


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Introduction to Computer Security


Access Control and Authorization

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
Resource access recapitulated





Access control overview

- Given a subject, which objects can it access and how?
- Given an object, which subjects can access it and how?





Main concepts of access control

- **Subject** is an entity that initiates an access request.
- **Object** is an entity an access to which is requested.
- **Rights** represent different types of access.
- **Reference monitor** makes authorization decisions.
- **Goals of access control:**
 - Granting access
 - Limiting access
 - Preventing access
 - Revoking access



Subjects

- Subjects are any **active** entities in a system.
- Subjects operate on behalf of **principals**.
- Each subject must be bound to a unique principal; a principal may be bound to several subjects.
- Examples:
 - Principal: user ID.
 - Subject: process ID.



Objects

- Objects represent **passive** resources of a system: memory, files, directories, nodes on a network, etc.
- The distinction of objects and subjects is made purely in terms of access requests.
- Depending on circumstances, a resource may be an object or a subject.



Reference monitor and access policies

- **Reference monitor** is an abstract notion of a mechanism for controlling access requests.
- **Access rights** represent various access operations supported by a system:
 - read
 - write
 - append
 - execute
 - delete
 - search
 - change owner
 - change permissions
- **Access policies** map principals, objects and access rights.



Access control structures

- **Access control structures** are mechanisms for implementing access policies:
 - access control matrix
 - capabilities
 - access control lists
 - intermediate controls (groups, negative permissions, roles, protection rings etc.)
- Requirements for access control structures:
 - an ability to express control policies
 - verifiability of correctness.
 - scalability and manageability



Access control matrix

Access control matrix is a basic control structure.

	bill.doc	edit.exe	fun.com
Alice	–	{execute}	{execute,read}
Bob	{read}	{execute}	{execute,read,write}

Advantages:

- clarity of definition
- easy to verify

Disadvantages:

- poor scalability
- poor handling of changes



Capability is a **subject-centered** description of access rights:

Alice: {edit.exe: execute}, {fun.com: execute, read}

Bob: {bill.doc: read, write}, {edit.exe: execute}, {fun.com: execute, read, write}

Advantages:

- easy ownership transfer
- easy inheritance of access rights

Disadvantages:

- poor overview of access rights per object
- difficulty of revocation
- need for extra integrity protection



Access control lists (ACL)

ACL is an **object-centered** description of access rights:

bill.doc: {Bob: read, write}

exit.exe: {Alice: execute}, {Bob: execute}

fun.com: {Alice: execute, read}, {Bob: execute, read, write}

Advantages:

- easy access to object access rights
- relative easiness of management using abstractions

Disadvantages:

- poor overview of access rights per subject
- difficulty of revocation
- difficulty of sharing



Access control abstractions

- **Group:** an collection of related subjects
 - easy sharing
 - easy addition and removal of users
- **Negative permission:** explicit revocation of access rights
- **Privilege:** a mapping of users to access rights
 - concise definition of access rights
 - {admin: read,write,execute}, /etc/passwd: {Alice, admin}
- **Protection ring:** a hierarchy of access right levels
 - 0 – operating system kernel
 - 1 – operating system
 - 2 – services
 - 3 – user processes



Discretionary access control (DAC)

- Access control is carried out by a **resource owner**.
- By associating ownership with principals, access rights are easily transferred to other subjects.
- Deployed in a majority of common systems.

Advantages:

- simple and efficient access rights management
- scalability

Disadvantages:

- intentional abuse of access rights
- unintentional abuse of access rights
- no control over information flow



Mandatory access control (MAC)

- Centralized access control by means of **system-wide policy**.
- Access control rights are fixed by an administrators.
- A limited number of implementations, e.g. SELinux, Systrace.

Advantages:

- strict control over information flow
- strong exploit containment

Disadvantages:

- major usability problems
- cumbersome administration



Role based access control (RBAC)

RBAC attempt to handle the complexity of access control by extensive used of abstractions:


- **Data types** are defined for all objects.
- **Procedures** are high level access control methods with a more complex semantics than elementary access control rights. Procedures can be only applied to certain data types.
- Procedures are grouped into **roles** assigned to users. A user can have more than one role and more than one user can have the same role.
- Role **hierarchies** can be used to match natural relations between roles.

Example: A *Lecturer* can create a role *Student* and give it a privilege “read course material”.



Reference monitors

A **reference monitor** is an abstract device that mediates all accesses of objects to subjects.




Core requirements for a reference monitor implementation:

- Tamper-resistance
- Complete mediation (guaranteed invocation)
- Easiness of verification and testing



Reference monitor design choices





Reference monitor placement

- **Hardware:**
 - low-level objects, no “layer below”, full system integrity
- **Operating system kernel:**
 - abstract low-level objects, hard to subvert, encapsulation
- **Operating system:**
 - conventional objects, *not* tamper-proof, most common
- **Services:** databases, JVM, .NET, CORBA
 - high-level abstract objects, very common
- **Applications:**
 - application-specific objects and access rights




Reference monitors in Intel 80x86

- Status register contains a 2-bit field corresponding to four **protection rings** (privilege levels):
 - 0 – operating system kernel
 - 1 – rest of operating system
 - 2 – I/O drivers etc.
 - 3 – application software (user processes)
- Processes can only access resources in their own rings.
- Access to OS objects is controlled by object descriptors stored in **descriptor tables**.



Access control in Intel 80x86

- Descriptor table is accessed by processes via **selectors**.
- A selector contains an index of an object's descriptor (in a descriptor table) and a **Requested Privilege Level (RPL)** field.
- A selector of a current process is stored in the code segment (CS) register. Its RPL is then compared with the privilege level in the descriptor (DPL) for access decisions.






Controlled invocation in Intel 80x86

- How can a program access OS resources?



Controlled invocation in Intel 80x86

- How can a program access OS resources?
- A **gate** is an object having a ring 3 privilege level which is able to call objects with higher privilege levels.
- Gates enable execution but prevent unauthorized manipulation of OS objects.





Summary

- Access control methods implement policies that control which subjects can access which objects in which way.
- Most common practical access control instruments are ACLs, capabilities and their abstractions.
- From the design point of view, access control systems can be classified into discretionary (DAC), mandatory (MAC) and role-based (RBAC).
- Reference monitors are instruments for realization of access control policies. They can be deployed at all levels of system hierarchy.