herz, das in Aengsten ist, Gottes Zorn recht fühlet, Gott nicht lieben, er geb denn dem Herzen Luft, er tröste und erzeige sich denn wieder gnädig. Denn dieweil er schreckt und also uns angreift, als wolle er uns in ewiger Ungnade in den ewigen Tod von sich stoßen, so muß der armen schwachen Natur das Herz und Mut entfallen und muß je für so großen Zorn erzittern, der so gräulich schreckt und straft, und kann je alsdenn, ehe Gott selbst tröstet, kein Fünkeln Liebe fühlen.

Finally, it was very foolish of our opponents to write that men who are under eternal wrath merit the forgiveness of sins by an elicited act of love, since it is impossible to love God unless faith has first [prius] accepted the forgiveness of sins. A heart that really feels God's wrath cannot love him unless it sees that he is reconciled. While he terrifies us and seems to be casting us into eternal death, human nature cannot bring itself to love a wrathful, judging, punishing God.<sup>22</sup>

Elsewhere the Apology reiterates one's inability to keep the law unless first receiving the Holy Spirit and being reconciled through Christ.<sup>23</sup>

So strong is the human's inability to do God-pleasing good works before faith that the confessors can say faith is logically necessary for good works, love, keeping the law, and the like. This logical necessity is variously expressed in the authoritative Latin with a grammatical construction known as a gerundive of necessity, the adjective *nesesse*

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<sup>22</sup> Ap IV:36, BKS, 167; Tappert, 112. (Emphasis added.)

<sup>23</sup> Ap IV:70; Ap XII:76.

(“necessary”), the verb *oporteo*, *oportere* (“it is necessary”), and the adverb *necessario* (“necessarily,” “of necessity”). An example of the use of the gerundive is in the Apology’s article on Justification, where the claim is also supported with Scripture.

Videmus nobis evangelium et promissionem de Christo propositam esse. Cum igitur lex praedicatur, cum praecipuntur opera, non est repudianda promissio de Christo. Sed haec prius apprehendenda est, ut bene operari possimus, et ut opera nostra Deo placere queant, sicut inquit Christus: Sine me nihil potestis facere.

We see that the Gospel and the promise of Christ are presented to us. We must not reject the promise of Christ when the law is preached and works are enjoined. We must first take hold of [*apprehendenda*, the gerundive of necessity] the promise so that we may be able to do good works and that our works may be pleasing to God, as Christ says (John 15:5), “Apart from me you can do nothing.”<sup>24</sup>

Later in the same article of the Apology on Justification, the confessors make a similar statement using the adjective *necesse*, significantly while drawing on Paul and, in a sense, turning away from human reason.

At Paulus docet nos non ex lege, sed ex promissione iustificari, quae tantum fide accipitur. Neque enim accedimus ad Deum sine mediatore Christo, neque accipimus remissionem peccatorum propter nostram dilectionem, sed propter Christum. Ac ne diligere quidem possumus iratum Deum, et lex semper accusat nos, semper ostendit iratum Deum. Necesse est igitur nos prius fide apprehendere promissionem, quod propter Christum Pater sit placatus et ignoscat. Postea incipimus legem facere. Procul a ratione humana, procul a Mose reiiciendi sunt oculi in Christum, et sentiendum, quod Christus sit nobis donatus, ut propter eum iusti reputemur.

Paul teaches that we are justified not by the law but by the promise, which is received by faith only. We cannot come to God without Christ, the mediator; nor do we receive forgiveness of sin because of our love but because of Christ. We cannot even love an angry God; the law always accuses us and thus always shows us an angry God. Therefore we must [literally “it is necessary that we”] first [*prius*] take hold of the promise by faith, that for Christ’s sake the Father is reconciled and forgiving. Later we begin to keep the law. Far away from human reason, far away from

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<sup>24</sup> Ap IV:266, *BKS*, 213; Tappert, 146. The German at this place seems to go off on another point and does not appear to make the same statement. On the use of John 15:5, confer Ap XII:85.

Moses, we must turn our eyes to Christ, and believe that he was given for us to be justified on his account.<sup>25</sup>

A similar claim is made in the Apology's article dealing with Penitence, using, among other key expressions in the authoritative Latin, both *necesse* ("necessary") and the verb *oporteo, oportere* ("it is necessary").

Propter has causas contendit Paulus, quod non iustificemur ex lege, et opponit legi promissionem remissionis peccatorum, quae propter Christum donatur, ac docet nos gratis propter Christum fide accipere remissionem peccatorum. Ad hanc promissionem revocat nos Paulus a lege. In hanc promissionem iubet intueri, quae certe irrita erit, si prius lege iustificamur, quam per promissionem, aut si propter nostram iustitiam consequimur remissionem peccatorum. At constat, quod ideo nobis data est promissio, ideo exhibitus est Christus, quia legem non possumus facere. Quare necesse est prius nos promissione reconciliari, quam legem facimus. Promissio autem tantum fide accipitur. Igitur necesse est contritos apprehendere fide promissionem remissionis peccatorum donatae propter Christum, ac statuere, quod gratis propter Christum habeant placatum Patrem. Haec est sententia Pauli ad Rom. 4., ubi inquit: Ideo ex fide, ut secundum gratiam firma sit promissio. Et ad Galatas 3.: Conclussit Scriptura omnia sub peccatum, ut promissio ex fide Iesu Christi detur credentibus, id est, omnes sunt sub peccato, nec possunt aliter liberari, nisi fide apprehendant promissionem remissionis peccatorum. Prius igitur oportet nos fide accipere remissionem peccatorum, quam legem facimus, etsi, ut supra dictum est, fidem dilectio sequitur, quia renati Spiritum Sanctum accipiunt; ideo legem facere incipiunt.

Aus dieser Ursache streitet Paulus, daß wir nicht durch das Gesetz gerecht werden, und hält gegen das Gesetz die Zusage Gottes, die Verheißung der Gnade, welche um Christus willen uns gegeben wird. Da rückt uns Paulus herum und weist uns vom Gesetz auf die göttliche Verheißung. da will er, daß wir sollen auf Gott und seine Zusage sehen. und den Herrn Christum für unsern Schatz halten; denn dieselbe Zusage wird vergeblich sein. so wir durch des Gesetzes Werk gerecht für Gott werden. so wir durch unser Gerechtigkeit Vergebung der Sünden verdienen. Nu ist es gewiß, daß Gott darum die Zusage tut, darum Christus auch kommen ist. daß wir das Gesetz nicht halten noch erfüllen können. Darum müssen wir erst durch die Verheißung versühnet werden, ehe wir das Gesetz erfüllen, die Verheißung aber kann man nicht fassen, denn

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<sup>25</sup> Ap IV:294-296, *BKS*, 218; Tappert, 152. (Emphasis added.) This passage comes in the midst of a nine-formatted-paragraph Latin section (§§285-315) with a German equivalent of one formatted paragraph that does not appear to translate this text. Confer above, n.191, p.266.

allein durch den Glauben. Darum alle diejenigen, so rechte Reue haben, ergreifen die Verheißung der Gnade durch den Glauben und glauben gewiß, daß wir dem Vater versühnet werden durch Christum. Das ist auch die Meinung Pauli zu den Römern am 4.: „Darum erlangen wir Gnade durch den Glauben, daß die Verheißung fest stehe.“ Und zu den Galatern am 3.: „Die Schrift hat alles unter die Sünde beschlossen, daß die Verheißung Jesu Christi durch den Glauben werde gegeben den Gläubigen“, das ist, alle Menschen sind unter der Sünde und können nicht erlöst werden, sie ergreifen denn Vergebung der Sünde durch den Glauben. Darum müssen wir erst Vergebung der Sünden durch den Glauben erlangen, ehe wir das Gesetz erfüllen. Wiewohl, wie wir oben gesagt, aus dem Glauben die Liebe gewiß folget, denn diejenigen, so gläuben, empfangen den heiligen Geist. Darum fahen sie an, dem Gesetz hold zu werden und demselbigen zu gehorchen.

For these reasons Paul contends that we are not justified by the law; to the law he opposes the promise of the forgiveness of sins granted for Christ's sake, and he teaches us to accept the forgiveness of sins by faith, freely for Christ's sake. Paul calls us away from the law to this promise. He asks us to look at this promise, which would certainly be useless if we were justified by the law before the promise or if we obtained the forgiveness of sins because of our own righteousness. But clearly the promise was given and Christ revealed precisely because we cannot keep the law, and therefore we must [*Quare necesse est*] be reconciled by the promise before [*prius*] we keep the law. Only faith accepts the promise. Therefore it is necessary for the contrite by faith to take hold of the promise of the forgiveness of sins granted for Christ's sake, and to be sure that freely for Christ's sake they have a gracious Father. This is what Paul means when he says in Rom. 4:16, "That is why it depends on faith, in order that the promise may rest on grace and be guaranteed"; and in Gal. 3:22, "The scripture consigned all things to sin, that what was promised to faith in Jesus Christ might be given to those who believe." That is, all men are under sin, and they cannot be freed in any other way than by taking hold through faith of the promise of the forgiveness of sins. We must therefore [*Prius igitur oportet*] accept the forgiveness of sins by faith before we keep the law although, as we said before, love follows faith, for the regenerate receive the Holy Spirit and therefore begin to keep the law.<sup>26</sup>

Not only is faith necessary for love, but also love necessarily follows faith, as the confessors make clear in the Apology's article on Justification, even using in the Latin

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<sup>26</sup> Ap XII:79-82, *BKS*, 268; Tappert, 193-194. The use of *consequimur* is no doubt also significant, even though in this context it is negated.

the term “effect” (*effectus*) and making an apparent attack on Duns Scotus and the Nominalists.<sup>27</sup>

Nos quoque dicimus, quod dilectio fidem sequi debeat, sicut et Paulus ait: In Christo Iesu neque circumcisio aliquid valet neque praepitium, sed fides per dilectionem efficax. Neque tamen ideo sentiendum est, quod fiducia huius dilectionis aut propter hanc dilectionem accipiamus remissionem peccatorum et reconciliationem, sicut neque accipimus remissionem peccatorum propter alia opera sequentia, sed sola fide, et quidem fide proprie dicta, accipitur remissio peccatorum, quia promissio non potest accipi nisi fide. Est autem fides proprie dicta, quae assentitur promissioni; de hac fide loquitur scriptura. Et quia accipit remissionem peccatorum et reconciliat nos Deo, prius hac fide iusti reputamur propter Christum, quam diligimus ac legem facimus, etsi necessario sequitur dilectio. Neque vero haec fides est otiosa notitia, nec potest stare cum peccato mortali, sed est opus spiritus sancti, quo liberamur a morte, quo eriguntur et vivificantur perterrefactae mentes. Et quia sola haec fides accipit remissionem peccatorum, et reddit nos acceptos Deo, et affert spiritum sanctum: rectius vocari gratia gratum faciens poterat, quam effectus sequens, videlicet dilectio.

Wir sagen auch, daß die Liebe dem Glauben folgen soll, wie Paulus sagt: „In Christo Jesu ist weder Beschneidung noch Vorhaut etwas, sondern der Glaub, welcher durch die Liebe wirkt.“ Man soll aber darum auf die Liebe nicht vertrauen, noch bauen, als erlangten wir um der Liebe willen oder durch die Liebe Vergebung der Sunde und Versöhnung Gottes. Gleichwie wir nicht Vergebung der Sunde erlangen um anderer Werk willen, die da folgen, sondern allein durch den Glauben, Denn die Verheißung Gottes kann niemand durch Werk fassen, sondern allein mit dem Glauben. Und der Glaube eigentlich oder fides proprie dicta ist, wenn mir mein Herz und der heilig Geist im Herzen sagt, die Verheißung Gottes ist wahr und ja; von demselbigen Glauben redet die Schrift. Und dieweil der Glaub, ehe wir etwas tun oder wirken, nur ihm schenken und geben lässet und empfähet, so wird uns der Glaube zur Gerechtigkeit gerechnet wie Abraham, ehe wir lieben, ehe wir das Gesetz tun oder einig Werk. „Wiewohl es wahr ist, daß Frucht und Werk nicht aussen bleiben, und der Glaub ist nicht eine bloß, schlecht Erkenntnis der Historien, sondern ein neu Licht im Herzen und kräftig Werk des heiligen Geistes, dadurch wir neu geboren werden, dadurch die erschrockene Gewissen wieder aufgerichtet und Leben erlangen.“ Und dieweil der Glaub allein Vergebung der Sünden erlangt und uns Gott angenehm macht, bringt er mit sich den

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<sup>27</sup> For the medieval background, see *BKS*, 183-184 n.2; *K-W*, 139 n.119.

heiligen Geist und sollt billiger genennet werden gratia gratum faciens, das ist, die Gnade, die da angenehm macht, denn die Liebe, welche folgt.

We also say, too, that love should follow faith, as Paul also says, “In Christ Jesus neither circumcision nor uncircumcision is of any avail, but faith working through love” (Gal. 5:6). We are not to think from this that we receive the forgiveness of sins by trust in this love or on account of this love, just as little as we receive the forgiveness of sins on account of the other works that follow it. For the forgiveness of sins is received by faith alone—and we mean faith in the true sense of the word—since the promise can be received only by faith. But faith in the true sense, as the Scriptures use the word, is that which accepts the promise. And because it receives the forgiveness of sins and reconciles us to God, we must be accounted righteous by this faith for Christ’s sake before we love and keep the law, although love must necessarily follow. This faith is no idle knowledge, nor can it exist with mortal sin; but it is a work of the Holy Spirit that frees us from death, comforting and quickening terrified minds. And since this faith alone receives the forgiveness of sins, renders us acceptable to God, and brings the Holy Spirit, it should be called “grace that makes us acceptable to God” rather than love, which is the effect [*effectus*] resulting from it.<sup>28</sup>

All other passages where good works or their equivalent are said to follow faith or its equivalent can reasonably be read in light of the logical necessity laid out in the foregoing.

The Reformers criticize their Roman Catholic opponents for not teaching the right sequence of faith first and good works logically following. The Reformers’ criticism is expressed in ways similar to those just seen. The first example, which comes from the Apology’s article on Justification, is a simple expression of sequence in connection with the terminology of cause and effect in connection with an expression of one’s inability to satisfy the law.

Ex his effectibus fidei excerpunt adversarii unum, videlicet dilectionem, et docent, quod dilectio iustificet. Ita manifeste apparet, eos tantum docere legem. Non prius docent accipere remissionem peccatorum per fidem. Non docent de mediatore Christo, quod propter Christum habeamus Deum propitium, sed propter nostram dilectionem. Et tamen qualis sit illa dilectio, non dicunt, neque dicere possunt. Praedicant se

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<sup>28</sup> Ap IV:111-116, *BKS*, 183-184; Tappert, 123. (Emphasis added.) Note the use of the Latin terms in the German version, followed by a definitional paraphrase.

legem implere, cum haec gloria proprie debeatur Christo; et fiduciam propriorum operum opponunt iudicio Dei, dicunt enim se de condigno mereri gratiam et vitam aeternam. Haec est simpliciter impia et vana fiducia. Nam in hac vita non possumus legi satisfacere, quia natura carnalis non desinit malos affectus parere, etsi his resistit Spiritus in nobis.

Aus diesen Früchten und Werken des Glaubens klaben die Widersacher nur ein Stücke, nämlich die Liebe, und lehren, daß die Liebe für Gott gerecht mache; also sind sie nichts anderes denn Werkprediger und Gesetzlehrer. Sie lehren nicht erst, daß wir Vergebung der Sünde erlangen durch den Glauben. Sie lehren nichts von dem Mittler Christo, daß wir durch denselbigen einen gnädigen Gott erlangen, sondern reden von unser Liebe und unsern Werken, und sagen doch nicht, was es vor eine Liebe sei, und können es auch nicht sagen. Sie rühmen, sie könnten das Gesetz erfüllen oder halten, so doch die Ehre niemand's gehöret, denn Christo; und halten also ihr eigen Werk gegen Gottes Urteil, sagen, sie verdienen de condigno Gnad und ewiges Leben. Das ist doch ein ganz vergeblich und gottlos Vertrauen auf eigene Werk. Denn in diesem Leben können auch Christen und die Heiligen selbst Gottes Gesetz nicht vollkömmllich halten; denn es bleiben immer böse Neigung und Lüst in uns, wiewohl der Heilig Geist denselbigen widersteht.

Selecting love, which is only one of these effects of faith [*Ex his effectibus fidei*], our opponents teach that love justifies. From this it is clear that they teach only the law. They do not teach that we must first [*prius*] receive the forgiveness of sins by faith, nor that on account of Christ, the mediator, we have a gracious God. They think this is on account of our love, though they do not and cannot say what the nature of this love is. They claim to keep the law, though this glory properly belongs to Christ. In opposition to the judgment of God they set a trust in their own works, for they say they earn grace and eternal life by merit. Such a trust is simply wicked and vain. In this life we cannot satisfy the law, because our unspiritual nature continually brings forth evil desires, though the Spirit in us resists them.<sup>29</sup>

Significant in the foregoing example also is the German translation's rendering the Latin's "effect" (*effectibus*) with the German "fruits and works" (*Früchten und Werken*). The next example comes later in the Apology's article on Justification, where

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<sup>29</sup> Ap IV:145-146, *BKS*, 188-189; Tappert, 127. (Emphasis added.) The German adds terminology that seems intended to bring concupiscence into view. The *BKS* points to the Confutation's sixth article (CR 27:100; confer Reu, 352\*; K-N, 110) and to Bonaventure *Breviloquium* V, 2. In sent. II d. 27 a. 2 a. 3 (*BKS*, 188 n.1, 189 n.1).



Melanchthon is critiquing his opponents' two faulty modes of justification, based upon reason and the law, respectively (the second mode is connected with scholastic theologians such as Thomas Aquinas).<sup>30</sup>

Facile est autem iudicium homini Christiano de utroque modo, quia uterque modus excludit Christum, ideo reprehendendi sunt. In priore manifesta est impietas, qui docet, quod opera nostra sint propitiatio pro peccatis. Posterior modus multa habet incommoda. Non docet uti Christo, cum renascimur. Non docet iustificationem esse remissionem peccatorum. Non docet prius remissionem peccatorum contingere, quam diligimus, sed fingit, quod eliciamus actum dilectionis, per quem mereamur remissionem peccatorum. Nec docet fide in Christum vincere terrores peccati et mortis. Fingit homines propria impletionem legis accedere ad Deum sine propitiatore Christo; fingit postea ipsam impletionem legis sine propitiatore Christo iustitiam esse dignam gratia et vita aeterna, cum tamen vix imbecillis et exigua legis impletio contingat etiam sanctis.

A Christian can easily evaluate both modes, since both exclude Christ and therefore both are to be rejected. The ungodliness of the first is obvious because it teaches that our works are a propitiation for sin. The second contains much that is harmful. It does not teach us to avail ourselves of Christ in our regeneration. It does not teach that justification is the forgiveness of sins. It does not teach that the forgiveness of sins precedes our love, but it imagines that we produce an act of love whereby we merit the forgiveness of sins. It does not teach that by faith in Christ we overcome the terrors of sin and death. Without any warrant it teaches that men come to God through their own keeping of the law and not through Christ, the propitiator. Then it imagines that this very keeping of the law, with Christ, the propitiator, is a righteousness worthy of grace and eternal life, although even a weak and feeble keeping of the law is rare, even among saints.<sup>31</sup>

Significant in the foregoing example also is the German translation's complete omission of the discussion of "modes". The next example is from the Apology's article on Penitence, which, in addition to drawing on John 15:5, makes use of the gerundive *accipienda* and the verb *oportet* in connection with *prius* in criticizing the opponents.

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<sup>30</sup> See Ap IV:287-289, Tappert, 150-151; *BKS*, 217.

<sup>31</sup> Ap IV:290, *BKS*, 218; Tappert, 151. This passage comes in the midst of a nine-formatted-paragraph Latin section (§285-315) with a German equivalent of one formatted paragraph that does not appear to translate this text.

Itaque repudiantur illae pharisaicae opiniones adversariorum, quod non accipiamus fide remissionem peccatorum, sed quod oporteat mereri dilectione nostra et operibus, quod dilectionem nostram et opera nostra irae Dei opponere debeamus. Haec doctrina legis est, non evangelii, quae fingit prius hominem lege iustificari, quam per Christum reconciliatus sit Deo, cum Christus dicat: Sine me nihil potestis facere; item: Ego sum vitis vera, vos palmites. Verum adversarii fingunt nos esse palmites non Christi, sed Moisi. Prius enim volunt lege iustificari, dilectionem nostram et opera offerre Deo, quam reconcilientur Deo per Christum, quam sint palmites Christi. Paulus contra contendit legem non posse fieri sine Christo. Ideo promissio prius accipienda est, ut fide reconciliemur Deo propter Christum, quam legem facimus. Haec satis perspicua esse piis conscientiiis existimamus. Et hinc intelligent, cur supra professi simus, iustificari homines fide, non dilectione, quia oportet nos opponere irae Dei non nostram dilectionem aut opera, aut confidere nostra dilectione ac operibus, sed Christum mediatorem. Et prius oportet apprehendere promissionem remissionis peccatorum, quam legem facimus.

Derhalben nur weit, weit von uns mit den pharisäischen Lehren der Widersacher, da sie sagen, daß wir Vergebung der Sünden nicht durch den Glauben erlangen, sondern daß wir sie verdienen müssen mit unsern Werken und mit unserer Liebe gegen Gott. Item, daß wir mit unsern Werken und Liebe sollen Gottes Zorn versöhnen. Denn es ist eine recht pharisäische Lehre, eine Lehre des Gesetzes, nicht des Evangelii, da sie lehren, daß der Mensch erst durch das Gesetz gerecht werde, ehe er durch Christum Gott versühnet werde, so doch Christus sagt: „Ohn mich könnt ihr nichts thun.“ Item: „Ich bin der Weinstock; ihr seid die Reben.“ Die Widersacher aber, die reden davon, als seien wir nicht Christi Reben, sondern Mosi. Denn sie wollen erst durchs Gesetz fromm und gerecht vor Gott werden und erst unsere Werke und Dilection Gott opfern, ehe sie Reben am Weinstock Christi sein. Paulus aber, welcher freilich ein viel höher Doctor ist, denn die Widersacher, redet klar und streitet wiederum dies allein, daß niemand das Gesetz tun könne ohne Christo. Darum diejenigen, so die Sünde und Angst des Gewissens recht fühlen oder erfahren haben, die müssen sich an die Zusage der Gnade halten, daß sie durch den Glauben erst Gott versühnt werden um Christus willen, ehe sie das Gesetz erfüllen. Dieses alles ist öffentlich und klar genug bei gottesfürchtigen Gewissen, und hieraus werden Christen wohl verstehen, warum wir hieroben gesagt haben, daß wir allein durch den Glauben für Gott gerecht werden, nicht durch unsere Werke oder Dilection usw. Denn all unser Vermögen, alles Tun und Werk sind zu schwach, Gottes Zorn wegzunehmen und zu stillen, darum müssen wir Christum, den Mittler, darstellen.

Therefore we reject the Pharisaic opinions of our opponents that we do not receive the forgiveness of sins by faith but merit it by our love and works, and that we ought to set our love and works against the wrath of God. This is a teaching of the law and not of the Gospel, to imagine that a man is justified by the law before being reconciled to God through Christ, though Christ says (John 15:5), “Apart from me you can do nothing,” and “I am the vine, you are the branches.” But our opponents imagine that we are members of Moses rather than of Christ. They want to be justified by the law and to offer our works to God before [prius] being reconciled to God and becoming the branches of Christ. Paul, on the contrary, contends that we cannot keep the law without Christ. Therefore we must accept [accipienda] the promise that by faith we are reconciled to God before [prius] we keep the law. We think that this is clear enough for devout consciences, and from this they will see why we said above that men are justified by faith and not by love. For we must not set our love or works against the wrath of God or trust in our love or works, but only in Christ, the mediator. We must [oportet] take hold of the promise of the forgiveness of sins before [prius] we keep the law.<sup>32</sup>

The opponents not only have the teaching wrong, but the Reformers in the Apology’s article on Good Works says that the opponents misread Scripture and confuse cause and effect (the Latin words are used this time in the German and without translation, with *Fruchten* [“fruit”] added after *Werken* [“works”]).

Adversarii etiam addunt testimonia suae condemnationi. Et operae pretium est unum atque alterum recitare. Allegant ex Petro: Studete firmam facere vocationem vestram etc. Iam vides, lector, adversarios nostros non perdidisse operam in discenda dialectica, sed habere artificium ratiocinandi ex scripturis prorsus quidquid libet. Facite firmam vocationem vestram per bona opera. Igitur opera merentur remissionem peccatorum. Sane concinna erit argumentatio, si quis sic ratiocinetur de reo capitalis poenae, cui poena remissa est: Magistratus praecipit, ut in posterum abstineas ab alieno. Igitur per hoc meritis es condonationem poenae, quod nunc ab alieno abstines. Sic argumentari est ex non causa causam facere. Nam Petrus loquitur de operibus sequentibus remissionem peccatorum et docet, quare sint facienda, scilicet, ut sit firma vocatio, hoc est, ne vocatione sua excidant, si iterum peccent. Facite bona opera, ut perseveretis in vocatione, ne amittatis dona vocationis, quae prius contigerunt, non propter sequentia opera, sed iam retinentur fide, et fides

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<sup>32</sup> Ap XII:85-87, *BKS*, 269; Tappert, 194-195. (Emphasis added.) Tappert notably does not translate *per Christum* (“through Christ”) in regards to the underlined reconciliation. On a similar use of John 15:5, confer Ap IV:266 above in the text.

non manet in his, qui amittunt spiritum sanctum, qui abiiciunt poenitentiam, sicut supra diximus, fidem exsistere in poenitentia.

Die Widersacher führen auch etliche Sprüche der Schrift ein, warum sie diesen Artikel verdammen. Nämlich bringen sie den Spruch Petri herfür: „Fleißet euch, euren Beruf fest zu machen durch gute Werke usw.“ Da siehet jedermann, daß unsere Widersacher ihr Geld nicht übel angelegt, da sie Dialecticam studiert haben. Denn sie mügen die Sprüche der Schrift gereimt, ungereimt, schließlich, unschließlich, wie sie wollen, und wie es ihnen gefällt, einführen. Denn also schließen sie: Petrus sagt: „Fleißet euch durch gute Werke, euren Beruf fest zu machen“; darum verdienen wir durch Werke Vergebung der Sunde. Es ist wahrlich eine feine Argumentation, als wenn einer spräche von einem Beklagten im Halsgericht, welchem das Leben gefristet wäre: Der Richter hat geboten, daß der forthin sich solcher Übeltat soll enthalten, darum so hat er verdienet mit solchem Enthalten, daß ihm das Leben gefristet ist. Also argumentieren, das heißt ex non causa causam machen. Denn Petrus redet von guten Werken und Früchten, die da folgen dem Glauben, und lehret, warum man sie tun solle, nämlich, daß wir unsern Beruf fest machen, das ist, daß wir nicht wiederum vom Evangelio fallen, wenn wir wiederum sündigten. Will sagen: Tut gute Werke, daß ihr bei dem Evangelio, bei eurem himmlischen Beruf bleibt, daß ihr nicht wiederum abfallet, kalt werdet, verliert Geist und Gaben, die euch aus Gnaden durch Christum widerfahren sind, nicht um der folgenden Werke willen. Denn in dem Beruf bleibt man fest durch den Glauben, und der Glaube und heilige Geist bleibet in denjenigen nicht, die sündlich Leben führen.

Our opponents quote many Scripture passages to show why they have condemned our article, and it is worthwhile to examine some of them. From Peter they quote (II Pet. 1:10), “Be zealous to confirm your call.” Now you see, dear reader, that our opponents have indeed got the most out of their logic courses, for they have learned the trick of deducing from Scripture whatever suits them. “Confirm your call by good works”; therefore works merit the forgiveness of sins! By the same argument we could say to a man who was sentenced to die and then pardoned, “The magistrate commands that from now on you steal no more, and therefore you are pardoned.” Such argumentation is to make the effect the cause. Peter is talking about the works that follow the forgiveness of sins; he is giving instruction that they should be done in order to confirm their call, that is, lest they fall from their call by sinning again. Do good works to persevere in your call and not to lose its gifts, which were given to you before your works and not because of them and which are now kept by

faith. Faith does not remain in those who lose the Holy Spirit and reject penitence; as we have said before, faith has its existence in penitence.<sup>33</sup>

Major portions of this passage from the Apology are cited by Solid Declaration IV:33 (Good Works), making its own the same expression of the relationship in logical language.<sup>34</sup> Thus, not just in early confessions but also in later ones and thus throughout *The Book of Concord* the Latin word *prius* is used to indicate a logical relationship of cause and effect between faith and good works.

### ***Summary of prius uses and other indications of necessity***

Good works not only follow faith but follow faith necessarily, as an effect follows its cause, according to the authors of the documents in *The Book of Concord*. The logical relationship between faith and works and their equivalents is variously expressed by the simple use of the Latin word *prius* and its German equivalents, by the gerundive construction indicating necessity, by various other words indicating necessity, and by different combinations of these expressions. Scripture and church fathers are adduced in support of this logical relationship, and other thinkers are criticized, at least indirectly, for teaching otherwise. At the center of such statements is fallen people's inability to do the works of the law, as well as even redeemed people's inability to fully keep the law. Also central in such statements is the Reformers' concern over preserving the teaching of justification by faith alone. Precisely because their opponents do not preserve this teaching of justification by faith alone and misuse logic in the process, the Reformers at

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<sup>33</sup> Ap XX:12-13, *BKS*, 315-316; Tappert, 228. (Emphasis added. This passage was also cited above, at n.8, p.96) The *BKS* points to the Confutation's twelfth article (CR 27:112; confer Reu, 356\*; K-N, 114), but the reference at that point in the Confutation is to Peter's statement in Acts 2:38, not to his epistle, 2 Peter 1:10.

In Melancthon's 1547 *Erotemata Dialectices*, he lists as one of seven fallacies, *Secundum non causam ut causam* ("according to a non-cause as a cause"), and he refers to medicine where great errors occur if the proper cause is not identified; he further illustrates the discussion with classical examples since he says he cannot find many scholastic examples, although he gives one related to the relationship between philosophy and theology (CR 13:737, 742-744; confer the 1528 *Dialectica* current at the time of the Augsburg Confession and its Apology, Melancthon, *De dialectica libri quatuor*, 235-237). "False cause" continues to be fallacy identified by logicians today (for example, see Copi and Cohen, *Introduction to Logic*, 158-159).

<sup>34</sup> Neither the authoritative German of the Formula nor its Latin translation follow particularly closely the precise wording of the Apology's authoritative Latin or its German translation (see *BKS*, 948).

this *locus* make a correct logical distinction between justification and sanctification, also as between cause and effect, respectively.

## **Sanctification as a logical distinction**

In Solid Declaration III, The Righteousness of Faith before God, there is an extended discussion of justification as distinct from sanctification.<sup>35</sup> Though elsewhere in *The Book of Concord* both justification and sanctification have broad senses that can include the narrow sense of the other term, in Solid Declaration III an explicit logical distinction is made between the narrow senses of the two terms, while nevertheless maintaining the interrelatedness of the two. (The different senses of these words are explained further below.) To properly consider this matter, this section begins with the earlier references to sanctification, proceeds to the later references in the Formula of Concord.

### ***Early Book of Concord references to sanctification***

Early references in *The Book of Concord* to sanctification are found in Melancthon's Apology of the Augsburg Confession and in Luther's Small Catechism and Large Catechism. Though slightly out of chronological order, the references are here considered in *Book of Concord* order.

Twice in the Latin of Apology IV, Justification, but not in its German equivalent, Melancthon cites 1 Corinthians 1:30 from the Vulgate: Christ is said to be made by God "our wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and redemption" (*sapientia, iustitia, sanctificatio et redemptio*). In both ¶86 and ¶306, where the quotes are made, the

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<sup>35</sup> The usual distinction between the two terms follows. "Justification" is God the Father's gracious act of declaring and making a believing sinner righteous by imputing to him or her the righteousness of Jesus Christ, Whose life, death, and resurrection alone merit such forgiveness of sins (human beings are dead in sin prior to justification and do not cooperate in any way with justification; the faith that receives forgiveness is itself a gift of God). "Sanctification" is the God-pleasing fighting against sin and doing of good works that justification brings about in the life of the believer by the Holy Spirit working through Word and Sacrament (a redeemed sinner in some sense can be said to cooperate with his or her sanctification). The text of the chapter explains the distinction more as it continues; see, for example, Table 5: Senses of "justification" and "sanctification" on p.342. On the definition of justification, confer with discretion "justification", Oxford Dictionary of the Christian Church, 914-915 (the *Dictionary* lacks a definition of "sanctification").

emphasis is on faith alone justifying, though in ¶306 the point is also being made, in addressing the voluntarist and intellectualist controversy (Ap IV:304), that the confessors are speaking of righteousness differently than “the philosophical or judicial investigation of a man’s own righteousness”.<sup>36</sup> So, despite the fact that the 1 Corinthians 1:30 passage is not being used to claim a distinction between justification and sanctification or a lack thereof, the confessors’ use of this passage coordinating the Greek terms δικαιοσύνη and ἁγιασμός and their Latin equivalents is significant.<sup>37</sup> Though Christ is not to be divided, his value for the Corinthians can be distinguished according to these terms, even if commentators on this passage do not always agree on the precise distinction.<sup>38</sup>

Luther, in both his Small Catechism and Large Catechism, also makes a distinction between justification and sanctification, but, instead of assigning sanctification to Christ, Luther assigns it to the Holy Spirit.<sup>39</sup> Luther titles the Second Article of the Apostolic Creed dealing with the work of the Son as “Redemption” (*von der Erlösung, de redemptione*) and the Third Article of the Creed dealing with the work of the Holy Spirit as Sanctification (*von der Heiligung, de sanctificatione*).<sup>40</sup> While the theological maxim *opera ad extra indivisa sunt* holds that the works of the Trinity

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<sup>36</sup> Tappert, 119, 154; BKS, 178, 219. On the critique of the “philosophical investigation”, see below at n.124.

<sup>37</sup> SD V:22 also refers to 1 Corinthians 1:30, though only by way of “righteousness” (*Gerechtigkeit, iustitia*) (Tappert, 562; BKS, 959).

<sup>38</sup> In three other paragraphs of the Apology one finds reference to sanctification in connection with citations from the New Testament: Ap XXIII:43, 65 (both citing 1 Thessalonians 4:4 [ἁγιασμός, Vulgate *sanctificatione*]); Ap XXIV:36 (citing 1 Peter 1:2 [ἁγιασμός, Vulgate *sanctificatione*]). In Ap XXIII:43 and XXIV:36, forms of both the Latin *sanctificatio* and German *Heiligung* are used; in Ap XXIII:66, the German version does not carry over the reference from the authoritative Latin (as with the two paragraphs using 1 Corinthians 1:30 discussed in the text above). (BKS, 342, 347, 361; Tappert, 245 and 248, translating “holiness”, and 257, translating “Sanctified”.)

Notably AC VI, generally regarded as the article dealing with sanctification, is commonly titled “The New Obedience” (*Von neuen Gehorsam, De nova oboedientia*) and makes no use of the term “sanctification”. The Confutation takes issue with AC VI in that justification is ascribed to faith alone, and thus the Confessors include in Ap IV their response to the Confutation’s objection to AC VI (see Reu, \*352-353; Ap IV:1).

<sup>39</sup> This apparent contradiction to 1 Corinthians 1:30 is only an *apparent* contradiction, as the work of the Holy Spirit can be identified as the continuation of Christ’s work, and, as noted below in the text, the works of the three Persons of the Godhead towards the world are united.

<sup>40</sup> SC II:3, 5 (Tappert, 345; BKS, 511); LC II:6, 35 (Tappert, 411, 415; BKS, 647, 653).

towards the world are not to be divided, Luther nevertheless proceeds to “sum up the entire Creed in three articles, according to the three persons of the Godhead” (*wollen wir den ganzen Glauben kürzlich fassen in drei Hauptartikel nach den dreien Personen der Gottheit; totum fidei Symbolum tribus tantum principalibus articulis complectemur iuxta tres divinitatis personas*).<sup>41</sup> Luther writes that, in order to accomplish sanctification, the Holy Spirit uses the other items of the Third Article—the holy Christian church, the communion of saints, the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and the life everlasting—as means (LC II:37) and that through such means the Holy Spirit “creates and increases sanctification, causing it daily to grow and become strong in the faith and in the fruits of the Spirit” (*dadurch er die Heiligung machet und mehret, daß sie täglich zunehme und stark werden im Glauben und seinen Früchten, so er schafft; per quod sanctificationem efficit, communionem amplificans, ut quotidianis incrementis crescat et in fide ejusque fructibus, quos producit, corroborata fortis evadat*).<sup>42</sup>

In the Large Catechism discussion of the Third Article that then follows, Luther elaborates on the idea that forgiveness of sins is constantly needed because in this world a human being is always sinful. In so doing, Luther refers to the Holy Spirit working sanctification (*die Heiligkeit durch den Heiligen Geist gemacht, sanctificatio per spiritum sanctum facta*)<sup>43</sup> and says that outside the Christian church there is no forgiveness and, as a result, no sanctification (*auch keine Heiligkeit da sein kann, quemadmodum nec ulla*

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<sup>41</sup> LC II:6, BKS, 647; Tappert, 411. Luther did something similar nearly a decade earlier (see BKS, 647 n.1; Tappert, 411 n.9), though apparently without attaching the labels of creation, redemption, and sanctification (WA 7:214<sup>25-27</sup>; Aland #234, *Eine kurze Form des Glaubens* [1520]; not in the AE).

Later Lutheran dogmaticians, such as Johannes Andreas Quenstedt (1617-1688), would defend attributing sanctification to the Holy Spirit “terminatively” (as the last One to do it and One present in the believer as a result of it), while at the same time acknowledging that the entire Trinity is sanctification’s efficient cause (Heinrich Schmid, *The Doctrinal Theology of the Evangelical Lutheran Church*, trans. Charles A. Hay and Henry E. Jacobs, 3rd ed., rev. ed. [Minneapolis, MN: Augsburg Publishing House, 1899], 491).

<sup>42</sup> LC II:37 (Tappert, 415), 53 (Tappert, 417; BKS, 657-658).

The discussion of sanctification that comes up in Luther’s Large Catechism treatment of the Third Commandment, pertaining to sanctifying the Holy Day, has little bearing on the discussion of the distinction between justification and sanctification. Luther simply says the day itself does not need sanctification (LC I:87; *darf fur sich selbs keins Heiligens nicht, pro se non opus habet sanctificatione*) and that our sanctification of the day occurs as “we occupy ourselves with God’s Word and exercise ourselves therein” (LC I:88; *Heiligen, sanctificatio*). (Tappert, 376-377; BKS, 582.)

<sup>43</sup> LC II:54; BKS, 658 (Tappert, 417, translates “holiness”).



*sanctificatio adesse potest*).<sup>44</sup> For those inside the church, sanctification on earth has begun and grows daily (*weil die Heiligkeit angefangen ist und täglich zunimmt, quando sanctificationis opus inchoatum est et quotidie augetur*)<sup>45</sup> by the Holy Spirit's work (*das alles soll des heiligen Geists Ampt und Werk sein, daß er auf Erden die Heiligkeit anfahe und täglich mehre, haec omnia spiritus sancti sunt officia et opera, ut hic in terris sanctificationem exordiat eandemque quotidie*).<sup>46</sup> Though because of the flesh believers are now "only halfway pure and holy" (*halb und halb reine und heilig, dimidio puri ac sancti*)<sup>47</sup> and the Holy Spirit must continue to work, in the life to come there will be "complete and perfect holiness" (*ganzer und volliger Heiligkeit, perfectam et absolutam sanctitatem*).<sup>48</sup>

Worth noting at this point in this discussion is that the New Testament can speak of a believer's present sanctification both as being complete according to the new, spiritual human being/nature and as being incomplete according to the old, sinful human being/nature, which distinctions also relate to different senses of the word "sanctification". One example is in Hebrews chapter 10. Verse 10 reads as follows:

NA26: ἐν ᾧ θελήματι ἡγιασμένοι ἐσμεν διὰ τῆς προσφορᾶς τοῦ σώματος Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐφάπαξ

Vulgate: in qua voluntate sanctificati sumus per oblationem corporis Christi Iesu in semel

Luther Bibel: In diesem Willen sind wir geheiligt auf einmal durch das Opfer des Leibes Jesu Christi.

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<sup>44</sup> LC II:56; *BKS*, 658 (Tappert, 418, translates "holiness").

Paragraph 56 also includes a statement by Luther that those who seek to merit sanctification through their own works (*sondern durch ihre Werke Heiligkeit süchen und verdienen wollen, sed propriis operibus sanctificationem quaerunt ac venantur ac promereri contendunt*) have separated themselves from the church. For the late medieval use of *promereri* in connection with *meritum de condigno*, see Heiko A. Oberman, "Duns Scotus, Nominalism, and the Council of Trent," *John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965*, eds. John Kenneth Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea (Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1965).

<sup>45</sup> LC II:57; *BKS*, 659 (Tappert, 418, translates "holiness"). Inchoate sanctification is discussed below in the text at greater length; see the discussions beginning on pp.350 and 370.

<sup>46</sup> LC II:59; *BKS*, 659 (Tappert, 418, translates "holiness").

<sup>47</sup> LC II:58; Tappert, 418; *BKS*, 659.

<sup>48</sup> LC II:57; Tappert, 418; *BKS*, 659.

KJV: By the which will we are sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all

A little further down is verse 14:

NA26: μιᾷ γὰρ προσφορᾷ τετελείωκεν εἰς τὸ διηνεκὲς τοὺς ἁγιαζομένους

Vulgate: una enim oblatione consummavit in sempiternum sanctificatos

Luther Bibel: Denn mit einem Opfer hat er in Ewigkeit vollendet die geheiligt werden.

KJV: For by one offering he hath perfected for ever them that are sanctified

Thus in verse 10 the writer speaks with a Greek perfect tense of complete sanctification, as in verse 14 he speaks with a perfect tense of one offering having completed its work of perfecting the saints. Verse 14, however, refers with a Greek present tense to those saints as presently being sanctified. Applied to believers who are still in this world and therefore sinful, the completed perfection of verse 10 and the first part of verse 14 is sanctification in the broad sense, which term entails justification in the narrow sense and sanctification in the narrow sense (although, if applied only to the believers according to their redeemed nature, the statement properly could be made of sanctification in the narrow sense alone). Applied to those same believer-sinners, the in-progress sanctification of the second part of verse 14 is strictly sanctification in the narrow sense. (See

Table 5 for a display of how the senses of these terms correspond.) Luther's Small Catechism explanation to the Third Article of the Apostolic Creed is one example of where in *The Book of Concord* one finds reference to sanctification with a perfect tense.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>49</sup> *im rechten Glauben geheiligt und erhalten; recta fide sanctificavit et conservavit*; "sanctified and preserved me in the true faith" (SC II:6; BKS, 512; Tappert, 345). According to the redeemed human nature the sanctification is one-time and complete, but according to the fallen human nature the sanctification in this life is in progress. The perfect tense also can be taken as a Greek perfect tense representing action in the past that resulted in a present and future state. Furthermore, note that present tense verbs are subsequently used in SC II:6 in connection with the Holy Spirit's work in the Church: *berüft, sammlet, erleucht, heiligt ... erhält; vocare, congregare, illuminare, snactificare ... conservare*; "calls, gathers, enlightens, ... sanctifies ... preserves" (BKS, 512; Tappert, 345).

**Table 5: Senses of “justification” and “sanctification”**

Term	Equivalent
justification <sub>narrow</sub>	= forgiveness of sins, made righteous, declared righteous, etc.
sanctification <sub>narrow</sub>	= love, good works, incipient keeping of the law, etc.
justification <sub>broad</sub>	= justification <sub>narrow</sub> + sanctification <sub>narrow</sub> = sanctification <sub>broad</sub>
sanctification <sub>broad</sub>	= justification <sub>narrow</sub> + sanctification <sub>narrow</sub> = justification <sub>broad</sub>

### ***Later Book of Concord references to sanctification***

Later references to sanctification in the *The Book of Concord* come in both the Epitome and Solid Declaration of the Formula of Concord and are found in several different articles: Original Sin, Free Will, and the Righteousness of Faith Before God.

The Formula of Concord in Article I, Original Sin, continues from the Catechisms both the idea of a chief article of faith titled sanctification and the idea of a corrupted human nature needing the process of sanctification to continue in this life. In the case of the Epitome, ¶3 lists as “the chief articles of our Christian faith” (*die Hauptartikel unsers christlichen Glaubens, praecipuis fidei nostrae articulis*): “creation, redemption, sanctification, and the resurrection of the flesh” (*Erschaffung, Erlösung, Heiligung und Auferstehung, de creatione, de redemptione, de sanctificatione et resurrectione carnis nostrae*), and the paragraph makes it clear that these articles could not coexist with a view that does not distinguish between corrupted human nature and original sin.<sup>50</sup> As would be expected, the Solid Declaration version makes the same point in greater detail, listing each of the four articles of faith and explaining why, under each heading, the failure to distinguish between corrupted human nature and original sin would contradict the Scriptures.<sup>51</sup> As with the use of the 1 Corinthians 1:30 passage noted above, these paragraphs from the Formula do not directly address the issue of a distinction between

<sup>50</sup> Ep I:3; Tappert, 466; BKS, 771. While such a division into four articles is not specifically found in Luther’s Catechisms, LC II:59 makes at least a chronological distinction between the sanctification that takes place now and the sanctification that takes place later “by means of the last two parts of this article” (*durch die letzten zwei, duobus articulis posterioribus*), namely, the resurrection of the body and the life everlasting.

<sup>51</sup> SD I:34, 43, 45, 46.

justification and sanctification, but the paragraphs do presume such a distinction, and, at the same time, as the paragraphs explicitly discuss the existence of the corrupted human nature needing increased sanctification, they presume in the believer the existence also of the renewed human nature already completely sanctified.

In Solid Declaration II, Free Will, as in the Large Catechism, the work of increasing sanctification is attributed to the Holy Spirit. In fact, the Solid Declaration cites the Large Catechism in making this point (SD II:36-39, citing from LC II:51-53).

The key excerpt for the matter at hand follows:

So bleibet der Heilige Geist bei der heiligen Gemeinde der Christenheit bis auf den jüngsten Tag, dadurch er uns heilet, und braucht sie dazu das Wort zu führen und treiben, dadurch er die Heiligung macht und mehret, daß wir täglich zunehmen und stark werden im Glauben und seinen Früchten, so er schaffet

Spiritus Sanctus autem manet cum sancta ecclesia catholica ad novissimum usque diem et per ecclesiam nos sanat eiusque opera utitur in docendo et propagando Dei Verbo, per quod ipse sanctificationem nostram operatur et promovet, ut de die in diem proficiamus et in fide confirmemur, atque in ferendis bonis fidei fructibus, quos ipse efficit, progressus subinde maiores faciamus

Until the last day, the Holy Spirit remains with the holy community of Christendom, through which he heals us and which he uses to proclaim and propagate his Word, whereby he initiates and increases sanctification [*die Heiligung macht und mehret*] so that we grow daily and become strong in the faith and its fruits, which he creates.<sup>52</sup>

Shortly after the Large Catechism quotation, the Solid Declaration, in denying the believer's will and power, states:

Und obwohl die Neugeborenen auch in diesem Leben so fern kommen, daß sie das Gute wollen, und es ihnen liebe, auch Guts tun und in demselbigen zunehmen, so ist doch solchs (wie daroben vermeldet) nicht aus unserm Willen und unserm Vermugen, sondern der Heilige Geist, wie Paulus selbst davon redet, wirkt solch „Wollen und Vollbringen“ Philip. 2. Wie er auch zun Ephe. 2. solch Werk alleine Gott zuschreibt, da er sagt: „Wir seind seine Werk, geschaffen in Christo Jesu zu guten Werken, zu welchen uns Gott zuvor bereitet hat, daß wir darinnen wandeln sollen.“

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<sup>52</sup> SD II:37; *BKS*, 887; Tappert, 528. Cf. LC II:52-53; *BKS*, 657-658.

Quamvis autem renati etiam in hac vita eo usque progrediantur, ut bonum velint eoque delectentur et bene agere atque in pietate proficere studeant, tamen hoc ipsum (ut paulo ante dictum est) non a nostra voluntate aut a viribus nostris proficiscitur; sed spiritus sanctus (ut Paulus ipse de hac re loquitur) operatur in nobis illud *velle et perficere*. Quemadmodum etiam alibi apostolus hoc opus soli Deo tribuit, cum inquit: *Ipsius sumus factura, creati in Christo Iesu ad opera bona, quae praeparavit Deus, ut in illis ambulemus*.

Although the regenerated, while still in this life, reach the point where they desire to do the good and delight in it (indeed actually do good deeds and grow in sanctification), nevertheless, as mentioned above, we do this not of our own will and power, but the Holy Spirit, as St. Paul says, creates such willing and doing (Phil. 2:13), just as the apostle ascribes this work to God when he says, “We are his workmanship, created in Christ Jesus for good works, which God prepared beforehand, that we should walk in them” (Eph. 2:10).<sup>53</sup>

The Holy Spirit is given the ultimate credit for the good works,<sup>54</sup> which pertains more to the article’s discussion of Free Will, but this passage is also relevant to the distinction between justification and sanctification, at least indirectly, as the progress in sanctification of the regenerated person’s corrupted nature is being discussed.<sup>55</sup>

In Solid Declaration III, the Righteousness of Faith Before God, the vocabulary of justification is taken up before the distinction in question is made between justification

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<sup>53</sup> SD II:39; *BKS*, 887-888; Tappert, 528. Notably the Triglotta (895) reads, “they will what is good, and love it, and even do good and grow in it”, and Kolb-Wengert (551) reads, “they desire the good and delight in it and even do good deeds and grow in practicing them”. Tappert’s insertion of “sanctification” may make an effective paraphrase but is not at this point, strictly speaking, a translation. The antecedent of *demselbigen* may be debated but appears to be *Guts* (“good deeds”, as K-W suggests with the pronoun “them”). To be sure, good works are the fruits of justification that are caused as an effect and are roughly equivalent to sanctification.

<sup>54</sup> In some places the Formula can also give the regenerated believer partial credit for the good works (Ep III:17 is just one example). Pieper says the Christian “plays a part”, but the Christian’s work is “not co-ordinate” with God’s “as when two horses draw a wagon”; instead, the “new man is always and fully subordinated to God’s activity” (*dependentem a Deo*) (Pieper, III:14). The illustration of the two horses and the wagon could go back to Plato’s description in the *Phaedrus* of the soul being like a charioteer and two horses pulling his chariot, one horse good and the other bad (Plato, *Symposium and Phaedrus* trans. Tom Griffith, Everyman’s Library [London: Everyman Publications, 2000], 121-122).

<sup>55</sup> Earlier in the same article, there is discussion of prayers for sanctification by the saints (for example, David and St. Paul) when they were living in this world (SD II:15; *daß sie von Gott gelehret, erleuchtet und geheiligt werden, doceantur, illuminentur et sanctificentur*). Such prayers cannot be construed as the prayer of an unbeliever for conversion or justification, as is made clear in ¶16, when the saints’ prayers are made a model for contemporary believers.

and sanctification. In ¶17, “justify” is defined and supported with relevant Bible passages as declaring or pronouncing righteous, freeing or absolving from sins, and reckoning or imputing Christ’s righteousness to faith.

Demnach das Wort *rechtfertigen* hier heißt gerecht und ledig von Sünden sprechen und derselbigen ewigen Straf ledig zählen umb der Gerechtigkeit Christi willen, wölche „von Gott dem Glauben zugerechnet wird“, Phil. 3.; wie dann solcher Gebrauch und Verstand dieses Worts in Heiliger Schrift Altes und Neues Testaments gemein ist,

Vocabulum igitur *iustificationis* in hoc negotio significat iustum pronuntiare, a peccatis et aeternis peccatorum suppliciis absolvere, propter iustitiam Christi, quae a Deo fidei imputatur. Et sane hic vocabuli illius usus tam in Veteri quam in Novo Testamento admodum frequens est.

Accordingly, the word “justify” [*rechtfertigen*] here means to declare righteous and free from sins and from the eternal punishment of these sins on account of the righteousness of Christ which God reckons to faith (Phil. 3:9). And this is the usual usage and meaning of the word in the Holy Scriptures of the Old and the New Testaments.<sup>56</sup>

In paragraphs 18, 19, and 21, “regeneration” is defined both as a sometime synonym of “justification” and as something distinct from “justification”. Clearly there are for the Reformers different senses of the word, and so extra caution is needed. (Note how in the following the German uses both the Latin terms and German equivalents.)

Die weil aber zuzeiten das Wort regeneratio, *Wiedergeburt*, für das Wort *iustificatio*, Rechtfertigung, gebraucht, ist vonnöten, das solch Wort eigentlich erklärt, damit die Verneuerung, so der Rechtfertigung des Glaubens nachfolget, nicht mit der Rechtfertigung des Glaubens vormenget, sondern eigentlich voneinander unterschieden werden.

Cum autem interdum vocabulum *regenerationis* pro vocabulo *iustificationis* usurpetur, necesse est, ut illud dextre et proprie explicetur, ne renovatio, quae iustificationem sequitur, cum iustificatione fidei confundatur, sed haec recte a se invicem discernantur.

Since the word “regeneration” [*regeneratio*, *Wiedergeburt*] is sometimes used in place of “justification,” [*iustificatio*, *Rechtfertigung*] it is necessary to explain the term strictly so that the renewal which follows justification by faith will not be confused with justification and so that in their strict senses the two will be differentiated from one another.<sup>57</sup>

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<sup>56</sup> SD III:17; *BKS*, 919; Tappert, 541-542.

<sup>57</sup> SD III:18; *BKS*, 920; Tappert, 542.

First, the broad sense of “regeneration” is given, which includes, though not specified in such terms, “justification” in the narrow sense and “sanctification” in the narrow sense.

(Again, the German uses both the Latin technical term and a German equivalent.)

Denn das Wort *regeneratio*, das ist, *Wiedergeburt*, erstlich also gebraucht wird, daß es zugleich die Vergebung der Sünden allein umb Christus willen und die nachfolgende Verneuerung begreift, welche der Heilige Geist wirkt in denen, so durch den Glauben gerechtfertigt sind.

Vocabulum enim regenerationis interdum in eo sensu accipitur, ut simul et remissionem peccatorum (quae duntaxat propter Christum contingit) et subsequentem renovationem complectatur, quam Spiritus Sanctus in illis, qui per fidem iustificati sunt, operatur.

The word “regeneration” [*regeneratio*, *Wiedergeburt*] is used, in the first place, to include both the forgiveness of sins solely for Christ’s sake and the subsequent renewal which the Holy Spirit works in those who are justified by faith.<sup>58</sup>

Then, a “limited” or narrow sense of “regeneration” is given that is equated to “justification” in the narrow sense.

Darnach wird es gebraucht allein *pro remissione peccatorum et adoptione in filios Dei*, das ist, daß es heißet allein Vergebung der Sünden, und daß wir zu Kindern Gottes angenommen werden. Und in diesem andern Verstand wird in der Apologia viel und oft dies Wort gebraucht, da geschrieben: *iustificatio est regeneratio*, das ist, die Rechtfertigung für Gott ist die Wiedergeburt, wie auch St. Paulus solche Worte unterschiedlich gesetzt Tit. 3: Er hat uns selig gemacht „durch das Bad der Wiedergeburt und Erneuerung des Heiligen Geistes.“

Quandoque etiam solam remissionem peccatorum et adoptionem in filios Dei significat. Et in hoc posteriore usu saepe multumque id vocabulum in Apologia Confessionis ponitur. Verbi gratia, cum dicitur: *Iustificatio est regeneratio*. Sed et Paulus haec vocabula cum discrimine ponit, cum dicit: *Salvos nos fecit per lavacrum regenerationis et renovationis Spiritus Sancti*.

But this word is also used in the limited sense of the forgiveness of sins and our adoption as God’s children. In this latter sense it is frequently used in the Apology, where the statement is made, “Justification is regeneration,” that is, justification before God is regeneration, just as St.

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<sup>58</sup> SD III:19; BKS, 920; Tappert, 542.



Paul uses the terms discriminately when he states, “He saved us by the washing of regeneration and renewing in the Holy Spirit” (Titus 3:5).<sup>59</sup>

Next, the term “vivification” is equated to that sense of regeneration (justification in the narrow sense).

Wie denn auch das Wort *vivificatio*, das ist, *Lebendigmachung*, zuzeiten in gleichem Verstand gebraucht worden. Denn so der Mensch durch den Glauben (wolchen allein der Heilig Geist wirkt) gerechtfertiget, sollichs wahrhaftig ein Wiedergeburt ist, weil aus einem Kind des Zorns ein Kind Gottes und also aus dem Tod in das Leben gesetzt wird, wie geschrieben stehet: „Da wir tot waren in Sünden, hat er uns sampt Christo lebendig gemacht,“ Eph. 2. Item: „Der Gerechte wird seines Glaubens leben,“ Röm. 1. In welchem Verstand dies Wort in der Apologie viel und oft gebraucht wird.

Quin etiam *vivificationis* vocabulum interdum ita accipitur, ut remissionem peccatorum notet. Cum enim homo per fidem (quam quidem solus Spiritus Sanctus operatur) iustificatur, id ipsum revera est quaedam regeneratio, quia ex filio irae fit filius Dei et hoc modo e morte in vitam transfertur, sicut scriptum est: Cum essemus mortui in peccatis, convivificavit nos in Christo. Et alibi: Iustus fide sua vivet. Et in hac posteriore significatione Apologia vocabulo regenerationis frequenter uti solet.

Likewise the term “vivification,” [*vivificatio*, *Lebendigmachung*] that is, being made alive, has sometimes been used in the same sense. For when the Holy Spirit has brought a person to faith and has justified him, a regeneration has indeed taken place, because he has transformed a child of wrath into a child of God and thus is translated him from death into life, as it is written, “When we were dead through our trespasses, he made us alive together with Christ” (Eph. 2:5). “He who through faith is righteous shall live” (Rom. 1:17). The Apology often uses the term in this sense.<sup>60</sup>

Finally, a narrow sense of “regeneration” is given that is identical to “sanctification” in the narrow sense.

Darnach aber wird es auch oft für die Heiligung und Erneuerung genummen, wölche der Gerechtigkeit des Glaubens nachfolget, wie es D.

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<sup>59</sup> SD III:19; BKS, 920; Tappert, 542. The exact phrase cited by the Formula does not appear in the Apology, though the sense is found in several places (Ap IV:72 [*Et quia iustificari significant ex iniustis iustos effici seu regerari* (BKS, 174<sub>37</sub>)], 78 [*ex iniusto iustum effici seu regenerari* (BKS, 175<sub>39</sub>)], and 117 [*ex iniustis iusti efficiamur seu regeneremur* (BKS, 184<sub>10</sub>)] and the phrase is said to be of the Apology’s author Melancthon (confer CR 27:466, 468, 470). (See BKS, 920 n.4; Tappert, 542 n.2.)

<sup>60</sup> SD III:20; BKS, 920-921; Tappert, 542. Examples given from the Apology are Ap IV:250 and VII:31 (see BKS, 921 n.2; Tappert, 542 n.4).

Luther im Buch von der Kirche und Konzilien und anderstwo also gebraucht hat.

Deinde etiam *regeneratio* saepe pro *sanctificatione* et renovatione (quae fidei iustificationem sequitur) usurpatur. In qua significatione D. Lutherus hac voce tum in libro De Ecclesia et conciliis tum alibi etiam multum usus est.

Frequently the word “regeneration” means the sanctification or renewal which follows the righteousness of faith, as Dr. Luther used the term in his book *On the Councils and the Church* and elsewhere.<sup>61</sup>

So, regeneration can be equal to justification in the narrow sense plus sanctification in the narrow sense (which is to be equal to justification in the broad sense or to sanctification in the broad sense), equal only to justification in the narrow sense (which is also equal to vivification), or equal to sanctification in the narrow sense. (See Table 6 for a summary of the senses of these terms according to SD III:17-21.) That the distinctions are being made is especially important.

**Table 6: Terminology according to SD III:17-21**

Term	Equivalent
regeneration <sub>broad</sub>	= justification <sub>narrow</sub> + sanctification <sub>narrow</sub> = justification <sub>broad</sub> = sanctification <sub>broad</sub>
regeneration <sub>narrow/justification</sub>	= justification <sub>narrow</sub> = vivification
vivification	= regeneration <sub>narrow/justification</sub> = justification <sub>narrow</sub>
regeneration <sub>narrow/sanctification</sub>	= sanctification <sub>narrow</sub>

<sup>61</sup> SD III:21; BKS, 921; Tappert, 542. Note that in the German *es* might be taken to refer to *Lebendigmachung*, the subject of the immediately preceding paragraph, but, as the Latin version makes clear (also with its paragraphing), the treatment of *vivificationis* was just a small digression from the term at hand, *regenerationis*.

The Luther reference is to *Von den Konziliis und Kirchen* (1539), Aland #382; WA 50:509-653; AE 41:9-178, translated by Charles M. Jacobs, revised by Eric W. Gritsch. More specifically, BKS (921 n.3) refers to WA 50:599<sub>26-35</sub>; 625<sub>25f.</sub>; 626<sub>30f.</sub>; 627<sub>10f.</sub> (confer Tappert, 542 n.5). Those passages are found in AE 41:114<sub>13-24</sub>; 144<sub>31-33</sub>; 146<sub>12-17</sub>; 146<sub>32-34</sub>. In these places, Luther in passing does distinguish *sanctificatione* and *vivificatione* (though vivification apparently in a different sense than that elaborated in SD III), or as he puts it “the sanctification of the Holy Spirit” (*der heiligung des Heiligen Geists*), from “the redemption of Jesus Christ” (*der Erlösung Christi*). As in the Catechisms of the late 1520s, Luther in this 1539 writing attributes the work of redemption to Christ and the work of vivification and sanctification to the Holy Spirit. Moreover, he indicates that the work of sanctification that is incomplete in this life takes place according to the old Adam, who is only fully and finally perfected “in the life beyond”. On *The Book of Concord*’s giving deutero-confessional status to some other writings, see above, n.73, p.223.

The discussion that follows in Article III makes use of the terms so defined as it notes that in this life “unrighteousness in essence and life adheres” (*Ungerechtigkeit ... im Wesen und Leben ... anhangen; iniustitia ... substantiae ipsorum ... adhaereat*) to the “justified and regenerated” (*den Gerechtfertigten und Wiedergeburt; iustificatis et renatis*).<sup>62</sup> Likewise, the Formula does not “mingle or insert that which precedes faith” (*was für dem Galuben hergehet ... eingemenget oder eingeschoben; quae fidem praecedunt ... admisceantur aut inserantur*), namely conversion or “contrition and sorrow” (*Reu und Leid; contritione*), and that which “follows faith” (*was demselbigen nachfolget; quae eam sequuntur*), namely love or good works, “into the article of justification, as if it were a necessary or component part” (*in den Artikel der Rechtfertigung, als darzu nötig und gehörig; articulo huic tanquam ad iustificationem necessaria et ad eam pertinentia*).<sup>63</sup>

Love and good works “certainly and necessarily follow” (*gewißlich notwendig folget; certissime et necessario sequitur*),<sup>64</sup> not precede, faith and justification, the Formula says, “since a person must be righteous before he can do good works” (*die Person muß erst gerecht sein, eher sie gute Werk tun kann; oportet personam primum esse iustam, antequam bona opera facere queat*).<sup>65</sup> In the same way, sanctification logically results from justification.

Gleichfalls auch, wiewohl die Verneuerung und Heiligung auch eine Wohltat des Mittlers Christi und ein Werk des Heiligen Geists ist, gehört sie doch nicht in den Artikel oder in den Handel der Rechtfertigung vor Gott, sondern folget derselben, weil sie vonwegen unsers verderbten Fleisches in diesem Leben nicht ganz rein und vollkommen ist ...

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<sup>62</sup> SD III:22-23; Tappert, 543; BKS, 921.

<sup>63</sup> SD III:24-26; Tappert, 543; BKS, 922.

<sup>64</sup> The words are those of logical necessity. *Folgen* generally translates *sequor* (Friedrich Adolph Heinichen, F. A. Heinichen's Lateinisch-deutsches Schulwörterbuch: mit einem Abriss der lateinischen Lautgeschichte, Wortbildung und Bedeutungsentwicklung, sowie der römischen Literaturgeschichte: Neubearbeitung von Heinrich Blase, Wilhelm Reeb, Otto Hoffmann, 9th ed. [Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1917], 778), and *sequor* is usually used for immediate consequences, in particular in logical conclusions (Lewis and Short, *A Latin Dictionary*, 1677). Confer Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, 9:727-728; 24:2503, 2506-2508.

SD IV:14-20 refers to the Augsburg Confession, the Apology, and Scripture itself in defending the use of “necessity” and clarifying precisely what is meant.

<sup>65</sup> SD III:27; BKS, 923; Tappert, 543-544.

Similiter et renovatio seu sanctificatio, quamvis et ipsa sit beneficium Mediatoris Christi et opus spiritus sancti, non tamen ad articulum aut negotium iustificationis coram Deo pertinet, sed eam sequitur, quia propter carnis nostrae corruptionem in hac vita imperfecta est et nondum omnibus numeris absoluta.

Similarly, although renewal and sanctification [*die Verneuerung und Heiligung*] are a blessing of Christ, the mediator, and a work of the Holy Spirit, it does not belong in the article or matter of justification [*der Rechtfertigung*] before God; it rather follows justification, because in this life sanctification [*sie*] is never wholly pure and perfect on account of our corrupt flesh ...<sup>66</sup>

An extended quotation from Luther's 1531 exposition of Galatians 2:16 comes next in the text of the Formula, in which quotation Luther explains that the teaching of "love and good works" must be done "apart from" (*außerhalb; extra*) the article of justification, which has to do with "how a person may be justified before God and be saved" (*wodurch man doch gerecht für Gott und selig werden möge; qua re iustificemur et vitam aeternam consequamur*).<sup>67</sup>

In the lengthy discussion that ensues (§32-36)<sup>68</sup>, the Formula notes that justified believers have both "the reckoned righteousness of faith" (*die zugerechnete Gerechtigkeit des Glaubens; imputatam fidei iustitiam*) and "the inchoate righteousness of the new obedience or of good works" (*die angefangene Gerechtigkeit des neuen Gehorsams oder guten Werk; inchoatam iustitiam novae obedientiae seu bonorum operum habeant*), but "these two dare not be confused with one another or introduced simultaneously into the article of justification by faith before God" (*diese beide müssen nicht ineinander gemenet oder zugleich in den Artikel der Rechtfertigung des Glaubens für Gott*

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<sup>66</sup> SD III:28; *BKS*, 923; Tappert, 544. Confer the Triglotta, 925, with a compound subject and singular pronoun and verbal forms. Kolb-Wengert makes the English pronouns and verbal forms plural: "Likewise, too, although renewal and sanctification are a blessing of our mediator Christ and a work of the Holy Spirit, they do not belong in the article or in the treatment of justification before God but rather result from it since, because of our corrupted flesh, they are never fully pure and perfect in this life ..." (K-W, 566).

Again, the location of the progress of sanctification in the sinful human nature is to be noted, with the implication being that the believer is perfectly sanctified according to the redeemed spiritual nature.

<sup>67</sup> SD III:29; Tappert, 544; *BKS*, 923-924. The quotation from Luther is more or less found in WA, 40<sup>1</sup>:240<sub>17-26</sub> (Aland #229; not included in the AE).

<sup>68</sup> This text is formatted as one paragraph in Tappert, 544-546.

*eingeschoben werden; haec duo non inter se permiscenda aut simul in articulum de iustificatione fidei coram Deo ingerenda sunt).*<sup>69</sup>

Also, wenngleich die Bekehrten und Gläubigen haben angefangne Verneuerung, Heiligung, Liebe, Tugend und gute Werk, so können doch, sollen und müssen dieselbigen nicht eingezogen oder eingemenget werden in den Artikel der Rechtfertigung für Gott, auf das dem Erlöser Christo seine Ehre bleibe und, weil unser neuer Gehorsam unvollkommen und unrein, die angefochtene Gewissen einen beständigen Trost haben mügen.

Quare, etsi conversi et in Christum credentes habent inchoatam in se renovationem, sanctificationem, dilectionem, virtutes et bona opera, tamen haec omnia nequaquam possunt aut debent immisceri articulo iustificationis coram Deo, ut Redemptori Christo honor illibatus maneat, et, cum nostra nova obedientia imperfecta et impura sit, perturbatae conscientiae certa et firma consolatione sese sustentare valeant.

From this it follows that although converted persons and believers possess the beginning of renewal, sanctification, love, virtues, and good works, [*angefangne Verneuerung, Heiligung, Liebe, Tugend und gute Werk*] these should and must not be drawn or mingled into the article of justification[*der Rechtfertigung*] before God, in order to preserve the glory due to Christ, the redeemer, and, because our new obedience is imperfect and impure, in order to supply tempted consciences with abiding comfort.<sup>70</sup>

Preserving Christ's glory and the believers' comfort are the controlling concerns.<sup>71</sup> Three key points come next, the third of which makes it clear that sanctification is not a cause of justification. (Note well the Latin expression present and translated in the authoritative German.<sup>72</sup>)

Das weder Neuerung, Heiligung, Tugende oder gute Werk *tamquam forma aut pars aut causa iustificationis*, das ist, unser Gerechtigkeit für Gott seie, noch für ein Teil oder Ursache unserer Gerechtigkeit gemacht

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<sup>69</sup> SD III:32; Tappert, 544-545; BKS, 924-925. There is additional discussion of inchoate righteousness below in the text, beginning on p.370.

<sup>70</sup> SD III:35; BKS, 925-926; Tappert, 545. This passage was this chapter's epigram.

<sup>71</sup> Similarly in SD XI:89, "despondency or a riotous and dissolute life" are avoided by the correct teaching regarding election, which includes the promise of the Holy Spirit "to cleanse and renew" (*zur Reinigung und Erneuerung verheißet; ad emundationem et sanctificationem promittit*) (Tappert, 631; BKS, 1089).

<sup>72</sup> The phrase is translated "as a form or part or cause of justification" and is said to "reflect the Roman Catholic argument at Trent that love provides the 'form' for the 'material' of faith", with reference given to *Examination of Trent* I, 493-494 (K-W, 569 n.118).

und gesetzet oder sonst unter einigerlei Schein, Titel oder Namen in den Artikel der Rechtfertigung, als darzu nötig und gehörig, eingemenget werden sollen ...

Denique has formulas teneamus, ut neque renovatio neque sanctificatio, virtutes aut bona opera, tanquam forma aut pars aut causa iustificationis aut sub qualicunque praetextu, titulo aut nomine, articulo iustificationis, tamquam ad eam rem necessaria aut pertinentia, immisceantur ...

That neither renewal, sanctification, virtues nor other good works[*Neuerung, Heiligung, Tugende oder gute Werk*] are our righteousness before God, nor are they to be made and posited to be a part or cause of our justification, nor under any kind of pretense, title, or name are they to be mingled with the article of justification [*der Rechtfertigung*] as pertinent or necessary to it ...<sup>73</sup>

Quite the contrary, justification is the cause of sanctification, as the following paragraph states in terms steeped in meaning from centuries of medieval philosophy, especially in a section of Latin text contained in the authoritative German that is only paraphrased in that same German version.<sup>74</sup>

Also muß auch bleiben und erhalten werden die Ordnung zwischen dem Glauben und guten Werken; item, zwischen der Rechtfertigung und Erneuerung oder Heiligung.

Dann gute Werk gehen nicht für dem Glauben her, auch nicht die Heiligung für der Rechtfertigung, sondern erstlich wird in der Bekehrung durch den Heiligen Geist der Glaub aus dem Gehör des Evangelii in uns angezündet; derselbe ergreift Gottes Gnade in Christo, dadurch die Person

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<sup>73</sup> SD III:39; *BKS*, 927; Tappert, 546. The *BKS* editors indicate this paragraph targets Osiander, and they cite CR VII:783.

Similarly, SD III's fourth antithesis condemns the following position: *daß zwei Stück oder Teile zu der Gerechtigkeit des Glaubens vor Gott gehören, darinn sie bestehe, nämlich die gnädige Vergebung der Sünden und dann zum andern auch die Verneuerung oder Heiligung; Quod iustitia fidei coram Deo duabus partibus constet, remissione peccatorum et renovatione seu sanctificatione* ("righteousness by faith before God consists of two pieces or parts, namely, the gracious forgiveness of sins and, as a second element, renewal or sanctification") (SD III:48; *BKS*, 931; Tappert, 548). Also here the *BKS* editors note that Osiander is the target of this condemnation. Confer also K-W, 573 n.132.

<sup>74</sup> *Ordo, ordinis* suggests the regular succession; *causa, causae* is that on account of which anything takes place; *effectus, effectus* in particular refers to the result of an action; *antecedente, antecedentis* is a technical term in philosophy for the antecedent or cause and is used opposite *consequens, consequens, consequentis* is the consequence that follows as an effect or results from a logical sequence (Lewis and Short, 1277, 303-304, 628, 129, 429-430, respectively). For one of Melancthon's treatments of cause and effect, see his 1547 *Erotemata Dialectices* in Philipp Melancthon, ed., *Philippi Melancthonis Opera quae supersunt omnia*, 28 vols. (Halle: C. A. Schwetschke et filium, 1834-1860), 13:673-687. Confer *De Dialectica* of 1528, current at the time of the Augsburg Confession and Apology, Melancthon, *De dialectica libri quatuor*, 189-195.

gerechtfertigt wird; darnach, wenn die Person gerechtfertigt ist, so wird sie auch durch den Heiligen Geist verneuert und geheiligt, aus welcher Verneuerung und Heiligung alsdann die Früchte der guten Werk folgen. *Et haec non ita divelluntur quasi vera fides aliquando et aliquamdiu stare possit cum malo proposito, sed ordine causarum et effectuum, antecedentium et consequentium ita distribuuntur; manet enim, quod Lutherus recte dicit: Bene conveniunt et sunt connexa inseparabiliter fides et opera, sed sola fides est, quae apprehendit benedictionem sine operibus, et tamen nunquam est sola.* Das ist: Welches nicht also verstanden werden soll, als ob die Rechtfertigung und Erneuerung voneinander geschieden, dermaßen, daß ein wahrhaftiger Glaube unterweilen eine Zeitlang neben einem bösen Vorsatz sein und bestehen könnte, sondern es wird hiemit allein die Ordnung angezeigt, wie eins dem andern vorgehe oder nachfolge, denn es bleibt doch wahr, das D. Luther recht gesagt hat: Es reimen und schicken sich fein zusammen der Glaube und die guten Werk, aber der Glaube ist es allein, der den Segen ergreift ohne die Werke, doch nimmer und zu keiner Zeit allein ist, wie daroben erkläret worden.

Eodem modo etiam conservandus est ordo inter fidem et bona opera, inter iustificationem et renovationem seu sanctificationem.

Bona enim opera non praecedunt fidem et sanctificatio non praecedit iustificationem. Sed primum in conversione per Spiritum Sanctum fides ex auditu evangelii in nobis accenditur. Illa vero apprehendit gratiam Dei in Christo, qua persona iustificatur. Cum vero persona iam est iustificata, tum etiam per spiritum sanctum renovatur et sanctificatur; ex ea vero renovatione et sanctificatione deinceps fructus, hoc est, bona opera, sequuntur. Et haec non ita divelluntur, quasi vera fides aliquando et aliquamdiu stare possit cum malo proposito, sed ordine causarum et effectuum, antecedentium et consequentium, ita distribuuntur. Manet enim, quod Lutherus recte dicit: Bene conveniunt et sunt connexa inseparabiliter fides et opera; sed sola fides est, quae apprehendit benedictionem sine operibus; et tamen nunquam est sola. De qua re supra satis est dictum.

In this way, too, the proper order also [*Ordnung*] between faith and good works is bound to be maintained and preserved, as well as between justification and renewal or sanctification [*der Rechtfertigung und Erneuerung oder Heiligung*]. For good works do not precede [*gehen nicht für*] faith, nor is sanctification prior to justification. First the Holy Spirit kindles faith in us in conversion through the hearing of the Gospel. Faith apprehends the grace of God in Christ whereby the person is justified. After the person is justified, the Holy Spirit next renews and sanctifies him, and from this renewal and sanctification the fruits of good works then follow. This is not to be understood, however, as though justification and

sanctification are separated from each other in such a way as though on occasion true faith could exist and survive for a while side by side with a wicked intention, but this merely shows the order in which one thing precedes or follows the other. For Dr. Luther's excellent statement remains true: "There is a beautiful agreement between faith and good works; nevertheless, it is faith alone which apprehends the blessing without works. And yet faith is at no time ever alone." This has been set forth above.<sup>75</sup>

Note the Latin text found in the German version, which text apparently originally stood in the German original of the Formula without the German paraphrase until the princes insisted it be translated,<sup>76</sup> and note that the translation of the Latin given in the Formula's German noticeably lacks the philosophical terminology pertaining to the order between justification and sanctification: that of cause and effect, antecedent and consequent.<sup>77</sup> The reference to the true nature of faith in this context is also significant.<sup>78</sup>

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<sup>75</sup> SD III:40-41; BKS, 927-928; Tappert, 546. Regarding the Latin text contained in the German text, other English translations at least try to bring in the Latin terminology. The Triglotta, 931, for example, inserts in brackets the translations of several Latin words: "but hereby only the order [of causes and effects, of antecedents and consequents] is indicated". K-W, 569, reads almost identically to Tappert.

The source of the Luther quotation is his lecture (ca. 1539-1540) on Genesis 22:16-18, WA 43:255<sub>38-39</sub>; Aland #517; AE 4:66, translated by George V. Schick. There the Latin reads: *Bene quidem conveniunt, et sunt connexa inseparabiliter fides et opera. Sed sola fides est, quae apprehendit benedictionem. Ideo solam fidem iustificantem praedicamus, quia sola benedicitur, opera non habent gloriam, quod benedicant, sed sunt fructus benedictae personae* (WA 43:255<sub>38-41</sub>). The AE translates: "To be sure, faith and works indeed fit together well and are inseparably joined; but it is faith alone that obtains the blessing. Therefore we declare that faith alone justifies, because it alone is blessed. Works do not bless; they do not have this glory. No, they are the fruits of the person who has been blessed." (AE 4:166<sub>21-23</sub>.) The SD quotation does not match the WA, though arguably the SD does not misrepresent Luther, although the German of the SD does undercut the "inseparable connection" (*connexa inseparabiliter*), which is expression pertains to the formal distinction between justification and sanctification discussed below in the text, beginning on p.372. In addition, though Luther is talking about faith and works and the SD primarily about justification and sanctification, the SD, as has been seen, made faith parallel to justification and works parallel to sanctification (SD III:40).

<sup>76</sup> Tappert, 464.

<sup>77</sup> In fact, the German paraphrase of the Latin in the German text might be read as a "dumbing-down" or a removal of the cause-effect relationship, since not everything that follows something else does so as an effect necessarily following a cause. The German text might also be taken as suggesting a temporal relationship between the two, though clearly the temporal relationship is excluded (for more on that exclusion, see Edmund Schlink, *Theology of the Lutheran Confessions*, Theologie der lutherischen Bekenntnisschriften, 3rd ed., 1948, trans. Paul F. Koehnke and Herbert J. A. Bouman [Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press, 1961], 114-116).

Kolb-Wengert note: "At the time, technical theological vocabulary had not yet developed in German, and the authors of the Formula of Concord believed that points that hinged on such technical terms had to be made with the aid of the Latin" (K-W, 485).

<sup>78</sup> See more below in reference to the formal distinction beginning on p.372.



*The Book of Concord* from beginning to end at a minimum knows of some sort of distinction between justification and sanctification, though no separation of them. Luther's Catechisms, for example, distinguish between the two in identifying justification with Jesus and sanctification with the Holy Ghost. Melancthon's Apology in its Biblical citations could be taken as identifying justification with sanctification, at least in broad senses of both words, though more likely gives evidence of a distinction on the basis of the Biblical citations. The Formula of Concord is arguably more precise in its terminology and makes a logical distinction between the two, with justification as a cause and sanctification its effect.<sup>79</sup> Yet, the later Formula does not go beyond the authors of the earlier confessions, making a point to cite both Luther and Melancthon in support of its position.<sup>80</sup> Finally, the Formula's own statement in SD III:41 noted above must be emphasized: that justification and sanctification are not separated (*Welches nicht also verstanden werden soll, als ob die Rechtfertigung und Erneuerung voneinander geschieden; haec non ita divelluntur*).<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>79</sup> While the Formula at least speaks of the relationship between justification and sanctification as that of cause and effect, *The Book of Concord* itself does not otherwise directly speak of justification as "the cause" of sanctification. Uses of philosophical "cause" terminology are sub-sentential uses of philosophy that are outside this dissertation's scope, which focuses on the supra-sentential uses of logic and argumentation.

<sup>80</sup> Of course, the intent of the Formula as a whole is to clarify and show continuity with the teaching of Luther and Melancthon (see, for example, the Preface to *The Book of Concord*, BKS, 14 [¶21]; Tappert, 13; K-W, 15 [¶23]).

<sup>81</sup> Pieper writes both of the "inseparable connection (*nexus indivulsus; unauf löbliche Verbindung*) between justification and sanctification" and of the need to maintain the proper order, not putting the cart (sanctification) before the horse (justification) (Pieper, *Christian Dogmatics*, III:7-13; Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, III:6). In support of the first point, he cites Quenstedt who writes that "their union is closer than that of a mathematical point; they cannot be separated and divorced" (Pieper, III:8 n.9) (*Regeneratio, iustificatio, unio et renovatio tempore simul sunt et quovis puncto mathematico arctiores, adeo et divelli et sequestrari nequeant, cohaerent* [Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, III:7 n.9.]).

Likely drawing on the Formula's distinction, 17<sup>th</sup>-century Lutheran dogmaticians, such as Quenstedt, would similarly differentiate between justification and renovation in part on the basis of their logical order: "Regeneration precedes justification, and justification precedes renovation. Renovation is related to justification as an effect to a cause, and follows it, not in the order of time, but of nature. Therefore Paul does not use these words indiscriminately. Tit. 3:5." (Quoted by Schmid, *Doctrinal Theology*, 488.) Confer SD III:19's reference above to Titus 3. (Quenstedt's other grounds for the distinction were the efficient cause, the subject, the object, the form, and the properties [Schmid, *Doctrinal Theology*, 488].) As to the efficient cause of sanctification, David Hollaz (1646-1713), for one, listed "the regenerate and justified man ... as a secondary cause" (quoted by Schmid, *Doctrinal Theology*, 491 ). More modern Lutheran dogmaticians suggest faith is the instrument of the Holy Spirit, who is the efficient cause of sanctification (Pieper, *Christian Dogmatics*, 11-12; Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, III:12 ).

## Sanctification distinction as alleged discontinuity

Despite the Reformers' insistence that justification and sanctification could not be separated, the logical distinction between the two that they made in the discussion of justification is sometimes taken as a point of discontinuity between the Reformation period and that which precedes it. This section presents that claim of discontinuity and seven responses to it. Ultimately, one sees that the authors of the writings in *The Book of Concord* consistently make—and thus *The Book of Concord* itself consistently makes—a logical distinction between justification in the narrow sense and sanctification in the narrow sense, which distinction has conceptual if not terminological continuity with the preceding medieval tradition. (The nature of this distinction—that of a philosophical formal distinction—is also a response of a sort to the claim of discontinuity, though it is discussed in the section that follows this one.)

Albert Ritschl, in his 1870 study of justification titled *Die christliche Lehre von der Rechtfertigung und Versöhnung*, translated in 1872 as *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, took note of the difference between the medieval and Reformation writers on this point, after noting their similarity on another:

We shall on the other hand search in vain to find in any theologian of the Middle Ages the Reformation idea of justification—the deliberate distinction between justification and regeneration. Instances indeed occur in which, by the word of justification is specially meant the Divine sentence of absolution from sins—particularly when certain unambiguous expressions of the apostle Paul are laid hold of; but we must not lay stress upon these instances so as to fancy in them an anticipation of the conscious thought of the Reformers. Their [presumably the Medieval theologians'] deliberate treatment of the idea of justification proceeds rather on the principle that a real change in the sinner is thought of as involved in it; in other words, the Reformation distinction between the two is at the outset rejected, and the explanation of justification in the forensic sense is seen to be only a preliminary statement that requires to be corrected and filled out. But this implies an essential difference of meaning in those formulae in which mediæval theologians seem to utter the watchword of the Reformers, and the work of collecting such utterances with a view to the defence of the doctrine of the Reformation,—such an attempt, for example, as may be seen in John Gerhard's

*Confessio Catholica*—exposes him who undertakes it to a strong suspicion of having suffered himself to be misled by careless observation. It was understood in the Middle Ages that faith alone pertains to justification; that justification is bestowed freely by grace; that it does not depend on *merita de congruo* as conditions: it is only the Nominalistic theory that forsakes these positions; nevertheless, from a theological point of view, what is meant by them is something entirely different from what is meant by the formulae of the Reformers that sound so like them.<sup>82</sup>

While Ritschl says the theologians of the Middle Ages did not make a “deliberate distinction between justification and regeneration”, he does find that the Reformers’ emphasis had “a broad basis in the Church”.<sup>83</sup>

For in the thought of justification, so far as the Reformers are concerned, what is aimed at primarily and chiefly is by no means an objective doctrine of systematic theology, but simply a supreme standard whereby the subject who is a member of the Christian Church, and who, as such, is active in good works by the influence of the Holy Spirit, may judge for himself of his true religious condition. And what in fact the Reformers wish to establish is that the regenerate person does not owe his position before God and his assurance of salvation to the good works which he really does perform, but to the grace of God, which to his believing confidence pledges his justification through Christ.<sup>84</sup>

So, when moving past the problems with terminology to the ideas behind them, Ritschl finds continuity in logical progression from the medieval thinkers to the Reformers.

But that this religious estimate of self, which practically denies to merit the value which is theoretically affirmed, should appear in a very pronounced form among the heroes of the mediaeval church, serves to show that the same way of thinking when adapted by the Reformers was a product of the Church; and that the Reformation use of that line of thought, to bring about a complete change in the doctrine and ordinances of the Western Church, is simply a logical result of the idea of grace which came to be practically operative on all hands when the time came and the proper men were raised up.<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>82</sup> A. B. Ritschl, *A Critical History of the Christian Doctrine of Justification and Reconciliation*, tr. John S. Black (Edinburgh, 1872), 90-91. Ritschl cites *Bernardi Tractatus de erroribus Abaelardi* cap. vi.16 and viii.20; *In Cantica*, sermo xxii. 6. These can be found in MSL 182:1066-1067, 1069; 183:880. Nothing there seems to necessarily rule out what the Reformers claim.

<sup>83</sup> Ritschl, *Critical History*, 92.

<sup>84</sup> Ritschl, *Critical History*, 92.

<sup>85</sup> Ritschl, *Critical History*, 94.

(Ultimately this dissertation's position is that there was not a change in the doctrine.) Ritschl proceeds to consider those on whom the logical result operated, such as Bernard of Clairvaux, Saint Francis of Assisi, John Staupitz (Luther's "mentor"), John Wessel, and others.<sup>86</sup>

Alister McGrath, in his more recent study of justification that he claims surpasses Ritschl's,<sup>87</sup> nevertheless cites Ritschl on this matter.<sup>88</sup> McGrath says the Reformers disagreed with their predecessors on justification's nature. McGrath writes that with the forensic nature of justification, which he says represents a "theological *novum*" and is "chief" among the discontinuities between the Reformation period and the period before it, came the introduction of the distinction between justification and regeneration, what McGrath calls a "fundamental discontinuity" in "the western theological tradition *where none had existed before*."<sup>89</sup> McGrath thus summarizes as a "leading primary characteristic" of Lutheran justification:

A deliberate and systematic distinction ... made between *justification* (the external act by which God declares the sinner to be righteous) and *sanctification* or *regeneration* (the internal process of renewal within man). Although the two are treated as inseparable, a notional distinction is thus drawn where none was conceded before.<sup>90</sup>

McGrath similarly writes:

the notional distinction between *iustificatio* and *regeneratio* provides one of the best *differentiae* between Catholic and Protestant understandings of justification, marking the Reformers' complete discontinuity with the earlier western theological tradition.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>86</sup> Ritschl, *Critical History*, 95-120.

<sup>87</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, x. McGrath there gives four reasons why he thinks his study is better: some of Ritschl's presuppositions are prejudicial against the early Luther, Ritschl restricts his focus to German Protestantism, scholarship since Ritschl calls his conclusions into question, and "new interest in ecumenism" makes essential a better-informed discussion of justification.

<sup>88</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §19, p.184, cites in an abbreviated form the quote in the text above from Ritschl, 90-91. McGrath's abbreviation of Ritschl's text is consistent with McGrath's purpose, though it seems to misrepresent the broader context of the quotation.

<sup>89</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §19, pp.184, 187 (emphasis McGrath's).

<sup>90</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, Introduction to §20, p.189. Confer Introduction to §20, p.190.

<sup>91</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §5, p.51.

Though some find in Augustine evidence of a distinction between the event and process of justification, McGrath claims Augustine is in such cases misrepresented or misunderstood.<sup>92</sup>

There are a number of responses, seven, to be exact, to be made to the claim of discontinuity raised by Ritschl and McGrath. First, their claims of a distinction between justification and sanctification being rejected or excluded are not supported;<sup>93</sup> neither contemporary author offers evidence of an ancient author saying that justification and sanctification cannot in this or any other way be distinguished. While McGrath's search of the sources may not have produced evidence of such a distinction, McGrath's search only supports the *absence* of a distinction, not the rejection or exclusion of a distinction. In essence, McGrath's claim is an invalid argument from silence. There are ways of interpreting the statements of the church fathers consistent with the Reformers' position.<sup>94</sup>

Second, McGrath arguably misrepresents the Lutheran position we have seen in *The Book of Concord*<sup>95</sup> and is inconsistent in how serious of a problem he considers the case of a notional distinction to be, perhaps failing to recognize the justification-

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<sup>92</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §4, pp.31-32. He gives no examples of and does not specifically deal with the "isolated passages" where Augustine's view of justification is said to consist of the remission of sins only and not also of the sinner's renewal.

<sup>93</sup> See the Ritschl quote above at n.82 on p.357 and confer McGrath's similar comment regarding the distinction being "excluded" (McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §5, p.41 ).

<sup>94</sup> Chemnitz writes: "For although the fathers mostly take the word 'justify' for the renewal, by which the works of righteousness are wrought in us through the Spirit, we do not start a quarrel with them where they according to the Scripture rightly and appropriately teach the doctrine how and why a person is reconciled to God, receives the remission of sins and the adoption, and is accepted to life eternal. This difference in meanings has often been shown by our teachers, and also how the former meaning can be rightly, piously, and skillfully understood and admitted according to the analogy of faith and the perpetual sense of the Scripture if it is accepted with the fathers according to the manner of the Latin composition. However, the papalists have not been placated at all. For the dissension and strife in the article of justification is not only about words but chiefly about the matters themselves." (Martin Chemnitz, *Examination of the Council of Trent*, trans. Fred Kramer, 4 vols. [St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1971-1986], I:468.) The mention of "the analogy of faith" is notable.

<sup>95</sup> McGrath, of course, has not limited his sample of Reformation writings to those contained in *The Book of Concord*. While, in the case of justification, he does consider specific writings contained in the *BOC* (for examples, AC IV, AC VI, Ap IV, Formula III in §22, 211-219 and §24, 231), he does not seem to regard the confessional authority of these writings and their resulting normative force over and against other writings of the Reformers not given such subscription. In other words, McGrath wrongly gives equal weight to any and all writings.

sanctification distinction as an example of a medieval Scotus-like formal distinction.<sup>96</sup> McGrath grants that justification and sanctification are “treated as inseparable” but still calls the “notional distinction” a distinction.<sup>97</sup> McGrath fails to identify the nature of the distinction as one of logic’s cause and effect, or antecedent and consequent, where sanctification necessarily follows justification and thus is never distinct in actuality.<sup>98</sup> Moreover, though McGrath here makes much of this “notional distinction”, elsewhere, as in the case of Aquinas, he minimizes the significance of such a difference.<sup>99</sup> Moreover, such distinctions were not in and of themselves innovations.<sup>100</sup>

Third, McGrath’s own evidence bears out some distinctions in the process of justification.<sup>101</sup> McGrath documents the development, beginning in the early 12<sup>th</sup> century, “of the inner structure of justification”. Notably developed in part through Aquinas’ application of Aristotelian physics, McGrath writes how this “*processus iustificationis*” comes to be accepted as consisting of four steps: (1) the infusion of grace, (2) the free will’s movement to God through faith, (3) the free will’s movement against sin (contrition), and (4) the remission of sin. Although there is no regeneration even mentioned, McGrath notes that “the four elements of the process were regarded as essentially aspects of the one and the same transformation, causally linked by their very nature (*ex natura rei*).<sup>102</sup> While the Reformers might differ on the precise steps or the sequence of the steps, their “notional distinction” between justification and sanctification

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<sup>96</sup> In one of the few somewhat-critical reviews of *Iustitia Dei*, Bray writes, “It is difficult to avoid the suspicion that these matters have been simplified, even to the point of distortion” (Gerald L. Bray, “Alister E. McGrath and Justification,” *Alister E. McGrath and Evangelical Theology*, ed. Sung Wook Chung [Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2003], 30.)

<sup>97</sup> See the quote above at n.90 p.358 in the text. Compare Schlink, who comments, “While the Formula of Concord distinguishes both, it does not tear them apart” (Schlink, *Theology of the Lutheran Confessions*, 126).

<sup>98</sup> SD III:27, as noted above in the text.

<sup>99</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §9, p.106. Confer McGrath’s discussion of Trent in regards to the “notional distinction” and “terminological confusion” (McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §27, p.259, and §28, p.272 ).

<sup>100</sup> On the matter of the justification-sanctification distinction as a medieval Scotus-like formal distinction, see in the text below, beginning on p.372.

<sup>101</sup> Confer Miyon Chung, “Faith, Merit, and Justification: Luther’s Exodus from Ockhamism *en route* to Reformation,” *Torch Trinity Journal* 6 (2003): 211.

<sup>102</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §5, pp.40-51, with the quotation from p.50.

by way of a causal relationship, rooted in medieval philosophy, is clearly similar to distinctions in the process of justification being made centuries before their time. *The Book of Concord* can allow a broad sense to justification in passages such as Solid Declaration III:18, though Solid Declaration III:28-29, in keeping with Luther, when discussing salvation makes the logical distinction between justification in the narrow sense (salvation) and sanctification in the narrow sense and excludes from the salvation discussion any treatment of works.

A related matter of Luther on the process of justification warrants mention at this point. McGrath claims, “Luther does not make the distinction between justification and sanctification associated with later Protestantism, treating justification as a process of becoming: *feri est iustificatio*.”<sup>103</sup> Of course, Luther could use both terms in a wide sense where they are equal. Either way, McGrath’s quotation does not say that Luther *rules out* such a distinction, but, even if it did, the early date of the work (1515-1516) would lessen its weight, which weight is already far less than the normative force of the later Luther citations from the subscribed *Book of Concord* given above, which citations clearly show Luther made at least some sort of distinction between justification and sanctification consistent with at least later Lutheranism, if not all of McGrath’s “Protestantism”. Furthermore, a closer inspection of the Luther quotation proffered by McGrath reveals that the quotation in question contradicts the very claim McGrath is using it to make. The quotation comes as Luther comments on Romans 12:2: *Sed Reformamini* (“but be transformed”), and Luther notes that Christians are to make progress (*pro profectu*).<sup>104</sup> Luther lists five stages in the case of the things of nature, relates them to Aristotelian

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<sup>103</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §21, p.200, citing WA 56:442.3, the scholia for Luther’s 1515-1516 lectures on Romans, which covers pages 157-528 in WA 56 (Aland #646; AE 25:133-524, translated by Walter G. Tillmanns).

<sup>104</sup> WA 56:441<sub>13</sub>; AE 25:433.

terms,<sup>105</sup> and then relates them to spiritual matters—all in a scheme that can be outlined thusly:<sup>106</sup>

1. nonbeing (*Non esse*)—privation (*priuatio*)—a thing without a name and a man in his sins (*Non Esse Est res sine nomine et homo in peccatis*)
2. becoming (*fieri*)—matter (*Materia*)—justification (*fieri Est Iustificatio*)
3. being (*Esse*)—form (*forma*)—righteousness (*Esse est Iustitia*)
4. action (*Actio*)—operation (*operatio*)—doing and living righteously (*opus Est Iuste agere et viuere*)
5. being acted upon (*passio*)—passion (*passio*)—to be made perfect and complete (*pati est perfici et consummari*)

Clearly by this categorization, Luther *does* distinguish between justification and sanctification, and he can do so in light of a person being both righteous and sinful at the same time.

Et hæc quinque semper velut in motu sunt in homine. Et quodlibet in homine est Inueniri – respectiue preter primum non esse et vltimum esse, Nam inter illa duo: Non esse et pati currunt illa tria semper, sc. fieri, esse, agere – per Natiuitatem nouam transit de peccato ad Iustitiam, Et sic de non esse per fieri ad esse. Quo facto operator Iuste. Se dab hocipso esse nouo, quod est verum non esse, ad aliud nouum esse proficiendo transit per passionem i. e. aliud fieri, in esse melius, Et ab illo iterum in aliud. Quare Verissime homo semper est in priuatione, semper in fieri seu potentia et materia et semper in actu. Sic enim de rebus philosophatur Aristoteles et Bene, Sed non ita imsum intelligunt. Semper homo Est in Non Esse, In fieri, In esse, Semper in priuatione, in potentia, in actu, Semper in peccato, in Iustificatione, In Iustitia, i. e. Semper peccator, semper penitens, semper Iustus. Quod enim penitet, hoc fit de non Iusto Iustus. Ergo penitentia Est medium inter Iniustitiam et Iustitiam. Et sic est in peccato quoad terminum a quo et in Iustitia quoad terminum ad quem. Si ergo semper penitemus, semper peccatores sumus, et tamen eoipso et Iusti sumus ac Iustificamur, partim peccatores, partim Iusti i. e. nihil nisi

<sup>105</sup> The editors of the Weimar edition suggest that Luther may be drawing on a number of different Aristotelian distinctions that he would have known through such authors as Ockam and Trutvetter (see the note on line 23ff. on pp.441-442). As noted previously, such sub-sentential uses of philosophy are outside the scope of this dissertation.

<sup>106</sup> WA 56:441-442; AE 25:434.



penitentes. Sicut econtra Impii, Qui recedunt a Iustitia, medium tenent inter peccatum et Iustitiam contrario motu. Quare hæc Vita Est via ad cælum et infernum. Nemo ita bonus, vt non fiat melior, nemo ita malus, vt non fiat peior, vsque dum ad extremam formam perueniamus.

And these five stages in some way are always in motion in man. And whatever is found in the nature of man—except for the first stage of nonbeing and the last form of existence, for between these two, nonbeing and being acted upon, there are the three stages which are always in movement, namely, becoming, being, and acting—through his new birth he moves from sin to righteousness, and thus from nonbeing through becoming to being. And when this has happened, he lives righteously. But from this new being, which is really a nonbeing, man proceeds and passes to another new being by being acted upon, that is, through becoming new, he proceeds to become better, and from this again into something new. Thus it is most correct to say that man is always in privation, always in becoming or in potentiality, in matter, and always in action. Aristotle philosophizes about such matters, and he does it well, but people do not understand him well. Man is always in nonbeing, in becoming, in being, always in privation, in potentiality, in action, always in sin, in justification, in righteousness, that is, he is always a sinner, always a penitent, always righteous. For the fact that he repents makes [*fit*] a righteous man out of an unrighteous one. Thus repentance is the medium between unrighteousness and righteousness. And thus a man is in sin as the *terminus a quo* and righteousness as the *terminus ad quem*. Therefore if we always are repentant, we are always sinners, and yet thereby we are righteous and we are justified; we are in part sinners and in part righteous, that is, we are nothing but penitents. Likewise, on the other side, the ungodly, who depart from righteousness, hold a middle position between sin and righteousness, but with a contrary direction. For this life is the road to heaven or to hell. No one is so good that he does not become better, and no one so evil that he does not become worse, until at last we come to our final state.<sup>107</sup>

This Luther quotation, with its “always a sinner, always a penitent, always righteous” (*Semper peccator, semer penitens, semper Iustus*) and its “in part sinners and

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<sup>107</sup> WA 56:442; AE 25:434-435.

The idea that one’s whole earthly life of faith is lived in penitence finds expression as the first of Luther’s 95 Theses and in *The Book of Concord* in Ap IV:142 (*Item fides illa, de qua loquimur, existit in poenitentia; Item, dieser Glaube ist in denen, da rechte Buße ist*; “The faith of which we are speaking, moreover, has its existence in penitence” [BKS, 188; Tappert, 126]; Ap IV:349 (*Haec fides, de qua loquimur, existit in poenitentia*; “The faith we speak of has its existence in penitence” [BKS, 227; Tappert, 160 (there is no German equivalent)]), and Ap IV:353 (*hanc fidem docemus in poenitentia existere et debere subinde crescere in poenitentia*; “this faith arises in penitence and ought to grow continually in penitence” [BKS, 227; Tappert, 161 (there is no German equivalent)]).

in part righteous” (*partim peccatores, partim Iusti*), leads directly to a fourth response to Ritschl and McGrath’s claims of discontinuity: that of complete justification and sanctification according to a person’s new, redeemed nature and renewed justification and in-process sanctification according to a person’s old, sinful nature. A classic expression of this daily struggle—and one both intended to be and in fact actually accessible to the ordinary Christian—is found in Luther’s Small Catechism treatment of Baptism.

Zum vierden.

Was bedeut denn solch Wassertäufen?

Antwort.

Es bedeut, daß der alte Adam in uns durch tägliche Reu und Buße soll ersäuft werden und sterben mit allen Sunden und bösen Lüsten, und wiederumb täglich erauskommen und auferstehen ein neuer Mensch, der in Gerechtigkeit und Reinigkeit für Gott ewiglich lebe.

Quartum.

Quid significat autem ista in aquam immersio? Responsio:

Significat, quod vetus Adam debet subinde per mortificationem ac poenitentiam in nobis submergi et extingui cum omnibus peccatis et malis concupiscentiis atque rursus quotidie emergere ac resurgere novus homo, qui in sanctitate et iustitia coram Deo vivat in aeternum.

Fourth

What does such baptizing with water signify?

Answer: It signifies that the old Adam in us, together with all sins and evil lusts, should be drowned by daily sorrow and repentance and be put to death, and that the new man should come forth daily and rise up, cleansed and righteous, to live forever in God’s presence.<sup>108</sup>

McGrath of course knows of Luther’s *simul justus et peccator* concept, referring to it as “*totus homo* [whole man] theology”, and elsewhere, perhaps more precisely, anthropology. McGrath claims that where Augustine, in a neo-Platonic fashion, understood *caro* (flesh) and *spiritus* (spirit) anthropologically, Luther understood them theologically.

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<sup>108</sup> SC IV:11-12, *BKS*, 516; Tappert, 349. For Biblical support of this answer, the next question and answer in the next two paragraphs cite Romans 6:4: “Therefore we are buried with him by baptism into death: that like as Christ was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father, even so we also should walk in newness of life” (KJV).

On an anthropological approach to the antithesis, *caro* is the ‘fleshly’, sensual or worldly side of man, whilst *spiritus* represents man’s higher nature, orientated towards striving towards God. For Luther, it is the whole man (*totus homo*) who serves the law of God and the law of sin at one and the same time, and who thus exists under a double servitude. The one and the same man is spiritual and carnal, righteous and a sinner, good and evil. It is on the basis of this anthropology that Luther bases his famous assertion that the believer is *iustus et peccator simul*.<sup>109</sup>

McGrath goes on to claim that according to this understanding the believer and unbeliever are distinguished on the basis of “the frame of reference from which the *totus homo* is viewed”: the believer is righteous before God (*coram Deo*) and the unbeliever before men (*coram hominibus*).<sup>110</sup>

But, McGrath misunderstands what Luther is saying. Luther and the other authors of *The Book of Concord* hold that from God’s perspective believers are fully redeemed and sanctified, while from their own perspectives they continue to struggle with sanctification. While the frame of reference is indeed central, *coram hominibus* is not necessarily only understood as one person before the eyes of other people, but *coram hominibus* is also understood as all people in their own eyes, as the English translation of the extended quotation McGrath gives makes clear, even giving the Latin term within the English text.<sup>111</sup>

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<sup>109</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §21, pp.198-199. For Luther’s position, McGrath cites from WA 56, Luther’s 1515-1516 scholia for lectures on Romans: 270<sub>9-11</sub> (on Ro 4:7, cf. AE 25:258<sub>28-31</sub>); 343<sub>16-23</sub> (on Ro 7:18, cf. AE 25:332<sub>4-13</sub>); 347<sub>2-11</sub> (on Ro 7:25, cf. AE 25:336<sub>1-18</sub>); 351<sub>23-352</sub><sub>7</sub> (on Ro 7:17, cf. AE 340<sub>28-341</sub><sub>1</sub>). The last citation is especially notable as Luther calls “silly and ridiculous” (*friolum et dehyriosum*) the “metaphysical theologians” (*Methaphysicorum theologorum*) who make philosophical distinctions between such things as spirit and sensuality.

For Augustine’s position and Luther’s departure from it, McGrath gives as an example Alois Schubert (*Augustins Lex-Aeterna-Lehre nach Inhalt und Quellen*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters: Texte und Untersuchungen [Münster: Aschendorff, 1924]) and refers to §4 of his book (in the 2<sup>nd</sup> ed., pages 32-34 are especially relevant, and there McGrath does provide citations from primary Augustine sources).

<sup>110</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §21, p.199, again citing WA 56, this time 268<sub>27-269</sub><sub>2</sub> (on Ro 4:7, cf. AE 25:257<sub>8-17</sub>) and 269<sub>25-30</sub> (on Ro 4:7, cf. AE 25:258<sub>9-17</sub>).

<sup>111</sup> To be sure, Luther is not locked into one sense or application of these two views. McGrath later presents evidence of what he calls Luther’s “two dimensions to justification” one by faith before God and the other evidenced by works before the world: “*Duplex in scripturis traditur iustificatio, altera fidei coram Deo, altera operum coram mundo*” (“A twofold justification is handed down in Scripture, one by faith before God, the other by works before the world”) (McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §21, p.204, citing WA

Sancti Intrinsic sunt peccatores semper, ideo extrinsece Iustificantur semper. Hypocrite autem intrinsic sunt Iusti semper, ideo extrinsece sunt peccatores semper. Intrinsic dico, i.e., quomodo in nobis, in nostris oculis, in nostra estimatione sumus, Extrinsic autem, quomodo apud Deum et in reputatione eius sumus. Igitur extrinsece sumus Iusti, quando non ex nobis ex nec operibus, Sed ex sola reputatione Iusti sumus.<sup>112</sup>

The saints are always sinners in their own sight, and therefore always justified outwardly.

But the hypocrites are always righteous in their own sight, and thus always sinners outwardly.

I use the term “inwardly” (*intrinsic*) to show how we are in ourselves, in our own eyes, in our own estimation; and the term “outwardly” (*extrinsic*) to indicate how we are before God and in His reckoning. Therefore we are righteous outwardly when we are righteous solely by the imputation of God and not of ourselves or of our own works. For His imputation is not ours by reason of anything in us or in our own power.<sup>113</sup>

McGrath makes much of an alleged difference in Luther between intrinsic and extrinsic justification, but McGrath fails to understand as Luther himself explains it here and elsewhere.<sup>114</sup> Moreover, the internal struggle between the redeemed nature and sinful nature does not take place in the unbeliever, so the distinction in view that McGrath applies to the unbeliever is an application Luther is unwilling to make, as Luther himself

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39<sup>1</sup>:208<sup>9-10</sup>, the 1536 *Disputation on Justification*, Aland #355, which is not found in the AE; this author’s translation).

<sup>112</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §21, p.199, citing WA 56: 268<sup>27</sup>-269<sup>2</sup>. As with most extended quotations in the 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. of his book, McGrath leaves the quote untranslated.

<sup>113</sup> AE 25:257<sup>8-17</sup>.

<sup>114</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §21, p.201, where McGrath writes: “Luther is able to assert at one and the same time that the righteousness of the believer is, and will remain, extrinsic to him, whilst Christ is nonetheless really present within the believer, effecting his renovation and regeneration.” McGrath cites as an example WA 56:279<sup>22</sup>, but McGrath again misrepresents what Luther is saying (and note the use of 1 Co 1:30): “Therefore, I was correct when I said that all our good is outside of us, and this good is Christ, as the apostle says (1 Cor. 1:30): ‘God made Him our wisdom, our righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption.’ And none of these things are in us except through faith and hope in Him.” (WA 56:279<sup>22-25</sup>: *Ideo Recte dixi, quod Extrinsecum nobis est omne bonum nostrum quod est Christus. Sicut Apostolus dicit: ‘Qui nobis factus est a Deo Sapientia est Iustitia et sanctificatio et redemptio.’ Quæ omnia in nobis sunt non nisi per fidem et spem in ipsum.*) What is outside of human beings is the ability to make themselves righteous, not the righteousness itself. Luther makes this point clear in a sentence immediately after where McGrath ends a previous quotation: “For His imputation is not ours by reason of anything in us or of our own works” (AE 25:257<sup>17-18</sup>; WA 56:269<sup>2-4</sup>: *Reputatio enim eius non in nobis nec in potestate nostra est. ergo nec Iustitia nostra in nobis est nec in potestate nostra*).

says in the continuation of a quotation from where McGrath leaves off.<sup>115</sup> Furthermore, McGrath's claim that Luther diverges from Augustine is refuted by McGrath's own evidence: Augustine could grant pagans who did their duties a civil righteousness of sorts in the eyes of human beings, but Augustine held the pagans would never be righteous in the eyes of God without faith. This continuity with Augustine, then can form a fifth response to McGrath's claim.

Related to the *simul justus et peccator* and what McGrath calls *totus homo* theology is justification understood forensically.<sup>116</sup> McGrath explains how he understands forensic justification:

The term 'forensic' derives from the Latin forum – the place in which judicial and other business was transacted – and in relation to the doctrine of justification, refers to a purely legal declaration that the sinner is righteous, *without or prior to* the concomitant actualization of righteousness in the sinner.<sup>117</sup>

While such an understanding may be McGrath's, such an understanding is not that of *The Book of Concord*, where justification is both forgiveness of sins and the accompanying change in the sinner. One example of that understanding is in Apology IV:76-78:

Consequi remissionem peccatorum est iustificari iuxta illud: Beati, quorum remissae sunt iniquitates. Sola fide in Christum, non per dilectionem, non propter dilectionem aut opera consequimur remissionem peccatorum, etsi dilectio sequitur fidem. Igitur sola fide iustificamur, intelligendo iustificationem, ex iniusto iustum effici seu regenerari.

Vergebung der Sünde erlangen und haben, dasselbige heißt für Gott gerecht und fromm werden, wie der 31. Psalm sagt: „Wohl dem, dem die Übertretung vergeben ist. Allein aber durch den Glauben an Christum“, nicht durch die Liebe, nicht um der Liebe oder Werk willen, erlangen wir Vergebung der Sünde, wiewohl die Liebe folget, wo der Glaub ist, Derhalben muß folgen, daß wir allein durch den Glauben gerecht werden.

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<sup>115</sup> Luther writes: “But this applies in no way to the carnal man, where the whole man is entirely flesh, because the Spirit of God has not remained in him” (AE 25:332<sub>13-15</sub>; WA 56:343<sub>23-25</sub>: *Hęc autem in Carnali homine nequaquam habent locum, Vbi omnino totus homo caro est, quia non permansit in eo spiritus Dei*).

<sup>116</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §22, p.209: “Luther's extrinsic conception of justifying righteousness is partly a consequence of his *totus homo* anthropology ... For Luther, what is being stated is that the believer is *extrinsically righteous* and *intrinsically sinful*” (emphasis McGrath's).

<sup>117</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §22 n.9, p.456. (emphasis McGrath's). A more detailed discussion of the much debated origins of the terminology related to justification is outside the scope of this dissertation.

Denn gerecht werden heißt ja aus einem Sünder fromm werden und durch den heiligen Geist neu geboren werden.

First, forgiveness of sins is the same as justification according to Ps. 32, 1, “Blessed is he whose transgression is forgiven.” We obtain the forgiveness of sins only by faith in Christ, not through love, or because of love or works, though love does follow faith. Therefore we are justified by faith alone, justification being understood as making an unrighteous man righteous or effecting his regeneration.<sup>118</sup>

McGrath knows of and even cites this statement in the Apology, but, McGrath claims the Apology and its author Melanchthon are ambiguous, pointing to Apology IV:252 as an example of a contradictory statement.<sup>119</sup>

Et iustificari significat hic non ex impio iustum effici, sed usu forensi iustum pronuntiari.

“To be justified” here does not mean that a wicked man is made righteous but that he is pronounced righteous in a forensic way,<sup>120</sup>

What McGrath seems to miss, however, is that in this latter statement Melanchthon is referring specifically to arguments their opponents made on the basis of James 2:24.<sup>121</sup> Melanchthon responds that in the James 2:24 passage the person who has believed and produced good works as a result of that faith is pronounced righteous and that James describes “only the nature of the just who have already been justified and reborn” (*quales sint iusti, postquam iam sunt iustificati et renati*).<sup>122</sup> Following the explanation of the sense or justification in James 2:24, another Bible passage where the meaning of justification is the same, Romans 2:13, is adduced, and Melanchthon then rejects the opponents’ conclusions that do not follow (“*Non enim sequitur*”) from James’ words.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>118</sup> Ap IV:76-78, *BKS*, 175; Tappert, 117.

<sup>119</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §22, p.212., see especially at his notes 30 and 28 (p.457), respectively.

<sup>120</sup> Ap IV:252, *BKS*, 209; Tappert, 143. That there is no direct German equivalent may even speak to the contradictory nature of the statement at first glance.

<sup>121</sup> Ap IV:244. James 2:24: ὁρᾶτε ὅτι ἐξ ἔργων δικαιοῦται ἄνθρωπος καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πίστεως μόνον (NA26); videtis quoniam ex operibus iustificatur homo et non ex fide tantum (Vulgate); So sehet ihr nun, daß der Mensch durch die Werke gerecht wird, nicht durch den Glauben allein (Luther Bibel); “Ye see then how that by works a man is justified, and not by faith only” (KJV).

<sup>122</sup> Ap IV:245-251. The quoted words are from ¶251, *BKS*, 209; Tappert, 143.

<sup>123</sup> Ap IV:252-253. The quoted phrase is in ¶253, *BKS*, 210. The German version does not directly translate the Latin at this point, but the German version does use rhetorically a repeated phrase making clear what cannot be drawn from the James passage: James *sagt nicht* (“does not say”).

Later in the Apology, in connection with Romans 5:1, Melancthon makes the following comment pertinent to what is meant by forensic justification.

Iustificare vero hoc loco forensi consuetudine significat reum absolvere et pronuntiare iustum, sed propter alienam iustitiam, videlicet Christi, quae aliena iustitia communicatur nobis per fidem. Itaque quum hoc loco iustitia nostra sit imputatio alienae iustitiae, aliter hic de iustitia loquendum est, quam cum in philosophia aut in foro quaerimus iustitiam proprii operis, quae certe est in voluntate. Ideo Paulus inquit 1 Cor. 1.: Ex ipso vos estis in Christo Iesu, qui factus est nobis sapientia a Deo, iustitia et sanctificatio et redemptio. Et 2 Cor. 5.: Eum, qui non novit peccatum, pro nobis fecit peccatum, ut nos efficeremur iustitia Dei in ipso. Sed quia iustitia Christi donatur nobis per fidem, ideo fides est iustitia in nobis imputative, id est, est id, quo efficimur accepti Deo propter imputationem et ordinationem Dei, sicut Paulus ait: Fides imputatur ad iustitiam.

In this passage “justify” is used in a judicial way to mean “to absolve a guilty man and pronounce him righteous,” and to do so on account of someone else’s righteousness, namely, Christ’s, which is communicated to us through faith. Since in this passage our righteousness is the imputation of someone else’s righteousness, we must speak of righteousness in a different way here from the philosophical or judicial investigation of a man’s own righteousness, which certainly resides in the will. Paul says (I Cor. 1:30), “He is the source of your life in Jesus Christ, whom God made our wisdom, our righteousness and sanctification and Redemption.” And II Cor. 5:21, “For our sake he made him to be sin who knew no sin, that in him we might become the righteousness of God.” But because the righteousness of Christ is given us through faith, therefore faith is righteousness in us by imputation. That is, by it we are made acceptable to God because of God’s imputation and ordinance of God, as Paul says (Rom. 4:5), “Faith is reckoned as righteousness.”<sup>124</sup>

Thus, McGrath tries to take the sense of justification used in one place in Apology IV and play it off a much more general sense used more consistently throughout Apology IV. To be sure, in regards to justification *The Book of Concord* uses a number of expressions with some degree of synonymy. As others have noted in other contexts, Apology IV is not trying to set out a systematic treatment of justification with precisely defined and used terms but rather to set forth a treatment of justification through faith by grace for the

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<sup>124</sup> Ap IV:305-307, BKS, 219; Tappert, 154. Again, there is no German equivalent. Aside from Ap IV:252 and 305, the only other four uses of *forensis*, *forensis* in *The Book of Concord*: come in LC I:53, 257, 261, and 301, where Luther refers to misusing God’s name in court, not bearing false witness in court, and coveting as exemplified in suits in court.

sake of Christ. The forensic sense of justification is not limited to those places noted above where the sense is said to be forensic nor is the sense of justification as used throughout only forensic. Courtroom illustrations serve some role in elucidating justification, but they are not the exclusive illustration. Moreover, there is a significant difference between human verdicts and verdicts of God: God speaks efficacious words that recreate. Thus, the Lutheran understanding of justification includes, contrary to what Ritschl and McGrath claim, a real change in the sinner.<sup>125</sup>

A sixth response to McGrath's claim of discontinuity pertains to the similarity between the concept of double righteousness and the Reformation's conceptual distinction between reckoned and inchoate righteousness. McGrath finds medieval evidence both of *iustitia infusa* (infused righteousness) or *iustitia inhaerens* (inherent righteousness), which provides the basis for justification (its "formal cause"), and of *iustitia acquisita* (acquired righteousness), which is subsequently established.<sup>126</sup> As has been seen above, the Formula of Concord confesses both first "the reckoned righteousness of faith" (*die zugerechnete Gerechtigkeit des Glaubens; imputatam fidei iustitiam*) as the basis for standing before God justified and second "the inchoate righteousness of the new obedience or of good works" (*die angefangene Gerechtigkeit des neuen Gehorsams oder der guten Werk; inchoatam iustitiam novae obedientiae seu bonorum operum*), which "inchoate righteousness or renewal in us is imperfect and impure in this life on account of the flesh" (*angefangene Gerechtigkeit oder Verneuerung in uns von wegen des Fleisches in diesem Leben unvollkommen und unrein; inchoata illa*

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<sup>125</sup> For more on the equation and use of terminology pertaining to justification, see, for example, Schlink, *Theology of the Lutheran Confessions*. Schlink's treatment of justification's terminology deals with some of the same secondary sources as McGrath's, and Schlink can also be colorful, as seen in this statement: "Forgiveness of sins and justification are not only repeatedly used side by side, but they are also interchanged promiscuously" (Schlink, *Theology of the Lutheran Confessions*, 91).

There is also a decidedly anti-philosophical aspect of calling a person righteous before they have done righteous works. In his 1531 lecture on Galatians 3:11 (published in 1535), Luther discusses that issue and specifically contrasts his position to Aristotle's. The AE editors suggest perhaps the reference is to *Politics* VIII:6, but that does not appear to be the case (see WA 40<sup>1</sup>:402; Aland #229; AE 26:256; and Barnes, II:2126-2128).

<sup>126</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §25, pp.245-247. According to McGrath, the Council of Trent would later consider but reject making these two types of righteousness a double formal cause of justification (see §27).



*iustitia seu renovatio in nobis propter carnem in hac vita imperfecta sit et impura*) and therefore cannot be the basis of justification.<sup>127</sup> While, the Formula's confessors will not allow these two righteousnesses to "be confused with one another or introduced simultaneously into the article of justification by faith before God" (*müssen nicht ineinandergemengt oder zugleich ... eingeschoben werden; non inter se permiscenda aut simul ... ingerenda sunt*), the distinction between the two and the distinction's medieval background in double righteousness nevertheless further demonstrates the continuity of the distinction between justification and sanctification.<sup>128</sup>

Seventh and finally, even if one grants that the distinction made is some sort of an innovation, one can counter that the circumstances of the controversy necessitated the distinction. McGrath himself notes the role of controversy in shaping at least the expression of the doctrine of justification:

For the first three hundred and fifty years of the history of the church, her teaching on justification was inchoate and ill-defined. There had never been a serious controversy over the matter, such as those which had so stimulated the development of Christology over the period. The patristic inexactitude and naïveté on the question merely reflects the absence of a controversy which would force more precise definition of the terms used.<sup>129</sup>

If controversy could force terminological precision at the end of the patristic period, why are controversy-forced refinements in terminology at the end of the medieval period questioned? The justification-sanctification distinction is precisely one born of the controversy over the role of good works in God's declaring and making the sinner righteous. McGrath himself notes the role of polemics in clarifying important points

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<sup>127</sup> SD III:32, Tappert, 544-545; *BKS*, 925. As has been seen, the *BOC* also makes it clear such inchoate righteousness is only pleasing to God on account of faith.

<sup>128</sup> Furthermore, McGrath notes a similarity between the Council of Trent's concept of second justification and the Reformers' concept of sanctification (McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §28, p.271).

<sup>129</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, §3, p.23.

during the 1530s.<sup>130</sup> And, even Ritschl, as noted above, sees the Reformation's expression of this distinction a logical outgrowth of medieval thought.<sup>131</sup>

Thus, we see both that the authors of the writings in *The Book of Concord* consistently make—and thus *The Book of Concord* itself consistently makes—a logical distinction between justification in the narrow sense and sanctification in the narrow sense and that that distinction has continuity with the preceding medieval tradition. In fact, evidence suggests that the nature of the distinction is that of a distinction usually attributed to John Duns Scotus and known as the “formal distinction”.

## **Justification and sanctification as “formally” distinct?**

The foregoing discussion showed that the Reformers do not separate justification and sanctification in practice; that lack of separation can be further seen to reflect justification's and sanctification's inseparability, a prerequisite for a type of formal distinction that may be in the Reformers' minds.<sup>132</sup> The Reformers explicitly state that they *do not* separate justification and sanctification as if true faith can exist with a wicked intention.<sup>133</sup> Furthermore, against their Roman Catholic opponents, the Reformers make clear that mortal sin drives out the Holy Spirit and faith, which faith otherwise brings about the believer's new life and good works.<sup>134</sup> In sharp contrast, moreover, the Reformers say their Roman Catholic opponents hold that, for people still in mortal sin, satisfactions nevertheless avail *ex opere operato* (“from the work having been done”), presumably apart from faith.<sup>135</sup> Thus, unlike their opponents, the Reformers do not envision the possibility of justification taking place without sanctification following as a result. In other words, justification and sanctification not only *are not* separated, but, if,

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<sup>130</sup> McGrath, *Iustitia Dei*, Introduction to §25, 241.

<sup>131</sup> See the quotation above at n.85, p.357. Confer Chung, who comments on the development of soteriology as the Roman Catholic church dealt with the rediscovery of Aristotle (Chung, “Luther's Exodus,” 211).

<sup>132</sup> Recall Luther's use of the expression *connexa inseparabiliter* in the Latin quotation used by SD III:40-41 that was paraphrased out of the authoritative German version (see above n.75, p.354).

<sup>133</sup> Ap IV:64, 115, 144; SA III:iii:43-45.

<sup>134</sup> Ap IV:48, 109.

<sup>135</sup> Ap XII:118, 132, 143, 165.

as the Reformers hold, mortal sin drives out the Holy Spirit and faith that justify and thereby bring about sanctification's new life and good works, then the Reformers can be taken to hold that justification and sanctification *cannot* be separated. The distinction between justification and sanctification may well then be understood as an example of the kind of formal distinction made by John Duns Scotus (and perhaps to a lesser extent by William Ockham).<sup>136</sup>

Before considering whether or not the justification-sanctification distinction is such a formal distinction, Scotus's formal distinction itself must be considered, its transmission through Ockham observed, and the Reformers' regard for Scotus and the formal distinction surveyed.<sup>137</sup>

### ***The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus***

Scotus may well be "the most powerful and unrestricted defender" of the formal distinction, but the notion is not his alone.<sup>138</sup> One viewing the world can somewhat

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<sup>136</sup> Credit for raising this possibility goes to Dr. Robert C. Koons, Professor of Philosophy, at the University of Texas at Austin.

<sup>137</sup> The potential relationship between philosophy and the justification-sanctification distinction is not necessarily a new idea. In writing about English reformer Thomas Cranmer (1489-1556), McGee said, "Where [Stephen] Gardiner [Bishop of Winchester, a principal Cranmer Roman Catholic opponent] and the Catholics held that man's justification was also his sanctification, that faith and glory were identical, and that good works set forth God's glory, the Protestants and Nominalists divided the two" (Eugene K. McGee, "Cranmer and Nominalism," *The Harvard Theological Review* 57.3 [1964]: 211). At that point, McGee cites the following sources: Lacey Baldwin Smith, *Tudor Prelates and Politics, 1536-1558*, Princeton University Princeton Studies in History (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1953), 194; Hubert Jedin, *A History of the Council of Trent*, trans. Ernest Graf, 2 vols. (London: Nelson, 1957-1961), I:167-169; and *Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique*, eds. Alfred Vacant, Eugène Mangenot and Emile Amann, 15 vols. (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1908-1950), coll. 775-775. However, none of those sources seem to support his claim (and at least one might be construed against it). Courtenay, who produced a thoroughgoing trashing of McGee's article, wrote: "For the Nominalists there is no distinction between justification and sanctification" (William J. Courtenay, "Cranmer as a Nominalist: Sed Contra," *The Harvard Theological Review* 57.4 [1964]: 379). Courtenay cited Oberman, *Harvest of Medieval Theology*, 353ff. On those pages (353-356), Oberman discusses the mischaracterization of "the nominalistic doctrine of justification" as "essentially forensic", denying that for the nominalists "acceptation by God" could be equated to the "*favor dei* of later Protestant orthodoxy". Oberman says that *in Biel* he "found no trace of a distinction between justification and sanctification", although Oberman recognized that Biel understood justification as a process.

<sup>138</sup> Philotheus Boehner, "The Medieval Crisis of Logic and the Author of the *Centiloquium* Attributed to Ockham," *Franciscan Studies* 25 (1944): 163. Boehner cites Bernhard Jansen, "Beiträge zur geschichtlichen Entwicklung der *Distinctio formalis*," *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 53 (1929):

obviously distinguish natural things existing in reality, and one's mind creates other distinctions on the basis of logic. Those two types of distinctions, however, seemed to lack the sophistication to make all the needed distinctions. So, in some cases modifications were made to the real and logical distinctions, and in other cases a third type of distinction, generally known as a *distinctio formalis* ("formal distinction"), came to be developed.<sup>139</sup> The most-debated alternatives were the so-called "virtual distinction" of Thomas Aquinas and Scotus's "formal distinction". Some thought the virtual and formal distinctions to be identical (among them were those who explained where the two contradicted), and others said the formal distinction restated the real distinction, therefore arguing against it on the basis of history, ontology, and theology.<sup>140</sup> Most would probably agree today that the virtual and formal distinctions are different; some would claim that Scotus's formal distinction is an innovation, but others, such as Maurice Grajewski, recognize such a distinction "at the core of the medieval Augustinian system".<sup>141</sup> For his part, Grajewski's seminal study traces its roots in Scotus's own work from Aristotle through Augustine (354-430) and other church fathers, Bonaventure (1221-1274), Peter John Olivi (1248/9-1298), Peter de Falco (c.1280), Peter de Trabibus (c.1290), and William of Ware (c.1290, one of Scotus's own teachers at Oxford), Matthew of Aquasparta (1240-1302), William of Macclesfield (c.1303), Roger Marston (c.1303), Alexander of Alexandria (1270-1314), William of Nottingham (c.1336), and others. However, where others had variously written of or used a formal distinction, Grajewski

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371ff. Confer Michael Jordan, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?" Franciscan Studies 45 (1985): 98-99.

<sup>139</sup> For an overview of this thinking, see Maurice John Grajewski, The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus: A Study in Metaphysics, The Catholic University of America Philosophical Series, vol. XC (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1944), xi-xii.

<sup>140</sup> Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 1-22. Scotus can be taken to have developed his formal distinction in order to address the weaknesses of Thomas Aquinas's virtual distinction (Maurice John Grajewski, "The Formal Distinction of Duns Scotus and Its Philosophic Applications," The Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 20 [1945]: 146-148).

<sup>141</sup> Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 102-103. Generally with Grajewski, confer Allan B. Wolter, "The Formal Distinction," John Duns Scotus, 1265-1965, eds. John Kenneth Ryan and Bernardine M. Bonansea, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1965).

wrote that Scotus perfected it, organized it, and made it “one of the foundations of his entire metaphysics.”<sup>142</sup>

What is Scotus’s formal distinction? Peter King introduced it as follows: “The core intuition behind Scotus’s formal distinction is, roughly, that existential inseparability does not entail identity in definition, backed up by the conviction that this is a fact about the way things are rather than how we conceive of them.”<sup>143</sup> King says the distinction is in a broad sense “real” because a person’s intellect does not cause the distinction, although the intellect may discover the *rationes* (or definitions) that are distinct.<sup>144</sup> A leading contemporary Scotus scholar, Richard Cross, explains that Scotus’s formal distinction is “mid-way between a real distinction and a merely rational or conceptual distinction” and applies to two realities or different aspects of one thing “if and only if they are both really identical and susceptible of definition independently of each other”.<sup>145</sup> Scotus measured real identity by real inseparability; put another way, real inseparability, the logical impossibility of separating two or more realities, “is necessary and sufficient for real identity”.<sup>146</sup> Although the formal distinction came out of Scotus’

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<sup>142</sup> Grajewski, *Study in Metaphysics*, 103-123. Swindler seems to trace Scotus’s distinction back to Avicenna, seemingly arguing also that Aristotle in *Categories* I can be taken as understanding there to be a secondary substance that is not a property of an individual but nevertheless present in an individual. Swindler reports a perception of “vacillation in Aristotle and Scotus”, evident in the term “formal distinction” itself. (J. K. Swindler, “The Formal Distinction,” *Southwest Philosophy Review* 4.1 [1988]: 71-72). On Scotus not introducing the formal distinction, also confer Boehner, “Medieval Crisis of Logic,” 163, and Jordan, “What’s new in Ockham’s formal distinction?” 98-99.

<sup>143</sup> Peter King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 22. King primarily refers to *Lectura (Lect.)*. 1, distinction (d.) 8, pars 1, question (q.) 4, paragraph numbers (nn.) 172-88; *Ordinatio (Ord.)*. 1, d. 2, pars 2, qq. 1-4, nn. 388-410, and d.8, pars 1, q. 4, nn.191-217.

<sup>144</sup> King, “Scotus on Metaphysics,” 22. King quotes *Ord.* 1, d. 8, pars 1, q. 4, n. 193; and he refers further to d. 25, q. un., n. 10, and *Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis (In Metaph.)* 7, q. 13, nn. 90-1.

<sup>145</sup> Richard Cross, *Duns Scotus*, Great Medieval Thinkers, ed. Brian Davies (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 149. In Cross’s n.13, he refers “usefully” to *Ord.* 1.8.1.4, n. 193. For his part, Grajewski objects to describing the formal distinction as “a middle distinction between the real and logical” (Grajewski, “Philosophic Applications,” 146 ).

<sup>146</sup> Cross, *Duns Scotus* 149. In Cross’s n.14, he refers “particularly” to *Quaestiones Quodlibetales (Quod.)* 3. n. 15 and *Ord.* 2.1.4-5.

work on the Trinity,<sup>147</sup> Scotus found occasion to apply this formal distinction in discussions of both God and humanity.<sup>148</sup>

Grajewski groups Scotus' applications of the formal distinction into three categories.<sup>149</sup> First, Scotus uses the formal distinction in metaphysics, applying it as follows: to the transcendentals (distinguishing between convertible and non-convertible transcendentals),<sup>150</sup> to grades of being (such as animality and rationality), to the universals and the common nature,<sup>151</sup> and to individuation and *haecceitas* ("thisness").<sup>152</sup> Second, Scotus uses the formal distinction in what Grajewski calls "psychology", applying it to soul and its faculties.<sup>153</sup> Third and finally, Scotus uses the formal

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<sup>147</sup> Grajewski, "Philosophic Applications," 155. Oberman says, "Scotus' idea of the formal distinction apparently had its origin in the problem of man's knowledge of God" (Heiko A. Oberman, "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance," The Harvard Theological Review 53 [1960]: 50). Confer also Robert G. Wengert, "The Development of the Doctrine of the Formal Distinction in the *Lectura Prima* of John Duns Scotus," Monist 49 (1965).

<sup>148</sup> Cross, Duns Scotus, 147. Confer Richard Cross, Duns Scotus on God, Ashgate Studies in the History of Philosophical Theology (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2005), 107-111, 154, 235-240.

<sup>149</sup> Grajewski, Study in Metaphysics, 124-197. What follows in the text is a summary of Grajewski's treatment with some other writers' comments noted.

<sup>150</sup> According to Cross, the facts we can know about God apart from revelation are knowable through metaphysics, or what Scotus calls the study of "transcendentals", or things that go beyond the substantial and accidental attributes that can be predicated in keeping with Aristotle's *Categories*, such as "being" and its properties. Being has coextensive attributes, disjunctive attributes (such as cause or caused, prior or posterior), and pure perfections. (Cross, Duns Scotus, 147-148.) Cross cites Allan B. Wolter, The Transcendentals and their Function in the Metaphysics of Duns Scotus, Franciscan Institute Publications, Philosophy Series (St. Bonaventure, NY: The Franciscan Institute, 1946), 138-161.

<sup>151</sup> Adams writes: "The most striking feature of Scotus' theory of universals, however, is his contention that the common nature and individuating principles are neither really distinct – in the sense of being distinct real things – nor distinct only in reason – in the sense of being thought of by means of distinct concepts." (Marilyn McCord Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, eds. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982], 414.)

<sup>152</sup> On the formal distinctions relation to individuation, Cross refers to both n.15 *Ord.* 2.3.1.1, n. 32 and 2.3.1.5-6, nn. 179-80, 192 (Cross, Duns Scotus 149). On genus and differentia, also confer King, "Scotus on Metaphysics," 23, who cites *In Metaph.* 7, q. 19, nn. 20-1 and n. 43; *Lect.* 1, d. 8, pars 1, q. 3, nn. 100-5; *Ord.* 1, d. 8, pars 1, q.3, nn. 101-7, and 2, d. 3, pars 1, qq. 5-6, nn. 189-90.

Swindler suggests "the difference between properties and universals is the difference between the ways attention can be paid to them," and he goes on to suggest that only Scotus' formal distinction stands between a property and a universal (Swindler, "The Formal Distinction," 72, 76).

<sup>153</sup> Cross says the "formal distinction between the soul and its powers of intellect and will" is more or less against Aquinas (Cross, Duns Scotus 83-84; Cross cites *Ord.* 2.1.6, n. 316 [Vatican, 7:154]; and *Ord.* 2.16.un., nn. 15-16, 18 [Wadding, 6:770-771, 773]). Scotus apparently also can be taken as making a formal distinction between a person and his or her essence (Cross, Duns Scotus, 69, citing *Ord.* 1.2.2.1-4, n.388).

distinction in what this author would term “theology”, applying it as follows: to the divine essence and its attributes (both perfections—such as goodness, wisdom, and justice—and attributes),<sup>154</sup> to the divine essence and the Persons of the Trinity,<sup>155</sup> and to the Persons and their properties (such as paternity). Scotus’s applications of the formal distinction in these different areas were not without controversy then or now—controversies that may have refined Scotus’s position over time, which change thus led to claims that his position changed over time.

Scotus’s discussion of the formal distinction comes up in a number of his different complete and incomplete surviving works, which works can somewhat be placed on a timeline, although not all scholars agree on the chronology and Scotus no doubt later revisited some of the works and revised them. The first work relevant here is the *Lectura* (to which some refer as the *Lectura Prima*), consisting of notes Scotus used as a bachelor at Oxford for his lectures on Peter Lombard’s *Sentences*.<sup>156</sup> The second relevant work is the *Ordinatio* (to which some refer as *Opus Oxoniense*), a revision of the *Lectura* that Scotus prepared for publication, which revision itself underwent at least two major alterations, one at Oxford and one at Paris. The third relevant work (or, given the number, group of works) is the *Reportatio parisiensis*, or students’ reports of Scotus’s Paris lectures, including one report that Scotus himself examined (and presumably revised or approved).<sup>157</sup> Likely to be placed somewhere in the midst of the Paris revisions

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<sup>154</sup> Cross explains that for Scotus God’s essential attributes are formally distinct from each other and are instantiated by His essence but only formally distinct from it. Where Scotus’s univocity gives a weak account of divine simplicity, Aquinas’ stronger account of divine simplicity, which rejects distinctions between divine attributes, requires an analogous use of language and produces knowledge of what God is not. Cross, *Duns Scotus*, 43-45.

<sup>155</sup> Confer Cross, *Duns Scotus*, 69-70, 120-121; Richard Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), 12 n., 307-308. Cross does not find Scotus’ Trinitarian treatment “wholly satisfactory” (Cross, *Duns Scotus*, 69 ).

<sup>156</sup> The *Lectura* is said both to show progressively more sophisticated technical language, consistent with the more technical language found in the later *Ordinatio*, and, after the *Lectura*’s section about ultimate abstraction, to reflect the end of reservations Scotus apparently had about the formal distinction, at least at that time. Wengert, “Formal Distinction in the *Lectura Prima*”. On the sophistication of the language clarifying the distinction, confer Jordan, “What’s new in Ockham’s formal distinction?” 100.

<sup>157</sup> On the general sequence of Scotus’s life and works and related controversies over them, see Thomas Williams, “The Life and Works of John Duns the Scot,” *The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus*, ed. Thomas Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). Confer Allan B. Wolter,

of the *Ordinatio* is the *Quaestio logica Scoti*, a report of a special disputation given by Scotus in Paris over his applying the formal distinction to God.<sup>158</sup>

Scotus's applying the formal distinction to God was controversial, and, some writers think the controversy led Scotus to change his position over time, as previously mentioned. Marilyn Adams is one writer who addresses Scotus's "at least two importantly different accounts of this alternative sort of non-identity or distinction, which he employs so often in his philosophy and theology." Adams explains Scotus's earlier first version thusly: "within what is really one and the same thing (*res*) there often is a plurality of entities or property-bearers whose non-identity or distinction in no way depends upon the activity of any intellect, created or divine." According to Adams, Scotus's later second version, perhaps in response to the charge by opponents in Paris that Scotus's formal distinction applied to God compromised His divine simplicity, denied "distinguishing a plurality of property-bearers within what is really one and the same thing", while still contending for "the existence of some distinction in reality (*ex natura rei*) and prior to every act of the intellect, but alternative to the real distinction between one thing and another". Thus Scotus allows a distinction *secundum quid* ("according to which") contrasted to *distinctio simpliciter* (an absolute distinction). According to Adams, the *secundum quid* distinction applies when *x* and *y* exist only as objects of thought or exist "only virtually in their causes" or when "fully real and actual" they are "only non-identical *secundum quid*."<sup>159</sup>

Against Adams and others, Stephen Dumont says the view that Scotus later had a less-realist take on his formal distinction depends in part on problems with two texts. The

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"Reflections about Scotus's Early Works," *John Duns Scotus: Metaphysics and Ethics*, eds. Ludger Honnefelder, Rega Wood and Mechthild Dreyer, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters (New York: E.J. Brill, 1996).

<sup>158</sup> Stephen D. Dumont, "Duns Scotus's Parisian Question on the Formal Distinction," *Vivarium* 43.1 (2005).

<sup>159</sup> Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," 414-416. Among others, Adams cites, from the so-called *Reportatio examinata*, *Reportatio Parisiensis* 1, d. 33, q. 2.



first problem is reading a work of William of Alnwick as that of Scotus.<sup>160</sup> The second problem is Luke Wadding's "highly corrupt" edition of the *Quaestio logica Scoti*, an often-ignored genuine Scotus work as drawn from a fourteenth-century Vatican manuscript that appears in print as the first of seven questions (the other six of which are inauthentic), which Wadding titles *Quaestiones miscellaneae de formalitatibus*. According to Dumont, the work also exists in seven other manuscripts that help clear up Wadding's misreadings and errant emendations. After extensive textual analysis of the work, Dumont essentially agrees with Michael J. Jordan and Christopher J. Martin that Scotus later simply clarified his position, perhaps in response to his Parisian opponents. Dumont concludes that Scotus, who uses terminology from Aristotle's *Topics* 2.11 (115<sup>b</sup>29-30) along the way, does not in fact later rule out the existence of "formalities" ("realities" or "entities"), even in the case of the Trinity, provided the formalities are given a qualified non-identity, or, put another way, provided that the formal distinction itself is qualified.<sup>161</sup>

### ***Scotus's distinction through Ockham***

Modern scholars are not the only ones to wrestle with interpreting Scotus's formal distinction. Attention now turns to William of Ockham, who stands in the line of Luther's teachers and to whom is attributed differing positions regarding Scotus's formal distinction. Ockham is said to be the first and most important critic of Scotus's formal distinction.<sup>162</sup> Ockham regarded distinguishing nature and a contracting difference to be an ontological paradox, and he thought that, taken together, five of Scotus's theses regarding the formal distinction were contradictory.<sup>163</sup> Still, Ockham allowed that faith

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<sup>160</sup> For her part, Adams is aware of the problem with the Alnwick's work and says she is reading from a manuscript of the *Reportatio* that Scotus himself revised Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," 416 n.20.

<sup>161</sup> Dumont, "Parisian Question." Confer Jordan, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?" 99-100. Jordan also sees Scotus shifting attention between "the type of subject *in which* the formal distinction occurs" and "the types of subjects *between which* the formal distinction occurs" (Jordan, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?" 100).

<sup>162</sup> Jordan, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?" 102.

<sup>163</sup> Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," 417-422. On the surrender of the principle of contradiction, confer Jordan, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?" 103-104. Oberman

could call for making a formal distinction in the theological realm.<sup>164</sup> While Ockham and the nominalists did not distinguish between God's will and His intellect,<sup>165</sup> at least Ockham accepted Scotus's formal distinction (or "formal non-identity") between the three Persons of the Trinity and their shared divine essence.<sup>166</sup>

Not everyone, however, who accepts that Ockham made a formal distinction agrees that that formal distinction was Scotus's.<sup>167</sup> There are said to be different schools of thought on the relationship between the formal distinctions of Scotus and Ockham, with Marilyn Adams holding that their formal distinctions are very different and with Philotheus Boehner and Hester Gelber holding that they are essentially the same but applied differently. Michael Jordan says Ockham's theory did not differ so much from Scotus's theory but that Ockham, perhaps because he did not fully observe Scotus's shifts in vantage points, had trouble transferring it to his own ontology. Jordan concludes that Ockham's formal distinction can be criticized the same way that Ockham criticized Scotus's distinction and that, unlike Scotus who used the distinction to explain individuation and the faculties of the soul, Ockham will only apply the distinction to the

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wrote that Ockham criticizes not the distinction itself but its incomplete application (Oberman, "Notes on the Theology of Nominalism"). On Ockham regarding Scotus's particular applications, see also Jordan, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?" 104-105.

<sup>164</sup> Jordan, "What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?" 105-106, 110.

<sup>165</sup> Courtenay, "Cranmer as a Nominalist: Sed Contra," 378.

<sup>166</sup> Russell L. Friedman, "Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology," The Medieval Heritage in Early Modern Metaphysics and Modal Theory: 1400-1700, eds. Russell L. Friedman and Lauge O. Nielsen, The New Synthese Historical Library: Texts and Studies in the History of Philosophy (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003), 113.

<sup>167</sup> Out of the vast literature regarding the formal distinction, Scotus, and Ockham, Friedman refers to the following studies as valuable: Wolter, "The Formal Distinction"; Hester G. Gelber, "Logic and the Trinity: A Clash of Values in Scholastic Thought, 1300-1335," University of Wisconsin - Madison, 1974; Marilyn McCord Adams, "Ockham on Identity and Distinction," Franciscan Studies 36 (1976); Marilyn McCord Adams, William Ockham, 2 vols. (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988); Rolf Schönberger, "Realität und Differenz: Ockhams Kritik an der distinctio formalis," Die Gegenwart Ockhams, eds. Wilhelm Vossenkuhl and Rolf Schönberger, Acta Humaniora (Weinheim: VCH Verlagsgesellschaft 1990); and Timothy B. Noone, "Alnwick on the Origin, Nature, and Function of the Formal Distinction," Franciscan Studies 53 (1993). (Friedman, "Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology," 113 n.24.)

Trinity in order to reaffirm its mystery.<sup>168</sup> There were certainly other options from which Ockham could choose.<sup>169</sup>

### ***The Reformers' regard for Scotus and the formal distinction***

The Reformers likewise had all of the philosophy and theology of the preceding medieval period that was known to them from which to choose, and there is evidence that the authors of the earlier works in *The Book of Concord* (and thus presumably the authors of the later works, as well) knew of and may have used Scotus's or another's formal distinction in their theology. Although neither the earlier nor later works contained in *The Book of Concord* make any specific mention of the formal distinction by name, there is evidence inside *The Book of Concord* and in other works of its authors that the formal distinction may nevertheless be in use. Thus, several works outside *The Book of Concord* from two of its relevant writers are briefly surveyed in the following subsections, beginning with Luther and Melancthon and proceeding to Chemnitz. Works taken up include some pertaining to the Trinity, one of the traditional *loci* for the formal distinction, as well as those pertaining to justification—the latter especially to see if there is evidence of a “formal” justification-sanctification distinction.

### **Martin Luther**

Secondary literature might lead one to expect Martin Luther, following Biel following Ockham, to accept a Scotus-like formal distinction at the *locus* of the Trinity.<sup>170</sup> Indeed, Luther's opposition to Ockham certainly seems to have centered more

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<sup>168</sup> Jordan, “What's new in Ockham's formal distinction?” For more on Scotus, Ockham, and Luther regarding God and creatures, see Klaus Bannach, “Relationen: Ihre Theorie in der spatmittelalterlichen Theologie und bei Luther,” *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie* 47.1-2 (2000).

<sup>169</sup> Scotus' moderate realism was not the only one at the time of Ockham: Walter Burley had a position in some ways similar with that of Scotus, but it was rejected by Ockham and Henry of Harclay, and, not surprisingly, Ockham and Burley attacked Harclay's position, and Ockham's position was criticized by Walter Chatton (Adams, “Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century,” 422-439 ). Walter Chatton is said to have defended Scotus against Ockham, at least in part on the basis of the *Logica Scoti* (Dumont, “Parisian Question,” 18-22).

<sup>170</sup> Friedman points out that Biel followed Ockham in his “late Franciscan style Trinitarian theology”, and, after his study and those of others, he suggests that Luther may have similarly followed Biel (Friedman, “Gabriel Biel and Later-Medieval Trinitarian Theology,” 109-119 ).

on the anthropology in his theology than on the epistemology and other aspects of his philosophy.<sup>171</sup> However, when Luther's works are examined for specific mentions of the *distinctio formalis* ("formal distinction"), one finds results suggesting Luther may have disagreed with Ockham on the application of a formal distinction at the *locus* of the Trinity.<sup>172</sup> The consideration of Luther in this subsection treats in chronological order Luther's specific mentions of *distinctio formalis* in a Psalm commentary, a Luther thesis that targets Scotus, and a significant letter Luther sent regarding Scotus' inclusion in the Wittenberg University curriculum.

In commenting on Psalm 66:17 ("I cried to Him with my mouth") as part of his 1513-1515 Psalm lectures, Luther says theologians, including himself, irreverently mention God's name arguing about things like the Trinity. Then he says, *de distinctione formali et reali sicut sutor de corio suo disputat* ("We argue about the formal and real distinction the way a cobbler argues about his leather").<sup>173</sup> Luther goes on, referring to proceeding *per nostra subtilitates in temeritate* ("foolhardily through our subtleties"), to having learned from Aristotle how to argue *loquaciter et audacter* ("verbosely and boldly"), and to hating the bold opinions *Thomistarum, Scotistarum et aliorum* ("of the Thomists, Scotists, and others"). Thus, Luther in this place of 1513-1515 does not appear to be a fan of the Scotist subtlety of the formal distinction, at least not in so far as it contributes to irreverent arguments about God.

Before October of 1517's more-famous 95 Theses for the Disputation on the Power and Efficacy of Indulgences, there were in September of 1517 the lesser-known 97 Theses for the Disputation against Scholastic Theology. The Disputation as a whole defends Augustine's views regarding the will against the "Pelagian tendencies" of others.<sup>174</sup> In four of the theses—specifically theses 6, 10, 13, and 19—Luther specifically targets Scotus. Singled out are positions that *voluntas possit se conformare dictamini*

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<sup>171</sup> See, for example, Chung, "Luther's Exodus."

<sup>172</sup> Thanks go to Michael Hayes and Reference Services at Concordia Seminary Library, St. Louis, Missouri, for conducting a search of the electronic version of the Weimar Edition of Luther's works for *distinctio formalis* in the various declensions.

<sup>173</sup> WA 3:382 (confer WA 55:353); Aland #593; AE 10:322, tr. Herbert J. A. Bouman.

<sup>174</sup> Gerrish, *Grace and Reason*, 95-96.

*recto naturaliter* (“the will can by nature conform to correct precept”); *voluntas ... est libera ad tendendum in quodlibet secundum rationem boni sibi ostensum* (“the will is ... free to strive toward whatever is declared good”), *homo errans potest diligere creaturam super omnia, ergo et deum* (“erring man can love the creature above all things, therefore also God”), and *de forti politico rempublicam plusquam seipsum diligente* (“concerning the brave citizen who loves his country more than himself”).<sup>175</sup> Such ideas led Luther to make other specific and more-general negative statements about Scotus, although not every single reference is negative.<sup>176</sup>

Another of the specific, negative Luther-references to Scotus is found in a December 9, 1518, letter Luther wrote to George Spalatin, seeking his approval to substitute in the Wittenberg University curriculum a course in Ovid for courses in Thomistic studies. In the letter, Luther wrote how he also expected that eventually the Scotus studies would be eliminated also.

Salutem. Convenit inter dominum Rectorem & me, Mi Georgi, de lectionibus bonum videri, ut non modo Physica Thomistica caderet, quam nunc deserit Magister Gunckel, succedens textuali lectioni D. Rectoris, verum ut rueret quoque logica Thomistica, quam profitetur Magister preßel Torgensis, ut pro ea Ovidium Metamorphosiacum legeret idem Magister, cum in literis humanitatis non parum valeat. Nam Scotisticam philosophiam & logicam cum textuali physica & logica sufficere putamus, donec & Scotiticę sectę, ęque inutilis ac infelicis ingeniorum negotii, cadat profession, si quo modo tandem dissidiorum nomina funditus pereant & pura philosophia & Theologia omnesque Matheses in fontibus suis hauriantur. Tuum in hac re audiamus Consilium. Vale Altera Conceptionis die 1518.

F. Martinus Eleutherius

Greetings. The President [Bartholomew Bernhardi] and I agreed, my George, on several things concerning the curriculum: it seems to be good not only to eliminate the course on Thomistic *Physics* (which is now being dropped by Master Gunckel, who is taking over the President’s reading

<sup>175</sup> WA 1:224-225 (Aland #263); AE 31:224-225, tr. Harold J. Grimm.

<sup>176</sup> In the American Edition of *Luther’s Works*, there are some 36 references to Scotus made by Luther and the editors (who note when Luther might be targeting Scotus under various labels such as “modernists”, “newer doctors”, “our theologians”, or “subtle theologians”). Less than a handful of these references to Scotus could be regarded as in any sense positive, and even those are really only relative to other scholastic theologians, such as Thomas Aquinas. That Luther may have thought Scotus to be a little better than Aquinas is still not really saying anything positive.

course), but also to eliminate the course on Thomistic logic, which is now taught by Master Premsel from Torgau. Instead the same master is to lecture on Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, since he is well qualified to teach classical literature. For we consider the course on Scotistic philosophy and logic, together with the reading course in [Aristotle's] *Physics* and logic, to be enough until such time as the Chair of the Scotistic Sect—that equally useless and unfruitful occupation of gifted men—is also abolished. In this way the subtle hair-splitting finally may perish altogether, and genuine philosophy, theology, and all the arts may be drawn from their true sources. We would appreciate your advice in this matter.

Farewell.

December 9, 1518

Friar Martin Eleut<sup>177</sup>

Again Luther's antipathy to Scotus and his subtle distinctions is clear. Although, to the extent that the formal distinction can said to be Aristotelian, Luther's curricular reforms would not remove completely the foundation for delineating such differences. Moreover, given the evidence from disputations that follows, it is clear that Scotus and his formal distinction never completely ceased to be a point of contention in Wittenberg.

On August 24, 1543, Pastor Erasmus Alber from Frankfort on the Main—and a friend of Luther's and Melancthon's—had the disputation for his doctoral degree, which he was awarded the following October 11. Dr. John Bugenhagen, the bishop of the Wittenberg city church, was the doctoral "advisor" (*Promotor*), but Luther drew up the theses, presided over the disputation, and, as dean, made the official entry in the theological faculty's record (*Dekanatsbuch*) in his own hand. The 38 theses for the disputation were under the heading *De unitate essentiae divinae* ("Of the unity of the divine essence"). A string of five theses is particularly relevant.<sup>178</sup>

7. *Quomodo distinguatur persona a divinitate ipsa, non est rationis inquirere, nec angelis comprehensibile*  
 ("How the persons might be distinguished from the divinity is not of reason to inquire, nor is it understandable by the angels").

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<sup>177</sup> #117, WA Br 1:262; #30, AE 48:95-96, ed. & tr. Gottfried G. Krodel. The insertions in square brackets to clarify the letter are drawn from the AE editors' notes. Names are reproduced as found in the AE.

<sup>178</sup> Nearly all of the theses are interesting on their own right, especially the following others: 17, which likens dialectics to women who should keep silent in the church; 18, which groups Arians, Jews, and Muslims in denying the divinity of Christ; 23 and 24, which speak of grammar and philosophy in relationship to theology; and 30 and 31, which target an aspect of Aristotle.

8. *Imo periculosum et cavendum est ibi, ullam esse putari distinctionem, cum sit quaelibet persona ipsissimus et totus Deus.*  
 (“On the contrary, the danger of holding any distinction there ought to be avoided, since whichever Person is His own very self and whole God.”)
9. *Frustranea est cogitatio et nihil Scoti et similium, qui formalem vel aliam distinctionem hic finxerunt.*  
 (“It is a vain thinking up and nothing of the Scotists and his like-minded, who here have fictioned a formal or other distinction.”)
10. *Nesciunt quid loquantur vel affirmant, dum talibus sapientiae pharmacis rationem iuvare volunt.*  
 (“They don’t know what they are talking about or saying yes to while by such poison of wisdom they wish to help their account.”)
11. *Nam utcunque ista subtiliter dici videantur, ratio tamen non capit distinctionem formalem esse aliam, quam realem seu essentialem.*  
 (“For no matter how subtly such seems to be spoken, reason, however, does not grasp a formal distinction to be other than real or essential.”)<sup>179</sup>

Assuming that Luther means to affirm the positions expressed in these theses, in 1543 he still opposes the use of Scotus’s formal distinction in the context of delineating the persons of the Trinity from their divine substance, a topic Luther thinks is off-limits to reason. Perhaps more significantly, Luther speaks as if there is no such thing as a formal distinction, essentially saying the Scotists and their ilk imagined such a formal distinction while on drugs (*talibus sapientiae pharmacis*).<sup>180</sup>

The next year, on December 12, 1544, to be precise, George Major and John Faber disputed for their promotion with theses that Luther had drawn up for them—Major on the Trinity and Faber on justification. One of Major’s theses on the Trinity specifically mentions the formal distinction.

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<sup>179</sup> For the background and the theses, see WA 39<sup>II</sup>:252-255 (Aland #18; not translated in the American Edition). The translations are this author’s.

<sup>180</sup> These theses were published in 1545 under the title *De unitate essentiae divinae* (“Of the unity of the Divine essence”) along with the theses used on July 3 of that year for the doctoral disputation of Petrus Hegemon, titled *De distinctione personarum fideliter explicatae* (“Of the distinction of persons faithfully set forth”). Together the two sets of theses were titled *Disputationes duae de unitate essentiae divinae et de distinctione personarum in divinitate fideliter explicatae* (“Two disputations of the unity of the Divine essence and of the distinction of Persons in the Divinity faithfully set forth”) (WA 39<sup>II</sup>:252-253). On Hegemon’s disputation, see below in the text.

14. *Leviter et frigide consolantur nos Scotus et Scholastici cum suis distinctionibus formalibus et realibus.*

(“We are consoled by Scotus and the Scholastics with their distinctions formal and real about as much as by airheads and icequeens.”)<sup>181</sup>

Again, taking the thesis at face value suggests that Luther had little regard for the formal distinction of Scotus or that of any other scholastics. While Thesis 14 with its mention of the formal distinction does not appear to have been discussed, according to the extant record of the disputation,<sup>182</sup> the formal distinction does appear in the *Anhang* (“Appendix”) of *Praeparatorium D. Georgii Maioris in suam disputationem fideliter conscriptum* (“Of the preparations for Dr. George Major in his disputation, faithfully written down”). This work apparently reflects Major’s own “carefully written down” preparations for the disputation with the involvement of Melanchthon.<sup>183</sup> There we find the following.

Essentia divina et persona non distinguuntur realiter, sed formaliter, et sunt unum. Hoc sic intellige: Essentia divina et persona sunt una res, una essentia divina. Inter personam enim et essentiam divinam non est discrimen. Personae tres sunt realiter distinctae inter se vel a se, sed non ab essentia. Et de utrisque recte dicitur: Essentia generat, item: Persona generat. Nam similitudo potest dari de Christo, ubi in una persona duae sunt naturae, divina et humana sic unitae, ut unus tantum sit Christus, et tamen mens cogitando distinguit inter naturam divinam et humanam, quamquam unus sit et maneat Christus, quae distinctio formalis Deo est. Realiter enim hae duae naturae in Christo distingui non possunt, quia in Christo sunt unitae, ut idem Christus verus sit Deus et verus homo.

Divine essence and person are not distinguished in themselves but by essence, and they are [numerically] one. Understand this so: the divine essence and person are one *res*, one divine essence. For between the person and divine essence there is no division. The three persons are really distinct between each other or from each other, but not by essence. And about which things it is rightly said: “the essence begets”, again “the person begets”. For example, a similitude can be given to Christ, with whom in one person there are two natures, divine and human, united so that there is only one Christ, and however a mind by having thought

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<sup>181</sup> On the background and the theses, see WA 39<sup>II</sup>:284-289 (Aland #447; not translated in the American Edition). The translation is this author’s, although the vivid colloquial expressions came from Dr. Ernest N. Kaulbach, Professor of English, at the University of Texas at Austin.

<sup>182</sup> WA 39<sup>II</sup>:290-320.

<sup>183</sup> WA 39<sup>II</sup>:286.



distinguishes between the divine and human nature, nevertheless one Christ is and remains, which formal distinction is by God. For these two natures are not able to be really distinguished in Christ, because they are united in Christ, so that the same Christ truly is true God and true man.<sup>184</sup>

Major, possibly under Melancthon's influence, significantly is willing to posit a formal distinction in Christ.<sup>185</sup> Although Luther had concerns about Major's theology and although Major was involved in one of the controversies that precipitated the Formula of Concord, the formal distinction was not explicitly at issue.<sup>186</sup>

The last disputation Luther was in charge of<sup>187</sup> was Peter Hegemon's, who on July 3, 1545, disputed for his doctoral promotion using theses that Luther had written on June 10, 1545. The 50 theses touched on the Trinity,<sup>188</sup> the Incarnation, forgiveness of sins, and traducianism (the question whether all souls were created by God in the beginning or whether He creates new souls each time new life is conceived). For this disputation, none of the theses themselves mentioned the formal distinction, although Luther apparently raised the matter when Thesis 13 was discussed in the disputation itself.<sup>189</sup> That thesis and the exchange designated "Argument 11" follow (only the records designated B and C contain Luther's reference to the formal distinction, so only they are reproduced below and translated).

13. *In divinis relatio est res, id est, hypostasis et subsistentia. nempe idem, quod ipsa divinitas; tres enim personae, tres hypostases et res subsistentes sunt.*  
("From God's perspective, a relationship is a *res*, that is, a hypostasis

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<sup>184</sup> WA 39<sup>II</sup>:333. The translation is this author's.

<sup>185</sup> Scotus is said to have applied the formal distinction to things that might otherwise be taken to be identical, not to things that are unified (Grajewski, "Philosophic Applications," 146). One type of unity is formal identity, but that type of unity is said not apply to the hypostatic union for Scotus because it is a union "of really distinct things" (Cross, *The Metaphysics of the Incarnation* 121; Cross cites *Ord.* 1. 2. 2. 1-4, n. 403 [Vatican, ii. 356-7] and *Quod.* 19, n. 2 [Wadding, xii. 492; Alluntis and Wolter, 419 (n. 19. 5)]).

<sup>186</sup> See Bente, "Historical Introductions," §120, p.94; §13, p.102; §144, pp.115-116.

<sup>187</sup> Simo Knuuttila and Risto Saarinen, "Luther's Trinitarian Theology and its Medieval Background," *Studia Theologica* 53.11 (1999): 7.

<sup>188</sup> These theses specifically are examined by Knuuttila and Saarinen, "Luther's Trinitarian Theology," 7-10.

<sup>189</sup> On the background and the theses, see WA 39<sup>II</sup>:337-342 (Aland #275; not translated in the American Edition). Knuuttila and Saarinen write, "Theses 11 to 13 are relatively general and do not represent the views of a specific school of thought" (Knuuttila and Saarinen, "Luther's Trinitarian Theology," 7).

and a subsistence. Formally the same as the divinity itself; for the persons are three, the hypostases are three, and the *res* are subsistences.”<sup>190</sup>

[B]

Doctoris Philippi argumentum. Contra 13. Relatio non est essentia. Relatio est *res*. Ergo in persona erunt duae *res*, relatio et essentia.

Resp. Martinus Lutherus: Duae *res* conveniunt ad personam. Persona constituitur ex divina natura et relatione. Concedimus, quod essentia generet essentiam, sed sic ut personam. Scotus format distinctionem formalem, quod est falsum, quia nostra natura non potest aliam distinctionem parare, animus non potest concipere. Scotus non intellegit se ipsum. Sunt tres hypotheses [sic!] ita distinctae, ut altera alteram generet et tertiam spirent. Audio, unam essentiam et tres personas esse, Wie es zugehe, necescio, credam.

Argument of Doctor Philip. Against 13. Relation is not an essence.

Relation is a *res*. Therefore in the person there are two *res*, relation and essence.

Response of Martin Luther: The two things occur in the [divine] person.

The person is constituted from the divine nature and a relation. We concede that essence generates essence but as [to generate] a person. Scotus falsely brings in a formal distinction, because our nature is not equal to making another distinction, our intellect can't conceive it. Scotus does not understand himself. There are three hypostases so distinct that the one generates the other and [the two] spirate the third. I hear one essence and three persons, how it goes from there, I don't know, let me believe.

[C]

11. Argumentum Domini Philippi Melanchthonis. Contra 13. Relatio non est essentia. Relatio sunt duae *res* secundum vestras propositiones. Ergo etiam in persona erunt duae *res*, relatio et essentia.

Responsio D. Lutheri: Concedo totum argumentum.

Philippus Melanchthon. Contra. Ergo vultis duas *res* in essentia?

Respondit Lutherus: Volumus.

Philippus Melanchthon. Quaero ergo declarationem.

Respondit D. Lutherus: Persona constituitur ex relatione et essentia, ut filius est essentia genita, natura essentia generat essentiam, sed ita, ut sint distinctae personae. Quomodo autem differant personae non possumus intelligere nec animo nostro concipere. Scotus cum sua subtilitate hoc loco seipsum non intelligit, qui volenter dicit, quod sit realis personarum distinctio. Nos vero essentia causa formalis distinctionem, quia animus . . . . . aliam distinctionem concipere. Formalem non intelligas ratione, sed

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<sup>190</sup> WA 39<sup>II</sup>:340. The translation is this author's.

si qua est essentialis distinctio, sunt tres personae, distinctae hypostases, alter alteram generat. Duae spirant tertiam. Ich hoer, das eine essentia sey et tres personae. Wie es zugehet, hic simpliciter tacendum est et credendum Deo, qui se ita cognoscendum in verbo suo nobis proposuit.

11. Argument of Lord Philip Melanchthon. Against 13. Relation is not essence. Relation is two *res* following your propositions. Therefore even in the [divine] person there are two *res*, relation and essence.

Response of Dr. Luther: I concede your whole argument.

Philip Melanchthon. Against. Therefore do you want two *res* in an essence?

Luther responded: Yes, we do.

Philip Melanchthon. I am looking for a clarification.

Luther responded: The [divine] person is made up of a relation and an essence, as the Son is a begotten essence, the nature by essence begets an essence, but in such a way that the persons are distinguished. How the persons might differ, however, we are not able to understand nor conceive in our mind. Scotus with all his subtlety does not understand this *locus* in and of itself when he willingly says there is a real distinction of persons. We [understand] essence to be the formal cause [which brings about] the distinction because our mind [cannot] conceive another distinction. Do not understand the word “formal” in any kind of rational way, but if there is an essential distinction, there are three persons, distinct hypostases, one generating another. Two spirating the third. I hear there is one essence and three persons. How that happens, this simply has to be kept quiet and God has to be believed, Who proposed that He is so to be known by us in His Word.<sup>191</sup>

Scotus, whether rightly or wrongly understood, continues to be ridiculed, and Luther seems to have no real need of making a formal distinction. Instead, Luther seems content to let the matter of the Trinity go without a complete explanation and just take the matter on faith.

From the 1513-1515 Psalm lectures through to the last disputation under his leadership, Luther seems to have little positive regard for Scotus or his formal distinction. Luther instead placed limits on into what reason ought to or even could inquire. At the same time, however, in Luther’s circle Major and Melanchthon appear to have allowed

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<sup>191</sup> WA 39<sup>II</sup>:362-365. The translation is this author’s. Knuuttila and Saarinen note, “As is known, Luther often wished to accept the expression *essentia generat*, condemned by the fourth Lateran Council. However in the last disputations this view is moderated by the qualification that the essence does not generate or bring into being *qua* essence but *qua* person.” (Knuuttila and Saarinen, “Luther’s Trinitarian Theology,” 9.)

the possibility that there is a formal distinction in the case of the divine and human natures united in the person of Jesus Christ, a place where Scotus could be taken to rule out such a distinction. Where Luther above was seen to have distinguished between justification and sanctification in a way that fit Scotus' definition of the formal distinction (to Luther justification and sanctification are inseparable, capable of being defined differently, and found that way apart from one's intellect) and, consciously or subconsciously could have been formed with Scotus's formal distinction in mind, this subsection has suggested that Luther likely would have been hard pressed to have termed the distinction a "formal distinction".

### **Philipp Melanchthon**

At least in his early years, Philipp Melanchthon is generally thought to have held to the same positions as Luther, and Melanchthon's association with Luther in the disputations considered above might be taken as evidence of their similar regard for Scotus and his formal distinction, but there is more to consider. First, there is evidence of at least some outright rejection of Scotus by Melanchthon. In October or early November of 1521, Melanchthon published in Latin a set of 65 theses or propositions about the Mass, the next to last of which condemned Thomas Aquinas and John Duns Scotus.<sup>192</sup>

64. Anathema sit Thomas et Scotus, qui huius abusus missae auctores sunt.

64. Let Thomas and Scotus, who are the originators of this abuse of the mass, be anathema.<sup>193</sup>

Around that same time in autumn of 1521, Melanchthon published a defense of Luther against the contemporary Paris theologians who had, after the Pope had excommunicated Luther, themselves entered judgment against more than 100 of Luther's alleged

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<sup>192</sup> Compare James W. Richard, "The Beginnings of Protestant Worship in Germany and Switzerland," *The American Journal of Theology* 5.2 (1901): 246, who cites *Corpus Reformatorum* I:478-481, and Philipp Melanchthon, *Selected Writings*, trans. Charles Leander Hill, eds. Elmer Ellsworth Flack and Lowell J. Satre (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1978), 62.

<sup>193</sup> Latin from CR I:481; English from Melanchthon, *Selected Writings*, 67. Only select theses are translated in Charles Leander Hill, "Some Theses of Philip Melanchthon," *Lutheran Quarterly* 6 (1954), and the relevant one is not one of them.

statements.<sup>194</sup> In that defense of Luther, Melanchthon condemns Paris' theological school, the Sorbonne, for originating scholasticism and the false teaching that goes with it, singling out as Paris "triflers" Thomist John Versor (d. ca. 1485), Scotist Peter Tartaretus (d.1522), and Nominalist John Major (1467-1550). At least in one place, Melanchthon favorably refers to Paris theologians Jean Gerson (1363-1429) and William of Ockham (1288-1348), but in another place he negatively refers to Ockham along with John Duns Scotus (1266-1308).<sup>195</sup> Melanchthon contrasts the Paris theologians to the church fathers whose correct exposition of Scripture, Melanchthon wrote, Luther followed.

Das ertzele ich nit darumb, das ich achte, es sey viel dran gelegen, was die lerer gehalten haben, wer sie auch sind, so anderß der schrift meynung kund ist, sondern das ich auch den eygen willigen will fare, die da meynen, Luther wolle alle ding new machen, ßo er doch nichts anderß thut, denn das er unß widder tzu der schrift bringe, ya auch tzu den veterenn, die tzu dem vorstand der schrift am nehsten kommen sind. Abir yhr, was thut yhr? Ists nit war, das yhr nichts anderß thut, denn das die Christlichen hertzen mehr ynn den formaliten Scoti und connotaten Occam, denn ynn Christo groß werden? Und hört, ihr sophisten, wie woll ihrß nit werdet vorstehen, yhr widder strebt dem auffgehenden liecht des Evangelii nit anderß, denn wie Jamnes und Mambres Mosi widder stunden. Derselben nach komling ist auch des Sorbonische gefinde, nemlich des da geporn ist auß der Aegyptischen Sorbonity.

I am enumerating these things not because I think that it makes a great difference what the writers thought, whoever they finally are, when the meaning of Scripture is settled, but to satisfy those captious souls who think that Luther has changed everything, when he has done nothing else than to call us back to Scripture and also to the fathers who came the closest to the meaning of Scripture. But what do you do? Anything other than let the minds of Christians become great in the formalities of Scotus and in the connotations of Ockham rather than in Christ? You oppose the rising light of the Gospel (hear, you Sophists, who will not understand) as Moses was opposed by Jannes and Jambres, whose posterity is the family

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<sup>194</sup> WA 8:267-312; Melanchthon, *Selected Writings*, 68-87.

<sup>195</sup> Elsewhere in the writing, Melanchthon negatively refers to Scotus along with Gabriel Biel (c.1420 or 1425 -1495), who did not attend or teach at Paris but considered Ockham his master.

of Sorbonne, beyond doubt descendants from that Egyptian  
“Sorbonnity.”<sup>196</sup>

Melanchthon’s specific mention of Scotus’s “formalities” is significant. Yet, when the Apology of the Augsburg Confession was published some ten years later, Melanchthon may be taken to have made use of Scotus’s formal distinction while at the same time distancing himself from Scotus.

There are several relevant passages from Apology IV. First, Melanchthon makes it clear that when faith justifies it is more than a preparation for justification and does more than start a process of justification.<sup>197</sup> Melanchthon is clear that works follow such justification and are a form of righteousness, but he is also clear that such works do not themselves justify and are only accepted by God because of faith.<sup>198</sup> Melanchthon is distinguishing between justification, the righteousness God brings about by faith, and sanctification, the works that justification causes. In a highly significant passage, Melanchthon presumably makes a not-so-subtle reference to the *Doctor Subtilis* (“Subtle Doctor”, what Scotus was called already by his contemporaries) and his formal distinction while explaining that Scripture sometimes “lump together the righteousness of the heart and its fruit” (*scriptura simul complectitur iustitiam cordis cum fructibus*).<sup>199</sup>

Nemo sanus iudicare aliter potest, nec nos aliquam otiosam subtilitatem hic affectamus, ut divellamus fructus a iustitia cordis, si tantum adversarii concesserint, quod fructus propter fidem et mediatorem Christum placeant, non sint per sese digni gratia et vita aeterna.

No sane man can judge otherwise. We are not trying to be overly subtle here in distinguishing the righteousness of the heart from its fruits, if only our opponents would grant that the fruits please God because of faith and

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<sup>196</sup> WA 8:300; Melanchthon, Selected Writings 74-75; emphasis added. Melanchthon apparently refers to the Egyptian wise men, sorcerers, and magicians mentioned in Exodus 7:11 as “opponents” of Moses; although no one is named in that passage, Jewish tradition said two of the opposing magicians were named Jannes and Jambres, and Paul, in the context of discussing the false teachers of the latter days, mentions the two and their opposition to Moses (2 Timothy 3:8). Jannes is also reportedly mentioned in Dead Sea Scrolls that predate Christianity.

<sup>197</sup> Ap IV:71.

<sup>198</sup> Ap IV:160-161.

<sup>199</sup> Ap IV:374, Tappert, 164; *BKS*, 230. On Ap IV:375-377, confer above at n.53, p.114.

Later humanist and Reformation opponents of Scotus’s teachings termed his followers, instead of “Scotists”, “Dunse”, which term led to “dunce” in English.

the mediator Christ but in themselves are not worthy of grace and of eternal life.<sup>200</sup>

Although the German paraphrase at this point is different, it carries over the essence of the “subtle” reference and gives a contrasting example of an incorrect distinction by the opponents.

Wir suchen hie nicht eine unnötige Subtilität, sondern es hat große Ursache, warum man in diesen Fragen einen gewissen Bericht muß haben. Denn alsbald, wenn man den Widersachern zulässet, daß die Werk das ewige Leben verdienen, bald spinnen sie diese ungeschickte Lehre daraus, daß wir vermögen Gottes Gesetz zu halten, daß wir keiner Barmherzigkeit bedürfen, daß wir vor Gott gerecht sein, das ist, Gott angenehm, durch unsere Werke, nicht um Christus willen, daß wir auch *opera supererogationis* und mehr tun können, denn das Gesetz erfordert. Also wird denn die ganze Lehre vom Glauben gar unterdrückt.

We are not seeking an unnecessary subtlety here, but there is a great reason why in these questions one must have a certain account. For, when one grants the opponents that works merit eternal life, then immediately they spin from it these inept teachings: that we are able to keep God’s Commandments; that we need no mercy; that we are righteous before God, that is, pleasing to God, through our works, not for Christ’s sake; and that we also can do *opera supererogationis* and more than the Commandments require. So then the whole teaching of faith becomes entirely suppressed.<sup>201</sup>

Clearly Melanchthon is not only distinguishing between justification and sanctification but is aware that his distinction might be subject to the kind of criticism that Scotus’s formal distinction receives, namely, that of being too subtle. He nevertheless makes the decision, and the German especially defends it by arguing it is necessary to defend against the opponents’ false teaching. Additional evidence from Melanchthon regarding the justification/sanctification distinction and the formal distinction is considered in connection with his student, Martin Chemnitz.

## Martin Chemnitz

Martin Chemnitz, who studied under both Luther and Melanchthon in Wittenberg and could even have been present at Luther’s last disputation, seems to have gone beyond

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<sup>200</sup> Ap IV:375, BKS, 230; Tappert, 164.

<sup>201</sup> BKS, 231; this author’s translation.

Luther and perhaps even beyond Melanchthon in being more ready to acknowledge at least some sort of formal distinction both at the *locus* of the Trinity and at the *locus* of Justification. As with the evidence from Luther and Melanchthon, this subsection presents relevant evidence from Chemnitz in chronological order.

The earliest piece of evidence may be the most convincing. In his refutation of the Council of Trent, the first two parts of which were published in 1566 and the latter two in 1573, Chemnitz distinguishes justification from sanctification as Luther did, with an allusion to the same comment on Galatians cited by the Formula of Concord, but, after a brief sarcastic mocking of his opponents, Chemnitz also likens the distinction to that between the senses and powers of the soul, the latter of which is understood as one of Scotus's applications of the formal distinction.<sup>202</sup>

Ita etiam nullo modo decemus, fidem justificantem esse solitariam, hoc est, talem persuasionem, quae sit sine poenitentia, et nulla omnino pariat bona opera. Sed fidem quae sine operibus otiose et mortua est, dicimus non esse veram et vivam illam fidem quae per charitatem efficax est. Gal. 5. Considerat autem Lector, qualis sit consequentia argumenti Tridentinorum. Fides viva non est solitaria, sine charitate, ergo non sola, sed una cum charitate justificat. Ergone quae simul adsunt, quae cohaerent et conjuncta sunt, unum officium, et eandem omnia habebunt proprietatem? Simul ergo auribus et pedibus audiemus, oculis et minibus videbimus. Nulla ergo erit vel sensuum, vel potentiarum animae distinctio: quia homo simul illa accipit, et habet. Sicut igitur haec et similia multa, etiam quando simul adsunt, recte et necessario distinguuntur. ita nos reconciliationem et renovationem, fidem et charitatem non ita divellimus, ut alterum tollamus et negemus: sed cuique suum locum, suum officium, et suam proprietatem tribuimus cum Scriptura: quae solius fidei hoc proprium esse docet, apprehendere et accipere in promissione Evangelii, Christum ad justitiam coram Deo ad vitam aeternam. Et illam justitiam fides non partitur inter Christum et nostram novitatem seu charitatem, sed in solidum eam tribuit merito Christi.

So also we by no means teach that justifying faith is alone, that is, that it is such a persuasion which is without repentance, and that it does not bring forth any good works at all. But we say that a faith which is without works, idle, and dead is not that true and living faith which works through love (Gal. 5:6). But let the reader consider what the consequence of the argument of the men of Trent is. Living faith is not alone, without

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<sup>202</sup> See above at n. 153. Confer Grajewski, *Study in Metaphysics*, 163-178.



love, therefore it does not justify alone, but together with love. Do therefore the things which are present at the same time, which hang together and are connected, have one office, and one and the same function? In that case we shall hear with our ears and with our feet and see with our eyes and with our hands. There will, therefore, be no distinction either of the sense or of the powers of the soul because a man receives and possesses them at one and the same time. As therefore these and many similar things, even when they are present at the same time, are rightly and necessarily distinguished, so we do not tear apart reconciliation and renewal, faith and love, in such a manner that we remove and deny one of them, but we give to each its place, its function, and its peculiar nature, with the Scripture, which teaches that this is the peculiar function of faith alone that it apprehends and accepts Christ in the promise of the Gospel for righteousness before God to life eternal. Faith does not divine this righteousness between Christ and our newness, or love, but it ascribes it entirely to the merit of Christ.<sup>203</sup>

Thus, in Chemnitz's 1566 *Examen*, Chemnitz essentially makes a formal distinction between justification and sanctification, albeit without using the terms "formal distinction" or "sanctification". There may be good reason for Chemnitz's avoidance of the term "formal distinction" so associated with Duns Scotus.

Whether or not Chemnitz himself was at the later disputations cited above, he certainly knew of them, writing in his 1578 *De Duabus Naturis in Christo* (*The Two Natures in Christ*) as follows.

[W]e know that Luther in the disputations of the year 1544 and 1545 and Philip with him, in opposition to certain Scholastics, taught that the person or the hypostasis of the divine being is not something which exists outside of or beyond the divine essence, to which this essence together with its essential attributes is communicated later on; and that the divine essence does not exist outside of or beyond the persons of the Deity; nor do the hypostasis and the essence actually differ in the same person of the Trinity, although they do differ in aspect.<sup>204</sup>

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<sup>203</sup> Ninth topic, section two, paragraph 23. Martin Chemnitz, *Examen Concilii Tridentini*, ed. Eduard Preuss (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1972), 187-188. Chemnitz, *Examination of the Council of Trent*, I:580-581.

<sup>204</sup> Martin Chemnitz, *Two Natures in Christ*, trans. Jacob A. O. Preus (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1971), 42. Preus footnotes a reference to Luther's 1544 *Kurzes Bekenntnis vom heiligen Sakrament* ("Brief Confession Concerning the Holy Sacrament"), WA 54:157-158 (Aland #661; AE 38:305-308). There, Luther relates believing in the real, physical presence of Christ in the Sacrament of the Altar as easier than believing the union of the two natures with only one of the three Persons of the Trinity;

With this knowledge of the disputations and almost certainly of their disregard for the formal distinction, Chemnitz can be understood as carefully avoiding the term “formal distinction” while nevertheless making precisely that kind of distinction. In *De Duabus Naturis*, Chemnitz goes on to cite approvingly the scholastic regard for the unity of the divine substance, especially in itself, but he also, as considered in relation to other things, goes on to approve a “degree of distinction” between God’s essence and attributes “for the sake of teaching and learning”.<sup>205</sup> Although unnamed, the “degree of distinction” is nothing less than Scotus’ formal distinction in one of the precise places Scotus applied it.<sup>206</sup>

Chemnitz apparently was willing to make such un-termed formal distinctions even where his teachers Luther and Melanchthon were unwilling. For example, in Melanchthon’s 1543 *Loci Communes*, Melanchthon wrote that “attributes such as God’s power are not to be distinguished or separated from His essence. Nor is the attribute one thing and the essence another.”<sup>207</sup> Chemnitz knew Melanchthon’s *Loci Communes* well, living with Melanchthon in Wittenberg and, at Melanchthon’s request, lecturing on the *Loci Communes* for a time there, sometimes with Melanchthon present, and later for some 30 years in Brunswick.<sup>208</sup> However, in commenting on that same part of Melanchthon’s *Loci Communes* in his own posthumously-published *Loci Theologici*, Chemnitz departs from Melanchthon, whom he identifies as “our preceptor”. First

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Luther faults his opponents with failing to believe both—the faulty Christology a result of the faulty sacramentology.

<sup>205</sup> Chemnitz, *Two Natures in Christ*, 307. Pieper quotes Chemnitz’s Latin at length (with some ellipses); the relevant wording here: *in ea relatione seu consideratione* aliquam quasi distinctionem *inter essentiam et attributa* eius docendi et discendi causa cogitamus (Pieper, *Christliche Dogmatik*, 265 n.561, emphasis original). Confer Pieper, *Christian Dogmatics*, II:240-241.

<sup>206</sup> For a relatively-thorough treatment, see Grajewski, *Study in Metaphysics*, 180-192.

<sup>207</sup> Melanchthon, *Loci Communes* 1543, 20.

<sup>208</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, I:13. Confer Jungkuntz, *Formulators of the Formula*, 50-53.

Jacob Andreä, a coworker of Chemnitz on the Formula of Concord, served as professor of theology at the University of Tübingen and there also lectured on Melanchthon’s *Loci*, a future examination of the content of those lectures, if such were possible, might be informative, although Andreä is said to have been more interested in the teaching about the Sacrament of the Altar than that of justification. Still, Andreä included treatments of justification in his proposals for Lutheran unity in 1568 and his 1573 sermons on controverted doctrines, which sermons eventually led to the Swabian Concordia, one of the precursors of the Formula of Concord. (Jungkuntz, *Formulators of the Formula*, 29, 30, 34-35, 37-38.)

Chemnitz refers to a scholastic distinction drawn from the *Thesaurus* of Cyril between things said about the substance of God and His relationships, both inter-Trinitarian and with His creatures. Next, Chemnitz allows that the attributes can be predicated of God's essence, and, finally, Chemnitz explains that "accidents" cannot be spoken of God, even analogically, although the term "analogically" does not seem to be used (Thomists would nevertheless seem to be in view).<sup>209</sup> Like Melanchthon, Chemnitz says God's attributes are not separated from his essence, but, unlike Melanchthon, Chemnitz is willing to distinguish the attributes from the essence.

In the same *Loci Theologici*, Chemnitz is careful, as he had done previously, to distinguish between justification and sanctification, although this time he eventually uses the term. Writing of the controversies over Grace and Justification as he expands on Melanchthon's *Loci Communes*, Chemnitz refers to church fathers who mixed the teaching of good works in with the doctrine of justification, implying a justification and sanctification distinction without terming it such and alluding to Luther's insistence that the distinction between justification and sanctification be made at this precise point.<sup>210</sup> Similarly, Chemnitz writes that the central point at the locus of justification is confused when mingled with good works that follow justification, which he himself says must be carefully distinguished.<sup>211</sup> In dealing with the Scripture testimonies about justification, Chemnitz makes a comment quite similar to those found in the Formula of Concord he helped author.

Scripture says that renewal is an effect or result of justification. ... We judge the cause by the effects. ... This distinction between causes and effects is also useful for showing that sanctification or renewal is to be distinguished from justification, and that the new obedience is not a cause or an essential part of our justification, because it is an effect or result.<sup>212</sup>

Chemnitz goes on to talk about how the distinction between such cause and its effect allows people to comfort themselves when they subjectively do not feel "joy, peace, or

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<sup>209</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, I:56-62. Preus gives the citation for Cyril's *Thesaurus* as MPG 75.24 ff.

<sup>210</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:470. Confer Chemnitz, Examination of the Council of Trent 468.

<sup>211</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:474.

<sup>212</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:555.

happiness.”<sup>213</sup> Then, in discussion at the locus of Good Works, he contrasts justification and good works, or sanctification, making it clear that faith-produced good works do follow justification,<sup>214</sup> and, again similar to the treatment of righteousness in the Formula, he further adds, to the treatment of Good Works from Melanchthon’s *Loci*, discussion of terminology, such as distinguishing an affective sense and a formal sense to the term “sanctification”.<sup>215</sup> Later, Chemnitz cites the same excerpt from Luther’s 1535 Galatians commentary regarding the necessary separation of the discussion of good works from the locus of justification.<sup>216</sup>

In short, Chemnitz makes distinctions like Scotus’s formal distinctions at the *locus* of the Trinity where his teachers Luther and Melanchthon would not, although Chemnitz, perhaps out of respect for his teachers, did not, in the passages cited, term such distinctions a “formal distinction”. Both at the *locus* of the Trinity and at the *locus* of Justification (like Melanchthon), Chemnitz, by his similar applications of the distinction, can be seen as clearly making Scotus-like formal distinctions. Seemingly in keeping with Scotus’s definition of the distinction, Chemnitz does not conceive of justification and sanctification as potentially occurring separately but nevertheless defines each independent of the other for the sake of preserving what he regards as the true teaching of justification.<sup>217</sup>

### ***Summary of justification-sanctification as a “formal distinction”***

Considering the justification-sanctification distinction to be a “formal distinction” such as that of Scotus is not out of the question.<sup>218</sup> Although John Duns Scotus did not

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<sup>213</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:555.

<sup>214</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:573.

<sup>215</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:574-575.

<sup>216</sup> Chemnitz, *Loci Theologici*, II:619. Confer WA<sup>1</sup>:240; AE 26:137; SD III:29, *BKS*, 923-924; Tappert, 544 (above at n.83, p.127).

<sup>217</sup> Recall Ep I:19’s rejection of Flacius’s rejection of what appears to be the formal distinction (above, n.30, p.103) and SD III:40-41’s use of the Luther quote essentially referring to justification and sanctification as inseparable but nevertheless distinct (above, n.75, p.354).

<sup>218</sup> The whole matter of the formal distinction’s complicating God’s simplicity seems to be not really relevant to the discussion of justification and sanctification being formally distinct, unless one sees some need for that process to be “simple”.

invent the formal distinction, he is best known for the distinguishing different aspects of one thing when the aspects are both in some sense identical and capable of being defined independently.<sup>219</sup> That Scotus considered cause and caused to be disjunctive attributes of being is also significant.<sup>220</sup> Although the distinction was primarily used in discussing God and His attributes, other applications have been noted, and Scotus's works have been observed to consistently speak of a qualified formal distinction.<sup>221</sup> Subsequent theologian-philosophers such as William of Ockham made similar if not the same type of distinctions as Scotus did in some of the same applications, especially those in the theological realm.

While the foregoing survey of principally Luther's and Chemnitz's regard for Scotus and the formal distinction with which he is usually associated did not provide definitive proof that the justification-sanctification distinction is or is not a "formal distinction", one might reasonably conclude that it is. From the foregoing evidence it is clear that Melancthon and Luther, the authors of the early writings in *The Book of Concord*, knew of Scotus' formal distinction. While they generally spoke ill of Scotus and may have refused to make every formal distinction he made and to refer to those distinctions like his that they did make as "formal distinctions", they nevertheless could have made use of his formal distinction, even without terming it such. In fact, Melancthon can be taken in Apology IV:375 to have made the formal distinction precisely regarding justification and sanctification. Chemnitz, one of the authors of the later writings in *The Book of Concord*, was a student of Melancthon's and Luther's and almost certainly knew of the formal distinction and of their generally negative regard for it. For that very reason, Chemnitz may well have been inclined to avoid the term, as he did, if he were to use the distinction, which the evidence suggests he also did.

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<sup>219</sup> Various names are used by Scotus to refer to what are distinguished within the same thing: "realities" (*realitates*), 'formalities' (*formalitates*), 'aspects' (*rationes*), 'formal aspects' (*rationes formales*), 'intentions' (*intentiones*), or 'real aspects' (*rationes reales*)" (Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," 415).

<sup>220</sup> See above, n.150.

<sup>221</sup> Although it may not be the sense in which Scotus or Dumont as he interprets Scotus uses it, the Reformers do "qualify" the distinction between justification and sanctification in that it is only made at the *locus* of justification, nowhere else.

Admittedly, the formal distinction is not specifically mentioned in the writings that are contained in *The Book of Concord*, and the writings of Luther, Melanchthon, and Chemnitz just considered were from outside *The Book of Concord* and therefore by and large lack its authoritative normative force. There are at least three potential reasons for the distinction's not being mentioned in *The Book of Concord*. A first reason that the formal distinction may not be mentioned in *The Book of Concord* is that the discussion of the Trinity, at which point the term is often introduced, is for the most part absent from the works in *The Book of Concord*. The *locus* of the Trinity was not one of contention between the Lutherans and the Roman Catholics nor, for the most part, between the Lutherans and the Reformed pseudo-Lutherans.<sup>222</sup> A second reason the formal distinction may not be mentioned is that, as has been seen, at least two of the principal authors (namely, Luther and Melanchthon) had a quite negative regard for the distinction and its chief advocate Scotus, and a third author (namely, Chemnitz) may have avoided using the term due to their negative regard. A third reason that the formal distinction may not be mentioned is that in some cases the Reformers avoided using technical terms that would be unfamiliar to the average person;<sup>223</sup> the uses of the term considered above were primarily in academic settings, and *The Book of Concord* had at least somewhat of a different target. Yet, the failure to find the term used does not mean the distinction is not being made, especially given the considered examples from writings outside and inside *The Book of Concord* where the distinction is arguably in use. To be sure, disregard for a philosopher or one aspect of his teaching does not keep the Reformers from using the philosopher or other aspects of his teaching, with or without mentioning him by name.

Thinking of the justification-sanctification distinction as a formal distinction has several advantages. First, while the Reformers do distinguish between justification and sanctification at the *locus* of justification, in other places (presumably all of them) they want to emphasize that justification and sanctification are in a sense united, and the

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<sup>222</sup> For the case of the Roman Catholics, see AC I and Ap I. For the case of the Reformed pseudo-Lutherans, note the lack of an article on the Trinity, but see the claim Luther made that is discussed above in n.204.

<sup>223</sup> Ep II:23-24 and its counterpart, SD I:54, are examples; there the Reformers recommend not using the terms *substantia* and *accidens* in sermons when teaching about original sin.

formal distinction helps in that emphasis.<sup>224</sup> Such an emphasis on unity with distinction is in keeping with Scotus's logical and metaphysical motivation behind the formal distinction,<sup>225</sup> and the specific relationship between justification and sanctification as "cause" to "caused" also fits. Second, if one is inclined to accept McGrath's claim that there is some degree of innovation in the Reformers' treatment of justification and sanctification, one might posit that the Reformers' innovation is in making a formal distinction between the two and in using the word "sanctification" in a narrow sense to speak of the aspect distinguished from the aspect referred to by "justification" in the narrow sense. McGrath's own evidence, as was discussed above, demonstrates that the Reformers were not the first to distinguish stages in the process known as the broad senses of "justification" and "sanctification", but they may well have been the first to articulate the distinction the way that they have been seen to articulate it. Third and finally, the consideration of the justification-sanctification distinction as a formal distinction has reinforced the understanding that the authors of both the earlier writings in *The Book of Concord* and the authors of its later writings essentially agree on the matter of the justification-sanctification distinction, even if the precise expressions are not identical. Moreover, the use of such a middle distinction, although it may be new to the discussion of justification and sanctification, is nevertheless perfectly in keeping with the preceding medieval philosophical tradition. That fact further minimizes McGrath's concern over the "notional" distinction that the Reformers make between the two aspects of God's one work in the lives of believers.

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<sup>224</sup> Grajewski, for example, discusses how understanding distinctions helps understand unity (Grajewski, *Study in Metaphysics*, xii; Grajewski cites Thomas Harper, *The Metaphysics of the School*, I, 3 vols. [New York: Peter Smith, 1940], 342, and Jacques Maritain, *Degrees of Knowledge*, trans. Bernard Wall and Margot R. Adamson [New York: Scribner, 1938], ix).

For his part, Engelland sees Melanchthon as emphasizing the unity of justification and sanctification, at least in the broad sense of the word "justification" as the "total benefit" (Hans Engelland, "Introduction," *Melanchthon on Christian Doctrine: Loci communes, 1555*, Library of Protestant Thought [New York: Oxford University Press, 1965], xxxix-xl).

<sup>225</sup> Adams writes: "often in philosophy and theology there is reason to deny that  $x$  and  $y$  are really distinct things (*res*) and yet apparent cause to affirm that  $x$  is  $F$  and  $y$  is not  $F$ " (Adams, "Universals in the Early Fourteenth Century," 415).

## Chapter V summary

Chapter V has shown that the Reformers' distinction between justification and sanctification, against their opponents, is the logical result of philosophy serving theology with the goal of preserving the teaching of justification by faith. The Reformers refuse to say that good works are necessary for salvation, but they similarly cannot imagine salvation occurring without good works necessarily following as an effect follows its cause. They indicate sanctification's (or good works') following justification as a logical necessity by use of *prius* and other indicators (gerundives and other words indicating necessity), and such indications are consistent within the Reformation era writings' mentions of sanctification. Where the claim is arguably falsely made that the distinction between justification and sanctification is theologically discontinuous with the preceding era, the distinction, likely an example of Scotus' "formal distinction", is certainly philosophically continuous.<sup>226</sup> While the justification-sanctification distinction is never called a "formal distinction"—perhaps because of the Reformers' antipathy to Scotus, its primary advocate—contextual clues in the writings of the Reformers both inside and outside *The Book of Concord* indicate that the distinction both was still discussed and is likely intended in this case. A formal distinction between justification and sanctification preserves their inseparability but allows that in some ways they be treated independently, which serves the Reformers' goals of keeping with Scripture, comforting consciences, and giving glory to Christ.

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<sup>226</sup> For the purposes of this dissertation, even if the claim of theological discontinuity were true, it would not necessarily mean the distinction was philosophically discontinuous.



## Chapter VI: Consideration of Findings and Conclusion

*... we are not minded to manufacture anything new by this work of agreement or to depart in any way at all, either in content or in formulation, from the divine truth that our pious forebears and we have acknowledged and confessed in the past . . .*

—*Preface to The Book of Concord*

The second generation of Reformers certainly did not intend to innovate *theologically* in comparison to their predecessors, who for them include not only the first generation of Reformers but also Christians from the beginning, as they make clear contextually by referring not only to the earlier confessional writings but also to Scripture and the three Creeds. The primary question being asked in this dissertation, however, centers on the continuity not of their theology but of their philosophy. Did the second-generation of Reformers or their forebears innovate *philosophically*? Using a close reading to explore the logic and argumentation of *The Book of Concord*, this dissertation has considered both the Reformers' opposition to philosophy and their use of philosophy despite that opposition, with a view also to the continuity of that use with the preceding medieval period and within the Reformation era. The working hypothesis was as follows:

Despite a second-order repudiation of philosophy, logic and philosophical argumentation are not a problem for either the authors of the earlier documents or the authors of the later documents contained in *The Book of Concord*; rather, consistent with the preceding medieval tradition, the problem with philosophy and philosophers seems to arise where the use of such methods directly contradicts how the authors understood God's revelation in the Bible.

The evidence gathered and considered in the preceding chapters bears out the working hypothesis. Before concluding the dissertation, this chapter presents a summary of that evidence regarding uses, considers those findings in terms of the present research questions, suggests implications of the research, and offers reflections that might lead to questions for future research.

## Summary of evidence regarding uses

First, then is the summary of the evidence regarding uses. *The Book of Concord* clearly uses philosophy at the supra-sentential level, that of logic and argumentation. Such uses have been examined pertaining to the confessors' organization of their works according to τόποι or *loci* ("topics" or "places"), their positive second-order regard for logic, their first order use of logic and argumentation by both inductive methods (example and analogy) and deductive methods (syllogisms), and their distinction between justification and sanctification that is philosophical in nature but nevertheless a product of philosophy in the ministerial handmaiden role.

The organization of content according to τόποι or *loci* for all practical purposes began with Aristotle and continued to some extent by way of figures like Cicero, Rudolph Agricola, and Erasmus through the period leading up to the Reformation. While the dialectical (or logical) and rhetorical uses of the method are variously related or distinguished in Aristotle himself and those that followed him, the authors of the works contained in *The Book of Concord*, used the logic to serve the rhetoric, but even that is not their innovation. *The Book of Concord* uses the word *locus*, *loci* in a number of different but related senses, from a general place, to a specific passage, to a point or argument, to a whole doctrinal article. That last sense of a whole doctrinal article is where the organizational role is found, principally in reference to the "chief locus" of justification by faith and the closely related topic of penitence, although the vast majority if not all of the doctrinal articles in the writings considered more or less relate to the main article of justification. All the documents in *The Book of Concord*, both early and late, use the *loci* method, and such documents use the method, essentially in continuity with the preceding tradition. While the Reformers are accused of letting the *loci* method distort their educational method and the faith itself, especially by turning faith into head knowledge, such claims were seen not to hold up, however, as the Reformers' primary concern is on faith that can be certain of salvation, and sanctified reason for them is a means to that end. Thus, philosophy is put in service of theology both by the teacher of the faith and by the individual believer.

Although they were neutral or negative about second-order “philosophy” and its related words, the authors of the works contained in *The Book of Concord*, both those early in the sixteenth century and those later, generally had a positive second-order regard for logic, as did, arguably, the bulk of the tradition leading up to their time period. Where the Reformers write negatively of logic their criticism is not directed at logic *per se* but at their opponents’ poor use of it in order to deceive and trick people into their opponents’ errors. Frequently the writings of the Bible are the basis for the Reformers’ opponents’ distortions, as the writings of the Bible are the basis for the Reformers’ own logical claims. To some extent the Reformers’ accusing their opponents of bad logic may also be a rhetorical or polemical device, but no examples were seen where the Reformers’ accusation was not accompanied by a case in point. For the Reformers, logic and human reason are impacted by original sin and cannot be used over the writings of the Bible but must remain subservient to them.

With the Reformers generally having a positive second-order regard for logic, their use both of induction by example and by analogy and of deduction by syllogism is not surprising. Such methods, in both their dialectical and rhetorical uses, also go back to Aristotle, and are used, in the case of induction, generally to reason from particulars to universals and, in the case of deduction, from universals to particulars. Medieval theologians made use of the inductive methods on some controversial issues, none of which were in contention between the Reformers and their opponents, which is not to say that the Reformers’ own use of the methods was discontinuous with the preceding tradition. The Reformers, early and late, capitalized on their own education in example and analogy and drew on a number of different Biblical and other examples to provide a basis for their reasoning on a wide range of *loci*, both for their own positions and against their opponents’ positions. The Reformers, who describe guidelines for the use of example, significantly criticize their opponents regarding teachings, such as those regarding the Mass and the Invocation of the Saints, that lack Biblical examples. The Reformers especially make use of analogy as it relates to the “analogy of faith”, which is equated to Scripture and their own confessional writings, as normative standards to allow

some things and disallow others. (A similar concept used by the Reformers is “the example of the Church”.) Analogy is said to be especially useful for those less-initiated. The Reformers in some cases criticize their opponents’ use of analogy but not analogy itself, although analogy does have its limits for the Reformers: it cannot be used over and against the Word of God.

Deductive syllogisms were also used in service to but not over Scripture. Although not every point in *The Book of Concord* merited such an elaborate argument, at least one extended argument and accompanying proofs stretched up to a full section. Even where partial or full syllogisms were not present, the vocabulary used by the Reformers nevertheless reflected the philosophical milieu. Scripture was a critical component for the Reformers’ arguments, although in some cases premises were assumed or provided from general principles otherwise demonstrated or assumed. As with the Reformers’ use of inductive methods, their use of the deductive methods generally followed uses in the period of time that preceded them and did not hesitate to dissect their opponents’ arguments at a technical level. Both inductive and deductive methods were put in service of establishing and defending the truth of the chief *locus* of justification by faith, itself a “general principle”, and its related *loci*. And, again this supra-sentential use of philosophy is for both the theological teacher and the individual believer, especially for his or her comfort.

A pair of premises comes before a conclusion that logically follows, and, in a similar way for the Reformers, faith of necessity comes before (*prius*) good works. In both earlier and later works in *The Book of Concord*, faith or its variously used equivalents—such as forgiveness, reconciliation, justification, rebirth, receiving the Holy Spirit—for the Reformers must precede works or their variously used equivalents—such as keeping the law and love. The Reformers base their exposition of this logical sequence on Scripture. The existence of faith is essentially treated as a premise from which the conclusion of good works certainly follows, as an effect follows a cause. In this way, as also in others, faith and good works are inseparably joined, but what amounts to a formal distinction between justification and sanctification nevertheless allows the Reformers to

treat them separately (at different *loci*) in order to preserve the teaching of justification by faith in Christ. Thus, the authors of both the earlier and later works in *The Book of Concord*, for the sake of preserving the teaching of justification by faith alone, make a logical distinction between justification that comes by faith and the sanctification that produces good works. Although the charge is made that this logical distinction is a point of discontinuity with the medieval period, the distinction is supported in the preceding era in spirit if not in letter. In addition, even one of the most strident claimants of innovation grants that the distinction is only notional and that the Reformers do not actually separate justification from sanctification. The logical “formal” distinction between justification and sanctification is an extremely valuable illustration of the supra-sentential philosophy in *The Book of Concord* serving its theology, principally the chief *locus* of justification by faith alone.

## **Findings for questions**

With the evidence regarding the uses of logic and argumentation summarized, attention now turns to how those findings relate to the three specific research sub-questions: the repudiation of philosophy with its simultaneous use, continuity and discontinuity between the late-medieval period and the Reformation period, and continuity and discontinuity between the initial Reformers and the next generation.

### ***Repudiation but simultaneous use***

The first of those sub-questions is the repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy. The repudiation is seen in the second-order data regarding mentions of “philosophers”, “philosophy”, “philosophical”, “philosophize”, and “logic”. In the case of *The Book of Concord*’s references to the “philosophy” cognates, despite some neutral mentions, the Reformers’ regard was overwhelmingly negative, particularly at the *locus* of justification and those more-closely related to it. The Reformers were explicitly against any mingling of things philosophical with things theological, setting things philosophical opposite the Word of God and labeling opponents “philosophers” and grouping them with other opponents polemically termed. In the case of *The Book of*

*Concord*'s second-order mentions of "logic", those connected with the Reformers' opponents were negative, while those connected with the Reformers themselves were positive. The simultaneous use is seen in the first-order data regarding the τόποι or *loci* method of organization, inductive and deductive reasoning, and the logical distinction between justification and sanctification, fully in service of the chief *locus* of justification. The Reformers clearly make supra-sentential use of philosophy and allow that its methods can and even must be used up to a point.

Although the sub-question is answered that there is in *The Book of Concord* a repudiation but simultaneous use of philosophy, one is inclined to ask *why* there is a repudiation of philosophy if the Reformers nevertheless use its logic and argumentation. That question is harder to answer definitively, but some tentative answers may be proffered. First, some arguably polemical uses of the "philosopher" label were observed, and there seems to be a sense in which the Reformers are tapping into a history of denigrating an opponent by the use of such a term. Second, in at least some cases where the second-order repudiation is found even an objective reader must affirm the Reformers' criticism of their opponents' philosophical method or logical argument. Third and finally, the Reformers cast philosophy and its logic in ministerial roles, as handmaids to theology, so a repudiation from the Reformers is not surprising when their opponents' philosophizing and logic exceed that handmaid role and become the "devil's whore".

One wonders *why* the reformers would repudiate philosophy but nevertheless still use it. One could think that they initially desired more of a break with the preceding medieval philosophical tradition but later realized that they needed that philosophical tradition more than they originally thought. However, the consistency of the polemic against philosophy and the simultaneous use despite that polemic militates against such thinking. Rather, it seems that the Reformers were both tapping into a long-standing polemic of negatively regarding opposing teachers and at the same time accurately critiquing their opponents' bad logic and argumentation. The polemical labels—such as "sophist", which goes back to Socrates and Plato—can arguably be said to come

precisely where the Reformers' opponents use logic poorly and let the argumentation exceed its set limits.

A final point regarding the repudiation but simultaneous use centers on an “irony” of sorts—that it is both precisely in regards to the *locus* of justification where philosophy is most severely criticized and in regards to the *locus* of justification where philosophy's logic and argumentation are arguably put in the greatest service of theology. The *loci* method itself allows the Reformers to somewhat separate their teaching regarding justification by faith from their teaching regarding the sanctification (or good works) that necessarily follows justification. In keeping with that difference in definition but logical inseparability, the Reformers use what is essentially Scotus's formal distinction to further keep the faith that saves both separate from but united to the works that follow.

### ***Continuity between the medieval and Reformation eras***

The second sub-question is about the continuity and discontinuity between the medieval and Reformation eras. Chapter I outlined how the tension between theology and philosophy has more or less existed since the beginning, so the second-order data indicating a repudiation of philosophy and logic certainly has some precedent from Old Testament times forward. The handmaid metaphor served as lens for seeing how some theological philosophers (or philosophical theologians) drew up the job descriptions for philosophy as a handmaid and how others let her take over the house. In Chapters I and II, the Reformers' “continuous” repudiation of philosophy and logic were seen. The Reformers were certainly not the first to repudiate philosophy, and their simultaneous use indicates the extent to which that repudiation was to be taken. The Reformers knew logic's and argumentation's places, and they kept them there.

For the Reformers philosophy was serving theology as a handmaid in their various uses that were continuous with the preceding tradition. The τόποι or *loci* method can be traced through Aristotle, Cicero, Agricola, Erasmus, and the like, even as the Reformers related the method's uses to logic and rhetoric, focusing arguments and indexing and arranging the Bible's teaching as means to theological ends. (There certainly also is a sense in which Peter Lombard's *Sentences* and Thomas Aquinas's

*Summa* were topically-oriented theological works.) Similarly, the Reformers' induction by example and analogy goes back to Aristotle. Although contentious medieval issues connected to these methods of induction were not at issue in *The Book of Concord*, that fact does not make the methods' use discontinuous. The Reformers made use of these methods especially for less-initiated, and they followed Aristotle both in deriving and applying universal principles regarding both examples and analogies and in turning their opponents' arguments into their own. Likewise, the deductive syllogisms used in *The Book of Concord* originate in the philosophy of Aristotle and figure prominently in logic all through the time period leading up to the Reformation. While not every *locus* has fully-developed syllogisms, the technical terminology and vocabulary related to syllogistic reasoning is quite frequently present at the various *loci*, and that same terminology and vocabulary makes it clear that the Reformers are not just thinking deductively but they are also doing so after the manner of Aristotle and those who followed him. Finally, even if the Reformers' justification-sanctification distinction is an unique application of philosophy's logic and argumentation, the philosophical relationships and concepts (for example, the relationship of cause to effect and the concept of the formal distinction) are nevertheless continuous with some lines from the preceding medieval era.

While the sub-question is answered that there is continuity of the philosophical uses between the preceding medieval era and the Reformation era, the wording of the foregoing phrase, "with some lines from the preceding medieval era", makes clear one of the considerations regarding this finding. What constitutes continuity? How is continuity defined? If, for the sake of argument, the Reformers are a continuation of Ockham's line but Ockham innovated in his use of philosophy, are the Reformers still continuous? Augustine is frequently said to have heavily influenced Luther and the other Reformers, especially through Gregory of Rimini; what if the line with which the Reformers are continuous had to skip an intervening millennium or so, does it still constitute continuity? Significantly, where aspects of a philosophical tradition are rejected, that which is rejected might be seen as a later accretion. Under this view, the Lutherans' break with



that preceding tradition to return to an earlier one would be true reformation in the sense of a return “to a primitive excellence”.<sup>1</sup> Another consideration regarding this finding is that the at least the first generation of Reformers were for the most part products of the late-medieval tradition, even though Luther at least came in some contact with humanism. The Reformers may have at one time intended a cleaner break with their own past, but as they realized the benefits of philosophy’s methods they may have found themselves keeping more of it than they had intended. Wittenberg’s University’s temporary abandonment of degree disputations could be a case in point, but the consistency with which philosophy’s methods are repudiated but nevertheless used militates against such an explanation.

### ***Continuity within the Reformation era***

The third sub-question is about the continuity and discontinuity within the Reformation era, between the earlier and later Reformers. No significant differences were found in their second-order regards for philosophy, and there was also no essential difference in their second-order regards for logic, even though the earlier Reformers’ references were all negative about their opponents’ and the later Reformers’ references were all positive about their own uses. In the case of organization by the *τόποι* or *loci* method, all of the documents in *The Book of Concord* are so organized, both those of the earlier authors and those of the later authors. In the case of the inductive methods of analogy and example, even if the uses of these methods are found somewhat less frequently in writings other than the Apology (*The Book of Concord*’s longest single work), the early and late uses are nevertheless consistently made and made both for the Reformers’ positions and against their opponents’ positions. Likewise both earlier and later authors envision that the analogy of faith plays an important normative role, such as determining what philosophical sub-sentential terminology is to be used in service to theology. In the case of the deductive method, Melancthon the logic teacher again in the Apology makes the most use of the method, but syllogisms are also found in the

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<sup>1</sup> See above at n.105, p.37.

confessional writings by Luther (albeit in a “simpler” syllogistic form) and in the confessional writing of their students. Furthermore, even where syllogistic forms are lacking but terminology or related vocabulary are present, deductive reasoning is in view, especially also where a later confessional article has taken over arguments from an earlier one. In the case of the justification-sanctification, the distinction is made in the earlier and later works, although the logical nature of the distinction is certainly more explicit in the later work, even as Chemnitz comes the closest of those considered to actually making the distinction’s connection to Scotus’s formal distinction.

The sub-question is answered that there is continuity of the philosophical uses within the Reformation era, but the findings again merit two further considerations. First, as with the earlier Reformers being products of the late-medieval tradition, so the later reformer were products of the Reformation tradition. The Formula’s principal author, Chemnitz, studied at Wittenberg and had a close association with Melanchthon, and even Andreä, who did not himself study at Wittenberg, came under the school’s influence via Brenz. The second consideration is more complex. At the time of the controversies that precipitated the Formula of Concord, there were various parties and factions, each at least to some extent claiming to be the correct interpreters of the Augsburg Confession. Perhaps from a socio-political point of view, Senator Marcy W. Learned’s 1832 statement regarding patronage is true in this case: “to the victor belong the spoils”.<sup>2</sup> By this thinking, if a different one of the factions had triumphed in the conflict, the degree to which the uses of philosophy would be continuous within the Reformation era would likely be different, especially as philosophical terminology and logic were more involved in some of the controversies. The Reformers, however, might have argued against this socio-political view that the triumph in the conflict was itself determined by the truth of the various claims and that the level of philosophical involvement in those claims was a determining factor (in other words, that God’s providence saw to it that the spoils went to the victorious theological truths with the duly deferential philosophical handmaid).

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<sup>2</sup> Respectfully Quoted: A Dictionary of Quotations Requested from the Congressional Research Service, 1989, Library of Congress, Available: <http://www.bartleby.com/73/1314.html>, March 7, 2007.

## Implications of this research

*Was ist das?* (“What does this mean?”) is a classic catechetical question, and it is to the implications or meaning of this research that this next section of this chapter now turns. For example, shortly after the 2004 presidential election, Pulitzer Prize winner Maureen Dowd criticized George W. Bush’s presidency for “replacing science with religion” and said “We’re entering another dark age”.<sup>3</sup> One take on Dowd’s statement was that she was afraid “religious superstition and religious bigotry will replace science and reason.”<sup>4</sup> Regardless of the statement’s accuracy or the accuracy of its interpretation, Dowd’s dire prediction highlights contemporary tension between religion and reason. Such tension between religion and reason is often associated with the last “dark ages”, and Martin Luther and his reform are generally characterized in the manner of Dowd’s prediction. For example, the character Lazarus in John Calvin Batchelor’s 1983 novel *The Birth of the People’s Republic of Antarctica* tells the protagonist, “You Lutherans...turn your face from the Age of Reason that you helped birth.”<sup>5</sup> Lazarus mischaracterizes Luther’s position on reason; the simultaneous continuous use of philosophy militates against such perceptions and portrayals, which has significance for those who see religion in modern society as antithetical to reason. How one understands that tension between religion and reason to have been resolved in the 16<sup>th</sup> century bears on how we might see resolution of that tension take place in our time. Illuminating that process is the first of the implications of this research.

Other implications of this research are less universal in their application. A second implication has to do with work being done between different religious traditions and denominations. Since *The Book of Concord* continues to serve as a confessional standard for many Lutherans worldwide, the elucidation of philosophy’s role in past religious differences might aid in discovering present common ground obscured by

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<sup>3</sup> Maureen Dowd, “Rove’s Revenge,” New York Times November 7, 2004.

<sup>4</sup> Joe Scarborough, 2005 (April 9), MSNBC.com, Available: <http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6330851>, April 16, 2005.

<sup>5</sup> John Calvin Batchelor, The Birth of the Kingdom of Antarctica (New York: The Dial Press, 1983), 290.

centuries of misunderstanding. Third, those who care about the internal claim of *The Book of Concord* that it maintained continuity and did not make anything new “in content or in formulation” can know that philosophically speaking that claim is demonstrated to be true. And fourth and finally, while the need for philosophical knowledge in theological instruction may seem obvious, seminarians experience it piecemeal, if at all; a systematic and coherent working through of philosophy’s sub-sentential, sentential, and supra-sentential uses that pertain to theology’s *loci* would be ideal. For this last implication to fully bear fruit, more research is needed, however.

## Reflections for future questions

Beyond the obvious need to consider the preliminary hypothesis in light of the sentential and sub-sentential uses of philosophy in *The Book of Concord* and the precedents of those uses,<sup>6</sup> the dissertation’s findings led to several reflections that might have bearing on future research. First, if one were to consider *The Book of Concord*’s use of justification by faith alone as a general principle and then develop a system of theology as one might develop a system of mathematics, with self-evident axioms and deducible theorems both contributing to proofs, one might wonder into which category justification by faith alone should be placed: axiom or theorem. At times the authors of the works contained in *The Book of Concord* treat justification by faith alone as a self-evident axiom, perhaps because for them as believers in Christ its truth is at least to some extent subjectively self-evident. Yet, in other places, most especially Apology IV:75-121, the confessors try to objectively demonstrate the truth of justification by faith alone, which would suggest its categorization as a theorem. One wonders, if justification by faith alone is demonstrable, whether it remains something received by faith. An answer may lie in the subjective appropriation of what is objectively true, or an answer may rest in the fact that the demonstration relies on Scripture, which itself is accepted on the basis of faith (faith itself at least logically preceding the acceptance of Scripture).

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<sup>6</sup> For examples, the *locus* of the two natures personally united in Christ includes sub-sentential philosophical terminology and concepts, and *loci* such as original sin, free will, and predestination include sentential philosophical content.

Second, the appearance that, when it comes to justification by faith alone, that the Reformers are arguing in a circle, with their agenda becoming an axiom that leads them to that very conclusion, seems to warrant still-closer scrutiny. Not every proposed structure of Apology IV's argument is the same, nor need they be, but a critical consideration of the argument over the whole article might demonstrate or disprove the suspicion of circularity. Somewhat similarly, the "example of the Church", the "analogy of faith" and the "analogy of the Word of God" are universal principles arrived at inductively from particulars, but they are also "deductively" applied as principles that norm how examples and analogies are to be used and understood. Finding the beginning of that cycle is a bit like asking, "Which came first: the chicken or the egg?" (with every intention of alluding to the Greek philosopher Plutarch who is said to have introduced that proverbial dilemma). If locating the beginning of the process is shrouded in mystery, that mystery may be where the Reformers would suggest the Holy Spirit enters the process. The Spirit works through the Word and ultimately is the One Who guides Jesus's followers into all truth. The Spirit works through means and keeps alive in the Church the correct understanding of both the particular examples and the universal principles. (*Sola scriptura* is not a campaign slogan for the Reformers that produces a Biblical or Biblicist fundamentalism.)

Third, returning for a moment to the questions about the distinction between justification and sanctification. Would the Reformers or their followers today be able to construct a proof to support the distinction that would meet the *klar genug* ("clear enough") standard of proof of which the Reformers themselves make use? Would the Reformers be done in by their own expectations? That the Reformers make a case, if not a structured proof, to support their distinction is clear, as are its Scriptural base and logical result, especially given their goal of protecting justification by faith alone. That their case may not be convincing to everyone is also clear. That the nature of justification as distinct from sanctification continued to be a source of controversy in the time

immediately following the Reformation and continues to be a source of controversy in modern times<sup>7</sup> suggests there may be a higher standard of proof.

Finally, there is the somewhat-classic question about the authors' intent, which question also takes up considerations of awareness and consciousness. For example, is it possible that the Reformers were just arguing syllogistically without necessarily being "philosophical" about it? One must almost deny the possibility, for, in using philosophical terminology such as "major" and "minor" to refer to the two premises that must lead to the resulting conclusion, they seem to be both aware of and consciously intending to use the Aristotelian method. Another example is the formal distinction of Duns Scotus. This dissertation has concluded that the evidence suggests the Reformers, despite their never specifically using the term in the context, are using the subtle doctor's device to both separate and keep together justification and sanctification. They may have been doing so subconsciously, but they may also have been so polemicized against Scotus and his formal distinction (or have been so aware of others' opposition to it) that they could not bring themselves to use the term. Given the evidence considered herein, one hardly can come to a firm conclusion, and that there is evidence out there that would support a firm conclusion is hard to imagine.

## Conclusion

In short, *The Book of Concord* repudiates philosophy and logic but nevertheless simultaneously makes supra-sentential use of them in the forms of the τόποι or *loci* method of organization and inductive and deductive reasoning. A significant example of *The Book of Concord*'s use of philosophy is the logical "formal distinction" made between justification and sanctification, which is demonstrably in keeping with the handmaid role that *The Book of Concord*'s authors give philosophy in service to theology. Although the authors hold that fallen human reason cannot properly use philosophy and its logic, they allow that logic enlightened by Scripture and baptized reason can and even must be used, up to a point. Returning to the illustrations that began

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<sup>7</sup> Parties on both sides of the 1999 Joint Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification readily admitted it was an agreement in name only.

this dissertation, the Reformers might themselves say Athens has much to do with Jerusalem, Wittenberg, and all points beyond. The Academy and the Church can have harmony, as long as a philosophical blend of Christianity is avoided by philosophy serving theology as her handmaid.

## **Appendix: *The Book of Concord* by Structure and Content**

### **Augsburg Confession**

(Articles of Faith and Doctrine)

- I. God
- II. Original Sin
- III. The Son of God
- IV. Justification
  
- V. The Office of the Ministry
- VI. The New Obedience
- VII. The Church
- VIII. What the Church Is
- IX. Baptism
- X. The Holy Supper of Our Lord
- XI. Confession
- XII. Repentance
- XIII. The Use of the Sacraments
- XIV. Order in the Church
- XV. Church Usages
- XVI. Civil Government
- XVII. The Return of Christ to Judgment
- XVIII. Freedom of the Will
- XIX. The Cause of Sin
- XX. Faith and Good Works
- XXI. The Cult of the Saints
- (Articles about Matters in Dispute)
- XXII. Both Kinds in the Sacrament
- XXIII. The Marriage of Priests
- XXIV. The Mass
- XXV. Confession
- XXVI. The Distinction of Foods
- XXVII. Monastic Vows
- XXVIII. The Power of Bishops

### **The Apology to the A.C.**

- I. God
- II. Original Sin
- III. Christ
- IV. Justification
  - What Is Justifying Faith?
  - Faith In Christ Justifies
  - We Obtain the Forgiveness of Sins only by Faith in Christ
  - Love and the Keeping of the Law
  - Reply to the Opponents' Arguments
  
- VII/VIII The Church
  
- IX. Baptism
- X. The Holy Supper
- XI. Confession
- XII. Penitence
- XIII. The Number and Use of the Sacraments
- XIV. Ecclesiastical Order
- XV. Human Traditions in the Church
- XVI. Political Order
- XVII. Christ's Return to Judgment
- XVIII. Free Will
- XIX. The Cause of Sin
- XX. Good Works
- XXI. The Invocation of the Saints
  
- XXII. The Lord's Supper Under Both Kinds
- XXIII. The Marriage of Priests
- XXIV. The Mass
  
- XXVII. Monastic Vows
- XXVIII. Ecclesiastical Power



## The Smalcald Articles

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Part I: Sublime Articles of the Divine Majesty

Part II: Office and Work of Jesus Christ

I. Christ and Faith

II. The Mass

The Invocation of the Saints

III. Chapters and Monasteries

IV. The Papacy

Part III: Matters we may discuss with learned and sensible men, or even among ourselves

I. Sin

II. The Law

III. Repentance

The False Repentance of the Papists

IV. The Gospel

V. Baptism

VI. The Sacrament of the Altar

VII. The Keys

VIII. Confession

IX. Excommunication

X. Ordination and Vocation

XI. The Marriage of Priests

XII. The Church

XIII. How Man is Justified Before God, and His Good Works

XIV. Monastic Vows

XV. Human Traditions

## The Treatise on the Power and Primacy of the Pope

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Testimony of the Scriptures

Testimony from History

Arguments of Opponents Refuted

The Marks of the Antichrist

The Power and Jurisdiction of Bishops

## The Small Catechism

### The Ten Commandments

The First

The Second

The Third

The Fourth

The Fifth

The Sixth

The Seventh

The Eighth

The Ninth

The Tenth

Conclusion

### The Creed

The First Article: Creation

The Second Article: Redemption

The Third Article: Sanctification

### The Lord's Prayer

Introduction

The First Petition

The Second Petition

The Third Petition

The Fourth Petition

The Fifth Petition

The Sixth Petition

The Seventh Petition

Conclusion

### The Sacrament of Holy Baptism

First

Second

Third

Fourth

### Confession and Absolution

### The Sacrament of the Altar

### Morning and Evening Prayers

Grace at Table

Table of Duties

## The Large Catechism

### First Part: The Ten Commandments

The First Commandment

Explanation of the  
Appendix

The Second Commandment

The Third Commandment

The Fourth Commandment

The Fifth Commandment

The Sixth Commandment

The Seventh Commandment

The Eighth Commandment

The Ninth and Tenth  
Commandments

Conclusion of the Ten  
Commandments

### Second Part: The Creed

The First Article

The Second Article

The Third Article

### Third Part: The Lord's Prayer

Introduction

The First Petition

The Second Petition

The Third Petition

The Fourth Petition

The Fifth Petition

The Sixth Petition

The Last Petition

### Fourth Part: Baptism

Infant Baptism

### Fifth Part: The Sacrament of the Altar

A Brief Exhortation to Confession

### Morning and Evening Prayers

Grace at Table

Table of Duties

## The Formula of Concord

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### Part I: Epitome

“Rule & Norm”

I. Original Sin

II. Free Will

III. The Righteousness of Faith before God

IV. Good Works

V. Law and Gospel

VI. The Third Function of the Law

VII. The Holy Supper of Christ

VIII. The Person of Christ

IX. Christ’s Descent into Hell

X. Church Usages, Called Adiaphora ...

XI. God’s Eternal Foreknowledge ...

XII. Other Factions and Sects ...

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### Part II: Solid Declaration

“Rule & Norm”

I. Original Sin

II. Free Will or Human Powers

III. The Righteousness of Faith before God

IV. Good Works

V. Law and Gospel

VI. The Third Function of the Law

VII. The Holy Supper

The Chief Issue ...

VIII. The Person of Christ

IX. Christ’s Descent into Hell

X. The Ecclesiastical Rites ...

XI. Eternal Foreknowledge ...

XII. Other Factions and Sects ...

... Anabaptists

... Schwenkfelders

... New Arians

... New Anti-Trinitarians

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## Vita

Jayson Scott Galler was born in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, on May 5, 1966. He is the son of Dr. Wayne Henry Galler and Caryl Ruth Galler (nee Schwoch). After graduating in 1984 from Richwoods High School in Peoria, Illinois, he entered Illinois State University in Normal, Illinois, as a Foundation-Alumni Distinguished Scholar. He was recognized there as a Robert G. Bone Scholar and a Board of Regents Scholar before graduating *summa cum laude* in 1988. He served for seven years as a newscast line producer for television stations in Peoria, Illinois; Hartford, Connecticut; Denver, Colorado; and Ft. Wayne, Indiana. His newscasts won awards from both the Associated Press and United Press International. In 1994 he began his master's work at Concordia Theological Seminary in Ft. Wayne, Indiana. In 1995 he transferred to Concordia Lutheran Theological Seminary, which is both on the campus of and affiliated with Brock University in St. Catharines, Ontario. During the 1996-1997 academic year he served his vicarage in Waterloo, Ontario, and in his final year he was recognized with The President and Mrs. Kraemer Honour Endowment. He graduated in 1998 and thereafter was ordained as a pastor in the Lutheran Church. In 2001 he began language studies at the University of Texas at Austin, and in 2002 he formally began his work there on his ad-hoc interdisciplinary Ph.D. based in Germanic Studies but also including philosophy and history. The first year of that work he was awarded a Research Intern Fellowship in Germanic Studies, and he was a teaching assistant in Civil, Architectural, and Environmental Engineering for the following seven semesters. In 2004-2005 he was that department's teaching assistant nominee to be the William S. Livingston Outstanding Graduate Student Employee. Among his publications is one from 2003 with Susanne Hafner, "Martin Luther, 'The Third Sermon, On Easter Day'", and he had previously (2001-2002) published an article titled, "Matthew 12:30; Mark 9:40; Luke 9:50; 11:23: 'With and For' or 'Against'?"

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This dissertation was typed by the author.